Book reviews

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Book Reviews

Frank K. Salter (ed.). *Risky Transactions: Trust, Kinship and Ethnicity*. New York and
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002. Pp.304. $79.95 (hbk); $29.95 (pbk). ISBNs 1 57181
710 7 and 1 57181 3195.

What kind of social ties exist between people who perform risky transactions? What
is the role of kinship and ethnicity on the risk- prone exchange? The answers to these
burning questions are disputed in the edited volume of *Risky Transactions: Trust,
Kinship and Ethnicity* by scholars from different disciplines.

The book is constructed on the idea of kin selection or inclusive fitness, which is
a part of modern evolutionary theory of social behaviour. Inclusive fitness theory can
be viewed as an expanded view of Darwinian understanding of natural selection that
explains altruism. Darwin assumed that individuals are units of selection. Hamilton,
by shifting the unit of analysis of selection to genes, offers an explanation for altruism
and risk-taking for kin and tribe. As close kin share a considerable proportion of their
genes, they have a common interest in sacrificing personal gain for each other to
protect their gene pool. Hamilton's theory of kin selection is combined with the ethnic
nepotism theory of Pierre van den Berghe. Pierre van den Berghe argues that 'ethnicity
is an attenuated form of kinship' (p.5). Kin selection theory is applied to ethnicity with
the assumption that it is an extended type of kinship. The central thesis of the book is
kinship and ethnicity have a significant effect on the relationships that survive in the
face of various types of risk. (p.13).

The authors supply answers to the questions at the outset of this review concerning
risk-taking on behalf of kin or co-ethnics under six headings: ethnography,
psychological mechanisms, risky business, oppressed families, minorities, and
miscellaneous – AIDS, the US Supreme Court, tourism and evolutionary synthesis.
The book's conceptual framework and overview of the debate over inclusive fitness
are presented in the first chapter of the book. Under the ethnography section, Polly
Wiessner provides an empirical analysis that addresses the question of 'how risky
transactions are handled within forager social security systems?' (p.21). Her reports on
the Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari show that kinship has an important role in risk-
sharing. Under the psychological mechanisms section, X. T. Wang tests the hypothesis
concerning the 'kith-and-kin rationality' adopted to the tasks of nepotistic decision-
making and risky choices in small groups. Wang's findings demonstrate that kinship
has an influence on shaping 'human rationality'. In the fourth chapter, role of kin
altruism as a motivation to run risks is discussed. Analysis supports the idea that kin
altruism exerts a significant influence on the likelihood of taking risks. In the risky
business section, Blok focuses on the nature of social ties that conduct risky
transactions within the Mafia. His study shows that biological and metaphorical
kinship is a significant factor that binds members of the Mafia to each other. Landa's
chapter points out the classification aspect of human nature and develops a new
approach to institutions by focusing on ethnically homogenous middlemen groups that
promote reciprocal trust among trading partners. In the section on oppressed families
and minorities, Strungaru examines a specific type of risk: 'opposing a totalitarian
regime' (p.145). Specifically, the risk of opposing the former Romanian Communist
government is pointed out. In the same section, MacDonald analyses Jewish social-
organizational and cultural responses to anti- Semitism, inferring that belonging to a
Jewish community is by itself a risky transaction. In the miscellaneous section,

Schubert and Curran test the hypothesis that people show increasing preference for physiognomic similarity under conditions of heightened transactional risk like risk of HIV exposure. Pierre L. van den Berghe in chapter 11 examines risks of tourism and kin-ethnic preferences of tourists. In the part on evolutionary synthesis, Meyer focuses on the causes of social integration considering the perspective of evolutionary approach. The findings show that individuals feel secure within societies composed of familiar individuals, kin or fellow ethnics. Frank Salter in the final chapter argues that ethnic solidarity can be a 'two-edged sword' and discusses possible methods for structuring societies in a way that they gain benefits of solidarity without aggression against others.

One of the important contributions of the book is its attempt to bring biology back into discussions of social science. The theories of biology – like evolutionary theory – offer connections with many debated issues of social science, like ethnic identity, as discussed in this book. Related to this, concerning the rise of ethnic conflicts, the possibility of practical implication of the findings makes this study an important one for not only scholars but also policy-makers.

The comprehensive discussion includes many disciplines is one of the strengths of the book. This volume should be of interest to a wide range of scholars in psychology, political science, ethology, sociology, economics and anthropology with different chapters concerning different groups. Although all of the chapters provide analysis related to the role of kinship and ethnicity in risky transactions, the discussion in each chapter can be read independently. However, the inclusiveness of the study brings the challenge of maintaining a coherent debate on the overall issue. Even though each chapter provides a unique contribution to its own discipline, they do not supply support to a clear-cut, detailed theoretical framework that is drawn by the book other than the application of inclusive fitness theory. For future research, precise theoretical structure that would provide communication between the findings of different disciplines would significantly contribute to the scientific inquiry that is opened with this book.

It is a minor point, but chapters of the book do not follow a common format. Dispersed structure provides both advantages and disadvantages. Unique design of each chapter offers authors opportunity to include more than the answer to the specific question concerning risk-taking on behalf of kin or co-ethnics. Yet, for the reader interested in the central thesis, different formats for the chapters constitute a barrier yet to be overcome.

YASEMIN AKBABA
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Oliver P. Richmond. *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002. Pp.264. $69.95 (hbk). ISBN 0 333 80049 4

The book under review is a timely study of the conflict resolution field. Oliver Richmond, a reader at the University of St. Andrews and a specialist on the conflict in Cyprus, identifies three generations of approaches to ending conflict. The central assumption lying behind these approaches is that both order and peace are values to be preserved at the level of the modern international system (which emerged following the peace of Westphalia of 1648) and, therefore, the system itself is conceptually and

practically prior to its parts. For Richmond, this explains the inherent limitations of attempts at ending conflict.

The Westphalian international system is a state-centric spatial organization of territory and politics. The fact that conflict, security, sovereignty, and conflict resolution are seen through the Westphalian prism limits the options for conflict resolution in two ways. First, conflict resolution approaches focus on state security, instead of human security and, by so doing, they ignore the role of the state in producing or perpetuating binaries of inclusion/exclusion. Second, because ethnic groups tend to see their only possibility for survival and/or security through the lenses of the Westphalian international system, they are not ready to accept alternatives other than self-determination and independence. In sum, not only does Westphalian sovereignty reproduce the very system at the root of conflict, but it also exacerbates local confrontation because it offers as the only formula for peace the very institutional rewards that make conflict an appealing option for the participants.

Richmond substantiates this argument by closely analyzing the strengths and limitations of three generations of conflict resolution approaches. The first generation, predominant during the Cold War, focuses on ameliorating conflict at the state level. The aim of these approaches is the modest one of 'managing' instead of resolving conflict. Centred on the power and interest of states, these approaches seek solutions based on state security instead of human security or justice. The ultimate objective of what Richmond calls 'status quo diplomacy' is to preserve the Westphalian international system by preserving the integrity of the states that compose it. To this end, the essential conflict resolution recipe is based on a cease-fire, followed by peacekeeping troops and opportunities for mediation and negotiation.

The second generation attempts to overcome the limitations of state-centred approaches by including the individual in the conflict resolution process. Instead of simply managing insoluble conflicts, second generation approaches allow for the possibility that conflict could be 'resolved'. Resolution, however, requires placing more emphasis on human security and human needs and less on state security. Since it is the suppression of human needs that is thought to lead to conflict, effective intervention requires a broader approach, by integrating élites, community leaders and grassroots actors. While first generation approaches consciously aimed at reproducing the state system, the second generation wants to reform it, yet without any radical change. Because the broadening of intervention is still carried out in the Westphalian context, second generation approaches tend to reconstruct states instead of reforming or substantially changing them.

The third generation differs from the previous ones in that it is multidimensional and has arisen in the post-cold war context. Third generation approaches benefit from the current late Westphalian order where the meaning of security and the actors involved in the conflict resolution process have been substantially broadened. While the state remains the dominant actor, new players and opportunities for making peace arise. NGOs have often bypassed state sovereignty in the name of democratic and cosmopolitan norms, providing an important contribution to the creation of local constituencies for peace. Regional organizations increasingly recognize that human security is as important as state security. Global organizations – most notably the United Nations – are willing to set aside their traditional neutral stance to intervene in the 'domestic affairs' of states to impose solutions by force. Ultimately, however, even though the third generation approaches move beyond the limitations of the Westphalian framework, they continue to be victims of the assumptions about state sovereignty that lie behind them.

As Richmond explains, the term 'generation' applies only loosely to the conflict resolution interventions he analyzes. The term both reflects a historical progression and a conceptual categorization of different conflict-ending and peacebuilding techniques. For this reason, while the presence of many empirical examples enliven the text, the occasional use of the same cases to illustrate the failures and possibilities of different conflict resolution generations, makes the reader wonder whether there exists a single empirical example where a specific conflict-ending approach was applied. This problem, combined with a writing style that often assumes some familiarity with the conflict resolution/international relations literature makes the text somewhat dense for undergraduates.

Potentially the most far-reaching contribution is Richmond's analysis of the prospect for a fourth generation of conflict resolution approaches. The first three approaches replicate a Western vision of peace and order. A fourth generation can arise only in the context of a post-Westphalian international society where practices reproducing conflict are not imposed by outsiders, and where cultural diversity and the expression of local differences is not only allowed but also welcomed. Drawing from critical theory – in particular Habermasian discourse ethics – Richmond argues for the creation of a dialogical order that both fosters pluralism and strives for a universal and more inclusive normative basis.

Richmond's most valuable contribution is the idea that conflict resolution models that do not impose particularistic norms and objectives need to move beyond the strait-jacket of the Westphalian international system. However, it is perhaps unfortunate that Richmond does not directly engage the literature on globalization to analyze the changing nature of sovereignty and the connected changes in ways we think of peace, conflict, and conflict resolution. It is largely asserted that globalization is undermining the state's control over its own territory. If this is true, is globalization opening the way for the possibility of addressing conflict beyond the limitations of Westphalian sovereignty? Is globalization a step forward towards a post-Westphalian system, or is it ultimately reproducing the very aspects of the state that limit and constrain conflict resolution interventions? Since Richmond seems to favour the creation of a post-Westphalian international society, suggesting how to get from here to there would have strengthened his argument. On balance, however, Richmond should be commended for systematically highlighting how ideas and practices about the international system influence the way we think of conflict intervention approaches and their possibility for success.

ROBERTO BELLONI
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Joshua Searle-White. *The Psychology of Nationalism.* New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Pp.169. $45.00. ISBN 0 312 23369 8

After field research visits to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Sri Lanka, Joshua Searle-White, a linguist and clinical psychologist, has written a book with the two objectives of explaining nationalism through psychology and providing a method of teaching ethnic conflict resolution through a simulation technique. To take the latter first, students in a Psychology of Nationalism course are assigned into one of four groups in a classroom divided by masking tape into four territorial sections. Resources, such as access to a single door, control of a telephone, or *no* resources, are by intention

allocated unequally to groups such that significant power imbalances are created. Initially, leaders are appointed by the instructor, but groups have the power to change these. A task is then imposed: for each group it is to make a presentation during the semester, on one of four dates that are subject to negotiation. In addition, daily tasks are handed out by secret memo. Ultimately, group identities emerge, and though the issues may be trivial and manufactured, very real and powerful emotions are generated, leading to what the author hopes is a heightened and more compassionate understanding of the psychology of nationalism.

The analysis of real world nationalism discusses the salient features of the process: categorization, thought processes for daily living, 'in-group favoritism', 'out group homogenisation' (whereby for example 'all Azerbaijanis are simply Turks, and all Turks are alike ', with the implication that present day Azerbaijanis can be held responsible for the genocide of Armenians in Turkey in 1915, which is a belief relevant to the explanation of the modern war over Nagorno-Karabakh). Another process is stereotyping and the 'contrast effect' whereby the more extreme a person's view, the more extreme he or she would judge an opposing person's view to be. Out-group devaluation, influenced by images, propaganda and atrocity stories, differences of language, religion and culture, and riots and mob violence, as richly illustrated in the recent history of Nagorno-Karabakh and Sri Lanka, are also important components of the nationalism process.

Chapter 2 reviews existing explanations: the role of agitators, extremists, terrorists, cultural and social conditions (as analysed by Staub), mob rule (Le Bon), organization and obedience (Kelman), the power of roles (Zimbardo), violence, rage and unconscious factors (Freud), and biology, in particular the role of testosterone (many writers). In all of these explanations, the common factor is identity, which is central because it is both personal and social, and both senses feed into nationalism. Searle-White prefers Anderson's definition of nationalism as 'an imagined political community ', to Smith's, which by emphasizing territory downplays the role of diasporic groups. Identity is continued existence, and is therefore easily threatened, so that identity is always at the basis of ethnic conflict, though, in the author's view, many would deny this, asserting that it is for example about terrorism. The primordialist and modernist views of ethnic identity are contrasted and a generally social constructionist view where perceptions play a central role, as supported by Tajfel's research, is adopted. Being a fragile and unstable phenomenon, any perceived threat to identity is likely to produce a violent reaction. Within itself, the sense of identity can be perceived as flawed and in need of cleansing and purging, as exemplified by the actions of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975.

Using a functionalist approach, Searle-Whirte sees nationalism as meeting important psychological needs, such as the sense of a need for justice, victimhood, retribution, revenge and life meaning, with the implication that conflict may be seen by many as preferable to peace.

Chapter 6 brings the themes together to provide a basic manual for negotiators: the need for respect and to maintain face, legitimacy (which can be conferred or denied), the handling of self-determination claims, and territory – the primary issue of most conflicts. As if already not enough, there are often unresolved issues of grievances over past atrocities, '... If the historical atrocity is not acknowledged by the perpetrator, or indeed by the larger world community, that is tantamount to a deep denial of the group's legitimacy and identity' (p.115).

Can there ever be hope of ending hostilities and achieving reconciliation? Realistically, this is asking a lot, and in fact it requires a deep reassessment of one's

own identity. Here Tillich's statement of the need to overcome self-contempt to achieve the overcoming of contempt for others is referred to. Hard though this may be to see happening in the context of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Sri Lanka, the fact that it has on occasions been achieved shows that it is possible. The importance of official public apologies and processes such as that of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is underlined.

This book is unusual in that it combines a discussion of teaching methodology with a theoretical analysis of two real world situations. Considering the former, simulation exercises and their subclass of role plays (where the interaction of real personalities is simulated), obviously can generate enthusiastic student participation with a non-threatening environment. Thus, they have gained an esteemed place in many diverse disciples, and it is excellent to have their value in the teaching of political conflict resolution affirmed.

With regard to the psychological theory of nationalism, one could say that the complexity of human motivation and behaviour is such that complete explanation will remain elusive. However, political scientists will appreciate this valuable study of the powerful forces that political leaders can harness for good or evil. The analysis of why the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan cannot simply be swapped for the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan in Armenia, as logic might suggest, provides an excellent example of the need for an understanding of the underlying psychological processes at work when dealing with nationalism.

WILLIAM W. BOSTOCK
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Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (eds). *Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe: The Reinvention of Citizenship*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002. Pp.341. $75.00 (hbk) and $25.00 (pbk). ISBNs 1 57181 804 9 and 1 57181 805 7

Dual nationality has historically been anathema to states intent on making exclusive claims on their citizens, but an unprecedented number of countries have recently accepted dual nationality. This volume's discussion of dual nationality makes an important contribution to the study of a subject that has not received book-length treatment in over 30 years. Based on a 1998 conference bringing together a multinational group of political scientists, legal scholars, and sociologists, 11 of the 14 chapters directly attend to dual nationality, or multiple national belongings more broadly, in Europe and the United States. Three other chapters address tangentially related issues of US naturalization trends in the 1990s and the variable coupling of social and political rights with formal citizenship and/or residence. While these three chapters address important topics in their own right, the volume as a collection would be more coherent were it limited to the discussion of dual nationality.

The reasons why dual nationality has become more common are explained well. Nationals regularly cross state lines to reside, bear children, and marry. In a world in which countries are converging to a mixed system of attributing nationality based on principles both of descent (*jus sanguinis*) and birth in a particular territory (*jus soli*), dual national claims are inevitable. In a delicious paradox noted by law professor Géraud de la Pradelle, it is precisely because nationality law is so jealously guarded as the exclusive competence of sovereign states that plural nationalities are created.

There is no effective international regime preventing multiple states from claiming the same individual. Dual nationality is becoming increasingly accepted and even promoted by the governments of migrant-sending countries, who see such policies as a means to maintain ties to emigrants. Governments of receiving countries often see dual nationality as an issue not worth the bother of policing. As international relations have become more pacific, the potential costs to most states of accepting their nationals' dual loyalty is fairly low.

Chapters by Peter Spiro, David Martin, and Peter Schuck advance the most overtly political arguments for and against specific aspects of dual nationality law. They are generally supportive, though Spiro argues that the United States should actually *embrace* dual nationality as a means to encourage assimilation and the flow of democratic ideals to immigrants' countries of origin. Other contributors offer country case studies of the historical development of stances towards dual nationality and European nationality. Dual nationality is a subject of heated political debate in Germany, as chapters by Kay Hailbronner, Peter Friedrich Bultmann, and Riva Kastoryano explain, whereas it is 'the dog that didn't bark' in the United Kingdom. Randall Hansen argues that British indifference towards dual nationality has not resulted in the negative political outcomes predicted by opponents in other countries. Peter Schuck notes the outpouring of political and legal opinions regarding the putative effects of dual nationality has not been matched by empirical research that would allow one to adjudicate those arguments. While some chapters are more clearly the stuff of political philosophy than historical or social scientific explanation, the normative and analytical dimensions of dual nationality are deeply intertwined throughout. This is unfortunate, but not surprising, given the inherently political quality of the topic, the almost complete overlap between state categories of practice and scholarly categories of analysis, and the direct involvement of several of the authors in the formulation of their countries' nationality policies. Even the empirically-oriented chapters appear driven as much by attempts to prove that dual nationality is 'good' or 'bad' as how dual nationality works in practice. There is little sense in this volume or elsewhere in the literature about how migrants and citizens actually engage dual nationality policies, apparently because the right kinds of survey, interview, and ethnographic data collection have not been undertaken. Despite the growth, some might argue the overgrowth, of citizenship studies in recent years, there is still much empirical spade-work to be done.

Following the convention of much of the literature, most of the authors use nationality and citizenship synonymously. In many cases, there is no effective difference between these terms, but some legal systems draw a fundamental distinction between citizenship and nationality. In Mexico, the decision about whether to extend the mostly symbolic status of dual *nationality* to include dual *citizenship*, and the set of political privileges including voting and eligibility for government positions that only Mexican *citizenship* includes, is a matter of considerable contention. More generally, the chapter on European Union (EU) citizenship by political scientist Carlos Closa makes a convincing case for why citizenship and nationality should be separated analytically, regardless of state categories of practice. *Nationality* is the *external* face of the relationship between the state and its members *vis-à-vis* other states; whereas *citizenship* is the *internal* face of the relationship between the state and its members. The nationality/citizenship distinction could be applied usefully to law professor Olivier Beaud's argument that federated forms of government imply a form of dual nationality in the sense that a citizen claims membership, and is claimed by, both the larger political organization and one of its constitutive units. It seems that in federal

states like the United States, Beaud is describing a form of dual citizenship rather than dual nationality, since the external face of nationality *vis-à-vis* other states is the sole competence of the federal government. In confederations like the EU, a nested form of dual nationality as well as dual citizenship is developing.

The introductory essay by the editors is an excellent synthesis of the contributors' main arguments, but the juxtaposition of articles originally written in different languages and vastly different expository styles is often jarring. Nevertheless, this book belongs on the shelves of any scholar of the politics of international migration and integration. Selected chapters would be suitable for undergraduate or graduate courses.

DAVID FITZGERALD
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Michael Keating. *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp.197. $45.00 (hbk). ISBN 0 199 24076 0

As the title would indicate, the highly-respected scholar Michael Keating's latest book, *Plurinational Democracy*, is an attempt to construct a new way of looking at the complex relationship between nationalism, sovereignty and citizenship. The author begins with the premise that the nation-state in the traditional definition of the term is no longer the sole platform on which sovereignty can operate. A person now can now wear several 'identity hats', each one suited to different situations. You can be both Scottish and British, and even European at the same time. Keating examines several issues that result from this new reality in a short yet important and well thought-out book.

Keating is far from the first author to look at the new forms of nationalism prevalent today. His book crosses paths with many others, such as mainstream works as Kymlicka's *Multicultural Citizenship* and Connor's *Ethnonationalism*, and less traditional pieces such as Tully's *Strange Multiplicity*. While the crux of the book is the role of citizenship and the power of statehood and nationalism, it can also be seen as adding to the large body of literature concerned with ethnic conflict. The majority of the cases examined have remained relatively peaceful, despite the long histories of oppression and exclusion (whether real or imagined). Keating's explanations of why ethnic conflict has or has not occurred strengthens and adds to the theories of writers such as Gurr, Horowitz, McGarry and O'Leary.

In order to examine the concept of plurinationalism – that citizens of a state can have several competing identities (which is different from multiculturalism where each person has only one identity but there are several within the state), Keating draws heavily on four cases: Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Spain. These cases are similar in that each has at least one historically separate minority group; the Quebecois and Natives in Canada, the Scots, Welsh and Irish in the United Kingdom, the Flemish in Belgium and the Catalans and Basques in Spain. While the problems are the same in all four cases, the choices made by the groups and the states have been different and therefore provide Keating with interesting comparisons. Keating does a good job justifying Canada as a case study despite the fact that, unlike the other cases, it is outside the European Union and has a very different history of development.

After briefly discussing the current state of the literature and outlining the argument for plurinationalism, the majority of the book is an examination of the power of nationalism and the options for a state to satisfy a minority group without the group seceding. Each of the chapters follows the same pattern with the theoretical aspects of how plurinationalism impacts the minority group/state relationship followed by concrete examples from the case studies. Keating's chapter on asymmetrical federalism is the most interesting of these chapters, but the chapters discussing the history of nationalism and the goals of nations are also useful. The author relies on historical analysis and secondary sources as well as polling data. The polling data is an excellent way to show how many of the perceived ideas of nationalism do not correspond with the mood of the minority group. In the various chapters, Keating is able to show what members of the minority group really want and how they perceive themselves, as opposed to just theorizing on what they should want or how they should feel. The final full chapter of the book is an interesting attempt to take what has been learned from the previous chapters and applying it to the emerging European community. Keating finds that a more unified Europe will allow for greater opportunities for groups to enjoy forms of sovereignty while remaining in their existing states. It is however, not the final answer on its own to the problems faced by such groups as the Basques and Northern Irish.

While the research is thorough and the ideas and conclusions are clear, *Plurinational Democracy* does have some minor problems. The most noticeable is that at times the narrative appears to be slanted too heavily towards the minority groups. Keating is effective in explaining the policies used by the various states to try to accommodate or control their minorities. However, at times particularly with his discussion of Canada, the author is overly critical of the government's policies and practices. The book could have been enhanced with a larger discussion of the difficulty governments have balancing the good of the minority group with the rights of the majority. The inclusion of an additional case study of a country that has not been as open to concessions to minority groups (i.e. Germany), or to a federal system (i.e. France), may have provided an interesting contrast with the countries outlined above. That being said, it is acknowledged that additional case studies may not have added enough to the work to justify the considerable amount of time they would have consumed.

It is somewhat difficult to determine the prospective audience for this book. Clearly, the level of sophistication of the arguments will be of value to academics looking for new ideas to augment their own manuscripts and journal articles. Readers of *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* will clearly benefit from this book. The recommendations appear to be aimed at a different audience however. The concluding chapter appears to be aimed at both academics and policy-makers with suggestions as to how to view the state in the new international system and how to accommodate the minority groups that are found inside the state. Keating is effective in speaking to the two separate audiences of the book, and allows the reader to take the recommendations for what each reader may feel is important.

Keating should be commended for this ambitious effort. Whether his concept of plurinationalism becomes fully accepted in the discussion of minority rights and sovereignty remains to be seen, but he has provided readers with an innovative argument that is supported by well- presented, effective evidence. His ideas are important and the topic will only become more relevant as more states begin to encounter large numbers of minority groups. His concepts outlined in *Plurinational Democracy* can be used as a springboard for further research and discussion for

scholars interested in the future of the nation-state system and those nations who do
not have a state of their own.

MICHAEL JOHNS
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Michael Suk-Young Chwe. *Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common
Knowledge.* Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2001. Pp.130 +xiv. $40.00
(hbk); $16.95 (pbk). ISBNs 0 691 00949 X and 0 691 11471 4.

Behind this extremely short book (with only 99 pages of text) is a very simple idea:
when actors have common knowledge (in the technical game theoretic sense of 'I
know that you know that I know that you know...'), generated by various structural and
institutional factors, they are better able to coordinate their actions to solve
coordination problems, also known as 'assurance games' (AGs). In co-ordination
problems modelled by the AG, unlike collective action problems modelled by the
Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), there are no dominant choices for actors; each actor
prefers to do what the other actors do. Chwe presents a series of anecdotes, ranging
from television commercials to movies, to illustrate his argument.

His basic contention that common knowledge helps solve co-ordination problems
may be correct, but it is difficult to tell because many anecdotes he uses to support his
contention are actually not co-ordination problems (AGs). For example, Chwe makes
frequent use of political protests and revolutions as examples of co-ordination
problems (pp.22–23, 31–32, 33–36, 65–66, 89), but they are not co-ordination
problems; they are instead collective action problems (PDGs). Let us say I am a citizen
of an oppressive regime and I want the dictatorship overthrown and democracy
established in my country. Let us further assume that, through eye contact (pp.31–33)
or strong ties (pp.61–66) or whatever, I know that 99.9 per cent of my fellow citizens
will protest on the streets next Sunday in an attempt to overthrow the dictatorship.
What should I do as a rational person? Stay home and watch the events unfold on
television! My choice will be exactly the same if I knew, through common knowledge,
that .1per cent of the population will protest. If the protest is going to succeed, it will
succeed without my participation and I will benefit from the public good of
democracy; if the protest is going to fail, it will fail even with my participation. Either
way, there is no point for me to waste my time and risk arrest and injury.

I believe there is a very good reason why everyone always resorts to which side of
the street to drive on as a premier example of co-ordination problems (as Chwe himself
does; p.97). It is probably because there are few other real situations that are usefully
modelled as an AG, rather than a PDG. Chwe's first mistake is to overestimate the
prevalence of co-ordination problems in real life.

His second mistake is to rely almost exclusively on anecdotes for empirical
support of his argument. All the problems and limitations of anecdotal evidence are in
this book, such as completely ignoring negative cases that do not support his argument.
For instance, Chwe argues that deciding what movies to see is a co-ordination
problem, because everyone prefers to see what everyone else sees so that they can talk
about it the next day. That's why, Chwe argues, movies based on popular cartoons and
television shows (*Dick Tracy*, *Superman*, and *The Addams Family*) or those with
heavy advertising campaigns (*Independence Day*, *Terminator 2*) become blockbusters
because everybody knows that everybody else knows what these movies are about. He

conveniently ignores the fact that there are also flops based on popular cartoons and television shows (*The Mod Squad*, *Josie and the Pussycats*) or with heavy advertising campaigns (*Waterworld*, *The Last Action Hero*). In fact, his logic would imply that remakes of earlier blockbusters would be sure hits, but in fact most remakes are box-office bombs (*The Truth About Charlie, Solaris*). Nor can he explain why so many movies with none of these elements become sleeper hits (*My Big Fat Greek Wedding*). Once again, Chwe's mistake is to assume that deciding which movie to see is a co-ordination problem. It would be, if moviegoers were completely indifferent to the contents of the movies and only care about seeing what everyone else sees. In fact, some movies are genuinely better than others, and moviegoers primarily want to see good, enjoyable movies. It is not a co-ordination problem.

Chwe does use quantitative data in one section, where he seeks to demonstrate that 'co-ordination goods' (goods that people want to consume if and only if others also do; he includes beer, soft drinks, and pizza in this category) are more likely to be advertised on popular television shows with large audiences. This is his explanation: 'If we assume that viewers generally know which shows are popular, we can say that when a product is advertised on a popular show, not only do many people see the ad, each viewer knows that many other people see the ad' (p.49). In other words, in order to explain how people figure out which brand of beer other people drink, he has to assume that they know which television shows other people watch. I don't understand why it is reasonable to assume that people know what television shows other people watch when they don't know which brand of beer other people drink. Once again, Chwe's mistake is to assume that brand selection is a co-ordination problem, oblivious to the fact that some brands of any good are genuinely better than (or intrinsically preferred to) others. People primarily want to consume pizza and soft drinks that taste good, even if nobody else does. Just as some movies are better than others, some pizzas are better than others.

Chwe is broadly conversant in all social sciences, and presents some mildly amusing anecdotes in his book. But unfortunately, it is not a careful piece of scientific work.

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Roger Mac Ginty and John Darby. *Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace Process*. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Pp.226. $65.00 (hbk). ISBN 0 333 77914 2

Guns and Government is a detailed chronological review of the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland and an outgrowth of an earlier work, *The Coming Out of Violence*. It applies the results of the latter, a comparative study on the evolutionary methodologies employed in peace processes, focusing on factors which are believed to impact success. *Guns and Government* records the significant events in the Northern Ireland peace process between 1994 and early 2001 and follows with an analysis of these factors and others indigenous to the Northern Ireland peace process.

As mentioned previously, this work followed an INCORE (International Conflict Research at the University of Ulster) conflict studies research project which entailed the monitoring of four other ongoing conflicts in Sri Lanka, the Israel/Palestinian territories, South Africa and the Basque country in Spain. In the INCORE project, the

researchers isolated, identified and evaluated common elements of the associated
peace processes and the degree of contribution of that element towards successful
negotiations. Darby and Mac Ginty then utilized those results and by empirical
examination and a comparative approach, analyzed the bearing of those same elements
on the Northern Ireland peace process. The fact that Darby and Mac Ginty were
participants in the earlier, publicly funded project, enabled them to bring significant
practical and field experience to the research and analysis undertaken for *Guns and
Government*.

Unlike most previous studies of peace processes which are the results of research
accomplished after the conclusion, i.e. historical studies, *Guns and Government* was
researched contemporaneously with ongoing events. This made it possible for Mac
Ginty and Darby to document real-time information, first impressions, feelings and
'gut' reactions of the principal actors. They were also able to observe at first hand the
application of previous research results in the INCORE project to this study and
narrow the focus of the comparative analyses on the impacting elemental factors,
providing a more reliable analysis.

The authors note that the Northern Ireland peace process is not alone in the pursuit
of peace in several major conflict situations ongoing during the period of research
(1995–2001): South Africa, Israel/Palestine, the Basque Country and Sri Lanka. Each
of these peace processes have borrowed interchangeably from the others those
processes and procedures that appear to provide successful approaches in negotiation,
building common ground, establishing trust, and furthering dialogue to ultimately
achieve the goal of a sustained state of peace. The documentation and analysis of these
key elements in the Northern Ireland peace process in *Guns and Government* can
contribute to success in other peace processes enabling other principals and actors to
readily assess viable approaches in a similar conflict situation with an accompanying
analysis.

Interestingly, the authors cite that one of the disadvantages of undertaking a
contemporary study as opposed to historical research is that the researcher will not
know the outcome. This disadvantage is duly noted particularly in view of the fact that
as of the date of this review, peace has not yet been achieved in Northern Ireland and
is in fact at a critical juncture as to its ability to achieve a successful outcome. The
discovery by British security services of a spy ring allegedly run by a Sinn Féin official
and the failure of coming to terms by the negotiating parties on the issue of IRA
disarmament has brought down the Northern Ireland four-party government and
forestalled high level negotiations.

Mac Ginty and Darby aver that the peace process would never have started without
the inclusion of those players that had the capacity to inflict violence – the
paramilitaries. Although this is most certainly true, the authors would have been more
accurate in identifying the violence for what it is, terrorism. This is important for those
who want to learn from the Northern Ireland peace process, especially when one of the
negotiating partners in a peace process happens to be a nation-state and the other a
terrorist organization. The question arises, 'Is it advisable for a government to
negotiate with terrorists?' Would it be by acts of terrorism that a government was
brought to the negotiating table? If so, it would appear that acts of terrorism were
successful in intimidating government and would thus encourage further terrorist acts
by others.

Although in the Northern Ireland peace process the nation-states of the Irish
Republic and the United Kingdom are involved, by managing the process, they have
removed themselves from being principals by the 'Good Friday Agreement'. The actual

negotiating partners are not governments and do not have the same concerns as governments in negotiating with those who commit acts of terrorism. It would have been helpful for the authors to have further expounded upon the ramifications, nuances and hazards of governmental entities versus non-governmental entities in negotiating with those who commit terrorist acts.

The authors note that another key element that played a significant role in the Northern Ireland peace process was the declaration of the Irish and British governments that no agreement would be acceptable unless it was consented to and agreed upon per referendum by the people of Northern Ireland. Although it is not disputable that the issue of 'consent' was an essential element of the peace process, it is doubtful that it would have been so had the two negotiating parties been representing constituents without a rough parity in numbers. For example, if the Republicans outnumbered the Unionists by large numbers, or vice versa, it would not be necessary for the majority party to persuade any members of the minority to adopt their position to win the referendum. If this were to occur, most assuredly the minority would continue fighting averring tyranny of the majority. However, this was not the case. The Republicans and Unionists do have a rough parity, which rendered it necessary for members of both parties to support the referendum which ensured a real consensus of a more enduring nature.

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A. J. Wilson. *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Developments in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. London: Hurst & Company, 2000. Pp.xiii+203. £35.00 (hbk) and £12.95 (pbk). ISBNs 1 85065 338 0 and 1 85065 519 7.

Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic island country located near India's southern coast. Starting in 1983, this small country of 18 million people became mired in an identity-based civil war between the majority Sinhalese (who dominate the government) and the minority Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic group. This book adds to the literature intended to explain the conflict. Written by a former adviser on Tamil affairs to the late President J. R. Jayewardene (who served from 1977–88), its particular contribution is to describe and explain the rise of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka.

Chapters 1–5 emphasize the period before Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948. They show how Tamils were always 'a community apart' with a shared Hindu identity. Faced with assimilationist pressures from the Buddhist Sinhalese, their group consciousness gradually transformed into national awareness that they were a group apart. Starting in the 1920s, this awareness transformed into a national consciousness that they needed to act politically to preserve the interests of their community. Chapter 2 also discusses Tamil social structure and ethnography, and chapter 3 explores the changing Tamil literature – which in the 1970s culminated in the literature of Tamil militancy and the demand for a separate state.

Chapter 6 concentrates on post-independence Tamil politics: the shifting political goals and approaches to achieve them, and how these shifts were defensive reactions to discriminatory Sinhalese practices. Chapter 7 focuses on the militarization of Tamil youth, the struggle for supremacy among armed Tamil groups, and the ascension of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Chapter 8 covers India's 1987–90 intervention. Chapter 9 is written by A. J. V. Chandrakanthan, a Tamil professor who lived through most of the post-independence turmoil in the northern province. The

final chapter summarizes the author's main point – that militant Tamil separatism would not have arisen had it not been for chauvinist Sinhalese policies that denied Tamils equal treatment or regional autonomy.

Like most books written by political insiders, the author's approach is narrative and descriptive. Explanations for the actions and reactions of both groups are forwarded within the context of explaining the particulars under discussion. Explicit attention to theory is only a minor part of the book, and the most extensive discussion of theory is in the book's introductory chapter. The author, who is also a Professor Emeritus of Political Science, cites classic works on nationalism from the 1960s–1980s. He says that they are too Eurocentric for understanding Tamil nationalism, because they underplay competing nationalisms that arise in many countries of the Third World. He forwards a short list of scholars who are attentive to some of these complexities (p.6), but he does not cite their particular works in the text, a note, or in the bibliography. Concerning ideas that inform the author's conception of causation, he focuses on the quality of individual leaders (p.12) and the fairness of political arrangements (pp.6–12). The latter approach fits within the liberal tradition of political science and comparative politics, which explains ethnic peace or conflict in terms of inclusive vs. exclusive constitutions, institutions, and practices. Thus his prescription is for a federal state that grants significant regional autonomy to Tamils, constitutional arrangements that enshrine equal rights for all groups, and leaders with the wisdom and courage to create and implement such policies.

The author does not explicitly discuss his research methods. The footnotes and bibliography suggest significant attention to the secondary literature as well as to published primary documents such as speeches and newspaper articles. From time to time, the author also writes that certain insights came in conversations with key political actors in Sri Lanka, particularly when the author was active in government.

Although the book was published in 2000, it contains no references to the 1990s scholarship on intra-state conflict that is explicitly theoretical and self-consciously comparative. These works reveal three major schools of thought on the topic – neorealist, liberal, and constructivist – as well as innovative approaches that combine levels of analysis.

If a reader assigns Wilson's book in a political science course on contemporary civil wars or on ethnic politics, I recommend supplementing it with one of the following collections: Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996); *Idem*, et. al. (eds), *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (MIT Press, 1997); Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). A collection with a more regional focus is Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (eds), *Government Politics and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For more depth on the implications of a nation's 'homeland', I recommend Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Finally, I recommend two chapters in Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring (eds), *Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). The chapter by Ronald Herring highlights an unintended consequence of globalization. He shows how the policies of international financial institutions contributed to large infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka that aided the growth of the economy, but which also contributed to the polarization of ethnic

politics and more militant nationalism on the part of both Tamils and Sinhalese. In contrast, the chapter by Norman Uphoff shows how carefully conceived, small-scale development projects helped Sri Lanka's economy *and* avoided harm to ethnic relations.

In sum, the book contributes to our understanding of the rise of Tamil nationalism and its implications. It will appeal most to general readers uninterested in theories. It also provides some evidence for scholars seeking to test competing hypotheses on ethnic politics in Sri Lanka. For instance, the author discusses the pacts of 1957 and 1965 that were negotiated between Sinhalese and Tamil leaders. These pacts would have provided substantial regional autonomy and other rights to Tamils. The governments at the time, however, failed to implement the pacts because 'their Sinhalese following persisted in preventing the leaders from carrying out their promises, and when one [Sinhalese] party was in office the other strove hard to embarrass it into reneging on its undertaking' (p.98). This theme of intragroup politics among Sinhalese as a cause of intergroup conflict also arises elsewhere (for example, pp.142–5). Such 'ethnic outbidding' is a major topic of constructivist theories of ethnic conflict. Finally, even though peace talks began to look promising after the book was published, the book rightly clarifies that any lasting solution must provide political space for Tamil nationalist aspirations. If a separate state for Tamils is not feasible, the least that would be required would be extensive and guaranteed regional autonomy. If a new pact could be reached, however, we are still left to wonder if Sinhalese 'ethnic outbidding' might constrain its implementation and rekindle militant Tamil nationalism.

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Kerry Ann Rocquemore and David L. Brunsma. *Beyond Black: Biracial Identity in America*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001. Pp.224. $36.95. ISBN 0 761 923 225

In 1997 the Office of Management and Budget decided not to add a multiracial category to the 2000 census, although respondents would be allowed to check more than one racial category. This decision disappointed the growing cadre of citizens who classify themselves as multiracial and want to be represented as such in the Census for official government purposes. On the other hand this decision was met with applause by many black citizens, who saw such a move as an attempt to dilute the political power of the race. As the number of intermarriages among certain segments of the African American population is on the rise, this argument will no doubt be revisited in 2007.

In their new work *Beyond Black: Biracial Identity in America*, Kerry Ann Rocquemore and David L. Brunsma attempt to grapple with the sticky question of bi-racial identity in America – focusing specifically on the children of black and white parents. More specifically they examine previous frameworks used to theorize about bi-racial identity, and previous research adopting these frameworks. They then present the results of their own research on the subject, and conclude with an attempt to project into the future, asking the question what will being 'black' mean in the future? To summarize quickly, they find a number of problems with past research. Previous attempts to study bi-racial identity largely spoke past one another, leading to inconsistent findings, methods and theories. Furthermore, the sample sizes varied in

such a way as to prevent generalizations within or across them. The literature review here is helpful. It provides a quick synthesis for other scholars to refer to. It also hints at the political construction of racial identity and the impact of that construction on scholarship. One cannot help but think that one of the reasons why the literature on 'bi-racial' identity is so scattered is because of the fact that being 'bi-racial' is not a category recognized by the state. I will revisit this below.

Rockquemore and Brunsma's own work on the subject is multiphased, with the first and third phases consisting of in-depth interviews and the second phase consisting of a survey of 177 respondents taken from the metropolitan Detroit area. Their use of both qualitative and quantitative methods is very insightful. They find that individuals having the same parental background (one black parent and one white parent) categorize themselves in a number of different way – with some identifying as black or white exclusively, others adopting a more situational identity (being black, white, or bi-racial depending on the context), others adopting a transcendental identity that is to a certain extent beyond race, and yet others adopting a border identity (being bi-racial). They also find that this process is a contextual one ... depending not only on the choice of the individual but on the wider context. Do they have the option to be 'bi-racial', or are their options truncated somehow by the environment around them? Does their own skin colour further truncate those options? While their work seeks to be more exploratory than definitive, Rockquemore and Brunsma's work is valuable here for people doing work in psychology specifically.

However this work could potentially have been of significant benefit to sociologists and political scientists as well. I mention the political nature of bi-racial identity above. The very concept of race is one that has been supported and in some cases modified by state-level processes for purposes both malign and benign. Given the very political nature of racial identity *particularly* among those who have black and non-black parents, it is very surprising that Rockquemore and Brunsma do not tackle the role of *political* factors in the decision-making process of individuals. In some ways, as the metropolitan Detroit area is one of the most segregated in the country, this setting is well-suited to addressing these questions. It would have been interesting, for example, to see if living in a city like Livonia (95 per cent white) or Dearborn (85–90 per cent white) would interact with skin-colour to impact identity choice. Similarly while Rockquemore and Brunsma do interrogate whether being treated negatively (by either blacks or whites) has an impact on identity formation, it is not clear whether state-level subjugation (at the hands of police, for example) are included within this broad category. This line of research is promising as it can look potentially at the explicitly political determinants of what is to a large extent a politicized psychological identity. Finally as the social movement of multiracialism increases in scope and size, it would be interesting to see how the various multiracial institutions (the growing number of magazines devoted to multiracial topics for example) impact identity.

So as it stands *Beyond Black: Biracial Identity in America* is a solid first step in understanding the processes behind bi-racial identity formation. Hopefully Rockquemore and Brunsma (or other scholars following their lead) will take the other steps in order to move the scholarship in this area forward.

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E. San Juan Jr. *Racism and Cultural Studies: Critique of Multiculturalist Ideology and the Politics of Difference.* Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp.428. $74.95 (hbk) and $24.95 (pbk). ISBNs 0 8223 2866 6 and 0 8223 2851 8.

In this book, E. San Juan criticizes multiculturalism and examines broader issues of racism, ethnic and cultural studies and post-colonial theories, from a historical-materialist perspective. In the introduction, the main themes of the book: racism and the subjugation of ethnic minorities and immigrants, are introduced. It is also mentioned how cultural studies and multiculturalism have become involved in the debate on these issues. The first chapter begins by putting forward the thesis of the US as a racial polity, and considers the issue of institutional racism, which is examined in the context of US hegemonic foreign policy. In chapter 2, San Juan explains how 'nationalism' and 'sexuality' have been devised by the bourgeoisie for controlling and expanding the market. The third chapter is dedicated to the predicaments and experience of Asian immigrants of various origins in the US. In chapter 4, ethnic studies in the US are examined. Emphasizing the link between the placement within occupational hierarchy and ethnic affiliation, San Juan argues that ethnic studies in their present form do not change the existing economic structure. Chapter 5 reviews the demand for recognition of difference and multiculturalism, which imply the existence of 'a common culture', constituted by the market. The sixth chapter is an interesting evaluation of cultural studies. It is followed by an assessment of post-colonial theories and the theories of underdevelopment, in chapter 7. The author, in the eighth chapter, studies the link between culture, in its widest sense, and society, by drawing upon the Marxist tradition, and comes up with an account of cultural revolution. Multiculturalism and the politics of difference in their various dimensions are criticized in the last part of the book.

An advantage of this book is the wide range of sources referred to in its various parts. Its other strong point is its reference to many facts and examples, which make it more than a theoretical work. For instance, the experience of the Filipino diaspora in the US is widely cited. Another interesting feature of the book is that it places the issue of disadvantaged groups in an international context. The thrust of San Juan's thought is that the politics of difference reifies 'superstructural' differences into almost intractable social and political disjunctions. On the one hand, the politics of identity, by defining individuals in a commonality of monadic identities, renders dialogue among various cultural groups impossible. It fossilizes differences. On the other hand, multiculturalism might function as a theoretical framework for legitimizing stratification and inequality as a result of cultural differences. Emphasis on the demand for recognition of equality of cultures may in fact effectively conceal existing material injustices. Multiculturalism fosters separatism among the oppressed in the name of celebrating cultural and ethnic distinctness. It does not address the cause of exploitation and racial or ethnic violence, which is the capitalist state. The politics of difference, by encouraging the dispossessed to attend to their cultural particularities, obstructs achievement of class consciousness.

Moreover, San Juan argues that the ideal of cultural diversity implies the existence of a 'common culture', which is the standard way of life and culture. What is important is the exclusivist tendency of the 'common culture', which leaves no room for nonconformist expression and practices. San Juan even argues that multiculturalism is another reformist tactic for achieving stabilization, deregulation and privatization. In his view, the 'genuine popular-democratic' celebration of cultural differences is only possible after the abolition of class divisions and the socialization of productive property.

San Juan's criticism of the divisiveness of multiculturalism is shared by many other thinkers, from the left to the right. These thinkers, such as Jean Elshtain and Brian Barry, argue that a politics of difference weakens public-spiritedness, since it emphasizes group differences, and undermines a commitment to the common public good. Such a politics damages the possibility of communication and coalition among different communities against poverty and injustice. This claim, however, is untenable. Although the politics of difference demands recognition of cultural differences, it does not undermine the possibility of co-operation in many other areas of social life where various groups share similar situations. The implausibility of this criticism can be better noticed when we consider another attack on the politics of difference. San Juan and some other thinkers argue that multiculturalism does not address all the problems facing minorities or disadvantaged groups. These two criticisms are grounded on the assumption that a theory of multiculturalism is a comprehensive theory covering all aspects of life. This is, however, far from the truth. Multiculturalism does not address all the problems facing minority cultures, nor is it necessary for it to do so. It only focuses on the issues rooted in cultural difference.

A more serious problem with San Juan's account is his 'historical-materialist' perspective, which sometimes inclines towards a crude Marxism. For instance, he claims that there is no choice beyond barbarism and socialism; and that multiculturalists, by denouncing Marxism, serve an 'anti-revolutionary function', and consequently belong to the first camp. Given this perspective, San Juan's denunciation of multiculturalism is not surprising. However, as an example, it shows how irresponsive to the delicacy of facts of social life, and specifically to the issue of identity, such a version of historical materialism can be. What is important about San Juan's book is that it provides academic as well as general readers with a Marxist critique of multiculturalism, which is not sufficiently articulated in the existing literature. This book opens the way for more theoretical assessments of multiculturalism on the basis of various versions of Marxism, which can clarify those aspects of the politics of difference that have so far been unnoticed by liberal and conservative thinkers.

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Heather Rae. *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp.xiii. $65.00 (hbk) and $24.00 (pbk). ISBNs 0 521 79284 3 and 0 521 7978 X.

'Pathological homogenisation' occurs, according to Heather Rae, when people who run states coercively expel, assimilate, convert, exterminate, or otherwise exclude members of culturally distinct minorities from collective presence within those states' territories. Perhaps wisely, Rae never locates precisely the boundary between pathological and healthy homogenisation, thus leaving uncertain the conditions under which uniform public education, control of mass media, and state enforcement of religious practices become part of her subject matter. Instead, she concentrates on visibly violent episodes: the expulsion and forced conversion of Muslims and Jews in fifteenth–seventeenth-century Spain, Louis XIV's persecution of Huguenots, the Armenian genocide of 1915–1916, and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. She then moves on to consider how international norms with respect to state-led

homogenisation were evolving toward its more definitive (and sometimes even effective) condemnation during the twentieth century, and to consider how the altered international situation is affecting treatment of minorities in the Czech Republic and Macedonia.

To her accounts of top-down homogenisation, Rae appends extensive and well-informed discussions of how analysts of international relations should think about culture: 'both those shared meanings and values which provide a framework for action *and* the practices through which, over time, agents remake their own social and cultural context' (p.47). In the processes at hand, she argues that cultural resources such as religious beliefs and practices did not simply serve rulers' pursuit of power but simultaneously constrained state action and, once in action, reconstituted relations among rulers, governments, and subject populations. In each of her four main cases – Spain, France, Turkey, and Yugoslavia – Rae claims cogently that rulers did not act chiefly out of fear or hatred, but crushed minorities as a signal that they legitimately controlled unitary states backed by unified peoples. Although Rae's account of Spain remains vague as to the audiences for Spanish rulers' homogenising tyrannies from 1480 to 1609 (the Pope? France? North Africa's Muslim rulers? Iberian populations?) and exaggerates the menace of Ottoman power to Spain (which by 1550 was almost completely abandoning its previous orientation to the Mediterranean and the Middle East in favour of Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean seafaring), she rightly portrays installation of the Spanish Inquisition, forced expulsion or conversion of Jews, and the later expulsion of Moriscos as dramatic but materially damaging acts of royal self-portrayal. Rae's account of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France misses the extent to which Protestantism provided great magnates with a programme of principled opposition to arbitrary royal power, neglects the open alliance of armed Protestants with military coalitions that formed against Louis XIII, and understates popular Protestant resistance to royal power in such regions as the Cévennes and Vivarais once the crown had cowed the great Protestant lords. Yet it correctly portrays Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), as a symbolic gesture disproportionate to any domestic political threat from the remaining Protestants. (Points of personal privilege: Rae wrongly attributes to me the view that Louis XIV initiated the strangulation of Protestant power in France, errors she could easily have avoided by consulting my detailed histories of seventeenth century France.)

When she arrives at the Armenian genocide of 1915–1916, Rae adopts somewhat more instrumental language: 'the Young Turks sought to build a Turkish corporate identity within the state, which in turn buttressed their own, always precarious, legitimacy' (p.127). She faces the difficulty that not long-term rulers but members of the Young Turks' main political movement – the Committee on Union and Progress – promoted the elimination of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, she makes a good case that CUP activists enlisted the state's resources and personnel in ruthless genocide. As for the case of Serbian and Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing during the 1990s, Rae goes even farther in the direction of popular support for genocidal policies; even more so than Turkish leaders of 1915–1916, Slobodan Milosevic and his allies in Bosnia braved international opprobrium as they consolidated internal backing from their ethnic fellows. As she points out, the Serbian effort to Serbianize Kosovo marked an extreme: an attempt to expel or exterminate a large majority of a long-established provincial population in the face of acute, if ineffectual, outside criticism. Thus her four ferocious instances follow a trajectory from signalling directed almost entirely outside the affected territory to signalling that defied outside responses but appealed strongly to domestic constituencies. Despite that trajectory's grim

implications, Rae's final discussions of Macedonia, the Czech Republic, and the evolution of international norms hold out the faint promise that the world's powers have learned something from the pathologies of the 1990s. Let us hope so.

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Sebastian Smith. *Allah's Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya.* London, UK: I. B. Tauris & Company Ltd., 2001. Pp.313. $18.95 (pbk). ISBN 1 86064 651 4.

With last winter's theatre siege and subsequent rescue in Moscow, the world's attention has again been focused on volatile Chechnya. In *Allah's Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya*, author Sebastian Smith, a journalist with Agence France-Presse, provides a superbly in-depth history of not only Chechnya, but the entire Caucasus region.

The first half of this book focuses on the diverse culture and history of the ethnic groups of the Caucasus region. Included is a dramatic description of Stalin's attempts to eradicate most of these ethnic groups. Smith describes not only the terror of the infamous deportations of entire peoples, but also the destruction of their religious and ethnic communities, even going so far as to wipe the very existence of these peoples from the official maps of the Soviet Union. Smith continues by highlighting how the fall of the Soviet Union affected these traumatized peoples and their hopes for complete 'reabilitatsiya' begun under Khrushchev. He concludes the first part of the book with an account of the fighting in Georgia and other ethnic flare ups of the early 1990s, as well as early, albeit failed, attempts to unite all ethnic groups of the Caucasus region against the Russians.

The book then makes a dramatic turn from the historical to the more personal and emotional as it describes the Chechen separatist movement and subsequent war. The author provides a unique and very personal account of what occurred, having nearly become a casualty of artillery shelling and strafing by attack helicopters. In particular, he gives great details on some of the events outside Chechnya that had a major impact on the war, including the Chechen rebel incursion and hostage take-over of a hospital in Budennovsk in the Russian Federation by Chechen commander and warlord, Shamil Basayev. Smith tells a gripping account of the bungled Russian attempts to free the hostages and the subsequent negotiations that allowed the surviving hostage-takers to return to Chechnya to fight another day. Though written years before the November 2002 Moscow theatre siege, his description of Budennovsk provides the reader insight into why Putin chose to take the theatre using overwhelming force and sleeping gas to free the hostages and kill the leader of the terrorists, Mosvar Barayev, in an operation for which Shamil Basayev claims responsibility.

Though the original version of this book was published in 1998, this 2001 version has a new introduction describing not only events in Chechnya between 1998 and 2001, but also pronouncing the author's view that western powers have chosen to turn a blind eye. However, this point is only briefly mentioned in the remainder of the book. In addition, Mr. Smith adds more analysis of radical Islamic movements involved in Chechnya, particularly the Wahabi movement, something that garnered only a few pages in the original version.

The strongest attributes of this book are personal interviews and eyewitness accounts of many Chechens, as well as other ethnic groups and even a few Russian conscripts, which truly put a human face on this tragedy. The maps of the Caucasus

ethnic groups, Chechnya, and Grozny also provide an excellent reference. Moreover, it is clear from the beginning that Sebastian Smith has a strong bond toward all the peoples of the Caucasus, but particularly the Chechens, among whom he has spent so many years living with and reporting about. However, the book spends a great deal of time criticizing the Russians' brutal behaviour in the war but rarely decrying Chechen rebels, even as the author admits the rebels' penchant for taking hostages in hospitals and using Chitin villages full of civilians as cover for operations, whether those Chitin townsfolk wanted them there or not. It is only in the last 50 or so pages that the author begins to provide a more unbiased account of the plight of the poor civilians at the hands of both Chitin rebels and Russian soldiers, in contrast to the rest of the work which concentrates almost solely on the well-documented Russian use of force.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the book is, given the amazing access to Chitin leadership, the author did not use his sources to provide unique accounts into what really motivated all the parties involved, from Russian politicians, to foreign volunteers, to Chitin commanders. Nowhere in the book is there any serious study of why the Russians maintained a two-year, disastrous war against Chechnya which threatened to bring down the Yeltsin government, aside from very superficial descriptions of the desire for power by Yeltsin's (as quoted repeatedly by the author) 'party of war'. Nor will the reader find analysis into what really motivated Dzhokhar Dudayev, Shamil Basayev, and a host of other Chechen commanders/warlords. Moreover, though the introduction decries how Western countries have turned a blind eye to war crimes committed by the Russians, the book concentrates primarily on the Russians' use of overwhelming force and their typical lack of proportionality in fighting the rebels. One finds few eyewitness accounts of the well-documented rapes, torture, etc. in this book. This is puzzling given the copious documentation of these war crimes in Chechnya by other news sources.

In sum, this book provides an exceptional history of the peoples of the Caucasus by an author who knows and loves them. If one is looking for an interesting book providing an overview of the Caucasus and a Chechen view of this terrible war while giving it a human face, then this is an excellent resource. However, this book is probably not the one to read for a serious scholar looking for an in-depth answer as to why this war began and what keeps it going.

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