Torun Dewan

I am a political scientist at the London School of Economics. My main research is in political economy and in the application of theory to decisionmaking in political parties,legislatures and by leaders. On these pages you can find brief details on my research and download some of my published articles and working papers.You can find a short CV by clicking here. I am the Director of the Political Science and Political Economy group. We hold a weekly research seminar and an annual conference (jointly hosted with New York University).

Contact:
Department of Government
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

T: +44 (0)20 7955 6406

Working Papers

" The Political Economy of Discrimination" with Stephane Wolton

" Playing for the Winning Team: Selection, Performance, and Longevity of Organizations " with David P. Myatt

Publications

" Victorian Voting: Party Orientation and Class Alignment Revisted " with Jaako Merilainen and Janne Tukiainen
(2020. American Journal of Political Science,64:4)

" Electoral Competition, Control and Learning" with Rafael Hortala-Vallve (2019. British Journal of Political Science,49:3)

" Leadership with Trustworthy Associates" with Francesco Squintani (2018. American Political Science Review, 112:4)

" In Defence of Factions" with Francesco Squintani (2016. American Journal of Political Science,60:4)

" Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive " with Andrea Galeotti, Christian Ghiglino and Francesco Squintani, (2015. American Journal of Political Science, 59:2)

" Franchise Extension and the British Aristocracy " with Samuel Berlinski and Brenda Van Coppenolle,
(2014. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 39:4)

"Elements of Political Persuasion: Content, Contact, or Cue" with Macartan Humphreys and Daniel Rubenson, (2014. Economic Journal, 124:574)

"Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crisis of Confidence " with David P. Myatt
(2012. American Political Science Review, 106:1)

"The Rhetorical Strategies of Leaders: Speaking Clearly, Standing Back, and Stepping Down" with David P. Myatt (2012. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 24:4). Winner of the American Political Science Association prize for the best conference paper in political economy

"Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminister Democracies" with Arthur Spirling
(2011. American Political Science Review, 105:2)

"The Three A's of Government Formation: Appointment, Allocation, and Assignment " with Rafael Hortala-Vallve (2011. American Journal of Political Science, 55:3)

" The Political Consequences of Franchise Extension: Evidence from the Second Reform Act" with Samuel Berlinski (2011. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6:3-4)

"Political Economy Models of Elections" with Kenneth A. Shepsle (2011. Annual Review of Political Science)

"The Declining Talent Pool of Government" with David P.Myatt (2010. American Journal of Political Science, 54:2), winner of the Midwest Political Science Association prize for best article published in the AJPS in 2010

"Individual and Collective Ministerial Performance and the Tenure of British Ministers 1945-1997" with Samuel Berlinski and Keith Dowding (2010. Journal of Politics, 72:2)

"Qualities of Leadership: Communication, Direction and Obfuscation" with David P. Myatt
(2008. American Political Science Review, 102:3)

"Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy,Part I" with Kenneth A. Shepsle,
(2008. British Journal of Political Science, 38:1)

"Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy,Part II" with Kenneth A. Shepsle,
(2008. British Journal of Political Science, 38:2)

Books

" Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival in British Government 1945-2007 " with Samuel Berlinski and Keith Dowding (2012. Cambridge University Press)

This book looks at the careers of ministers who served in British government between 1945 and 2007. Using a unique dataset on the personal characteristics of ministers it analyzes when they entered government, what happened to them during their spell in government, and the timing of their exit from government. The key variable of interest in our analysis is how long these ministers serve. We ask to what extent does the length of their spell depend upon characteristics that are fixed at the time of their entry? What effect do political events, such as resignation calls that may be connected to performance-related scandals, have upon their tenure? And what do the data on ministerial careers tell us about the nature of accountability in British politics?

Teaching