Publications
"Dynamic Government Performance
" with David P. Myatt
(Forthcoming, 2012, American Political Science Review )
Abstract. We model the interplay
between a government's performance, its expected lifetime, and the
confidence it enjoys. Here, ``confidence'' can be broadly
interpreted as the government's popularity, the size of its
parliamentary majority, its reserve of talent, or other factors.
Confidence evolves in response to performance, and if it
evaporates then the government falls. We analyze how confidence
influences ministers' behavior. A minister's tenure is
determined by the performance of both himself and others. He
chooses higher performance when the government is expected to
last, which is so when others perform well. Multiple equilibria
arise: in an optimistic equilibrium, high performance sustains a
government indefinitely; in a pessimistic equilibrium, the
government's expected demise is a self-fulfilling prophecy. When
confidence evolves stochastically, however, there is a unique
equilibrium in which a crisis of confidence begins if and only if
negative shocks shift confidence below a critical threshold.
"The Rhetorical Strategies of Leaders: Speaking Clearly, Standing Back, and Stepping Down" with David P. Myatt
(Forthcoming, 2012, Journal of Theoretical Politics), Awarded Best Paper in Political Economy presented at the 2009 meetings of the American Political Science Association
Abstract. Followers wish to coordinate their actions in an uncertain environment.
A follower would like his action to be close to some ideal (but unknown) target; to
reflect his own idiosyncratic preferences; and to be close to the actions of others.
He learns about his world by listening to leaders. Followers fail to internalize the
full benefits of coordination and so place insufficient emphasis on the focal views
of relatively clear leaders. A leader sometimes stands back, by restricting what she
says, and so creates space for others to be heard; in particular, a benevolent leader
with outstanding judgement gives way to a clearer communicator in an attempt to
encourage unity amongst her followers. Sometimes a leader receives no attention
from followers, and sometimes she steps down (says nothing); hence a leadership
elite emerges from the endogenous choices of leaders and followers
"Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminister Democracies" with Arthur Spirling
(2011. American Political Science Review, 105:2)
Abstract. Cohesive government-vs-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish parliament we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood and use roll call records show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension. Using a simple variant of the agenda-setting model---in which MPs can commit to their voting strategies---we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in Westminster systems can explain this phenomenon: in the equilibrium, on some bills, members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal that is made. Such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes. We introduce new data from the House of Lords, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Irish Assembly to distinguish our claims from competing accounts of the data.
"The Three A's of Government Formation: Appointment, Allocation,and Assignment
" with Rafael Hortala-Vallve (2011. American Journal of Political Science ,55:3)
Abstract. How does the Prime Minister organize her government so that she can
implement her policy agenda? In our model, policy specific expertise is acquired by
ministers who head government departments. A popularly elected Prime Minister
appoints individuals to her cabinet, allocates their portfolios, and assigns their policy
tasks - that is, she decides the relevant jurisdiction of departments. Ministers
strategically communicate their information to the Prime Minister, and a policy is
implemented. Utilizing the instruments available to her, the Prime Minister implements
her agenda even when she is constrained to appoint ministers with policy
preferences far from her own. In a large government, the ability to allocate portfolios
suffices for the Prime Minister to implement her agenda. Moreover, delegating
policy implementation to ministers implies no loss of a Prime Ministerial infl
uence.
There are normative implications: an open leadership contest for the position of
Prime Minister produces policies that are Pareto efficient; moreover, when a Condorcet
winner policy exists it is implemented with certainty. We provide comparative
statics on the inter-relationship between cabinet personnel and the assignment of
policy tasks, and provide insight into the diversity of cabinet appointments.
" The Political Consequences of Franchise Extension: Evidence from the Second Reform Act"
with Samuel Berlinski (2011. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6:3-4)
Abstract:We use evidence from the Second Reform Act, introduced in the United Kingdom in 1867, to analyze
the impact of changes in rules concerning eligibility to vote on electoral outcomes.
By exploiting the constituency level variation in the effect of the
change in the franchise, we separate the effect of the reform from that of underlying constituency level demographics correlated
with the voting population. We analyze three measures of Liberal strength- the proportion of constituency level seats contested by the Liberals, and the proportion of constituency level seats won by the Liberals, and the Liberal share of the constituency vote.
Controlling for a trend in Liberal support, we find no evidence that
relates Liberal strength in 1868 to changes in the franchise rules.
Our null findings continue to hold when we instrument-using the size of the voting population in 1832-
to account for the effects of measurement error and possible endogeneity. We do find that franchise
extension is causally related to an increase in the number of uncontested seats. However some of our estimates suggest that
this was due to greater contestation by Conservative party candidates.
"Political Economy Models of Elections" with Kenneth A. Shepsle (2011. Annual Review of Political Science )
"The Declining Talent Pool of Government" with David P.Myatt
(2010. American Journal of Political Science,54:2), awarded best article published in the AJPS in 2010
Abstract: We consider a government for which success requires high performance by talented ministers.
A leader provides incentives to her ministers by firing those who fail.
However, the consequent turnover drains a finite talent pool of potential
appointees. The severity of the optimal firing rule and ministerial
performances decline over time: the lifetime of an effective government is
limited. We relate this lifetime to various factors including external shocks;
the replenishment of the talent pool; and the leader's reputation. Some
results are surprising: an increase in the stability of government and the
exogenous imposition of stricter performance standards can both shorten the
era of effective government, and an increase in the replenishment of the
talent pool can reduce incumbent ministers' performance.
"Individual and Collective Ministerial Performance and the Tenure of British Ministers 1945-1997"
with Samuel Berlinski and Keith Dowding (2010. Journal of Politics, 72;2)
Abstract: We study the effects of individual and
collective ministerial performance on the length of time a minister
serves in British government from 1945-97, using the number of
resignation calls for a minister as an individual performance
indicator and the cumulative number of such calls as an indicator of
government performance. Our analysis lends support to a `two-strike
rule': ministers facing a second call for their resignation have a
significantly higher hazard than those facing their first,
irrespective of the performance of the government. A minister's
hazard rate is decreasing in the cumulative number of resignation
calls; but conditional on receiving a first resignation call, the
hazard rate increases with the number of calls that all government
ministers have faced in the past. Our message is that collective
ministerial performance is a key determinant of whether a minister
survives his first resignation call.
"Qualities of Leadership: Communication, Direction and Obfuscation" with David P. Myatt
(2008. American Political Science Review,102:3)
Abstract:Party activists wish to (i) advocate the
best policy and yet (ii) unify behind a common party line. An
activist's understanding of his environment is based on the
speeches of party leaders. A leader's influence, measured by the
weight placed on her speech, increases with her judgement on
policy (sense of direction) and her ability to convey
ideas (clarity of communication). A leader with perfect
clarity of communication enjoys greater influence than one with a
perfect sense of direction. Activists can choose how much
attention to pay to leaders. A necessary condition for a leader
to monopolize the agenda is that she is the most coherent
communicator. Sometimes leaders attract more attention by
obfuscating their messages. A concern for party unity mitigates
this incentive; when activists emphasize following the party line,
they learn more about their environment.
"Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy,Part I" with Kenneth A. Shepsle,
(2008. British Journal of Political Science 1, volume 38,1)
"Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy,Part II" with Kenneth A. Shepsle,
(2008. British Journal of Political Science 1, volume 38,2)
"Leading the Party: Coordination, Direction and Communication"
with David P. Myatt
(2007. American Political Science Review, 101:4)
Abstract: Party activists face a coordination problem: a critical mass (a barrier to coordination) must
advocate a single policy alternative if the party is to succeed.
The need for direction is the degree to which the merits of
the alternatives respond to the underlying mood of the party. An
individual's ability to assess the mood is his sense of
direction. These factors combine to form an index of both the
desirability and the feasibility of leadership: we call this index
Michels' Ratio. A sovereign party conference gives way to
leadership by an individual or oligarchy if and only if Michels'
Ratio is sufficiently high. Leadership enhances the clarity of
intra-party communication, but lessens the response of policy
choices to the party's mood.
"Scandal, Protection and Recovery in the Cabinet" with David P. Myatt
(2007. American Political Science Review,101:1)
Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes discourage activism: it enhances the value of a minister's career and hence encourages him to "sit tight" by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to "live for today" by pursuing controversial policies. The prime minister's ability to protect ministers is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet; the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role.
"The Length of Ministerial Tenure in the UK 1945-1997" with Samuel Berlinski and Keith Dowding
(2007. British Journal of Political Science,37:2)
Abstract: We analyse the determinants of ministerial hazard rates in the UK from 1945-1997. We focus on three sets of attributes i) personal characteristics of the minister; ii) political characteristics of the minister and iii) characteristics pertaining to the government in which the minister serves. We find that educational background increases ministers' capacity to survive, that female ministers have lower hazard rates and older ministers have higher hazard rates. Experienced ministers have higher hazard than newly appointed ministers. Ministerial rank increases a ministers' capacity to survive, with full cabinet members having the lowest hazard rates in our sample. We use different strategies to controls for the characteristics of the government the ministers serves in. Our results are robust to any of these controls.
"Why States Don't Defect: Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden Sharing" with Eiko Thieleman
(2006. West European Politics,29:2)
Abstract:Why do states accept what appears to be disproportionate and inequitable burdens in the provision of international collective goods? Traditional burdens-sharing models based on the 'economic theory of alliances' literature emphasise free-riding opportunities of small countries at the expense of larger ones. An alternative 'trade based' model suggests that countries are expected to specialise according to their comparative advantage as to the type and level of contribution they make to international collective goods. We apply this model to forced migration and suggest that countries can contribute to refugee protection in two principal ways: proactively, through peace-keeping/making and reactively, by providing protection for displaced persons. While the existing literature on peace-keeping provides evidence for the 'exploitation of the big by the small', our analysis of UNHCR data on 15 OECD countries for the period 1994-2002 balances this view by showing that reactive burdens are disproportionately borne by smaller states. We also show that existing refugee burden-sharing initiatives, largely aim at equalising particular dimensions of states' contributions to refugee protection, without taking account of the broader picture. By doing so, they might curtail opportunities for specialisation and risk consolidating a sub-optimal provision of international refugee protection.
"The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations" with Keith Dowding
(2005. American Journal of Political Science,49:1)
Abstract:Using data from the UK we estimate the effects of ministerial resignations on
government popularity. We test a counterfactual argument that resignations
should have a `corrective effect', an increase in popularity, when taking
into account the effect on popularity of the resignation issue. We get
empirical estimates by using the age of ministers involved in resignation
issues as an instrument. Our IV estimates provide empirical support for the
corrective effect.
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Working Papers
" Policy Learning and Elections "
with Rafael Hortala-Vallve
Abstract: We compare performance of politicians under appointment and election in a situation where learning by trial and error can yield better policy outcomes.
We model an incumbent who chooses between a ``safe'' option with a known payoff and a ``risky'' policy that yields higher or lower payoffs depending
on the policymaker's type. We consider two types of elections: in noncompetitive elections voters learn about the incumbent's type and compare expected payoffs from retention against dismissal and replacement by another representative agent; in competitive elections, an opponent campaigns on a ``safe'' or ``risky'' platform, voters evaluate the type of both incumbent and challenger, and choose between the two alternatives. Politicians prefer holding office but otherwise politicians and voters are symmetric with respect to policy preferences and information. An appointed agent will engage in ``risky'' policies even when expected first period returns are relatively low. Relative to this efficient benchmark, elected politicians either under invest in the risky option due to a ``fear of failure'' or over invest by ``gambling on success''. Despite this, competitive elections can induce efficiency gains. Moreover, when voters use their votes to simultaneously select high performers and provide incentives, competitive elections are unambiguously superior to appointment. We test our hypothesis in a laboratory experiment that yields support for our findings.
" Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive "
with Andrea Galeotti, Christian Ghiglino and Francesco Squintani
Abstract: We study a model where a parliamentary majority strategically aggregates information, after collectively assigning decision-making authority over policies.
Communication takes two forms: private conversations, or public meetings. The former is typical of `ministerial government', whereas the latter arises in `cabinet governments'.
We first suppose that politicians' private information is relevant for all policies (the `common-state' case). Then full authority centralization is optimal.
We show that public meetings Pareto dominate private conversations and so a multi-member cabinet may be superior to a single person executive. However the ``executive leader''
should be assigned a large share of decisions --- at least 80 \% in our numerical simulations. The optimal leader should be ideologically moderate and have the ability to elicit
information from ideologically close party allies. We consider whether these results are robust when politicians have localized policy expertise: on each policy a single politician
is informed. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal executive structure is no less centralized than in the common-state case: all policy decisions are assigned to the most moderate
politician, unless the policy expert has `intermediate' ideology. Our results provide fresh impetus to the study of cabinet governments and centralized authority in parliamentary democracies.
A detailed description of the implications of our study for Victorian England is presented.
" Selection, Performance and Government Longevity "
with David P. Myatt
Abstract: Potential executive appointees choose whether to take up a ministerial appointment.
They vary according to their talent which is (positively) correlated with expected performance and their payoff upon accepting office or remaining outside.
In a deterministic world, where outside talent corresponds perfectly with competence at performing ministerial tasks, then multiple equilibria
arise: in a ``good'' equilibrium, high performance is sustained by competent ministers, talented ministers are willing to join the cabinet, and the government survives indefinitely; in a ``bad'' equilibrium, performance is poor, government is short-lived, and only incompetent ministers are willing to serve. When talent and ministerial competence are imperfectly correlated, then there is a unique Markovian equilibrium: in this equilibrium, talented ministers serve when the existing stock of competent ministers is above a threshold and the government ends in finite time.
"Elements of Political Persuasion: Content, Contact, or Cue" with Macartan Humphreys and Daniel Rubenson
Abstract. Are leaders effective because of some innate qualities—for example, clarity,
trustworthiness or focality—or because of the particular arguments they employ?
To analyze these effects systematically we need variation in both messages
and leaders. Whilst these conditions are satisfied in many political settings, and in
particular during political campaigns, observational studies are likely to produce
biased estimates of these effects due to correlation, selection-bias and endogeneity.
We describe a hierarchical model which allows us to untangle the effects of leader
qualities from those of the arguments leaders use. We implement this model using
data from a unique field experiment. Working together with the BC-STV campaign
in the May 2009 British Columbia referendum on electoral reform, we randomly
assign canvassers to voting areas, who randomly messages to households. We analyze
leadership effects in two ways: (i) by estimating the between voting area differences
in opinion that are due to the assignment of different canvassers; and (ii)
by allowing some of the messages to be endorsed by leading public figures. Neither
of these strategies yields any evidence of leadership effects: a fairly substantial
overall campaign effect is entirely due to the arguments used by the campaign, not
to individuals making the case for reform.
"The Party's Over: A Model and Test of Endogenous Party Splits"
Abstract: A model of parties is developed in which factions
compromise over policy in return for higher levels of electoral
support which cooperation yields. Factions choose an unobserved
level of activism with low levels of activism indicating greater
party cohesiveness on party policy. The level of support for the
party acts as a signal with regard to the activism of factions.
Where no monitoring exists, periodic party splits triggered by low
support can help sustain higher levels of party cohesiveness
(lower activism). I find that where an effective threshold to the
entry of new parties is in place, parties will be more cohesive.
However where cohesiveness is high the "trigger level" at which
the party splits will be higher also. The implication of this
model is that whereas electoral shocks lead to a higher risk of a
party split, institutional barriers to entry, such as an
"effective threshold" have no such direct effect. This insight
is supported by analysis of the hazard rates on 115 parties in 21
Liberal Democracies.
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