Daniel Ferreira's research page

My Google Scholar profile
My SSRN page

Selected Working Papers

1.      How to Sell Jobs, Daniel Ferreira and Radoslawa Nikolowa.

When employees perceive desirable job attributes and monetary compensation as complements, the optimal mechanism for selling desirable jobs is to assign young employees to low-quality jobs and then promote only some of them to the desirable jobs.

2.      Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching, Daniel Ferreira, Edith Ginglinger, Marie-Aude Laguna, and Yasmine Skalli. (Internet Appendix)

The annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011.

3.      Job Ladders and Adverse Selection, Daniel Ferreira and Radoslawa Nikolowa. (Internet Appendix).

Workers who move up the job ladder are adversely selected: workers who move from low-productivity firms to high-productivity firms have mediocre ability, while those who stay with their firms have high ability.

4.      Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers, Vasiliki Athanasakou, Daniel Ferreira, and Lisa Goh.

CEOs who either overinvest or underinvest subsequently receive fewer stock options as part of their compensation packages.

5.      The Inner Workings of the Board: Evidence from Emerging Markets, Ralph de Hass, Daniel Ferreira, and Tom Kirchmaier.

We survey non-executive directors in emerging markets to obtain detailed information about the inner workings of corporate boards across a variety of institutional settings.

6.      Measuring Management Insulation from Shareholder Pressure, Daniel Ferreira, David Kershaw, Tom Kirchmaier, and Edmund Schuster.

An improved measure of management insulation from shareholder pressure, with an application to the banking industry.

        Read The Wall Street Journal article about this paper: here (for WSJ subscribers) or here (from The Australian).

7.      Boards of Banks, Daniel Ferreira, Tom Kirchmaier, and Daniel Metzger.

Country characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence.

Published or Forthcoming Papers

1.      Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira, and Beatriz Mariano. Journal of Finance, forthcoming.

The number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by roughly 24% (on average) following loan covenant violations.

2.      When Does Competition Foster Commitment? Daniel Ferreira and Thomas Kittsteiner. Management Science, November 2016, 62(11), 3199-3212. (On-line appendix).

Product market competition helps firms to commit to narrow business strategies.

3.      Unbundling Ownership and Control, Daniel Ferreira, Emanuel Ornelas, and John Turner. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Spring 2015, 24(1), 1-21. (Lead article).

A mechanism design analysis of trading under private information; it generalizes Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) to allow for fractional ownership ex post.

4.      Board Diversity: Should We Trust Research to Inform Policy? Daniel Ferreira. Corporate Governance: An International Review, March 2015, 23(2), 108-111.

A short commentary based on a keynote address given at the Diversity in Boards Workshop at De Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam, December 2013. It is part of a special issue on board diversity.

5.      Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private, Daniel Ferreira, Gustavo Manso, and Andre C. Silva. Review of Financial Studies, January 2014, 27(1), 256-300.

Public equity incentivizes the exploitation of existing ideas; private equity incentivizes the exploration of new ideas.

6.      Corporate Boards in Europe: Size, Independence, and Gender Diversity, Daniel Ferreira and Tom Kirchmaier. Chapter 4 in Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies, M. Belcredi and G. Ferrarini (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2013, 191-224.

A comprehensive description of the cross-section of board characteristics across Europe.

7.      Who Gets to the Top? Generalists versus Specialists in Managerial Organizations, Daniel Ferreira and Raaj K. Sah. RAND Journal of Economics, Winter 2012, 43(4), 577-601. (Lead article).

A model of hierarchical communication among heterogeneous agents. Communication is noisy because of differences in expertise.

8.      Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors' Incentives to Attend Board Meetings, Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. International Review of Finance, special issue: Governance, Policy, and the Crisis, June 2012, 12(2), 227-248.

Director attendance is affected by explicit incentives. Similar findings as in Adams and Ferreira (JAE, 2008), but with a different data set.

9.      Corporate Strategy and Investment Decisions, Daniel Ferreira. Chapter 2 in Capital Budgeting Valuation: Financial Analysis for Today's Investment Projects, Baker, H.K., and P. English (eds.), John Wiley & Sons, 2011, pp. 19-35.

A pedagogical review of the literature on business strategy and its relations to corporate investment decisions.

10. Board Structure and Price Informativeness, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira, and Clara Raposo. Journal of Financial Economics, March 2011, 99(3), 523-545.

Evidence of a negative relation between stock price informativeness and corporate board independence.

        Winner of the Egon Zehnder International Prize for the best paper in the ECGI working paper series on company boards and their role in corporate governance. See Clara accepting the prize in Barcelona.

11. Board Diversity, Daniel Ferreira. Chapter 12 in Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice, Anderson, R. and H.K. Baker (eds.), John Wiley & Sons, 2010, pp. 225242.

A selective review of the literature on the demographic characteristics of corporate board directors.

12. Moderation in Groups: Evidence from Betting on Ice Break-Ups in Alaska, Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. Review of Economic Studies, July 2010, 77(3), 882-913.

Evidence that group decisions are more moderate, either because groups have to reach a compromise when their members disagree or because individuals with extreme opinions are less likely to be part of a group.

13. What Determines the Composition of Banks' Loan Portfolios? Evidence from Transition Countries, Ralph De Haas, Daniel Ferreira, and Anita Taci. Journal of Banking and Finance, February 2010, 34(2), 388-398.

Evidence of empirical links between bank characteristics, the institutional environment, and the composition of banks' loan portfolios.

14. Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Governance and Performance, Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. Journal of Financial Economics, November 2009, 94(2), 291-309.

Board gender diversity is a good proxy for board independence.

        Media coverage: The Economist. Financial Times (1 , 2 , 3), The Times, Observer (August 9 and August 16). Invited comment in the Sunday Telegraph: If women ruled boards. Oral evidence given to the UK Treasury Committee in the House of Commons (video). Press coverage: FT, The Times, BBC News, Yahoo News.

15. Strong Managers, Weak Boards? Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. CESifo Economic Studies, September-November 2009, 55 (3-4), 482-514. (Symposium on Executive Pay).

An alternative model of friendly boards, based on career concerns. Some suggestive evidence.

        Prepared for CESifo Venice Summer Institute - Workshop on Executive Pay (July 2008).

16. Understanding the Relationship between Founder-CEOs and Firm Performance, Renee Adams, Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira. Journal of Empirical Finance, January 2009, 16(1), 136-150.

Evidence of causal effects of founder-CEO status on firm performance. New evidence that founder-CEOs are more likely to relinquish the CEO post after periods of unusually high operating performance.

        Media coverage: read the article on founder CEOs in Financial Director magazine.

17. Do Directors Perform for Pay? Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. Journal of Accounting and Economics, September 2008, 46(1), 154-171.

Corporate board directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board meeting fees are higher. This is surprising because meeting fees are very low.

18. One Share - One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. Review of Finance, 2008, 12(1), 51-91.

Critical survey of the empirical literature on disproportional ownership, i.e. the use of mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights in corporations.

        Policy impact: here.

19. A Theory of Friendly Boards, Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira. Journal of Finance, February 2007, 62(1), 217-250.

A model of boards that both monitor and advise. Management-friendly boards can be optimal because managers are more willing to share information with friendly directors.

        Emerald Citations of Excellence Award, 2011 and 2014. Winner of the 2006 Egon Zehnder International Prize for the best paper in the ECGI working paper series on company boards and their role in corporate governance. Second most cited paper out of all articles published in the JF since 2007. Click here to see publisher's announcement and here to see the top ten list from the Web of Science.

20. Corporate Strategy and Information Disclosure, Daniel Ferreira and Marcelo Rezende. RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2007, 38(1), 164-184.

Disclosure of information about corporate strategy incentivizes agents to undertake strategy-specific investments.

21. Options Can Induce Risk Taking for Arbitrary Preferences, Luis Braido and Daniel Ferreira. Economic Theory, April 2006, 27(3), 513-522.

A new result showing that, with no information about preferences and some knowledge about price distributions, one can write a call option that makes all managers prefer riskier projects to safer ones.

22. Powerful CEOs and their Impact on Corporate Performance, Renee Adams, Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira. Review of Financial Studies, Winter 2005, 18(4), 1403-1432.

Evidence that firms in which CEOs have more decision-making power have more volatile performance. The evidence is particularly strong for founder-CEOs.

23. Biased Managers, Organizational Design, and Incentive Provision, Cristiano Costa, Daniel Ferreira, and Humberto Moreira. Economics Letters, March 2005, 86(3), 379-385.

Hierarchical forms are optimal when managerial biases are small; matrix structures are optimal when such biases are large.

24. Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance, Heitor Almeida and Daniel Ferreira. Economics and Politics, November 2002, 14(3), 225-257. (Lead article).

Evidence that autocratic countries have more volatile economic performances than democratic ones.