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Christian List |
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Christian List FBA, MAE Professor of Philosophy and Decision Theory & Co-Director, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy LMU Munich |
Visiting Professor Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics |
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I work at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and political science, with a particular focus on individual and collective decision-making and the nature of intentional agency. I have long-standing interests in social choice theory and the theory of democracy. A growing part of my work addresses metaphysical questions, e.g., about free will, consciousness, causation, probability, and the relationship between “micro” and “macro” levels in the human and social sciences. My book, titled "Why free will is real", was published by Harvard University Press in 2019 (look inside) (also translated into Italian and German). My earlier book, "Group Agency" (with Philip Pettit), was published by Oxford University Press in 2011. For interviews on free will, see, e.g., Nautilus, Scientific American Blog, and Philosophy Bites. For a series of blogs, see here (Brains Blog), for a short informal article, see here (Boston Review), and for a debate with critics, see here (The Philosopher). For an interview on decision theory, see here (to appear in a volume of Conversations on Rational Choice). Below is a list of recent papers. At the bottom, there is a list of some earlier representative papers. |
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Click here for all my papers, here for an overview by projects, and here for books or edited collections. Most recent papers A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness, Philosophical Quarterly, online early, 2024 Probabilistically coherent credences despite opacity, Economics and Philosophy, online early, 2024 Levels of Description and Levels of Reality, in A. Wilson and K. Robertson (eds.), Levels of Explanation, OUP, forthcoming Dynamically rational judgment aggregation (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare, online early, 2023 Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response, Criminal Law and Philosophy 18: 109-131, 2024 Agential Possibilities, Possibility Studies and Society 1(4): 399-513, 2023 Do group agents have free will?, Inquiry, online early, 2023 The many-worlds theory of consciousness, Nous 57(2): 316-340, 2023 The naturalistic case for free will, in S. Ioannidis et al. (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy, Springer, 2022 Special Science Counterfactuals, The Monist 105(2): 194-213, 2022 Group Responsibility, Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, 2022 Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Technology 34: 1213-1242, 2021 Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science (with M. Pivato), Synthese 198(3): 2551-2612, 2021 Other recent papers Free will: real or illusion? (A debate with G. D. Caruso and C. J. Clark) The Philosopher 108(1), 2020 What's wrong with the consequence argument: In defence of compatibilist libertarianism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119(3): 253-274, 2019 My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it (with P. Menzies), in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2017 Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement (with W. Rabinowicz), Philosophical Perspectives 28: 155-172, 2014 Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise, Nous 48(1): 156-178, 2014 (see here or here for the original 2011 versions) On beliefs, degrees of belief, and belief revision The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem (with F. Dietrich), invited contribution to a CUP volume on Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief, edited by Igor Douven, 2020 From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory (with F. Dietrich), Journal of Philosophy 115(5): 225-270, 2018 Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules (with F. Dietrich and R. Bradley), Journal of Economic Theory 162: 352-371, 2016 Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology (with F. Dietrich), Synthese 19(5): 787-808, 2013 On rationality, reasons, preferences, and individual choices What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories (with F. Dietrich), The Philosophical Review 126(4): 421-479, 2017 Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 175-229, 2016 Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 249-281, 2016 A reason-based theory of rational choice (with F. Dietrich), Nous 47(1): 104-134, 2013 Where do preferences come from? (with F. Dietrich), International Journal of Game Theory 42(3): 613-637, 2013 On causation, physicalism, reduction, and chance Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontological, Nous 53(4): 852-883, 2019 Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism? (with D. Stoljar), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 96-108, 2017 [official journal link] Emergent Chance (with M. Pivato), The Philosophical Review 124(1): 119-152, 2015 Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle (with P. Menzies), Journal of Philosophy CVI(9): 475-502, 2009 On political philosophy What normative facts should political theory be about? Philosophy of science meets political liberalism (with L. Valentini), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 6: 185-220, 2020 Freedom as independence (with L. Valentini), Ethics 126(4): 1043-1074, 2016 The Methodology of Political Theory (with L. Valentini), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, 2016 Can there be a global demos? An agency-based approach (with M. Koenig-Archibugi), Philosophy and Public Affairs 38(1): 76-110, 2010 Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice: A Review, Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, 2018 The Condorcet jury theorem and voter-specific truth (with K. Spiekermann), in H. Kornblith and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics, Oxford (Blackwell), 2016 Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive (with A. Vermeule), Rationality and Society 26: 170-207, 2014 Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls (with R. C. Luskin, J. S. Fishkin and I. McLean), Journal of Politics 75(1): 80-95, 2013 The Logical Space of Democracy, Philosophy and Public Affairs 39(3): 262-297, 2011 Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, Journal of Political Philosophy 19(1): 1-27, 2011 On group agency and social ontology What is it like to be a group agent? Nous 52(2): 295-319, 2018 Three kinds of collective attitudes, Erkenntnis 79(9,Suppl.): 1601-1622, 2014 Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K. Spiekermann), American Political Science Review 107(4): 629-643 On judgment aggregation and social choice Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized (with F. Dietrich), a pair of companion papers:
Probabilistic opinion pooling [an introductory review] (with F. Dietrich), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, 2016 Social Choice Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013 Edition The theory of judgment aggregation: An introductory review, Synthese 187(1): 179-207, 2012 The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory (with F. Dietrich), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3, 2010 Majority voting on restricted domains (with F. Dietrich), Journal of Economic Theory 145(2): 512-543, 2010 Some earlier representative papers Group decisions in humans and animals: a survey (with L. Conradt), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 719-742, 2009 Independence and interdependence in collective decision making: an agent-based model of nest-site choice by honeybee swarms (with C. Elsholtz and T. D. Seeley), Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 755-762, 2009 Strategy-proof judgment aggregation (with F. Dietrich), Economics and Philosophy 23(3): 269-300, 2007 Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation (with F. Dietrich), Social Choice and Welfare 29(1): 19-33, 2007 A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment (with R. E. Goodin), American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 940-949, 2006 The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason, Ethics 116(2): 362-402, 2006 A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions, American Political Science Review 98(3): 495-513, 2004 Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (with J. S. Dryzek), British Journal of Political Science 33(1): 1-28, 2003 Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result (with P. Pettit), Economics and Philosophy 18: 89-110, 2002 (companion paper in Synthese 2004) Two Concepts of Agreement (revised version), The Good Society 11(1): 72-79, 2002 Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (with R. E. Goodin), Journal of Political Philosophy 9(3): 277-306, 2001 |
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