

Patronage as Institutional Choice:
Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda

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Abstract:

An increasingly large literature on patronage has developed within political science in recent years. Yet this body of scholarship has heretofore failed to explain variation in patronage allocation across countries. Here I develop such a theory based on the logic of institutional choice, whereby political leaders allocate patronage in accordance with the varying political threats they face. I explicate two variables which capture this variation, namely geography and visibility, and show how they explain patronage allocation. I test this theory through the comparative analysis of Rwanda and Uganda, whose current regimes are remarkably similar in origin and structure. I also extend my analysis to previous regimes in both countries. In all cases I find strong support for my theory.

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Organisation pour la démocratie populaire – mouvement du travail (ODP-MT)

(Organization for Popular Democracy – Labor Movement)

Name of ruling party in Burkina Faso, 1989-1996

Office de distribution du pain; mange et tais-toi

(Office for Bread Distribution – Eat and Shut Up)

Popular wordplay on ODP-MT²

1. Introduction

In recent years there has been an increased emphasis in political science on the importance of patronage as a mechanism by which politicians build and maintain political support. As such, a rapidly growing literature on patronage has attempted to understand how, why, where and when politicians allocate material incentives to their constituencies. Recent scholarship, for instance, has focused on the relationship between corruption, economic development, democratization and patronage; whether politicians target patronage at “swing” or “core” voters; how politicians and voters overcome commitment problems; and why or whether politicians target their own ethnic group for patronage.³

However, within this literature there has been minimal interest in exploring variations in the *types* of patronage politicians employ, or why and how the nature of patronage distribution varies across regimes. This paper thus discusses patronage as a series of “institutional choices” or strategies which

² Ernest Harsch, “Burkina Faso in the Winds of Liberalization,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 25 (December 1998), 636-637.

³ A non-exhaustive list includes Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Miriam Golden, “Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 33 (April 2003), 189-212; Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Kimuli Kasara, “Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa,” *American Political Science Review*, 101 (February 2007), 159-172; Simeon Nichter, “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying,” *American Political Science Review* 102 (March 2008):19-31; James Robinson and Thierry Verdier, “The Political Economy of Clientelism,” unpublished paper, Harvard University; Susan Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” *American Political Science Review*, 99 (September 2005), 315-325; and Susan Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” in Charles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

hinge upon a series of trade-offs.⁴ Specifically, I argue that patronage variation can be explained by the nature of political threats to politicians which vary across time and space. I explicate two variables which capture this variation in political threats, namely geography and visibility, and show how they explain patronage allocation. In so doing I attempt to understand why politicians might choose to allocate patronage in a state's periphery versus its center, and why the patronage that is distributed can vary between being very visible and obvious to being practically invisible and secretive in nature.

In order to understand this variation I take the two case studies of contemporary Rwanda and Uganda. Rather than employ a large-N quantitative analysis, I use a small-N comparative approach as it is better in understanding the causality behind patronage allocation, a process which is often complicated and secretive and therefore not easily quantifiable. Rwanda and Uganda are ideal case studies for this approach because, despite an unusually high degree of similarities in the current regimes of these two countries, the allocation of patronage across both states is strikingly different. I show below that, in accordance with my theory, current patronage in contemporary Rwanda is centralized and relatively invisible while it is peripheral and highly visible in contemporary Uganda.

In the rest of the paper I first introduce a typology of patronage before examining the two case studies of Rwanda and Uganda. After a detailed assessment of the current Kagame and Museveni regimes I extend my analysis to previous regimes in each country, where examinations of counterfactual or "off-path" behavior confirm my argument. Finally, I conclude with wider thoughts on the study of patronage in general as well as the allocation of patronage in Africa more specifically.

2. An Institutional Choice Typology of Patronage

Patronage is a universal form of politics, whereby political rulers allocate material benefits to a select group of citizens in return for political support.⁵ Inasmuch as patronage allocation is governed by

⁴ Catherine Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁵ Despite their confusion in the literature, it is important to distinguish patronage, which is generally not illegal, from corruption, which is considered illegal inasmuch as it involves politicians both allocating and receiving material benefits. It

a set of rules and established practices, it is thus a type of institution along the lines established by Douglass North.⁶ Moreover, inasmuch as rulers are the ones who decide when, where and to whom they will allocate patronage, their institutional choices are governed by the desire “to maximize their individual political power... by designing institutions that will allow them to exercise their power to the greatest extent possible. They will prefer institutions that make them more powerful rather than less.”⁷ We should therefore expect rulers to choose patronage strategies that will maximize their power and maintain them in office,⁸ which suggests that rulers will have different strategies depending on which threats they face to their power.

Yet, despite a growing literature on patronage, there have been remarkably few attempts at developing theories to explain patronage variation across time and space.⁹ This lacuna should not, however, be surprising, considering the more general focus of scholars in the New Institutionalism paradigm on institutions as independent rather than dependent variables.¹⁰ While a new set of literature has more recently attempted to explain why various political rulers choose one set of institutions over another based on a variety of pre-existing conditions, much of this literature has been focused on the post-communist transition in eastern Europe and has therefore largely been concentrated on market and electoral reforms at the expense of other issues.¹¹ As such, here I develop two variables which can help to explain patronage variation, namely geography and visibility, which I explain in order; I later argue through the case studies why other potential variables cannot explain this variation.

is also important to distinguish patronage, which can take the form of “pork” or club goods that are targeted towards specific groups of citizens and are therefore (at least *de facto*) excludable, from the allocation of pure public goods, which by definition are non-excludable. Clientelism, on the other hand, appears to be merely a synonym for patronage in much of the literature and thus I do not consider it here. For more on these definitions see Stokes, “Political Clientelism.”

⁶ Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁷ Timothy Frye, “A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (October 1997), 532.

⁸ Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 40 (November 2007), 1279-1301.

⁹ The sole notable exception here is René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, “Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis,” *Comparative Politics*, 4 (January 1972), 149-178, who establish a four-fold typology of patronage along a single variable of modernization. Their analysis, however, unfortunately does not help us much in analyzing patronage variation at similar levels of development.

¹⁰ See criticism from Boone; Kenneth Benoit and John W. Schiemann, “Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 Electoral Law,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13 (April 2001), 153-182.

¹¹ Frye; Benoit and Schiemann; Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

2.1. Geography

One choice faced by rulers in the distribution of patronage is geographical, whereby they can hand out patronage at the center of their state or in the rural periphery. The advantage of the former is spelled out in the old adage, “keep your friends close but your enemies closer”:¹² in other words, provide your political enemies with patronage to keep them from rebelling while also keeping an eye on them. Such a strategy involves the distribution of patronage in the state capital, thereby encouraging provincial rivals to leave their rural source of power behind. The classic practitioner of this strategy was King Louis XIV of France, who drew together his nobles at the court of Versailles in order to prevent a recurrence of the *Fronde* and other provincial revolts that preceded his rule.¹³

However, there are at least three problems with this strategy. First, patronage that goes to the center will trickle down to peripheral citizens, most likely through their ethnic “delegates” at the center. This strategy, however, requires an enforcement mechanism between urban migrants and their rural brethren, and when this mechanism fails or is non-existent and patronage does not trickle down, poor citizens in the periphery will often take up arms in revolt, as arguably took place in Mali and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.¹⁴

A second problem is a risk that, once clients are “hooked” on patronage and a state fully suffers from what Jean-Paul Azam calls the “redistribution syndrome,” those who receive less patronage than others can become angry and threaten the government. Indeed, the oft-heard claim from coup d’etat leaders that the previous regime was “tribalistic” or “corrupt” is merely another way of saying that patronage was unequally distributed across society. For example, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s relative parity of patronage distribution in Côte d’Ivoire allowed him to rule in peace up to his death

¹² While this phrase is most famously uttered in the film *The Godfather, Part II* (1974), its origins lie in Sun-Tzu’s *The Art of War* (6th century BC).

¹³ Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (New York: Anchor Books, 1955 [1856]).

¹⁴ Jean-Paul Azam, *Trade, Exchange Rate and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 236.

from natural causes in 1993, but his successors' unwillingness to redistribute to northerners led to a coup d'état in 1999 and an ongoing civil war since 2002.¹⁵

A third and final problem with patronage at the center is that a sudden drop in patronage can lead to instability as clients grow angry and rebel against their former patrons. Once they had decided their patrons were more a burden than a benefit, these clients could use the commercial networks and links they had formerly established to fund and launch insurgencies, as seen in the collapse of such regimes as Doe's Liberia, Barre's Somalia and Mobutu's Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo; DRC), among others.¹⁶

An alternative approach to the centralized model is thus for a government to create patronage in the rural periphery, where clients cannot threaten to overthrow the regime in power. While this strategy is politically safer for the government, its downside is that clients are free to develop independent sources of power in the countryside and potentially form secessionist or rebel movements. For instance, Barrington Moore notes how such a concern among India's Mogul emperors led them to frequently shift bureaucratic assignments despite the subsequent rural instability that these policies produced.¹⁷ More recently the Afghani warlords Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan developed their own armies and links with neighboring Uzbekistan and Iran, respectively, before the overthrow of the Taliban; as a result, President Hamid Karzai appointed Dostum and Khan to largely ceremonial posts in Kabul so as to neutralize their ability to threaten his rule from the periphery.¹⁸

Thus, to summarize, in states where secession, rebellion or invasion is not a worry or where peripheral areas do not threaten the center, we should expect leaders to employ patronage in the periphery rather than the center. Conversely, where the periphery poses a political challenge to the center, we should expect leaders to centralize patronage.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁶ William Reno, "The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States," *Development and Change*, 33 (November 2002), 837-858.

¹⁷ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 327-328.

¹⁸ Antonio Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

2.2. Visibility

A second trade-off is in the visibility of patronage, whereby the patron can choose to utilize patronage that is either visible to the general public or unknown to others beyond the recipient. Where politicians face serious political competition they have incentives to use public resources or policy concessions to win elections or maintain support,¹⁹ whereby their spending often takes the form of public goods that are both observable or measurable and whose benefits are easy to trace back to the politicians who created them.²⁰ In particular “pork” or club goods – i.e., patronage that is publicly and legally allocated to a select group of citizens in the form of government policies²¹ – are highly visible, inasmuch as they are “clearly seen as evidence of political patrons fulfilling their promises to clients.”²² Moreover, inasmuch as politicians in competitive democracies have short time horizons, there are more incentives for them to pursue short-term policies like pork that will win them the next election. As such, evidence abounds of highly visible public projects that developing world politicians have utilized to win elections, including state farms in Ghana and Nigeria,²³ sugar factories and port facilities in Côte d’Ivoire,²⁴ wells in Pakistan,²⁵ drought relief programs in Botswana²⁶ and, perhaps most famously, food distribution programs in post-independence India,²⁷ among others. In all of these cases, however, the level of visibility is contingent upon the media, whose coverage of a policy can greatly alter the

¹⁹ Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel,” *Journal of Politics*, 56 (May 1994), 377-399.

²⁰ Anandi Mani and Sharun Mukand, “Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 83 (July 2007), 506-529.

²¹ While some authors consider pork merely a type of private good, with club goods as an intermediate between private and public goods, I consider the two concepts synonymous inasmuch as they are understood to mean the “distribution of a collective benefit... targeted to a specific electoral district;” Golden, p. 200.

²² Philip Keefer and Stufi Khemani, “Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services,” *World Bank Economic Observer*, 20 (Spring 2005), p. 12.

²³ Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 114-115.

²⁴ Azam, p. 234.

²⁵ Keefer and Khemani, p. 13.

²⁶ Roger Charlton, “The Politics of Elections in Botswana,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 63 (August, 1993), 342.

²⁷ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), pp. 179-180.

influence it has on voters. Indeed, recent scholarship has shown how both the media and competitive elections push governments to spend money on club or public goods rather than on private goods.²⁸

However, as political competition decreases, the pressures for redistribution diminish as well, since politicians have less of a need to curry votes from the public. In states with non-competitive elections and low levels of press freedom there is thus obviously more of an incentive for politicians to provide private goods, or “spoils,”²⁹ to their rivals in order to maintain their support. As opposed to the club goods or pork in competitive democracies, here patronage primarily consists of politicians offering jobs. In particular, according to Robinson and Verdier,³⁰ the allocation of jobs is useful as it is reversible, thus getting around the problem of how to ensure long-term political support. Indeed, the problem with pork in this setting is that, once it has been created, it cannot be withdrawn from ungrateful clients.

Thus patronage in this sense is personalized and not always legal, and as a result usually fails to have a paper trace. As with club goods, evidence abounds, but perhaps one classic example from Mobutu’s Zaire can suffice here. When the Kabila government’s aptly-named Office of Ill-Gotten Gains (OIGG) attempted to locate his estimated \$8 billion fortune, it only managed to find \$4 million in his Swiss bank accounts. The rest of the money, it seemed, had been distributed as patronage, but a lack of records meant that any attempts of the OIGG to track down who received what was largely hopeless.³¹

In summary, according to this logic, leaders in competitive democracies with a free press should be more likely to employ easily visible types of patronage, or pork, as they seek to win their next election, while leaders in states without competitive elections and a free media would more likely rely upon less visible or permanent types of patronage. Phrased another way, politicians with high discount rates have an interest in employing visible project-based patronage that could bring them a large one-off benefit, rather than a series of more modest long-term gains. Conversely, when politicians are better

²⁸ Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess, “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117 (November 2002), 1215-1451.

²⁹ Gandhi and Przeworski.

³⁰ Robinson and Verdier.

³¹ Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), pp. 286-288.

able to plan for the future due to a weak opposition, we should expect them to employ less visible types of patronage like state jobs, tariffs and taxes that they can (threaten to) withdraw from unworthy clients.

3. Empirical Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda

Table 1 recapitulates the two institutional strategies listed above, along with examples of what types of patronage comprise each strategy.

[Insert Table 1 here]

As with practically all of the other empirical literature on patronage, I employ here a case-based approach in order to assess the empirical evidence behind these predictions. Specifically, I examine the two case studies of Rwanda and Uganda, with the goal of explicating exactly how the current regimes of Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni have utilized patronage to maintain political support. Rwanda and Uganda have many factors in common which have been previously been taken to account for varying types of public policy allocation, including the degree of democratic institutionalization,³² poverty levels,³³ the number of years of continuous democratic elections,³⁴ levels of urbanization,³⁵ the ratio of the winning political coalition to the “selectorate,”³⁶ and literacy/education levels.³⁷ In the rest of this section I introduce the two states and demonstrate how and why Kagame and Museveni have chosen different institutional strategies for the allocation of patronage. I show how my theory not only

³² Nicolas van de Walle, “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³³ Kitschelt and Wilkinson; Stokes, “Political Clientelism.”

³⁴ Philip Keefer, “Clientelism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 51 (October 2007), 804-821.

³⁵ Ethan Scheiner, “Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³⁶ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alistair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

³⁷ Keefer and Khemani.

explains how both leaders have allocated patronage but also explains patronage variation under previous regimes in both countries.

3.1. Background Information on Rwanda and Uganda

As indicated in Table 2, Rwanda and Uganda are among the poorest countries in the world, with low literacy and urbanization rates and high levels of poverty. Both countries are land-locked and blessed with high-quality farmland suitable for growing coffee, historically both country's main export, with concomitant higher population densities than any of their other neighbors. Presidents Kagame and Museveni have a remarkable amount in common as well. Both men were raised in southwest Uganda, attended the same secondary school in Mbarara district, left Uganda for Tanzania in 1978 to fight against Idi Amin's regime, and fought together against Milton Obote's regime in the early 1980s.³⁸ After joining Museveni's government as the head of military intelligence in 1986, Kagame started his own rebel movement of Rwandan exiles, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), with whom he invaded Rwanda in 1990 and took Kigali in 1994.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Both Kagame and Museveni took power as the leaders of rebel armies which had fought against regimes that targeted the formerly dominant ethnic groups in each country, namely the Tutsi and Baganda, as part of their counter-insurgency strategies. After overthrowing the previous regime, both Kagame and Museveni formed broad-based post-conflict governments and initiated processes of democratization, beginning with local elections alongside the creation of a constitutional commission designed to solicit views of the public on the design for a new constitution. Once the new constitutions had been approved by their parliaments, Kagame and Museveni set up presidential and parliamentary

³⁸ Colin M. Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front* (London: McFarland & Company, 2004), p. 12.

elections under majoritarian rules (in 2003 and 1996, respectively), which they and their parties overwhelmingly won. In both cases the new constitutions mandated for the first time significant minority representation in the parliament, especially for women but also for youth and the disabled.³⁹ Post-conflict reconstruction in both countries, as well as efforts at post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda and successful HIV/AIDS policies in Uganda, have drawn large amounts of praise and aid from donors and visits from US Presidents Clinton and Bush. As such both leaders were for a while dubbed members of the “new breed” of African leaders that were supposed to lead Africa to a new era of democracy and development.⁴⁰

Yet despite holding a number of elections, both countries have authoritarian tendencies and therefore fit into the recently-created category of “semi-democracies” or “anocracies.”⁴¹ In both cases opposition politicians are regularly arrested and power remains in a small series of concentric groups within each government: in Uganda power rests in the Banyankole ethnic group (10% of the population), and within it in the hands of the Bahima sub-group, while in Rwanda Tutsis (14% of the population) dominate in the government, with more power concentrated in the *akazu* (little house) of Ugandan-born Tutsis.⁴² In other words, in the terminology of Bueno de Mesquita et al.,⁴³ the size of both Kagame and Museveni’s “winning coalition” is small in comparison to the size of their “selectorates,” which in both cases is synonymous with the electorate.

3.2. The Institutional Logic of Patronage in Rwanda and Uganda

³⁹ Rwanda’s 2008 elections saw 56.25% of its parliamentary seats go to women, the first time in world history women have comprised an elected majority of a national parliament.

⁴⁰ J. Oloka-Onyango, “New-Breed” Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,” *Africa Today*, 50 (Spring 2004), 29-52.

⁴¹ This fact is reflected in similar scores for both countries in the most recent Polity IV datasets, where scores between -5 and 5 qualify as anocracies. Rwanda had a score of -4 from 2000 to 2002 and has had a score of -3 since 2003, while Uganda’s was -4 between 1993 and 2004 and has been -1 since 2005. Rwanda and Uganda have also had almost the same Freedom House scores since 2000.

⁴² An Ansoms, “Re-Engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the Rwandan Elite,” *African Affairs*, 108 (April 2009), 289-309; Elliott D. Green, “Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Uganda,” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 44 (November, 2006), 370-388.

⁴³ Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow.

Despite these similarities, however, Kagame and Museveni have employed strikingly different strategies of patronage allocation. These supposed inconsistencies, however, can be explained by the institutional constraints of each country's political and economic endowments. I now return to the two sets of institutional choices detailed above, before examining how each president has utilized patronage to his advantage.

3.2.1. Geography

Above I concluded that rulers that were unconcerned about political threats from the periphery but were concerned about potential rebellions from the center would tend to allocate patronage in peripheral areas, and vice-versa. Uganda, despite verbal threats of secession from southern political leaders in the 1960s and northern politicians today more recently, does not have a serious history of secession or peripheral rebellion that has threatened the center.⁴⁴ Indeed, the various rebel movements that have erupted in Uganda's periphery have all failed to threaten the center, with the one partial exception of Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement, to which I return later. Much of this peripheral weakness in Uganda is due to the fact that none of Uganda's major indigenous ethnic groups have politically or numerically powerful brethren in neighboring countries.

On the other hand, however, Uganda has a long history of central instability, with five coup d'états overthrowing regimes since independence. Moreover, the one Ugandan rebel movement that successfully overthrew the regime in Kampala was Museveni's National Resistance Army, which was based in central Uganda rather than its periphery. More recently, President Museveni has faced numerous threats from within his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, most notably from his former personal doctor, Colonel Kizza Besigye, who broke ranks to run against Museveni in the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections. Thus we would expect to see the peripheral allocation of patronage in Uganda.

⁴⁴ The one exception here, namely the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1978 was, of course, a counter-invasion in response to Amin's invasion of Tanzania.

Rwanda is quite different from Uganda in this respect, in that, with the exception of Juvenal Habyarimana's coup d'état in 1973, it does not have a history of rebellion from the center. It does, however, have a history of being surrounded by enemies intent on overthrowing the regime in Kigali. As opposed to Uganda, all four of Rwanda's neighbors have significant Tutsi and Hutu populations due to migration and refugee movements. Indeed, Rwanda's history of foreign invasions and enemies started only one year after independence, when Tutsi exiles launched two failed invasions from Burundi in 1963, the second of which reached as close as 12 miles from Kigali before being repelled; a week after the second invasion Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda launched another failed attempt. More recently, of course, Kagame and the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 and took Kigali after the 1994 genocide. The RPF's success led the *interahamwe* who committed much of the genocide to flee across the border to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); their presence there supposedly prompted Rwanda's subsequent invasion of the DRC. However, relations between Kagame and Museveni over their joint invasions of the DRC soured to the point where the Rwandan and Ugandan troops fought each other in the Congolese city of Kisangani in 1999-2000. At the same time many *interahamwe* reformed as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and invaded the provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in northwest Rwanda, only to be repelled by the Rwandan army after fierce fighting. This long history of invasion from three different neighboring countries, the threat of ALIR and its successors, the presence of a hostile neighbor only 80 km from Kigali, and Kagame's own successful history in leading an invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, all suggest that Kagame would be concerned about the allocation of patronage in peripheral Rwanda that might fall into the hands of his enemies. In other words, we would expect to see more centralized patronage in Rwanda and more peripheral patronage in Uganda.

3.2.2. Visibility

The logic above suggested that rulers in competitive democracies with a free press would employ more visible patronage, or pork, in order to win elections, while their counterparts in less competitive states with fewer press freedoms would allocate patronage less visibly. Here again we see a marked contrast between Uganda and Rwanda, which have very different histories of political competition. The nature of each country's social composition has much to do with this difference: some 85% of the Rwandan population is Hutu, making it possibly the most ethnically homogenous country in Africa.⁴⁵ Uganda, on the other hand, has a claim to the title of the most ethnically fractionalized country in the world,⁴⁶ with the largest ethnic group, the Baganda, only comprising some 17% of the population. Similarly and just as important in many ways, Rwanda has been dominated since colonial times by Catholics, who currently account for 57% of the population, with the rest of the population splintered among a number of different religious groups. Uganda, on the other hand, has historically been split between Catholics (currently 42% of the population) and Anglicans (36%),⁴⁷ with the latter assuming national power after independence thanks in part to British support.

Thus it is no surprise that Rwanda has had a post-independence history of single-party dominance; its sole multi-party election took place before independence in 1961, when the Hutu Catholic PARMEHUTU party secured 77.7% of the vote. However, even before independence Uganda was politically split between the Protestant Uganda People's Congress and the Catholic Democratic Party, which had fierce electoral battles in the first two post-independence elections of 1962 and 1980. In the latter case the election was largely assumed to be stolen by Milton Obote, whose brazenness in doing so launched Museveni's ultimately successful rebellion. More recently we can compare each country's first post-constitutional election, whereby Museveni received 74.3% in 1996 while Kagame got 95.1% of the vote in 2003; in each country's first multi-party legislative elections, the NRM received 57.8% of the seats while the RPF coalition received 73.8%.

⁴⁵ James D. Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8 (June 2003), 195-222.

⁴⁶ Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeshauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8 (June 2003), 155-194.

⁴⁷ US State Department 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom; <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/index.htm>.

Another measure of political competition is the nature of regime change and the length of rulers' tenure,⁴⁸ and here again Rwanda and Uganda differ. Rwanda's most recent political succession, namely the resignation of President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2000, was peaceful; in all it has had only three extralegal regime changes since independence, in 1973 and 1994 (twice). Uganda, however, has had no peaceful political transitions since independence, with six extralegal regime changes in 1971, 1979, 1980 (twice), 1985 (twice) and 1986. The result is that Uganda's presidents have only lasted in office for a mean of 4.7 years and a median of 1.7 years, while Rwandan presidents have lasted in office for 9.6 and 10+ years, respectively.⁴⁹

Finally, there is also a large contrast between Rwanda and Uganda in their levels of press freedom. Rwanda has one of the lowest levels of press freedom in the world: the government has regularly suspended newspapers and radio broadcasts – including the BBC Kinyarwanda service – and has routinely arrested and expelled numerous local and foreign journalists, respectively. With only one daily newspaper – the government-run *New Times*, which is published in English and has a circulation of only 5000 copies per day – and one television station, Rwandans have remarkably little access to information about their government and are thus ill-placed to respond to visible patronage. In contrast, Uganda has a moderately high level of press freedom in comparison to other African countries: its two most popular newspapers have a combined circulation of 75,000 copies per day, and several other magazines, newspapers and television stations are published or broadcast in a variety of languages.⁵⁰

Thus, as a result of Rwanda's relative lack of political competition and press freedom compared to Uganda, we would thus expect to see more visible patronage in Rwanda than in Uganda.

3.3. Patronage in Current Rwanda and Uganda

⁴⁸ Gandhi and Przeworski.

⁴⁹ Kagame's time in office currently marks the median tenure for Rwandan presidents.

⁵⁰ *Reporters without Borders* (RWB) has consistently lowered Rwanda's global annual ranking from 107th in the world in 2002 to 157th in 2009, or the fourth-worst in Africa. Uganda, however, has consistently been ranked in the upper half of African countries in RWB's rankings. For more see <http://en.rsf.org/>.

I now examine the actual use of patronage in contemporary Rwanda and Uganda to see if it conforms to my theoretical predictions. To recall, I predicted that patronage in Rwanda would be centralized and relatively invisible, while in Uganda it would be peripheral and visible. As I now show, the evidence conforms very well with these predictions, as it also does regarding the changing nature of patronage over the length of Museveni's reign in Uganda.

3.3.1. Rwanda

Patronage distribution in Kagame's Rwanda has largely been focused on central government jobs, both in the cabinet and the legislature, and particularly in the Senate (the Upper House of Parliament). Rwanda's 26 Senators serve for eight year terms; of these twelve are elected by provincial councils, eight are appointed by the President to "ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities," four are appointed by the Forum on Political Organizations and two are elected by university staff. Kagame has used his power to appoint to the Senate an opposition presidential candidate in 2003 from the opposition Party for Progress and Concord as well as the former vice-president of the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) and son-in-law of the interim President of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Since 2005 the Senate's President has been the chairman of the opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD) which received 12.3% of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary elections, while one of the two Vice-Presidents is the former President of the Liberal Party (PL) which received 10.6% of the vote in the elections. In all there are seven non-RPF members in the Senate, comprising 26.9% of the seats, a far cry from the 4.9% opposition candidates received in the 2003 presidential election. As regards the Chamber of Deputies (Rwanda's Lower House of Parliament), MPs are elected according to a closed-list proportional representation system with one national constituency, with the selection of MPs thus done by party leaders in Kigali rather than by voters.⁵¹

⁵¹ Alexander Stroh, "Electoral Rules of the Authoritarian Game: Undemocratic Effects of Proportional Representation in Rwanda," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 4 (March 2010), 1-19.

Moreover, Rwanda's 2003 constitution has institutionalized power-sharing across political parties by stipulating both that the President and Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies must be from different political parties (Article 58) and that no party can control more than 50% of seats in the cabinet (Article 116). These provisions, while ostensibly designed to prevent future conflicts, not only allow for the allocation of cabinet posts to opposition party members, but, by stating this openly in the constitution, greatly increase the credibility of Kagame's offers of patronage redistribution. As such the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is the leader of the Centrist Democratic Party (PDC), while opposition members in the cabinet include the current Prime Minister, Minister of Youth and Internal Security Minister, among others. In addition, there are allegations that the government fraudulently increased the proportion of the vote received by the PSD and PL in the 2008 parliamentary election in order for the two parties to maintain themselves above the 5% minimum threshold.⁵²

One could, of course, argue that the opposition parties represented in government have little popular support and are only allocated positions in order to allow Kagame to pretend that his regime is broad-based, despite the fact that he banned the main MDR opposition party in 2003. Yet of the three original opposition parties other than the MDR which were allocated cabinet positions in the 1993 Arusha Agreement, the leaders of all three – the PL, PDC and PSD – have seats in the Senate or cabinet today. Moreover, Kagame has successfully bought off individual MDR members with offers of positions in the cabinet and Senate, including current Prime Minister Bernard Makuza, former Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema and former Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana. Finally, Kagame has also integrated former rebel leaders like Paul Rwarakabije into his army after their surrender with the same ranks that they held in the bush.

Indeed, while increasingly utilizing patronage opportunities in Kigali,⁵³ Kagame has simultaneously reduced the amount of patronage in the periphery. In 2002 he cut the number of districts, the second-highest level of local government, from 154 to 106 before making even sharper cuts across all levels of local government in 2006. More specifically, Kagame's government reduced

⁵² Stroh, p. 9.

⁵³ Kagame's government created three new ministries in 2008; it also proposed a constitutional amendment in 2010 which allocated sole power over the appointment of members of National Commissions and parastatals to the President.

the number of provinces from 12 to 5, districts from 106 to 30, sectors from 1536 to 416 and cells from 9135 to 2148; it also cut the number of vice-mayors per district from three to two.

Finally, Kagame's provision of central government jobs have been relatively invisible as well, with very little public focus on patronage as a means to garner votes. For instance, in 2003 Kagame ran his presidential campaign on non-distributive issues like security, stability, reconciliation and economic recovery.⁵⁴ Similarly, the 2008 parliamentary election similarly focused on general government achievements such as stopping "the genocide, rebuilding the country, promoting unity and reconciliation, providing for the genocide survivors, increasing overall healthcare [and] promoting regional integration."⁵⁵ The election was notable for the paucity of campaign posters, restricted campaign finance expenditures and a general lack of information about party programs, all of which served to leave voters relatively uninformed about specific government policies.⁵⁶

3.3.2. Uganda

In recent years Uganda has seen a very different system of patronage than in Rwanda. While Museveni has, like Kagame, used central government positions as a source of patronage, he has not allocated them to current or former political rivals but rather political allies. Since his rebel days Museveni's base has been among the Bantu-speaking peoples of southern and western Uganda, specifically the Baganda of central Uganda and his own Banyankole ethnic group in western Uganda. Under his rule it is these two groups which have most benefited in Kampala: to take a recent snapshot of the cabinet as an example, of the nineteen senior ministers in 2004, eleven were from the west and five were from Buganda, with only two from the North and one from the East.⁵⁷ Indeed, two of Museveni's three Vice-Presidents and three of his four Prime Ministers have been Baganda, while five

⁵⁴ Waugh, pp. 88-198.

⁵⁵ European Union Election Observation Mission, "Republic of Rwanda: Final Report" (Kigali, 2008), p. 26.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

⁵⁷ Richard Mutumba, "Issues in Parliament," *The Monitor*, Aug. 31, 2004.

out of six army commanders, as well as two of the three Inspector Generals of Government responsible for fighting government corruption, have been westerners.

However, Museveni began his reign very differently, inasmuch as he enjoyed an overwhelming amount of support across much of the country thanks in large part to his relatively successful efforts at post-conflict reconstruction.⁵⁸ At the time Museveni faced an unusually strong rebel movement called the Holy Spirit Movement from northern Uganda, which reached less than 100 kilometers from Kampala in 1987 before it was finally defeated by the government army. Thus, with little political competition alongside peripheral threats to Museveni's power from the HSM and other rebel movements, my patronage theory suggests that Museveni would have employed a centralized and invisible patronage strategy at the time. True to form, for most of his first decade in power Museveni led a broad-based government that included the main opposition leader and chairman of the Democratic Party as a member of his cabinet up to 1995 alongside other leaders from the Conservative Party and the former UNRF rebel movement. Moreover, he decidedly failed to create new patronage opportunities in the countryside, despite calls from a government-appointed Commission of Inquiry for the creation of new districts in 1987 and from monarchists for the restoration of the five ethnic kingdoms abolished in the 1960s.

Yet Museveni's broad-based support began to narrow in the 1990s as political party leaders and even former rebel army allies like Besigye started to turn against him in Kampala. With no non-NRM and only one or two non-Bantu ministers and army officers left, Museveni instead shifted towards other forms of patronage to rule over Uganda. In Bantu areas he restored four of the five ethnic kingdoms just in time for the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections;⁵⁹ while the kingdoms were not granted the political powers they held in the 1960s and under colonial rule, they were rather allowed to exist as cultural institutions. In the non-Bantu areas of northern and eastern Uganda which had never had large ethnic kingdoms, Museveni focused on the creation of new districts (the highest level of local

⁵⁸ Nelson Kasfir, "The Ugandan Elections of 1989: Power, Populism and Democratization," in Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., *Changing Uganda* (Oxford, James Currey, 1991), p. 255.

⁵⁹ The restored kingdoms were Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga and Toro. The one kingdom Museveni did not restore was his own, Ankole, ostensibly because it was not popular, but possibly also because a restored traditional king would be technically superior to all Banyankole, including Museveni.

government), despite his aforementioned earlier reluctance. In complete contrast to Kagame, Museveni has created 64 districts since 1990, or more new highest-level sub-national units than any other country in the world.⁶⁰ These have been concentrated in non-Bantu areas of Uganda and have been consistently created around election times: in 2000 and 2005 Museveni created districts only a matter of months before elections the following year, while in the 1996 and 2006 campaigns he promised to create new districts after the elections. As expected, voters in new districts have responded by voting more for Museveni than the Ugandan average across all three elections.⁶¹

These two types of patronage – the restoration of kingdoms and new districts – have been peripheral in location. Almost by definition the new districts have been in the periphery, with only one of the 64 districts created in an urban area. The kingdoms have brought many new jobs to rural parts of central and western Uganda: even the Buganda kingdom, whose capital is in Kampala, has used funds donated by rich Baganda to restore its various palaces and shrines across rural Buganda. Each district has also brought a whole slew of new jobs to rural Uganda, including more than two dozen technical support positions, a new set of district councilors representing special interest groups, and jobs in the construction and donor industries. As Uganda's districts are not represented in Kampala (with the exception of Women MPs from each district), Museveni thus does not face the risk of creating clients that could eventually overthrow him.⁶²

The kingdoms and new districts have been very visible as well. The restoration of the kingdoms in 1993 drew international attention, and each kingdom has focused on local development projects within its area. Uganda's decentralization program has brought prominence to local governments by

⁶⁰ Inasmuch as the kingdoms and the districts created under Museveni “incorporate potential opposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler's survival,” they are thus highly comparable to the use of partisan legislatures by autocrats analyzed by Gandhi and Przeworski, p. 1280. The only real difference here is that I claim that the kingdoms and districts are *themselves* a form of patronage, rather than a means to create patronage as in Gandhi and Przeworski. The end effect, however, is the same.

⁶¹ Elliott D. Green, “Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45 (2010), 83-103. While Museveni has also expanded the number of ministries and presidential advisors since the 1990s, these posts are both few in number in comparison to those created through the restored kingdoms and new districts, and remain largely targeted towards his fellow Banyankole. Cf. Giovanni Carbone, *No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 66-67.

⁶² The expansion in the number of Parliamentarians due to the Women MPs from the new districts has merely brought Uganda into line with other countries: with one Parliamentarian per 101,473 citizens in 2010, it has proportionally exactly the same number as Rwanda (101,380). While both countries have proportionally more Parliamentarians than the DRC, Kenya or Tanzania, they have fewer than Burundi, Mozambique, Sudan, or Zambia.

reallocating power over public land from the center to the districts, and regular local elections mean that leadership positions within the districts, as with kingdoms, are not decided from Kampala. Moreover, both kingdoms and districts are not reversible like central government jobs inasmuch as the government has never even threatened to abolish a kingdom or a district. Finally, in contrast to Rwanda, Museveni and NRM candidates have prominently reminded voters of the restoration of the kingdoms and the creation of new districts in numerous parliamentary and presidential elections.⁶³

3.4. Historical Extensions and Counterfactuals

The point of the “most similar” comparative research design is to demonstrate that the two cases are almost identical with the exception of dependent variable and the crucial independent variable, thereby isolating and clarifying causality.⁶⁴ Of course, what this approach suggests is that the same causal explanation should apply when the cases are not so similar; in the current context, this would mean that patronage allocation in Rwanda and Uganda should not only conform to the theory developed above under the regimes of Kagame and Museveni but also under previous rulers as well. Here I briefly examine four previous regimes in Rwanda and Uganda whose allocation of patronage and subsequent success or failure at maintaining themselves in power clearly demonstrates support of my theory.

In Rwanda the pre-genocide regime of Juvenal Habyarimana was quite successful at allocating patronage to maintain its hold on power. On the one hand Habyarimana claimed at least to be interested in the allocation of patronage to the countryside, with positive references to agriculture and the Hutu peasantry in his speeches.⁶⁵ However, as with Kagame Habyarimana centralized power in Kigali rather than the countryside, using his coffee revenues to buy off his opposition in Kigali while also channeling large amounts of state resources to Hutu elites from his home region of Gisenyi.

⁶³ Carbone, pp. 107-108; Green, “Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda.”

⁶⁴ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁶⁵ Philip Verwimp, “Development Ideology, the Peasantry and Genocide: Rwanda represented in Habyarimana's Speeches,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2 (November 2000), 325-361.

Indeed, despite claims in 1974 that development policy would be decentralized to the communes, Habyarimana instead increasingly centralized control over local government personnel and policy in Kigali.⁶⁶ As regards ethnicity, Habyarimana hired many Tutsis as cabinet ministers, ambassadors and as senior members of his MRND party. In accord with the theory here, however, Habyarimana allowed Tutsis no remit in the countryside, with “an almost total absence of Tutsis from the organs of the local state: [in 1990] there was only one Tutsi prefect, the prefect of Butare who was killed in the genocide, and not a single Tutsi burgomaster.”⁶⁷ Habyarimana’s loss of control from the late 1980s onwards thus had arguably less to do with patronage politics than it had do with the collapse of international coffee prices, the winds of change blowing through Francophone Africa, the imposition of a Structural Adjustment program in 1990, the end of the Cold War and the invasion of the RPF, which consisted of Tutsi exiles whose allegiance Habyarimana was unable to purchase.⁶⁸

In Uganda, Idi Amin’s rule conformed to the Museveni pattern of decentralized patronage but, as his regime had no competitive elections and little freedom of the press, patronage was largely invisible and personalized. While Amin was notorious for almost exclusively appointing his fellow citizens from West Nile region to top positions in the military and government, he was able to maintain himself in power by creating three new sources of patronage that he could allocate to his political rivals. First, in 1972 he notoriously exiled the country’s Asian community, thereby opening up a great deal of patronage resources. Rather than centralize these assets by resting them in government hands, Amin instead quickly redistributed some 3000-4000 former Asian businesses within only three months, thereby creating a new class of businessmen known as the *mafutamingi* (Swahili for “a lot of fat”).⁶⁹ Secondly, in 1973 he introduced a whole new provincial tier of regional government, numbering ten across the whole country, while also nearly doubling the number of districts from 19 to 37. As under Museveni these new provinces and districts allowed Amin to placate his political rivals and remove

⁶⁶ Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 24.

⁶⁷ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 141. Burgomasters were the political heads of the communes.

⁶⁸ Ibid; Philip Verwimp, “The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship and Genocide,” *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19 (June 2003), 161-181.

⁶⁹ Michael J. Schultheis, “The Ugandan Economy and General Amin, 1971-1974,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 10 (Fall 1975), 3-34.

them from Kampala at the same time;⁷⁰ however, unlike Museveni Amin did not allow for local elections or decentralize power, decision-making or resources to these new administrative units, thereby making them useful as patronage posts or “prebends” but hardly visible or useful to most Ugandans. Third and finally, in 1975 Amin’s government passed the Land Reform Decree, which nationalized all land in Uganda and thereby created even more peripheral sources of patronage. As with the aforementioned example of Mobutu and the DRC’s missing billions, there are almost no records of the names of the recipients of these three types of patronage, which again is indicative of the largely secretive or invisible nature of patronage allocation under Amin. In the end Amin’s ability to redistribute enough patronage to maintain himself in power lasted until the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, the US ban on the import of Ugandan coffee in October 1978 and the Tanzanian decision to counter-invade after Amin sent troops across the border two weeks after the US coffee ban.

Another way to test the theory presented here is to examine counterfactuals or “off-the-path” behavior by politicians that led to adverse consequences.⁷¹ Here again the evidence is strong. As opposed to Habyarimana and Kagames’s centralized system of patronage, Rwanda’s first President Grégoire Kayibanda did not redistribute resources to his political enemies in Kigali. For instance, Kayibanda completely shut out Tutsis from his government after 1964 while allowing Tutsis to gain access to lower-level jobs, especially in schools. However, perhaps most important in Kayibanda’s eventual downfall was his failure to distribute centralized patronage to Hutus outside a small circle from southern Rwanda, who dominated the powerful state marketing board TRAFIPRO. Instead, Kayibanda kept troublesome military leaders like Major Sabin Benda and future RPF chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe far from Kigali, appointing them instead as directors of a tea factory in Cyangugu and a seminary in Gisenyi, respectively. Kayibanda’s final mistake was to create local anti-Tutsi vigilante committees in 1972-73, whose power was quickly usurped by local Hutu

⁷⁰ Jan Jelmert Jørgensen, *Uganda: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

⁷¹ Boone.

politicians who, along with the aforementioned military officers outside the remit of Kigali, supported Habyarimana's military coup in July 1973.⁷²

The Obote regime in the early 1960s represents a similar example of “off-the-path” behavior from Uganda. Obote made the mistake of centralizing patronage, most notoriously by abolishing Uganda's southern Bantu-speaking kingdoms and all regional and district assemblies across the country in 1967. In his attempt to copy Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa* policies in Tanzania, Obote announced the partial nationalization of some 80 major companies in his so-called “Move to the Left,” whose rhetoric indicated that future policies were more likely to include the nationalization of land and large-scale government redistribution of income than the distribution of club goods. Included among these policies was Obote's notorious “one plus three” election proposal for the never-held parliamentary elections of 1971, which required putative MPs in a given constituency to receive a base amount of support in three other constituencies in other parts of Uganda and thereby disadvantaged MPs who only had local support. All of these moves thus threatened local patronage networks, especially among the Baganda who stood to lose the most from Obote's policies. Despite efforts to build an inclusive cabinet and bureaucracy with citizens from all of Uganda's regions, Obote was nonetheless overthrown by Amin in a widely-supported coup in 1971.

4. Conclusion

In this article I created a typology of patronage as a series of institutional choices or strategies along two variables, namely geography and visibility. I showed how similar regimes in Rwanda and Uganda have employed quite different strategies of patronage allocation, with centralized and relatively invisible types of patronage in Kagame's Rwanda and peripheral and highly visible patronage more recently in Museveni's Uganda. Moreover, I showed how the same logic of patronage allocation explained a shift over time during the Museveni regime in Uganda, the logic of patronage under

⁷² Filip Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda: Droit Public et Evolution Politique, 1916-1973* (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1985).

Habyarimana's and Amin's regimes, and why off-path behavior in Kayibanda's and Obote's initial post-independence regimes contributed in both cases to their fall from power.

I conclude here with three lessons for the study of patronage. One lesson is that the nature of patronage allocation can have little to do with regime type and economic development but much to do with the different threats to political power across time and space. The evidence here suggests that geographical factors play a large role in deciding where political leaders allocate patronage, and it emphasizes the role of competitive elections and the media in altering the decision of politicians to create visible vs. invisible patronage. It thus suggests that the level of democracy as measured by Polity IV and others may not be the most important factor in explaining patronage distribution, thereby adding to a growing literature that suggests that democracies and non-democracies in the developing world have fewer policy differences than was previously thought.⁷³ Further research into the differences between countries which have varying levels of political competition and press freedom alongside different political geographies might therefore help to bring their patronage strategies into sharper focus.

A second lesson is that attempts to develop theories of patronage need to incorporate variations in threats to political power. The debate over whether governments allocate patronage to swing or core voters discussed by Stokes is thus not very useful without a discussion of political context, as is increasingly suggested by the literature. For instance, in Uganda neither the core nor the swing voter hypotheses do a good job at predicting district creation;⁷⁴ and there is similar evidence that country-specific institutional factors like executive dominance and center-local ties, rather than the swing/core voter hypotheses, account for patronage variation in contemporary South Korea.⁷⁵

Third, the evidence here suggests that a focus on ethnic patronage may miss much of the variation in patronage across time and space. While ethnic patronage has been prominent in all six

⁷³ Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (Winter 2004), 51-74; Michael Ross, "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (October 2006), 860-874.

⁷⁴ Green, "Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda."

⁷⁵ Yusaku Horiuchi and Seungjoo Lee, "The Presidency, Regionalism and Distributive Politics in South Korea," *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (June 2008), 861-882.

regimes examined here, arguably none of the four previous regimes were overthrown due to an over-concentration of patronage among the president's ethnic group, and in contemporary Rwanda and Uganda the most important political opposition currently comes from the same ethnic groups as Kagame and Museveni.⁷⁶ In other words, future research on the role of patronage in regime survival may wish to examine in more detail how politicians distribute patronage to citizens from other ethnic groups rather than continue to focus on the redistribution of patronage within ethnic groups.

In the end, however, it is important that scholars continue to study the nature of patronage allocation across both time and space in order to better understand how and why governments employ a variety of patronage strategies. I can only hope that the evidence I have presented here will help to move us further towards this goal.

⁷⁶ Uganda's most prominent opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, is a Munyankole like President Museveni. In Rwanda Kagame's main opposition has come from other Tutsi returnees within the RPF, including those who support the restoration of the monarchy. Cf. Sebastian Silva-Leander, "On the Danger and Necessity of Democratization: Trade-Offs Between Short-Term Stability and Long-Term Peace in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (December, 2008), 1601-1620.

Table 1: Patronage as Institutional Choice

| Institutional Variable | Option 1 | Option 2 |
|-------------------------------|---|--|
| Geography | Center (Central Government Jobs) | Periphery (Local Government Jobs) |
| Visibility | Invisible and Reversible (Private Goods or “Spoils”) | Visible and Non-Reversible (Club Goods or “Pork”) |

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