Paying for Peace: Comparing the EU’s Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo

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Abstract: The conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo are among the most important recent conflicts in Europe for the EU’s ambition to develop a role and capacity in conflict management. The EU has frequently presented Northern Ireland as a ‘model’ for conflict management, but it is not clear what the substantive elements of the model are, or whether lessons have been transferred to other cases such as Kosovo. The EU’s role in both conflicts is analysed, in particular as regards the impact of its immense funding on peace-building and reconciliation, and how EU capacity in this policy field has developed over the last decade. The tensions and contradictions in EU policy are illustrated in both cases. The article concludes that core features of the model of political accommodation in Northern Ireland are the nature of the consociational institutions, the virtual absence of transitional justice, and the policy acceptance of the segregated social structures. Such lessons are not easily compatible with EU declaratory policy on conflict management.

Over the last decade the EU has steadily developed a narrative about its positive role in bringing the conflict in Northern Ireland to an end. The EU self-image is that it acted as a ‘beacon for positive movement’ and that the peace process demonstrates the validity of the ‘European peace-making model’.1 The framing of Northern Ireland as a ‘model’ for EU conflict management is frequently stressed by the Commission. At a January 2008 press conference with the First and Deputy First Ministers of the new government for Northern Ireland, Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness, respectively, Commission President Barroso pointedly observed that the region had conflict management ‘expertise’ to be drawn on: ‘Northern Ireland is a success story that can be an inspiration for other parts of Europe—we still have problems in our continent—and for other parts of the world’. More recently, Commissioner Hubner stated that ‘The Commission has always maintained that the experiences of the International Fund for Ireland, as well as those of the PEACE programme should be recorded with a view to sharing them with other regions facing similar problems’.2 Similarly, the author was recently told by a Commission official: ‘Northern Ireland is on our radar screens as a model for the Western Balkans’.3

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The Northern Ireland conflict had many distinctive features compared with the kinds of conflict that the EU engaged itself in managing from the late 1990s. It was a conflict within an existing member state, the UK. The increasing cooperation of the British and Irish governments, in particular following the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, meant that two member states were deeply involved in the management of the conflict. Until the landmark shifts towards European Union and the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the mid-to-late 1990s, the EC, later EU, lacked the legal and functional capacity to engage in any conflict management, let alone interfere directly in the internal politics of a member state. It was only in the latter 1990s—by which time the Northern Ireland conflict was in the final stages of resolution—that the EU established key instruments that became the foundation for its conflict management strategy, such as the strengthened High Representative for CFSP, the Special Representatives system, the accession process and its conditionality leverage, including the Enlargement Directorate-General (DG) and its annual monitoring and reporting mechanism for the Commission. Thus, in the case of Northern Ireland, the EU not only lacked the toolbox of instruments that came to shape and characterize its role in conflict management in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus and elsewhere, but also there was no legal basis for direct engagement. That the conflict occurred within a member state was an enormous political constraint.4

Yet, Northern Ireland is presented by the EU and others as a ‘model’ for conflict management. What is evident is that the EU played a pivotal role in paying for the peace. If funding levels to aid conflict management are an important measure of the political significance of a conflict, then the conflict in Northern Ireland played a major role in the development of the EU’s capacity in peace-building and reconciliation. Between 1995 and 2004 the EU committed over €1.66 billion to its Peace I and II Programmes in Northern Ireland, while Peace III (running to 2013) involves an additional €2.25 billion. Moreover, several hundred billion euros have been injected into the British and Irish government’s vehicle for promoting peace—the International Fund for Ireland—since the mid-1980s.5

This article assesses the role of the EU in the peace process in Northern Ireland, and attempts to analyse whether the EU had any substantive role in shaping the peace process. It evaluates critically the argument that this case is a ‘model’. Comparisons are made with the Kosovo conflict to explore whether the EU, in fact, is applying transferable lessons and benefits from Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland and Kosovo: Comparing Root Causes of Conflict

EU engagement in Northern Ireland predates that of Kosovo by about 5 years and I begin by mapping the broad similarities and differences between the two conflicts. Northern Ireland and Kosovo are bi-national small places, where violent conflict is the product of historically rooted antagonisms derived from territorial partitions and repartitions, and systemic political and socio-economic discrimination by privileged hegemonic groups against unprivileged subordinate groups. In both cases politics hinges on a challenge or questioning not only of the legitimacy of government policy, but also of the legitimate authority of the state itself. These contested territories, consequently, should be properly understood within a wider European context of the challenges posed by territorialized minorities to the territorial integrity of states (Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK), and of the political power of irredentism and national unification projects. The deep divisions in both places reflect reinforcing ethnic, religious
and national differences, even though the relative strength of these identities has fluctuated over time and in practice secularism has become more pronounced in the late twentieth century. The two cases have a reverse order of hegemony and subordination. In Northern Ireland a hegemonic majority ethnonational group (Protestant British ‘Unionists’) penalized a subordinate minority ethnonational group (Catholic Irish ‘Nationalists’). In Kosovo a hegemonic minority ethnonational group (Orthodox Serbs) penalized a subordinate majority ethnonational group (Muslim/Catholic Albanians). In both cases sudden socio-economic modernization and raised living standards over a few decades after World War II led to demographic changes that altered the balance of power between the communities. In particular, the surge in demographic growth of the subordinated communities (Irish Catholics, Kosovar Albanians) made an ethnic hegemonic regime increasingly untenable without the use of coercion by mass repression and/or mass expulsion.

There are legitimate questions, however, about the contingent as opposed to the root causes of the conflicts. For some ‘integrationists’ the immediate context from which violence erupted is a better explanation of the dynamics of the conflicts. This approach focuses on the violent state repression of peaceful democratization movements: the Unionist attempts to crush the 1960s civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, and the Serbian oppression of Rugova’s non-violent protest movement, leading to mass expulsions of Albanians from public service employment and the removal of Kosovo’s autonomy status under Milosevic in the 1990s. Most studies of these conflicts treat the competing ethnonationalisms as forms of false consciousness that were contingently mobilized and ensued from the drift into violent conflict. The so-called ‘social transformation’ scholarship, uniting Liberal and Leftist-leaning scholars, tends to argue that the space for a more liberal civic society might have opened had states pursued reforms and removed the causes of antagonism (discrimination and legislating for a more equal citizenship). The context of discrimination immediately prior to the eruption of violence in both cases, however, was also part of a longer term continuum of decades and perhaps hundreds of years of discriminatory practices, where hegemonic groups penalized subordinate groups because their ethnicity and/or national identity was perceived to be a threat to the existence of hegemony and the state itself.

The structural features and epiphenomena of the conflicts, such as discrimination, inequality, injustice, sectarianism, racism and segregation, are derived from the ‘root causes’ of ethnic and national enmity. If one accepts nationalism as the key driver one must also recognize that national unification projects play a major role, though these may for practical or policy reasons fluctuate in their public salience. The institutional arrangements that have been devised to manage both conflicts recognize ethnic and national enmity as the key drivers. In Northern Ireland, The Belfast Agreement (1998) provided for a complex web of institutions and policies to entrench ethnonationally based consociational structures in government and society. It accepts the fundamental division between the ‘two communities’ as the basis for power-sharing institutional arrangements. In this case, the institutional and governing design is pivoted on a ‘separate but equal’ philosophy encapsulated in the notion of ‘parity of esteem’ for the two main communities. A similar design and philosophy has been incorporated into the design for an independent Kosovo elaborated by the United Nation’s Ahtisaari Plan (2007), which is built around the notion of a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo. Despite the fact that the Albanian majority in Kosovo is estimated at over 90% of the population and the Serb minority was overwhelmingly forcibly displaced in 1999, a concept of state ‘multiethnicity’ has been imposed in
Kosovo. However, the institutionalization of ‘multiethnicity’ in a new constitution and several pieces of enabling legislation passed in 2008 is a more diluted form of ethnic power-sharing compared with Northern Ireland and is being implemented in practice in a manner that is informed by a ‘separate but equal’ concept of the state.

Aside from the international military intervention by NATO and UN administration in the case of Kosovo, perhaps the key difference between the two conflicts in terms of their internal dynamics is in the scale and intensity of the forced displacement of populations. In the case of Northern Ireland, forced ethnic displacement was temporally confined to the early years (1969–1971) of the conflict, was small scale (a few thousand), and was aimed at a consolidation of ethnic territories within the confines of the state (i.e. there was no attempt to expel the subordinated minority community to the Republic of Ireland). This simply reflected the fact that the two communities already lived in a high degree of segregation. In Kosovo, by contrast, ‘ethnic cleansing’ was on the level of the population as a whole. It involved attempts first by the Serbs and then by Albanians to homogenize Kosovo in their favour. The end result was that Kosovo’s Serbian population (some 200,000–250,000 strong) was almost totally expelled in 1999–2000 in the wake of the NATO military intervention, the withdrawal of Serb security forces and the establishment of a UN mandated Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999.8 This fact makes institutional and policy fixes based on multiethnicity, consociationalism or integrationism redundant, as there is no longer a minority community of any significant strength.

The Meaning of the Northern Ireland ‘Model’

Politicians have presented the Northern Ireland conflict as a ‘model’ of conflict resolution, but what kind of ‘model’ do they have in mind? As noted earlier, Commission President Barroso referred to Northern Irish ‘expertise’ on conflict management and dialogue and its lessons for other conflicts, but without specifying what this entailed or how it could be deployed in practice. The EU narrative at root appears to emphasize the role of economic success in promoting peace, for as Barroso has stated: ‘Northern Ireland has now emerged as an example to the world on how to succeed in promoting peace and reconciliation in a deeply divided community. Its political leaders have recognized the importance of economic success in this process, and of the role of the European Union in the drive for growth and jobs. Just like the emerging European Community of 50 years ago, the story of Northern Ireland shows that people from different communities, sometimes with fundamentally different opinions, can overcome the divisions, work together and share a common future’.9 For EU leaders, the connection between Northern Ireland and peace appears to confirm and reinforce the EU’s own developmental model. The origins of the EC lie in the attempt to overcome the European divisions that caused World War II by building interstate cooperation around the notion of economic ‘common interests’, and thereby creating a functional logic for political integration. As a Commission official told the author, this is the ‘European way’ and it informed the Commission’s thinking about how to advance peace in Northern Ireland.10

Many of the key political actors at the heart of the peace process were less certain of the lessons of Northern Ireland beyond the symbolic importance of bringing a protracted violent conflict to an end. President Bill Clinton, for example, at a time when he was deeply engaged in negotiations in the Middle East conflict, was one of the first to point to the international demonstration effects of the Belfast Agreement. Clinton stressed the
symbolic importance of the fact that the parties to one of the world’s most protracted con-
flicts had reached a settlement:

And let me tell you, you cannot imagine the impact of the Good Friday Agreement
in Northern Ireland on troubled regions of the world—in Africa and the Middle East,
in Latin America and, of course, in the Balkans, where the United States has been
heavily involved in my time. Peace continues to be challenged all around the
world. It is more important than ever to say: but look what they did in Northern
Ireland and look what they are doing in Northern Ireland.11

British and Irish political leaders, however, have shied away from explicit endorsements of
consociationalism as the key conflict resolution instrument. For rather than attest to the
value of the complex institutional engineering, they have emphasized the importance of
the process of mediation itself (the ‘peace process’, ‘dialogue’, ‘talking with terrorists’,
etc). Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Hain, for example, in a speech
at Chatham House in London in June 2007 promoting Northern Ireland as a ‘model’ of con-
flict resolution, identified four main components: the role of personalities, the aligning of
international influence, the political framework and dialogue. According to Hain, the
detailed structures are secondary to a basic political will to agree’, and developing dialogue
in the peace process was ‘arguably ... its ultimate objective’.12 For Hain, Northern Ireland
offered lessons for conflicts as diverse as Iraq, Sri Lanka, Basque Country, Kashmir and
Western Sahara. A key British negotiator and Blair advisor, Jonathan Powell, has also
recently argued that the importance of the Northern Ireland agreement lies in the way
that engaging and ‘talking to terrorists’ moved them from violence to democratic politics.
Controversially, he posited that a similar process of engagement is required with Al
Qa’ida.13 For British policy-makers, the substance of the ‘model’ is dialogue, but this
grossly underestimates the importance of the institutional and other outcomes of conflict
settlement.

As a consequence of the success in Northern Ireland, the Irish government has placed
conflict resolution and mediation at the core of its stated foreign policy objectives
through its Conflict Resolution Initiative. Drawing on the experience of the peace
process, the Irish government aims to become a ‘world leader’ in UN mediation efforts,
and has begun to establish a number of special roving ambassadors to crisis regions.14
Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari had a long engagement as a peace mediator
in Northern Ireland and no doubt brought some of this experience to his conceptualization
of the Kosovo problem and the promotion of consociational power-sharing arrangements
as a means of conflict resolution in Kosovo. Yet, even he too, in his public speeches on
peace-making, is overwhelmingly concerned with the ‘professional mediation process’
rather than the institutional and other ingredients of settling conflicts.15

There is clearly a disjuncture between how the Northern Ireland ‘model’ is being framed
by politicians and how it is viewed by academics. While politicians tend to emphasize the
centrality of dialogue, fervent academic advocates of consociationalism such as McGarry
and O’Leary stress the institutional fix—how the political accommodation in Northern
Ireland was democratically and institutionally engineered. The endogenous actors, those
former protagonists in the conflict, are embedded in the routine problems of making the
engineering a ‘worked’ example, but their expertise is also being called on in mediation
and dialogue in international conflicts. Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
Paul Murphy, was engaged in mediation by the Sri Lankan, British and Norwegian governments. As part of the mediation exercise Martin McGuinness visited Sri Lanka in January and June 2006. McGuinness also co-chaired with former South African Government Minister Roelf Meyer mediation talks between Iraqi groups, held in Finland in September 2007, which led to the so-called ‘Helsinki Agreement’ between Sunni and Shia groups. These talks were an important factor in the creation of the political climate that led to the ‘Sunni Awakening’ and the co-option of secular Sunni forces by the USA, thus largely defusing the insurgency.

Both aspects of the peace process, the institutional design and the dialogue, are obviously important, but that there is such reticence in proclaiming the value of consociationalism as an outcome tells us that there is a powerful liberal normative ideological resistance to championing this form of conflict resolution, and a reluctance among policy-makers to elaborate publicly on the inherently ‘separate but equal’ substance of the ‘model’. What then has been the role of the EU in shaping this process?

The EU’s Role in Conflict Management in Northern Ireland

There have been several important sources of funding for peace-building and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, including direct grants from the UK government, the International Fund for Ireland established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), and the Atlantic Philanthropies (a foundation funded by Irish-American entrepreneur Chuck Feeney), but the EU’s Special Support Programmes for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland are by far the largest and most thematically targeted. Established by the European Commission in 1995 following the first IRA ceasefire, the funding was strongly supported by Jacques Delors (Commission President in 1993–1994), primarily as an opportunity to demonstrate the EU’s capacity in conflict resolution. The peace programme has evolved in three sequential stages: Peace I (1995–1999); Peace II (2000–2004) and the Peace II Extension (2005–2006); and Peace III (2007–2013) (hereafter PR-I, PR-II and PR-III). Northern Ireland received £640 million in EU funding through the peace programmes in the period 1995–2006. In the period 2000–2006, six EU-funded programmes (including the ‘Building Sustainable Prosperity’ and the PEACE II programme) received EU aid of some £2.2 billion, not including the EU contribution to the International Fund for Ireland. Between 1986 and 2004, the International Fund for Ireland provided funding of over £465 million, and the Atlantic Philanthropies funding was about £230 million between 1982 and 2004. The grand total for the peace programmes in the period from the early 1980s to 2006 was approximately £1.35 billion. Clearly, the EU provided a huge amount of funding for peace-building in Northern Ireland, but was it simply a paymaster or was the funding part of a broader strategy for peace and reconciliation?

The EU’s Strategy: Peace through the ‘Social Model’

The initiation of the PR-I by the Commission in 1995, with the support of the UK and Irish governments, tapped into a pre-existing social capital capacity and a joint governmental concept of the role of reconciliation in bringing an end to the conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s this policy fell under the generic policy heading of ‘community relations’. There was a persistent tension in British government policy between a policy of coercion, (using military means to establish and maintain control and order in Northern Ireland), and
an ‘integrationist’ policy, which held that the conflict was essentially caused by problems of ‘backwardness’ (under-development such as social exclusion, social need and inequality, which were primarily experienced by the Catholic Nationalist community, leading to its political alienation). While for most of the 30-year period of the conflict British policy prioritized a military-security solution, which failed, British government reformers also attempted non-coercive policy options on two key dimensions. First, there was a policy of promoting ‘good community relations’ within Northern Ireland. Second, there was recognition of the political nature of the conflict as one involving competing nationalisms. This reality required an external ‘Irish’ and other international dimension (notably the involvement of the USA and latterly the EU).

As the violence escalated in the 1970s, however, the efforts to assist the development of, and in essence manufacture, an integrationist cross-community civil society became inoperable. Historically, civil society (whether voluntary organizations, trades unions and business associations, churches, etc.) largely operated on a sectarian basis in Northern Ireland, naturally reflecting the divided society. As violent conflict intensified in the early 1970s, communal segregation was consolidated and the potential for civil society to moderate the conflict was completely marginalized. In the 1970s and 1980s, the development of civil society capacity occurred separately within the communities. The dynamics of the conflict, notably the intense sectarian violence in the mid-to-late 1970s and the surge in Irish nationalist mobilization in the early 1980s following the IRA hunger strikes, reinforced the segregation. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 led to a refocus on ‘community relations’ and created the International Fund for Ireland to channel investment (including EU contributions) to Northern Ireland to promote peace.

There were also important social changes transforming the social capital of the rival Nationalist and Unionist communities throughout this period. The consensus among civil society activists was that there was a scissors effect in the development of social capital as a result of the combined effects of structural socio-economic decline and violent conflict. Whereas social capital strengthened in Catholic Nationalist communities and there was a dynamic growth in civil society and community organizations, by contrast there was a steady decline in social capital within the Unionist working class community in the 1970s and 1980s. In both communities paramilitary organizations and political movements penetrated and exercised a powerful influence on civil society, and indeed provided its leadership. This fact made the British government policy of fostering community organization highly susceptible to the charge that UK taxpayers’ money was funding paramilitaries. The asymmetry in social capital and cultural power was the background against which the peace process developed in the early 1990s and into which the EU’s peace programme began to inject funds. Not surprisingly, there was much resentment among Unionists that Nationalist community structures seemed to thrive during the conflict whereas their own communities were wracked by fragmentation and disorder. Against this background, the EU’s PR-I was initially treated with suspicion in the Unionist community and was perceived as favouring Nationalists, whose organizational capacity meant they were best placed to benefit from the funding mechanisms. A popular Unionist slogan against PR-I was ‘shove your doves’.

The EU, however, was not merely a passive donor to policy efforts by the British and Irish governments. Commission President Jacques Delors was keen to promote an EU ‘social model’ post-Maastricht. He saw the EU’s PR-I as a major social experiment in how social partnerships could be used as a developmental tool to advance European
Union, even though the focus was to be placed on community reconciliation and conflict resolution according to EU priorities. What British Thatcherites termed ‘backDelors Socialism’ yoked the open market economy of the common market to a social policy package that included a minimum level of social provision, educational equality, social partnership and a role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in ‘governance’. In essence, the Delors vision of ‘partnership’ was an instrument to circumvent obstructive national governments. PR-I was the EU’s first major funding initiative directed at this broader political goal and Northern Ireland was to be a test for the European notion of ‘partnership’ as a dialogue and consensual decision-making process between politicians and social interests in the provision of public goods. The emphasis was on ‘bottom-up’ delivery mechanisms, where the greatest share of the funding is managed by locally based partnership structures and by NGOs.19

The injection of EU funding on such a massive scale contributed to a redefinition of the political landscape in Northern Ireland by empowering civil society and weakening state control over the ‘community relations’ agenda. The organizational structure for the implementation of the EU funding balanced the decisional power of state officials and national- and local-level politicians by including representatives of social partners, including the community and voluntary sectors, the private sector, as well as European Commission officials. Not surprisingly, the process created much tension between the different interests, as elected representatives felt usurped by the new-found power of civil society and the new enhanced role of the Commission.

The EU funding was injected into a place where there was a substantial capacity for ‘partnership’. Indeed, PR-I and its successors have operated through the existing community relations expertise and civil society apparatus. The EU relied on the apparatus of the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust Community (NIVTC) that had been built up by successive British governments, but this was essentially a segregated voluntary sector. There was also enormous tension between ‘old’ versus ‘new’ community organizations, and even much debate and concern among policy-makers over what constituted a ‘community organization’. The paradox at work here was the fear on the part of policy-makers that funds would end up with paramilitaries (and the bad publicity that would result), while the paramilitaries were key hubs of community organization, especially on the Nationalist side.

The lesson of PR-I was that the EU did not have a strategic understanding of conflict management or a substantive understanding of what peace and reconciliation mean. Beyond the generic concepts of promoting its social model of ‘partnership’ and a reliance on civil society as the foundation for building peace and reconciliation, there was no strategy for what the funding should deliver. The priorities for the EU’s PR-I programme were generated locally, by NIVTC, not by the Commission. In the thematic priorities we see obvious evidence of the tension between contradictory priorities and policy approaches: between the ‘social’ need dimension (development, employment, capacity-building, regeneration) and the ‘political’ (human rights and constitutional issues). Robert Putnam’s work on social capital, notably his ideas about the connection between social networks, community engagement, ‘civic virtue’ and democracy, had a tremendous influence on how civil society activists in Northern Ireland shaped the EU funding priorities. PR-I focused on ‘capacity-building’, i.e. building social capital within the two communities.20

During the evolution of PR-II, it was widely accepted among the civil society activists that PR-I had made a strategic error by overweighting capacity-building within the communities at the expense of cross-community work and the development of what became...
known as ‘bridging’ or ‘bonding’ social capital. The prioritizing of projects that involved joint participation by both communities only developed in PR-II, and even then much of this ‘partnership’ was of a formalistic pragmatic nature to secure the funds. PR-II and PR-III have also evolved into programmes that focus more on the EU’s ‘Lisbon Agenda’ of economic growth. There is also a question as to how much of this funding is being recycled and renamed from other funds that would have gone to Northern Ireland and cross-border economic development in any event.\(^{21}\) As a consequence, the EU strategy shifted to placing a higher priority on economic development, especially stronger cross-border economic development, and downplayed ‘community work’. The recent report of the Barroso Task Force on Northern Ireland to assess the impact of EU funding, while claiming success, has finally graduated Northern Ireland from the PR programmes and has imposed explicit economically defined priorities lifted from the Lisbon Agenda for future EU funding.\(^{22}\)

The EU’s Concept of ‘Peace and Reconciliation’

When the consultation exercise for PR-I was rolled out by EU officials, despite the labelling there was no prior strategic discussion about what peace and reconciliation meant or entailed, or could be delivered. Discussion about reconciliation rendered the term ever more contested in Northern Ireland. Even the academic and practitioner literatures are inconsistent, as the term is given multiple meanings and is disfigured by ambiguous jargon. A public debate about reconciliation began as part of PR-I project implementation on key themes such as human rights, victims and survivors, and truth commissions. It was in this context that a leading US advocate of reconciliation, Jean Paul Lederach, was invited to Northern Ireland for the first time in 1995. He introduced the idea of ‘conflict transformation’ as a more progressive alternative concept to the contested and politicized term ‘reconciliation’. Perhaps reflecting the relative strength of religious organizations working in the fields of reconciliation, community relations and mediation in Northern Ireland, it is Lederach’s work that has most informed practitioners since the mid-1990s.\(^{23}\) Lederach’s vision of ‘conflict transformation’ has also infiltrated the public policy arena; for this is also a philosophy of social activism for practitioners. It requires a core of enlightened believers who will push the ‘conflict transformation’ process. Local government project initiatives on reconciliation are even titled ‘Conflict Transformation’.\(^{24}\)

The substantive content of the notion of ‘conflict transformation’ is less easy to discern. Lederach criticizes the ‘narrowness of resolution approaches’ (no doubt such as consociationalism) because although they may solve problems in the short term, they do not create a dynamic of interpersonal ‘constructive change’. His is not an approach that is concerned with the nitty-gritty institutional outcomes to a political accommodation. But what kind of ‘constructive change’ does Lederach envisage? This is never fully explained; rather, Lederach resorts to generic notions such as building positive ‘relationships’, ‘changing lives for the better’ and building ‘capacities which are creative, responsive, constructive, and non-violent’ (Lederach, 2003, pp. 69, 70).

The 1998 Belfast Agreement placed the concept of reconciliation among its foremost aspirations and included a separate section under this heading. Although we are not offered a clear definition as such, we are presented with several components of a working definition of reconciliation that informs the Belfast Agreement. There is a value-based component: an elite ethos of compromise and a societal ethos of mutual
respect and understanding (elsewhere referred to in the Agreement as ‘parity of esteem’). There is a social capital component (funding organizations engaged in what we might term ‘community relations’). There is a policy component: overcoming sectarian polarization in the areas of housing and education. How these components were to be activated was not specified in the Agreement, the bulk of which detailed the complex constitutional arrangements.

It is on the issue of reconciliation that we see a major fissure developing from the late 1990s between governments and political parties on the one hand and the more liberal cosmopolitan elements of civil society on the other. By the late 1990s, following political changes in Latin America and South Africa, and in response to conflicts in Africa, the Western Balkans and elsewhere that involved genocide and mass ethnic killing and displacement, a new normative drive had gained momentum around the concept of ‘transitional justice’. The concept has four key dimensions: restorative justice (essentially trials—punishing perpetrators, ensuring impunity does not go unpunished), reparations (supporting victims and securing compensation), truth-seeking (normally through a ‘truth commission’, public hearings, eliciting statements of regret and wrongdoing, developing a consensus narrative and a culture of forgiveness) and, finally, institutional reform (primarily in the field of policing, civil–military relations and justice). The implicit assumption in the concept is that a transparent process of catharsis and punishment allows post-conflict societies and democratizing states to move forward. Paradoxically, while the UK, Irish and US governments and the EU were in the forefront of the international drive for transitional justice, all were agreed that there should be no such process in Northern Ireland. None of the parties had anything to gain from truth-telling about the ‘dirty war’, and the Agreement itself hinged on a modified form of amnesty for all the parties to the conflict. There was to be no truth commission, which might uncover evidence of states crimes, and prisoners from groups adhering to a ceasefire would be offered an ‘accelerated release’ scheme. While there was a focus on compensation and assistance to victims, even this was highly politically sensitive given that there is no agreement on what the term ‘victim’ means. The disagreement has blocked any significant memorialization of the victims.

In practice, Northern Ireland is a major exception to the international norm of imposing transitional justice on post-conflict states. Although the rhetoric of reconciliation was kept alive by the political elites making the Agreement, many community relations professionals have abandoned the term in favour of a new rhetoric of ‘conflict transformation’. The latter idea was embraced enthusiastically by many of the voluntary organizations mentioned in the Agreement and which took part in the EU programmes. Thus, by the time the Agreement was concluded in 1998, the term ‘reconciliation’ had itself become a politically contested term and there was a disjuncture between the political elites, who make the Agreement work, and the cosmopolitan element among civil society activists, who tended to view consociationalism as creating new obstacles to the ending of the conflict and who demanded a process of transitional justice.

One of the most striking impacts of the EU funding has been on making peace-making a major business opportunity. By the time of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, according to UK government figures, there were approximately 5,000 voluntary and community organizations alone in Northern Ireland, which provided employment to some 33,000 people. By this stage of the conflict there were more people engaged in the community relations sector than were employed in manufacturing industry in Northern Ireland. The gross annual income for the sector was estimated to be around £500 million.
EU funding has not only extended the life of community relations organizations (what some may critically refer to as ‘NGO darlings’ or ‘NGO royalty’), but it has also generated a new professionalized ‘mediation’ business, and facilitated the integration of the senior cadre of the sector into the international peace and conflict management industry.

The peace in Northern Ireland is now generally perceived by the liberal constituency as having been won by the extremists, where the ‘bad guys’, the ‘terrorists’, have been rewarded with power. Much the same sentiment is evident among Serbs in Kosovo with regard to the ruling Albanian political elite, which they regard as dominated by ‘KLA terrorists’. What then are the transferable lessons, if any, from Northern Ireland to Kosovo as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) mission evolves?

The EU’s Role in Kosovo

As discussed at the beginning of the article, the EU role in Kosovo differs vastly by comparison with Northern Ireland because of the new instruments that the EU has developed since the late 1990s and the strengthening of the EU’s political union and CFSP. The EU has a number of instruments for direct involvement, from its Special Representative, currently Pieter Feith, the Commission Liaison Office, headed by Renzo Daviddi, and the EULEX mission mandated by the European Council in February 2008 and operating under the UN ‘umbrella’. Kosovo is outside the EU and seeks membership. It is de facto part of the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), though the nomenclature differs slightly as Kosovo operates under a mirror instrument—the Stability Tracking Mechanism. The Commission monitors progress, and provides reports and recommendations on how to approach and achieve the targets that the Council has set out in the European Partnership for Kosovo.28 The European Council and EU leaders have repeatedly stated that Kosovo has a ‘clear European perspective, in line with the European perspective of the region’, which is code for the membership track. However, Kosovo’s ‘European Partnership’ process with the EU is legally linked to that of Serbia.29 In theory, the EU has all of the accession conditionality levers at its disposal in Kosovo, with all of their strengths and weakness of implementation, compliance and credibility. However, the divisions within the EU (and internationally) over the recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence of February 2008 have created major dilemmas and legal uncertainties for enhanced EU action in Kosovo. So far, 60 UN member states and 22 EU states have recognized Kosovo. Five EU member states refused to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence (Slovakia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Romania), thus blocking an ‘EU’ recognition.

As in Northern Ireland, the EU is the largest payer for peace. As the largest donor to Kosovo, so far the EU funding commitment from 1999 to the present stands at some €1.8 billion. This figure will increase further as a result of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission in the rule of law area (EULEX) and an additional €800 million committed by the Commission and EU member states at the Donors’ Conference for Kosovo hosted by the Commission in Brussels in July 2008.30 Kosovo has also benefited from EU autonomous trade preferences since 2000. The EU is the main trading partner of Kosovo and also with reference to foreign direct investments, which in 2007 represented 10.0% of GDP. In contrast to Northern Ireland, the EU has not provided targeted PR programmes for Kosovo. According to Commission sources, much of its funding simply went directly to underwriting the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), and the many non-EU (often American) consultants.\textsuperscript{31} According to UNMIK, the EU was the largest donor in 2006, underwriting about 30\% of its costs. The question then is what kinds of programme and targeting priority are being employed by the EU and what lessons, if any, has the EU learnt from the PR programmes in Northern Ireland?

In contrast to Northern Ireland, the EU has been a major player in the military intervention through its member states’ participation in NATO’s KFOR operation and in the subsequent UN administration and international negotiations over the future of Kosovo. This more active role means that the EU is pivotal to the strategy of conflict management based on the idea of imposing stability by creating a ‘multiethnic Kosovo’, as proposed by the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ (March 2007), discussed later. Moreover, reflecting the different state capacities and social capital between Northern Ireland and Kosovo, the EU has a significant and increasing presence on the ground—indeed, the goal was to create a EULEX mission some 3,000 strong, though the final deployment as of summer 2009 is well below this target. The EULEX mission was envisaged in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ and followed on from the priorities identified in the Commission’s Kosovo Progress Report (2007), which stressed the weak rule of law and judicial capacity.\textsuperscript{32} The function of EULEX is to build state and social capital in order to deliver on the ‘multiethnic’ strategy.\textsuperscript{33} The contrast between the EU’s limited role in Northern Ireland, restricted to funding, and its strategic role in Kosovo, combining funding and political management, is a reflection also of the different institutional involvement from the EU side. In Northern Ireland (a member state issue) the EU’s engagement was directed by the Commission, whereas in Kosovo (an external issue) it was the Council taking the lead in conflict management and in EULEX. The fact that EULEX took more than 1 year actually to deploy (even if below its intended complement) is indicative of the EU divisions, the difficulties of deploying on the ground in Kosovo, and the EU’s weakness in attracting the skilled personnel required for such post-conflict reconstruction missions.

\textbf{The EU Strategy for a ‘Multiethnic Kosovo’}

The ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ of March 2007, which was fully supported by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, proposed that Kosovo be led towards ‘independence, supervised by the international community’, but on the condition that a constitutional framework guaranteed that the new state would be a ‘multiethnic’ one, with protections and privileges for the Serb and other minority communities.\textsuperscript{34} Ahtisaari presented his plan as the ‘best compromise’, but he seems to have prejudged his task, for he interpreted the ‘maximum leeway’ given to him by the Secretary-General as one that would result in ‘no return to the pre-conflict status’ of Kosovo as part of Serbia. Ahtisaari, and presumably also the Secretary-General, assumed that Kosovo was ‘primarily a European issue’, and therefore the aim was to secure a ‘UN exit and an EU takeover’.\textsuperscript{35} Divisions in the UN Security Council and the threat of a Russian veto meant that the plan was not approved by the UN. The USA and many EU states nevertheless proceeded to act unilaterally during 2007 by preparing for independence in the expectation that UN approval was a \textit{fait accompli}. It was on this basis that the EULEX mission was prepared in late 2007 to early 2008 to replace the UN role in ‘monitoring, mentoring, advising’ (MMA) Kosovo towards full independence. The EU divisions over recognition of Kosovo’s independence clouded the EULEX mission with legal uncertainty. Ultimately the mission was deployed, but under the existing UN mandate. The EU has taken the lead in securing Kosovo’s compliance with
the ‘multiethnic’ concept of the state. The Kosovo Constitution adopted in June 2008 was drafted with the assistance of EU and US experts. The Albanians came under strong pressure to adhere fully to Ahtisaari’s recommendations for the ‘highest standards’ of minority protection.\textsuperscript{36} These include: quota representation in government and the Assembly, special language and education rights, low-level decentralization and the redrawing of municipal boundaries to favour minorities (currently under way). The standards are so high and the population thresholds for minority rights are so low that they have no match in any other European country. Potentially, the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’, and the imposition of the plan in the new Constitution of Kosovo and the enabling laws of summer 2008, will recreate parallel communities on a significant scale in Kosovo. The decentralization scheme for Kosovo entailed in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ appears to have been informed by the view that Kosovo was a divided society, much like Northern Ireland. This was true of Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s, but such a formulation was an invention after the wholesale forced displacement of Serbs and Roma from most of Kosovo in 1999. His complex institutional engineering for minority protection was designed with the Serbs in mind. In the absence of the Serb population, however, a ‘multiethnic’ concept of the state seems unworkable and only likely to antagonize the Albanian population and destabilize the peace.

Despite the EU support for a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo, the country was an overwhelmingly homogenous society—93% Albanian—even before the conflict of 1999. The country is, however, in a dire economic situation, with at least 40% unemployment, high levels of out-migration, and many families relying on remittances. Estimates vary of the pre-1999 Serb population, from 200,000 to 250,000. Few Serbs remained in Kosovo after the interethnic violence of 1999–2000 and the fresh Albanian attacks of March 2004. The vast majority of the Serb population lives in Kosovo in the special UN-administered zone in Northern Mitrovica and are unlikely ever to become subordinate to the government of Kosovo. Kosovo is \textit{de facto} a partitioned entity.\textsuperscript{37} A small number of Serbs live in a few enclaves inside Kosovo, such as in Grazanica. The UN administration is supposed to manage the return of refugees, restore their property and provide security. However, there are no reliable statistical measures of numbers of returnees, let alone the number of Serbs actually residing in Kosovo. According to UNHCR, the total number of all minority returnees since 2000 (to 2007) is estimated to be 17,821, but no figures are kept on how many returnees actually remain permanently residing in Kosovo. Given the weak security provided to returnees by local police and KFOR and the intensity of Albanian violence against returnees, it is probable that many returnees return only to sell up their property, and then return to safe zones such as Northern Mitrovica. An indication of the low priority attached to refugee returns by the Kosovo government is the small allocation of just €5.2 million from the Kosovo budget in 2007 to support the policy.

The ‘multiethnic’ constitutional framework will only be feasible if the Serbs return on a mass scale. However, the security costs of this would be so high that it is not feasible and, in practice, return is informally discouraged by KFOR. In place of large-scale returns, the policy emphasis has taken a declamatory turn in recent years, concentrating on delivering the return of small numbers in a small number of high-profile projects with small funding allocations. For example, six ‘Organized Returns projects’ costing €3.7 million were launched in 2007, five of which were completed, leading to the return of 108 families.\textsuperscript{38} The process of property restitution presided over by UNMIK’s Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) in 1999–2006 failed to facilitate return of any significance by Serbs.
Despite a small number of high-profile evictions with wide media coverage (e.g. the Velika Reka case), HPD actually managed to adjudicate for the restitution of just 2,377 properties out of some 27,000 cases (and most of these have probably been repossessed for the purpose of selling on to Albanians). No data are kept as to the sustainability of these returns. A recent independent report stated: ‘nine years of international administration have failed to unmake the powers of ethnic cleansing.’ At this rate of property restitution the pre-1999 Serb population would require hundreds of years to obtain even the potential of return to Kosovo. One measure of the low number of Serbs is the Government of Kosovo Statistical Office data on live births for 2007, which recorded just seven births to Serb mothers, and almost 32,000 to Albanian mothers.

The Albanian political elite accept the ‘multiethnic’ nomenclature imposed on it by the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ for transient instrumental reasons—to secure international support for independence. The universal Albanian view is that the ‘multiethnic’ framework will be removed by the Kosovo government or will be superseded by a new constitution or legal framework within ‘a few years’. As the current system lacks ‘local ownership’, it seems inevitable that it will be superseded in due course.

Currently, Kosovo is not ‘multiethnic’ and the strong probability is that it never will be in any meaningful sense. The return of the Serb minority on any significant scale is very unlikely as it would require a major security operation, with a KFOR troop increase to many tens of thousands, and would in any event most probably be violently resisted by the Albanians. The return of Serb property on a large scale would also probably lead to an Albanian revolt. After 8 years of UN administration, UNMIK’s efforts to rebuild Kosovo as a multiethnic society have failed. The UN, OSCE and KFOR peace-building operation collectively has failed to establish conditions in Kosovo that are conducive to the safe return of Serb refugees and displaced persons. It seems likely that the EULEX mission will suffer a similar fate.

As the EU now plays a leading role in Kosovo, a major issue is whether it accepts the segregated nature of Kosovo, admits that the ‘multiethnic’ concept has failed under the UN, or whether it actively seeks to break down the societal divisions. The Northern Ireland conflict ‘model’ demonstrates that even in a low-scale protracted conflict, the realities of the divided society must be recognized in the settlement through some form of consociational governmental arrangements. Moreover, the Belfast Agreement did not make any substantive provision, nor has there since been any significant policy effort, to break down the two main structures of sectarian social division in Northern Ireland: segregated public housing, and segregated and parallel education systems. In interviews with officials in the Council, the author was told that the EU informally tried to stop Ahtisaari’s emphasis on a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo, recognizing that this was impossible to achieve without a major security operation. The EU preferred the more vacuous term ‘coexistence’ of communities and more diluted constitutional provisions for minorities. Officials in the Council and Commission accept, as one put it, that ‘we pay a lot of lip service to reconciliation’, but equally much of the EU’s work in the Western Balkans involves many issues related to reconciliation and transitional justice: refugees’ return, for example. Even on the issue of refugees and property restoration, however, there is a huge gulf between the sustained efforts that have been made elsewhere in the Western Balkans (notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina where refugee return is a major EU priority) and the lack of commitment to the issue in Kosovo. The EU’s aid to Kosovo via the Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) was €184.7 million in 2008, of which just €4 million was directed at ‘the
sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and displaced people’, whereas some €38 million was allocated to renovate central municipal, district and Supreme Court buildings and prosecutorial offices ‘to complement EULEX initiatives’. The salience of the EU’s work in Kosovo is directed at institutional reform and capacity-building and border management, and that places a serious question mark over the commitment of the EU to sustaining the implementation of the ‘multiethnic’ dimension of the Ahtisaari Plan.44

There is a potential dilemma for the EU in that it could allow its funding programmes to become directed at promoting the diseconomies of a divided society that are entailed in a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo, including the controversial decentralization process currently under way. Such funding would most probably build social capital within communities, much as PR-I and PR-II in Northern Ireland. Only in PR-III in Northern Ireland did the EU focus its priorities on economic development. The lesson from Northern Ireland is to focus on economic development in Kosovo early. The homogenous nature of the society makes this kind of prioritization potentially even more effective as there are fewer diseconomies of division. By accepting that the ‘multiethnic’ dimension is unworkable and destabilizing, the EU could focus its energies on the association aspects of SAP. It suggests that socio-economic stabilization would be a much more effective policy choice for the EU in Kosovo.

Current EU policy appears to exhibit many tensions and contradictions. The list of priority areas and benchmarks included under the rubric of minority rights and the protection of minorities in the 2007 European Partnership for Kosovo is substantially greater than in previous documents. It includes issues ranging from completing legislation for refugee return and property rights to adopting laws on public broadcasting and against civil defamation, to developing an integrated conservation policy for cultural heritage and creating a climate for reconciliation, interethnic tolerance and sustainable multiethnicity.45

One of the goals of the EULEX mission is to deliver on the rule of law dimension of the ‘multiethnic’ strategy for Kosovo. However, other EU policy moves since 2007, notably the replacement of the CARDS programme by the IPA, suggest that the EU’s approach to Kosovo is focusing more on economic developmental and institution-building issues rather than ‘reconciliation’ and return.46 The potential for confusion is magnified also by the overlapping and unclear hierarchy between the EUSR, EULEX and the Commission’s Liaison Office.

Another point of comparison with Northern Ireland is the question of transitional justice. Peripheralized in the Northern Ireland peace process, the issue has high political salience in the Western Balkans region, including Kosovo. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has been one of the spearheads for the implementation of transitional justice as a new legal norm in international law. Locally, missing persons is perhaps the most persistent source of antagonism (some 1,500 outstanding cases in Kosovo, mainly Albanians). Moreover, states involved in the conflict as protagonists (whether Britain or Serbia) also have an interest in blocking transitional justice approaches such as truth commissions. States have an interest in sustaining their own well-established frames and narratives of the conflicts, and protecting their agents from accountability for crimes committed during ‘dirty wars’. In Kosovo some elites favour a ‘culture of silence’ similar to that of Northern Ireland, whereas others persist with notions of securing trials and investigations.47 Adopting a South American technique, families of missing persons post rows of photographs of missing persons on the gates of government buildings in Pristina, while the appeals of relatives are not considered a priority by the political
elites. On the other hand, one of the dilemmas facing the EULEX mission will be the extent to which it confronts the backlog of war crime cases in Kosovo, and pursues KLA veterans and Albanian civilians for war crimes. A recent report by Amnesty International highlighted how the UN administration has failed to address issues of transitional justice in Kosovo, while tolerating impunity for perpetrators in Kosovo and Serbia. Many KLA veterans occupy elite positions in Kosovo. To pursue them would risk renewed violence and instability. It seems likely, consequently, that EULEX will be forced into the kind of compromise and trade-off seen in Northern Ireland, sacrificing transitional justice to a workable political accommodation.

Conclusion
It is often quipped with some discontent by EU officials informally that the EU’s main function is to act as paymaster in conflicts—often bank-rolling the costs of reconstruction and development without being given a major stake in setting the strategy for peace and reconciliation. We have examined two major conflict cases in which there has been an immense injection of EU funding and also significant EU political capital expended. Both of the cases analysed provide much evidence for a lack of strategic thinking within the EU about some of the fundamental concepts in conflict management, irrespective of whether it has the capability or intention to intervene directly. The EU’s capability for conflict management has developed immensely over the last decade. Kosovo is inundated with EU personnel and a variety of EU offices that are directly and routinely involved in agenda setting and policy-making. However, huge sums of EU funding have been expended in Northern Ireland and Kosovo without much deep strategic policy thinking about what peace and reconciliation means in either context, how it relates to a political accommodation, or how aid might contribute to stability and a sustainable end to conflict. Both cases demonstrate that we need to bring social structures back into our discussions about the sustainability of peace and not just focus on the new governing institutions and elites, or civil society, or the latest fads in international norms. In so doing we may then be better positioned, for example, to evaluate what kind of ‘model’ Northern Ireland is.

Embedding the structures of division is an intrinsic component of the ‘model’ of political accommodation achieved in Northern Ireland. This factor, not dialogue, is arguably the key lesson from Northern Ireland. This is a discomforting conclusion for the Liberal Cosmopolitians and the political Left, both of which constituencies have an inordinate influence on EU policy thinking and dominate the NGO apparatus on which the EU relies for ‘partnership’. In this sense the concept of ‘conflict transformation’ is a misnomer. Transformation requires incremental change over generations, but the advocates of conflict transformation and transitional justice want action today, often with revolutionary zeal and in ways that do not serve the interests of reconciliation. We must recognize that segregation is a structural foundation of security and peace-building in divided societies not by design but by default, because it meets the needs and demands, often democratically expressed, of rival communities already living in parallel and in mistrust and fear of the ‘other’. Only coercion in the form of authoritarian and totalitarian social engineering can rapidly achieve the kind of ‘great leap forward’ of conflict transformation aspired to by Cosmopolitans. The dilemma for the EU’s role in Kosovo is that to manufacture or reconfigure a ‘multiethnic’ state would require a massive military operation
and authoritarian response to resistance. The facts on the ground are that Kosovo is an overwhelmingly homogenous state of Albanians. In due course its political and legal structures will reflect this. The EU’s role can be effective only if it works with this reality. It is not clear that the EU has learned much from the Northern Ireland conflict, despite the rhetoric about this case being a ‘model’.

Notes

1. See European Economic and Social Committee SC/029, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the role of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process (own-initiative opinion).
3. Author’s interview with Commission official, May 2008.
4. The potential for a ‘Europeanization’ of the conflict was at its greatest in the early 1970s, when British and Irish governments had strong disagreements over how to end the conflict and the Irish government, in particular, looked for external support to pressurize the British. The most significant European intervention, however, was the ECHR case brought by the Irish government against the UK over torture and human rights abuses against detainees. See ECHR, Ireland versus the United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71, Judgement, 18 January 1978, at the HUDOC database.
5. Peace III Operational Programme, pp. 4–5. In terms of funding levels and priorities for post-conflict peace-building and to put this level of funding in perspective we should note that at the 2002 Tokyo donors’ conference, the EU pledged €1 billion to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan over 5 years (although in 2004 it updated this pledge and committed $2.2 billion for the period 2004–2006); see http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographicalThemes/afghanistan/index_en.htm
6. The ‘social transformation’ approach has been articulated most recently in several of the contributions in Taylor (2008).
7. For the origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland, see McGarry & O’Leary (1996); for Kosovo, see Kostovicova (2005).
10. Author’s interview with Commission official, May 2008.
11. President Bill Clinton, speech at the Odyssey Arena, Belfast, 13 December 2000, available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/bc131200.htm
12. Peter Hain, Peace-making in Northern Ireland; A Model for Conflict Resolution, RIIA Chatham House speech of 12 June 2007, available online at: http://www.nio.gov.uk/nio_conflict_speech-2.pdf. Hain discussed Northern Ireland not only as an ‘inspiration’ for peace-making but also drew some of the main lessons from it as a ‘worked example’.
15. Ahtisaari was one of the independent decommissioning monitors in 2000–2001. As a Finn, he was familiar with complex power-sharing arrangements and autonomy from the Aaland Islands case, but he has also accumulated extensive experience of conflict resolution though his roles in Namibia (1973–1981), Bosnia (1992–1993), Kosovo (1999 and 2006–2007) and Aceh (2005). His report of January 2007 to the UNSG recommending independence for Kosovo under international supervision contains several
recommendations for consociational-type arrangements to protect the Serb and other minorities. For the report, see http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf. For one of his recent speeches on ‘mediation’ see Mediation Capacity and Opportunities for International Peace Mediation, Keynote address by President Martti Ahtisaari at the European Mediation Conference, Belfast, 10 April 2008, available online at: http://www.cmi.fi/?content=speech&id=99. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008.

16. Organized by the John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy Studies at the University of Massachusetts – Boston, with the assistance of the Crisis Management Initiative, which is headed by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, Iraqi delegates were aided by senior representatives of the peace processes in Ireland and South Africa to agree on a set of recommendations to start negotiations to reach national reconciliation. This included the principles of inclusivity, power sharing and a commitment to removing the use of violence as a means of resolving political differences. See An Phoblacht, 6 September 2007, available online at: http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/20563


18. The analysis presented here draws on the author’s interviews with community relations and civil society professionals in Belfast conducted in December 2007.


24. For example, there is Belfast City Council’s ‘Conflict Transformation Project’. The project is funded under the European Union Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland 2000–2006. See http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/conflict/index.asp

25. See Section 1.2, ‘we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all’; Section 1.5, ‘we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements’; and the section headed ‘Reconciliation and Victims of Violence’. The ministerial code of conduct also specified that ministers must at all times ‘operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of treatment’. The Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations, 10 April 1998, available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm

26. See the major government report on ‘victims’ by Sir Kenneth Bloomfield KCB, We Will Remember Them. Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner, April 1998, available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/victims.htm#21. Author’s interview with Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Belfast, December 2007. Note also that when in January 2009 the consultative group of ‘wise persons’ led by former Church of Ireland head Lord Eames (appointed by the UK government in 2007) proposed financial compensation of all victims, the subsequent media backlash and political controversy over ‘moral equivalence’ forced the government to abandon the proposal. For reactions, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7856590.stm
33. See the EULEX mission statement at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?id=2
34. For the plan, see http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf
36. Author’s interview with Kosovo government ministers and politicians, Pristina, September 2008.
37. Author’s interviews with Serb community leaders in Northern Mitrovica, September 2007.
39. For critical analyses of HPD’s activities, see Vagle & de Medina-Rosales (2006).
42. Author’s interviews in Kosovo September 2008, including leaders of Albanian parties and government leaders, KLA veterans.
43. Author’s interviews in the Commission and Council, May 2008.
46. The IPA’s two components are: Component I—Institution Building and Transition Support; and Component II—Cross-border Cooperation.
47. Author’s interviews with ICRC representatives in Kosovo, September 2007.

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