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How the EU conceptualizes the causes and dynamics of conflict should, in theory, shape its policy responses. The EU’s conceptualization and understanding of the drivers of conflicts and how they should be prevented or managed is elaborated in the European Security Strategy. From this document it is clear that the EU’s conflict management strategy is founded on a linkage between security and development. This document’s understanding of violent conflict is informed by an array of liberal approaches that emphasize the economic causes of conflict, the role of political and economic development in managing conflict, and the importance of addressing the EU’s self-interest in achieving security and other goals through conflict management. There is an implicit acknowledgement of the two dominant paradigms that emerged from the collapse of Communism, the end of the Cold War and the global rise of violent conflicts in the 1990s. First, Democratic (or Liberal) Peace Theory, which holds that democracies do not go to war against each other and that democracy promotion will prevent conflict, for as the EU strategy puts it: ‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’ (European Council, 2003). Second, the ‘conflict trap’ paradigm that is advocated by the World Bank, which correlates civil wars with economic failures in development policy and proposes an agenda of measures to correct them (Bigombe et al., 2000; Collier et al., 2003).

The European Security Strategy aspires to creating an EU strategic culture of ‘early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention’, but it is somewhat contradictory in identifying what approaches are of paramount importance to delivering this goal. On the one hand, the document reflects an underlying tension between a ‘hard’ ‘security first’ approach to conflict management and more nuanced political and economic intervention. The term ‘security’ is used in the document across the spectrum of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ interpretations, from the maximalist ‘hard’ understanding that associates ‘security’ with the absence of war and the ending of violent conflict by military means, to more ‘soft’
forms, including the prevention of spillover effects from dysfunctional and failed states such as transnational organized crime and refugee flows. There is a stress on a ‘security first’ approach: ‘security is a precondition for development’ and ‘security is the first condition of development’ (European Council, 2003, pp. 2, 13). Equally, the document expresses reservations about a purely military approach: ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’. The ‘multi-faceted’ complexities of conflict situations requires, the document proposes, a ‘mixture of instruments’ (European Council, 2003, p. 7).

There is also the perennial issue of whether declaratory policy informs practice, and how political interests shape particular responses to conflict cases. A primary goal of this special issue is to present a number of case studies of EU conflict management as a means of exploring how consistent, coherent, politicized and effective EU strategy is in implementation. While the case studies can inform us as to the extent to which the EU actually implements its own strategic directives, we need also to take account of the context in which the EU strategy has evolved, and how its conceptual frames have developed over time. This introduction tracks the EU’s conceptualization of the relationship between development and security in step with its expanding role in conflict management regionally and internationally. What is at stake here is whether there is a linear or ‘cyclical’ relationship between conflict, insecurity and poverty (as the European Strategy frames it) or whether this is a too restrictive understanding of the drivers and dynamics of conflict. The EU’s self-image as portrayed in the carefully crafted narrative of its own genesis follows this linear model—it was founded to promote developmental interdependence among European states as a means of conflict prevention and building security (the existing security environment established by World War Two tends to be played down). What other drivers and dynamics might the EU be leaving out of its conceptualization, thereby limiting its strategic policy formulation on conflict prevention? There are some obvious gaps. Most importantly, there is the absence of an overt recognition of the political, ideological and group rivalries and grievances that underpin most dysfunctional or failed states and conflicts. There is also a failure to understand the dynamic interaction between grievances and conflict, and of the escalating and radicalizing effects of violence, whether by state or non-state actors, which can often have a transformative effect on the drivers of a conflict. This introduction sets out the key conceptual linkages between conflict, security and development as informed by intellectual currents and debates ongoing since the early 1990s.

Concepts and Norms in Conflict

The political science approaches to conflict generally identify group mobilization around nationalist and ethnic factors as an umbrella for many key motivations, including: rival social identities and hierarchies leading to inter-group fears and competition (Horowitz, 1985), inter-group resentments at relative inequalities of power and resource distribution (Petersen, 2002), or grievances and antagonisms at discrimination (Gurr, 2000). During the 1990s, however, the discourse in the study of conflict became increasingly dominated by attempts by economists to measure the role of individual incentives and economic drivers. The competing explanations for conflict were encapsulated in the ‘greed and grievance’ debate, i.e. whether to give prominence to materialistic, cultural identity or other factors in explaining group competition and a spillover into violence. The ‘greed
and grievance’ debate also increasingly informed the international policy agenda in conflict management during the late 1990s.

From the late 1990s influential econometric models that offered policy solutions to conflict were becoming hegemonic in academic and policy-making circles. The political, ideological and group motivations for conflict were increasingly discounted and ‘rebellion’ became equated with ‘quasi-criminal activity’ (Collier, 2000). The Collier–Hoeffler Model identified the most salient correlates of civil wars as ‘opportunities for rebellion’ that were ‘greed motivated’ and ‘substantially disconnected’ from other social drivers, such as grievances around inequality, political rights and identity (Collier et al., 2005).

While the concept of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state had been part of the international discourse on conflict since the early 1990s collapse of Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, Fearon & Laitin (2003) offered an econometric model that demonstrated the potential for a strong state to prevent the organization of rebellion, thus reinforcing the need for state-building as an international policy priority.

The scholarly research agenda and debates since have increasingly emphasized the limitations of such material correlates and developed complex narratives and observations as regards the interaction of greed and grievance in the dynamics of violent conflicts. The conceptual flaws in the model are twofold. First, the model embraces only what can be measured and analysed by econometrics, thus the focus on economic data. Yet violent conflicts are generally a result of a breakdown of more than just material relationships between groups, and this approach does not explain the many important non-economic causes of conflict. Second, the paradigm does not distinguish sufficiently between violent conflicts in developed and developing states, and between regime types, notably whether a country is democratic or authoritarian. The model’s advocates are mostly developmental economists specializing in Africa, and not surprisingly the most pronounced correlations are between civil wars, poverty and developing states, but this tells us little about the causes of violent conflict in more advanced states where poverty levels were much lower and state capacity is very high (notably, the UK and Spain) (Woodwell, 2005). Moreover, critics contend that the relationship between different factors, such as ethnicity and identity, geography, ideology, material grievances, crime and ‘lootable’ natural resources in the causation of violent conflict is still not well understood. Equally, the relationship between causes, different forms of violence and the protractedness of a conflict is also under-researched and under-theorized (Sambanis, 2005; Ballentine, 2003). In recent studies the explanations for failed states have returned to an emphasis on the centrality of relationships between groups and ‘intercommunal enmity’, for as Rotberg put it: ‘There is no failed state . . . without disharmonies between communities’ (Rotberg, 2004). Consequently, scholarly attention has refocused on the importance of the role and nature of state legitimacy in peace and state-building and the means of achieving it (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2009).

The debate on the primacy of security over development and vice versa, and the usefulness of econometrics to understanding violent conflict, was paralleled by a scholarly and policy debate on the democratic options for peace-building in deeply divided societies. Broadly, the arguments are aligned along an axis bracketed by options for assimilationist and integrationist solutions at one end and multiethnicity or multiculturalism and consociationalism at the other. All of the potential options are concerned with configuring institutional technocratic fixes to achieve stability, and ultimately to engineer politically a conflict resolution. The engineering should be properly understood, in the first instance,
as an elitist project, for peace processes inevitably focus on bringing political elites to the
negotiating table to hammer out institutional solutions that will accommodate their interests
and those of their represented group constituencies. The mid-to-late 1990s saw a number of
internationally mediated democratic transitions and peace agreements in which the EU
played a significant role that embedded features of consociationalism (South Africa, the
Dayton Agreement and the Belfast Agreement). The societal divisions in these conflict
cases were viewed as so deep and antagonistic that only institutionalized power-sharing
and other complex constitutional and legal arrangements were seen as capable of delivering
peace and stability. Although a societal accommodation between the groups in conflict is
not excluded over the longer term by Consociationalists, they view this as an aspirational,
if not very likely, organic development. In the meantime, consociationalism is designed
to make political institutions build trust and confidence, and thus to drive forward what
Lijphart termed the ‘spirit of accommodation’ among political elites.

The critics of consociationalism are unsettled by this philosophy for three main reasons.
First, they frame it as a ‘group’-differentiated approach in fundamental breach with liberal
forms of democracy. Second, embedding ethnic or other group power blocs in government
is seen as perpetuating the potential for conflict. Third, consociationalism in the aftermath
of violent conflict generally sees the conflict parties elected and installed in government.
This ‘rewarding’ of perpetrators discomforts liberal cosmopolitans. The intellectual dis-
contents contend that consociationalism merely reproduces and sustains the divisions,
and offers no perspective for moving beyond a deeply divided society by building a
cross-cutting civic identity. Assimilationist/integrationist policies aspire to the building
of a single cross-cutting civic identity, and thereby must eliminate group autonomy,
whether cultural or territorial, and seek to deter political mobilization around national,
ethnic, religious, or cultural differences by incentivizing political mobilization that cuts
across identities. Institutional and electoral structures that specifically prohibit or at
least disincentivize group political activism are seen as the answer to conflict (even
though policies are often rightly suspected as being a cloaking device for reinforcing
the hegemony of one group in a state).

The normative push for integrationist solutions to conflict also drew on the drive in inter-
national politics from the early 1990s for transitional justice—in particular for truth commis-
sions, and a no impunity policy that sought to bring perpetrators of violence to justice, and
advocacy of ‘reconciliation’. This drive gathered intensity as a result of the transition
in South Africa and the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia and the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As with the linkage
between security, development and conflict, the rhetoric of reconciliation became ubiquitous
in academic and policy discussions of peace-building in the aftermath of conflict, despite the
fact that as a concept it lacks a coherent or agreed definition. The concept of reconciliation
became a pivotal framing device in policy rationales for domestic and international recon-
struction efforts, most notably in the EU’s assistance for the Northern Ireland peace
process—its first major such undertaking. However, there was no substantive elaboration
of how this concept was to be operationalized in policy or in the funding programme.

While the scholarly research agendas on conflict have become more complex in
attempting to explain and address issues of causation and dynamics, international
policy-making, including by the EU, has become increasingly informed by the ‘conflict
trap’ thesis—the attempt to measure and address the consequences rather than causes
per se. In addition to a focus on institutional and state failure as explanations for conflict,
policy-makers have been absorbed by efforts to shape the economic calculus of protagonists (especially non-state actors) by sanctions and rewards through more coercive and interventionist strategies. Moreover, since the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ following 9/11, there has been a growing tendency for international policy-makers to de-legitimize rebellion and selectively to characterize, in essence demonize, violent resistance to states in terms of linkages to criminality and terrorism.

**Capability and Intention in the EU Strategy**

The core themes in the EU’s concept of conflict prevention—the importance of economic factors in conflicts, the ‘link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance’—are repeatedly stated in Council documents (see e.g. the Council Common Position 2005 (European Council, 2005)). Some scholars rigidly underline the EU’s oft-stated normative commitment to the ‘shared values’ of democracy and human rights (Schimmelfennig & Maier, 2006). The EU is frequently portrayed as being a ‘unique’ international actor, one that seeks to use normative and civilian forms of power instead of military power to promote its values (Manners, 2002; Smith, 2003). However, often it is the EU’s capacity to secure a ‘change of scripts’, to change the idiom of conflict protagonists in how they interact with each other and outsiders that is most obvious (Tocci, 2007).

But where does the balance lie in the EU conflict management strategy between interests and norms? The consequentialist self-interest of the EU is evident in its policy documents. Conflict management is not only a ‘moral’ question, but is also viewed as a means to advancing EU interests such as curbing organized crime and terrorism, illegal migration and trafficking, and promoting trade and cooperation with ‘well-governed’ and stable neighbouring countries to the East and in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the promotion of an EU ‘strategic culture’ of intervention is seen as a mechanism for delivering ‘greater political weight’ for the EU in international politics (European Council, 2003). The rationale for the EU’s attempt to specialize in peace-building is, therefore, an amalgam of norms and interests that may not be easily reconciled. But is it programmatically coherent and consistent in implementation?

A legal framework for an EU role in conflict prevention (via the Western European Union) developed from the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The EU’s role in conflict management is now embedded in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), according to Article 2 of which ‘the Union’s aim is to promote peace . . .’ and the new general provisions on external action include the aims to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts . . .’ It was the ‘Prevention of Violent Conflict’ (Göteborg Programme) document of 2001, however, that saw the EU begin to develop its own programmatic approach to conflict prevention, or as some have termed it a ‘European model of peacemaking’ (European Council, 2001).

The Göteborg Programme incorporates a number of key elements in the European strategy. First, the Union views itself as a normatively motivated organization that embodies a ‘community of peace and progress’ that is informed by fundamental ‘democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development’. Accordingly, the Union sees its role as being endowed with the moral responsibility to act multilaterally with the international community, in compliance with the UN Charter, to prevent the human suffering and destruction caused by violent conflicts. The EU’s declaratory policy statements on conflict prevention affirm that this task has the
'highest political priority' and is ‘one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations’. Second, the EU’s external relations policy has been framed with the goals of facilitating peaceful solutions to disputes and addressing the ‘root-causes’ of conflicts, without specifying how it conceptualizes such causes. Third, in addition to developing its ‘soft power’ tools for conflict prevention, such as the accession and association processes, trade and economic assistance, the EU has also expanded a ‘hard power’ instrument in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to strengthen the EU’s capacity for action—though as of yet this remains only weakly developed (European Council, 2001).

Certainly by 2006 the scope of EU action in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building had widened substantially to include not only peacekeeping operations but also disarmament and demobilization, democratization and institutional reform, transitional justice, reconstruction and development and numerous other sub-fields of action (European Commission, 2006). Furthermore, efforts were made to make EU action more coherent and systematized, and guided by an ‘early warning, early action’ philosophy of pre-emption that is reminiscent of the activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. To enhance its administrative capacity for action, Civilian Response Teams for crisis management were created (in 2006), and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism was replaced with the Instrument for Stability (in 2007) to provide short- and medium-term crisis assistance, mainly to African states in conflict. Moreover, cooperation with civil society was enhanced, and a Conflict Prevention Partnership with leading non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was established. However, the main burden of the EU’s direct role in conflict prevention and management activities has fallen on the 11 EU Special Representatives appointed by the Council to support the activities of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in key zones of conflict that are considered to be of strategic importance for the EU. The idea of ‘mainstreaming’ a culture of conflict prevention within EU institutions has, in effect, diluted and dispersed the ‘programmatic’ momentum into other strategic instruments that have many broader or, indeed, more specific goals, such as the ENP Action Plans and the African Peace Facility, as well as more narrow policy themes such as the environment, the Kimberley Process (the international instrument to combat conflict diamonds), illegal logging, water security issues, counter-terrorism and human rights (European Council, 2006, 2007).

A retuning of the underlying concept in the EU’s programmatic thinking on conflict prevention occurred in 2007 around the idea of state ‘fragility’—a development of the theses on the ‘Conflict Trap’ and ‘weak states’. Here the focus was on a nexus of causation that connected weaknesses in state authority (the weak or failed state concept) to failures in service provision, which in turn led to a legitimacy crisis (Stewart & Brown, 2009). With increasing Western and EU intervention in Africa and the Western Balkans, and with the escalation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, policy attention became fixed on how to join up effectively the broad range of government, aid and NGO actors involved in providing security and development and often working on similar tasks in related programmes funded by states and international organizations.

Consequently, by 2007 EU declaratory strategy on conflict prevention was firmly rooted in the idea that security is the precondition for development. The Commission advocated that EU support for ‘fragile states’, whether in the form of democratic governance, state-building, reconciliation processes or human rights protection, should be ‘through
dialogue and incentives, rather than through conditionality and sanction’ (European Commission, 2007, pp. 8–9). The conceptual prism is fixed on two levels: the developmental dimension (how effective is state service provision and delivery?), which is linked to structural reform, authority and legitimacy questions; and democratic institution-building. Such a focus facilitates the ‘checklist’ method that developed out of the EU’s enlargement process to Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, allowing monitoring and reporting to adhere to a template of boxes to be ticked. It is not simply a symptom of bureaucratization or an administrative convenience, however, for Carothers, a leading democracy promotion practitioner, has observed that the ‘checklist’ culture is inherent in the transition paradigm that is itself informed by the Democratic Peace Theory.6

Flexibility or Incoherent Implementation?
The articles in this special issue are case studies of the EU’s role in conflict management and its implementation of its own declaratory strategy. The aim of the issue is to assess critically whether there is policy substance, coherence and consistency beyond the EU’s rhetorical claims. Are there particular models, concepts, techniques or envisioned outcomes developed and promoted by the EU? The study of conflict suffers from much terminological competition and confusion, notably terms such as conflict regulation, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and conflict management (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, pp. 29–30). Here we use the term conflict management broadly, as a generic envelope to capture EU policy activities that include pre-emption (early warning, early action), as well as a broad range of instruments, measures and actions that include attempts to positively prevent, contain, end and move beyond violent conflicts.

The articles share a focus on the incoherence, inconsistencies and ineffectiveness in practice of the EU’s conflict management strategy. What is extraordinary is that in all of the major EU documents discussed above, the experiences of conflict management within the EU are rarely, if ever, mentioned. In particular, the EU expended significant funds and resources in Northern Ireland from the mid-1990s and had many years experience of programming to draw lessons from. Not only were two member states deeply involved in the Northern Ireland peace process, but also the European Commissioner for External Relations during a critical period (1999–2004), when the EU was formulating its conflict management strategy, was Chris Patten, who had also for several years headed a commission on police reform in Northern Ireland. James Hughes attempts to disentangle some of the reasons for this reticence, exploring the myths surrounding the Northern Ireland ‘model’ of conflict resolution, and analyses why, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the EU appears unable to draw appropriate lessons from its involvement in Northern Ireland to apply to Kosovo.

One of the significant paradoxes in EU conflict management in many of the cases analysed in this issue is that the EU attempts to combine simultaneously policies that are not always compatible: containing, and moving beyond conflict, while also advancing the process of accession for the countries involved. There is often not only an uneasy tension over how to reconcile these two goals, but also the EU’s leverage can change dramatically. The limitations to EU conditionality are explored in several articles. Christalla Yakinthou analyses the EU’s role in the attempts to resolve the Cyprus conflict in advance of the accession to the EU of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004, when conditionality leverage was maximized, and how the EU’s ability to influence the conflict was
severely reduced post-accession. The articles by Sofia Sebastian on the EU’s role in the attempts at constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Claire Gordon on the Stability and Association Process (SAP) as an instrument for conflict management, and Zoran Ilievski and Dane Taleski on the EU’s active role in conflict management in Macedonia analyse the direct and indirect effects associated with the process of EU integration and association. These articles illustrate the fluctuations in EU policy and engagement, and reveal the strengths and limitations over time of EU accession conditionality as a conflict management tool. The bureaucratization of the security–development tandem informing EU conflict management is particularly well demonstrated by the SAP, which encases a checklist of complex issues, including compliance with internationally mediated peace agreements, cooperation on reconstruction, progress on transitional justice and reconciliation, refugee return, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia, and regional developmental cooperation. The articles’ shared conclusion is to question whether EU conditionality and engagement has seriously altered the cost–benefit calculus of political elites and whether interests are being rearticulated in a manner conducive to the long-run resolution of the identity-based conflicts.

Similarly, Gwendolyn Sasse analyses the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy on conflict management in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in cases where, in contrast to the Western Balkans and Cyprus, there is no explicit membership perspective, and thus minimal conditionality leverage. Here, the scope for EU influence in conflict management is determined much more by ENP states’ interest in closer relations with the EU, and the EU’s geostrategic competition for influence with Russia. By comparing the EU’s role in Moldova and Georgia, Sasse demonstrates the risks posed by EU entanglement in conflicts where it lacks the capacity to engage effectively and where broader European security issues, notably NATO expansion, are in play. The EU has had the most positive effect on stabilizing the conflict in Moldova, where NATO membership is not an issue, and where there is a willingness among the parties to negotiate. By contrast, in Georgia, where the government has coupled EU engagement and NATO membership, ENP has raised false expectations and has contributed to the radicalization leading to the renewal of violent conflict, as in the Russia–Georgia war of August 2008.

Nathalie Tocci’s analysis of the EU’s role in the Israel–Palestine conflict not only explores the coordination problems in EU foreign policy-making, but also challenges the central pillar of the thesis that the EU is a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power, namely, that the EU, lacking coercive military power, rarely applies sanctions and prefers instead to induce cooperation and promote its values through extending material incentives in the form of trade, commerce and overseas development aid. Tocci’s analysis of the politics of the close EU–Israel relationship and the preferential treatment of Israel (especially in commerce) despite its breaches of international humanitarian law in the conflict with the Palestinians casts serious doubts on the premise that the EU is intent on promoting its values as ends in themselves. Catherine Gegout’s article examines the EU’s mission-creep in conflicts in Africa to illustrate the relationship of these conflicts to the EU’s still weak military capacity, to question whether the missions have an underlying normative intent, and to chart the EU’s prioritization of military security intervention at the expense of the development of a comprehensive, longer-term policy designed to tackle the root causes of conflict.
The articles share some central concerns and currents: the problems of coordination and coherence in the field of conflict management across the key agents of EU foreign policy-making (the European Commission, European Council, national governments, the European Parliament); the inconsistent interaction multilaterally with other states, the UN and other international organizations; and the evident linkage between the EU’s leverage to shape a conflict case and the membership perspective, with leverage weakening as the membership perspective fades. Several articles question the very independence of an EU role, arguing that in many cases the EU is subordinate to US policy.

In conclusion, a set of dichotomies can be employed to frame how we should understand the dynamics of EU conflict management strategy. First, there is a security–development nexus, which hinges on the uncertainty of sequencing. There may be broad agreement that both security and development have essential roles to play in stabilizing a conflict, but which should come first, which should be prioritized, and are both necessarily compatible? Second, there is the dilemma of coercion versus persuasion. In principle, the EU’s stated preferences as a ‘civil’ power combined with its accession conditionality leverage should position it to lean towards the latter. Third, there is the question of economic dogma in the management of divided, conflictual societies. Liberal economic policy approaches are antipathetic to the inevitable costs of duplication that are entailed in governing divided societies. In principle, the promotion of shared interests through socio-economic interdependencies is a not unreasonable policy position, but questions of speed of implementation and local ownership will be critical to the effectiveness of such policies. Finally, there is the enormous conceptual gulf between strategies of accommodation and integration, in particular with regard to the institutional engineering. The more innovative proposals for a fresh look at sequencing in post-conflict societies do not bridge this gulf. For, whether it is ‘letting go’ of the democratic transition paradigm and recognizing its limited usefulness in many places (Carothers, 2002), or the preference for institutional development (what the EU terms institutional capacity-building) before liberalization (Paris, 2004), they tend to side with assimilationist–integrationist policy solutions.

Understanding the EU’s role in conflict management requires not only that we map the evolution of EU policy and strategic thinking, and the development of its institutional or military capacity to manage crises, but also that we take account of the extent to which the EU can exert influence on conflict parties, which itself depends on a number of changing factors: how the EU conceptualizes conflict and policy solutions; what the balance of interests is within the EU on the issue (divided or concerted); how much scope there is for an external EU role; and the value attached by the parties to EU engagement—a value that is almost wholly bound to their interest in a membership perspective, rather than to ‘shared values’ as an end in themselves.

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Notes

1. Low intensity protracted conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country are excluded from the model as they fall outside a numerical threshold of casualties established for the characterization ‘civil war’ to apply.

2. According to the European Commission its support for conflict prevention and peace-building includes: ‘peacekeeping operations, peace processes, peace negotiations and reconciliation efforts; Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR); anti-mine action; Security Sector Reform (SSR); civilian administration and good governance; democratisation; strengthening of the rule of law; justice reform; ensuring respect for human rights; children-related post-conflict assistance; institution building; independent media and truth commissions; facilitation of the transition from crisis situation to normal cooperation; addressing degradation and exploitation of natural resources; tackling proliferation of small and light weapons; targeted economic and other measures such as relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction operations and development assistance. Trade-related measures have also played a critical role in tackling post-conflict challenges’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 3).

3. The Conflict Prevention Partnership is a cooperative effort by the International Crisis Group, International Alert, the European Policy Centre and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, whose aim is to work to prevent conflicts worldwide by helping improve the European Union’s conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding capacities. http://www.conflictprevention.net. The guiding philosophy of this network is that human rights, democracy and conflict prevention are inextricably linked.

4. The Special Representatives are located in Afghanistan, the African Great Lakes Region, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Kosovo, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Sudan.

5. The EU lagged somewhat in this sphere given that the World Bank had opened a ‘Fragile States Unit’ in 2002.

6. Carothers argued that it was time to ‘let go’ and bring the transition paradigm to an end, and explained: ‘A whole generation of democracy aid is based on the transition paradigm, above all the typical emphasis on an institutional “checklist” as a basis for creating programs, and the creation of nearly standard portfolios of aid projects consisting of the same diffuse set of efforts all over—some judicial reform, parliamentary strengthening, civil society assistance, media work, political party development, civic education, and electoral programs. Much of the democracy aid based on this paradigm is exhausted. Where the paradigm fits well—in the small number of clearly successful transitions—the aid is not much needed. Where democracy aid is needed most, in many of the gray-zone countries, the paradigm fits poorly’ (Carothers, 2002, p. 18).

References


