Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces:

Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping

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Abstract
The period since the end of the Cold War has presided over a dramatic expansion in the number of multilateral peace operations. Yet individual states have varied significantly in their enthusiasm for peacekeeping, and moreover, demonstrated a greater propensity to participate in missions located in certain countries than others. Our major contribution in the present paper is to provide new insights into how geography underpins these spatial variations. To do so, we invoke the notion of “proximity”, which we use to conceptualise different geographic influences shaping countries’ interests in peacekeeping and ability to legitimate extra-territoriality. Advancing on previous work concerned with peacekeeping contributions, we make use of a geographically disaggregated dataset of multilateral peace operations, which allows us to capture various dyadic linkages between sending and receiving countries. Our study shows that participation in multilateral peace operations can be broadly understood in terms of three dimensions of geographic proximity. The first is issue proximity, with countries exhibiting a greater probability of sending troops where the “liberal” objectives of peacekeeping (freedom, democracy, etc.) are more closely aligned with domestically-embedded norms, institutions and practices of democracy and humanitarianism. Second, we provide unique evidence that spatial proximity matters, in that countries are more likely to participate where the host state is physically closer or located in the same region. And third, to the extent that dyadic
colonial ties and share of target country diaspora positively influence participation, we find selective evidence for the influence of relational forms of proximity.

**Keywords** Conflict; dyads; extra-territorial; peacekeeping; proximity; relational

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INTRODUCTION

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed considerable growth in the number of multilateral peacekeeping operations (Chopra, 1996, Solomon, 2007, Welsh, 2003). Much of this expansion has taken place in the world’s ‘geopolitical blackholes’ (Tuathail, 2000, pg. 170), spaces of instability where rising levels of civil conflict have been accompanied by economic collapse, human rights abuses and loss of life (Hyndman, 1999, Mullenbach, 2005, O'Loughlin, 2005, Silberfein, 2004). Peacekeeping operations have sought to bring an end to hostilities, prevent further conflict, provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate post-conflict state-building (Diehl, 1988, pg.487, Ku and Jacobson, 2003).

According to Dodds (2005, pg.160), multilateral peacekeeping represents something of a ‘geopolitical paradox’. The dominant form of human-territorial organisation, the Westphalian state, is predicated on bounded sovereignty, i.e. states enjoy a monopoly right to exercise control over their own territory. As a form of extra-territorial influence, peacekeeping violates this principle, and therefore runs counter to the supposed immutability of insular forms of sovereignty (Agnew, 2005). At the same time, peacekeeping places demands on participants, requiring them to sacrifice domestic resources, and even soldiers’ lives, in the pursuit of peace, stability and human rights in non-domestic spaces. An important corollary is that multilateral peacekeeping is a highly controversial, contested and politically-loaded activity (Chopra, 1996, Mingst, 2003, Welsh, 2003).
Indeed, such factors might go some way in explaining why peacekeeping remains geographically selective. Selectivity is apparent in terms of both recipients and senders. Much to the consternation of certain observers, therefore, not all inter-state or intra-state conflicts have led to multilateral interventions (Dodds, 2005, Fortna, 2004a, Mullenbach, 2005). Of greater interest in the present paper, however, are variations on the sending side. While a large share of the global population of states has contributed towards peace operations, individual countries have varied significantly in the number of missions in which they have participated. Individual countries have also been selective in their geographic choices, demonstrating a greater preference for sending peacekeepers to missions located in certain countries (Neack, 1995, Pugh, 2004, Solomon, 2007).

What explains these variations? Although a number of studies have sought to address the question of uneven contributions, we argue that they have provided a geographically underspecified account of multilateral peacekeeping (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, Khanna et al., 1999, Lebovic, 2004, Mullenbach, 2005, Neack, 1995, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2003). Two characteristics of the existing literature are apposite here.

The first is a comparatively narrow focus on domestic (place-based) attributes that, by and large, are independent of the state where the peace operation is hosted. Whilst doing a good job of examining the impact of domestic polity and capacity, past studies have fallen into something of a territorial trap (Agniew and Corbridge, 1995), failing to adequately explore the influence of factors beyond the boundaries of (potential) contributing states. Missing almost entirely from the existing literature are any systematic efforts to examine the impact of host country location on the decision by countries to
participate. With few exceptions (Khanna et al., 1999, Lebovic, 2004), the literature has also had relatively little to say about the impact of transnational linkages. These omissions are perhaps surprising: states are increasingly enmeshed in a world of cross-border influence, spillovers and interdependency, all of which might plausibly influence a country’s decision to intervene (c.f. Carter, 2005, Dodds, 2005, c.f. O'Loughlin, 2005, Roberts et al., 2003).

Another salient feature of existing research is a geographically aggregated analytic focus on the so-called “peacekeeping burden.” The dependent variable explained in previous studies has been a measure of states’ relative contribution to the overall financial and/or personnel requirements of peacekeeping operations orchestrated by the UN or regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) (Khanna et al., 1999, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2003). Although entirely appropriate to questions of burden sharing in the context of a global public good, by failing to take account of the country source and destination of contributions for specific peace operations, existing studies have ignored a great deal of geographic information. Most importantly, perhaps, their geographically aggregated approach means that they have been unable to explore the influence of various dyadic linkages between sending and receiving countries.

Our unique contribution in the present paper is to provide a more geographically disaggregated and multi-dimensional analysis of countries’ uneven participation in multilateral peace operations. We advance on previous research in two important ways. First, we examine the influence of a far wider set of geographic variables, including ones which capture the relationship between sending and receiving states. Novel in this field of
research, therefore, we investigate various aspects of spatial and relational proximity largely neglected in the existing literature. The inclusion of these variables helps us unpack the different geographic determinants of extra-territoriality, which as elaborated on below, we conceptualise in terms of domestic issue, spatial and relational proximity.

Another important advance, and one which enables us to investigate our distinctive spatial and relational attributes, is the use of dyadic data. Departing from previous monadic analyses, we analyse a novel dataset which records individual countries’ participation in specific peacekeeping missions, and therefore captures more completely the uneven geography of peacekeeping. Dyadic statistical analyses are popular in the international relations (IR) literature investigating the correlates of inter-state war and foreign intervention in domestic civil wars (Gartzke, 2007, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006, Kinsella and Russett, 2002, Oneal et al., 1996). Uniquely, we apply similar techniques to understand the place-based, spatial and transnational network attributes which shape states’ propensity to join particular peace operations.

Our research covers the period 1990-2005. The number, nature and targets of peacekeeping have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, meaning that a focus on post-1989 operations provides a temporally coherent period over which to investigate the nature of contemporary peace operations, geopolitical interests and exercise of extra-territoriality (Andersson, 2002, Dodds, 2005, Jakobsen, 2002, Reuber, 2000, Wheeler, 2003). Unlike a number of past studies, which have focused exclusively on NATO (Shimizu and Sandler, 2003) or UN (Khanna et al., 1999) missions, we examine peacekeeping under the auspices of both the UN, regional IGOs and ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.”
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the changing nature of peacekeeping and summarises the findings of previous research. Section 3 outlines our conceptual framework and theoretically-inspired predcations. Variables, measures and estimation methods are detailed in section 4. Section 5 presents our results. Finally, section 6 concludes, and discusses the wider implications of our findings.

**POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING**

Following the end of the Second World War, the mantle of peacekeeping was taken up by the United Nations. However, the number of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War period remained comparatively ‘modest’, not least because of enduring super-power rivalries which limited peace operations to conflicts where the permanent members of the UN could agree on a course of action (Lyons, 1998, Solomon, 2007). This situation changed with the end of the Cold War which precipitated a dramatic rise in the number of peacekeeping missions. For example, UN commanded peacekeeping operations tripled from 12 over the period 1947-87 to reach 36 between 1988-2001 (Jakobsen, 2002, pg.270). As well as an expansion in missions, three further characteristics distinguish Cold War from post-Cold War peacekeeping. The first is the objectives of intervention. Marking a departure from the Cold War period, when peace operations largely addressed inter-state conflict, a large share of peace operations over the past two decades have targeted countries experiencing intra-state hostilities (Wheeler, 2002). Accompanying this shift in emphasis has been an expanded remit. From a predominant emphasis on
monitoring, observation and verification roles, multilateral peacekeeping since the early-1990s have increasingly assumed humanitarian and state-building functions (Ku and Jacobson, 2003, Wheeler, 2002).

A second important development has been a growing role for non-UN operations. While UN commanded operations have continued to dominate multilateral peacekeeping during the post-Cold War period, a rising number of operations have been orchestrated by two additional sets of actors: regional/sub-regional IGOs; and “coalitions of the willing”, i.e. ‘groups of actors that come together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to particular crises’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, pg.169). Another difference is the range of participating countries, with a growing number and diversity of developing nations contributing to Post-Cold War peacekeeping duties (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, Jones, 2004, Neack, 1995, Neethling, 2004).

States’ commitment to multilateral peacekeeping has nevertheless remained highly geographically uneven. Approximately one-third of countries have abstained from peacekeeping altogether, while amongst active peacekeepers, certain states have participated in a far larger number of operations than others. Most importantly for the analysis here, individual countries have also proved selective in where they send their peacekeepers, demonstrating a greater propensity to volunteer for peace operations in specific countries. Our goal in the present paper is to identify the geographic factors which explain these differences.

Several large-N studies have previously examined geographic variations in peacekeeping contributions, albeit largely from the perspective of burden sharing, investigating why certain countries shoulder more of the overall costs of global or
regional peacekeeping commitments than others. Although not strictly comparable with
our paper, these studies have nevertheless furnished a number of relevant insights into the
uneven geography of participation in peace operations. They have generally (but not
always) found that more powerful countries contribute more to peacekeeping operations
have shown that domestic regime type is an important determinant of peacekeeping, with
democratic polities far more likely to carry the burden for peace operations (Andersson,
2002, Lebovic, 2004). Previous research has also located a role for economic ties, with
Khanna et al. (1999) finding that trade openness is positively correlated with certain
countries’ peacekeeping contribution, although it is worth noting that their analysis is not
based on dyadic (i.e. bilateral) trade data.

Whilst providing useful insights, what is perhaps remarkable about previous
studies is their lack of attention to the relationship between peacekeeper sending and
receiving countries. It is entirely plausible that a country’s decision to volunteer
personnel for a mission in a particular target state will be shaped by dyadic spatial and
relational connections. Yet the existing empirical literature has almost entirely ignored
this possibility. Our study provides a first step to overcoming this geographic myopia. To
our knowledge, it is the first large-N, econometric study to use dyadic data to explore the
influence of both spatial and relational proximity. In the next section, we outline our
conceptual framework, before going onto develop our predications.

CONCEPTUALISING PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS
An important feature of multilateral peacekeeping is that it is voluntary in the sense that states can choose whether to participate in a particular operation (Diehl, 1988, Jakobsen, 2002). Yet this choice is by no means unproblematic. Sending peacekeepers is potentially costly and involves varying degrees of risk (for soldiers’ lives, countries’ reputation, etc.) (Byman and Waxman, 2002). It is also politically, legally and morally contentious on account of the fact that it involves the exercise of extra-territorial influence.

Two implications follow from these observations. The first is that individual states must possess interests in dispatching peacekeepers for a specific peace mission (Nye, 2003). Second, a country’s participation must be perceived as legitimate, not only by domestic constituencies, but also influential actors within target states and the wider international community (Wheeler, 2002). It is our contention that states’ participation in particular peace operations will be determined by a range of geographic attributes which shape interests in peacekeeping and their ability to legitimate intervention.

There is nothing especially controversial in the idea that peacekeeping is an interest-based form of extra-territoriality. Instead, the major point of contention in the literature is the source and nature of these interests. According to realists, interests in peacekeeping are self-serving, strategic and materialist in orientation (Pugh, 2004). In particular, participation is seen as a means to advance a state’s power, geopolitical influence and prosperity, a view widely espoused by several high-profile critics of Western peace operations (Pilger, 1999). Another school of thought, closely aligned with liberal theories of IR, maintains that countries’ interests in peacekeeping operations are more idealistic in nature, and bound-up with domestic concerns about human rights, freedom and democracy. We believe that both sets of “interests” will positively influence
a state’s decision to volunteer personnel for a particular peacekeeping mission (Nye, 2003). No doubt, different interests will predominate at different times, and there will be cases where one or other type of interest plays a negligible role. Yet, to the extent that interests help to offset the economic, political and military costs of peacekeeping, it would be surprising if they did not matter.

Even if it is in the interests of states to intervene, there is no guarantee that they will actually do so. Willing peacekeepers face a range of constraints which limit their ability to participate. One oft-discussed constraint is capacity. Countries wishing to contribute to a particular mission must possess the financial, bureaucratic and military resources to deploy, operate and maintain peacekeepers. What concerns us more in the present article is a second constraint on states’ participation in peace operations, namely, legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Welsh, 2003). We use the term here to describe a situation where a particular intervention is seen as morally, legally and politically acceptable by relevant actors. The need for legitimacy arises because deploying personnel to “police” conflict transgresses the territorial norm of authoritative sovereignty. Sovereignty, and its natural corollary, non-intervention, has come to assume considerable normative, legal and diplomatic force (Agnew, 2005, Biersteker, 2002). Actors who violate this principle must therefore command, construct or otherwise demonstrate legitimate reasons for doing so.

Of course, as evidenced by recent events in the Middle East, it is possible for states to side-step the issue of legitimacy (Falah et al., 2006, Roberts et al., 2003). Yet they generally prefer to avoid this course of action. Internationally, failure to command or construct sufficient justification for intervention can result in reputational damage, and
possibly even sanctions (Falah et al., 2006). Along similar lines, where domestic publics, the media, etc., remain unconvinced of the case for intervention, governments may encounter opposition, and struggle to gain sufficient political support to risk lives in non-domestic spaces. Equally important, potential participants whose involvement is deemed “inappropriate” may find it difficult to secure approval from belligerents in the host state, whose consent is invariably required before peacekeepers can be deployed (Diehl, 1988).

Our conceptual framework in the present paper therefore emphasises the role of two factors in shaping the geography of peacekeeping. The first is interests, and the second, legitimacy. We suggest that cross-national variations in these factors are not only likely to affect the conflicts selected for a multilateral peace operation, but also different countries’ willingness to participate in these operations. Of course, we are not the first to argue that geography matters in the decision to participate. Our particular contribution here, however, is to go far further in unpacking, exploring and clarifying how geography matters.

To do so, we invoke the notion of “proximity”. With the exception of spatial proximity (Buhaug and Rød, 2006, Tir and Diehl, 2002, Toset et al., 2000), political geography has made very little use of this concept, at least explicitly. Yet we suggest that proximity offers a useful way of conceptualising the influence of various geographic attributes which combine to shape geopolitical interests and legitimacy. Our basic contention is that a country’s participation in a particular peace operation will depend on its proximity along one or more geographic dimensions. Three specific forms of proximity are explored in the present paper: domestic issue, spatial and relational. In geographic terms, these forms of proximity broadly correspond to concepts of place,
space and transnational networks, respectively. Our paper therefore speaks directly to wider debates in geography about the sources, nature and geometry of geopolitical influence and behaviour (Agnew, 2005, Reuber, 2000, Tuathail, 2000).

In the rest of this section, we briefly outline these categories, and advance a series of propositions linking specific aspects of domestic issue, spatial and relational proximity to countries’ participation in (particular) peacekeeping missions. We begin with issue proximity.

**Domestic Issue Proximity**

The concept of issue proximity draws its inspiration from theories of domestic politics which emphasise the role of domestic institutions, interest groups and political actors in shaping state policy (Gourevitch, 2002). It is deployed in the present context to capture the degree of alignment between the “liberal” goals of post-Cold War peacekeeping activities, on the one hand, and place-based norms, interests and practices, on the other. While a range of geographic attributes are likely to shape the domestic political resonance of peace operations, we restrict our focus here to place-based attributes which are largely independent of a country’s locational or relational ties to other states, at least in the short- to medium-term.

One such attribute, widely discussed in the existing literature, is domestic concern for, and commitment to, human rights. First and foremost, this is likely to influence participation by shaping demand for intervention (Mingst, 2003). Human welfare has been an increasingly important factor in post-Cold War peace operations (Dodds, 2005,
Jakobsen, 2002, Ku and Jacobson, 2003, Welsh, 2003). At one level, this reflects the changing legal and normative context at the international level, which has become increasingly permissive of extra-territorial intervention in the defence of human rights (Popescu, 2005). Yet it is also a function of countries’ growing willingness to volunteer personnel in conflicts giving rise to human rights violations, atrocities and suffering.

For some, this new-found willingness is largely a matter of public demand (Byman and Waxman, 2002, Wheeler, 2003). Within the political geography literature, for example, several authors have documented how domestic publics have been instrumental in creating “bottom-up” political demand for humanitarian interventions (Chopra, 1996, O’Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002, Tuathail, 2000). Other observers emphasise the changing values of domestic political elites who, it is suggested, have progressively incorporated human rights protection into their conception of the national interest (Wheeler, 2002). Either way, it follows that countries’ participation in peace operations will be influenced by underlying attitudes, beliefs and commitments towards human rights (Mingst, 2003). A second, closely related, domestic attribute which might plausibly shape the decision to participate in peace operations is democracy (Mitchell and Prins, 1999). The idea that domestic regime type influences foreign policy has its roots in liberal theories of IR. Starting from the empirical observation that democracies rarely go to war with each other, it is suggested that democracy has a pacifying effect, a proposition encapsulated in the popular notion of the “democratic peace” (Owen, 1994). More recently, and expanding on these precepts, liberal scholars have argued that democracies are also inclined towards spreading democracy to non-democratic territorial spaces, if need comes by force.
Central to these claims is the idea that democratic polities regard the creation, maintenance and expansion of well-functioning democracies as part of the national interest. According to variants of liberalism, therefore, democracy embodies norms which carry the assumption that political – and, particularly apparent in recent geopolitical discourse, economic – freedom is in the shared interests of the international community, supporting mutually beneficial stability, security and prosperity (Lebovic, 2004). Along similar lines, it is suggested that modern democratic values create normative obligations to defend human rights, dignity and good governance, which states seek to meet out of reputational reasons (Andersson, 2002).

Whether through one or more of these hypothesised mechanisms, the implication is clear: democratic polities should be more willing to participate in multilateral peace operations. Conflict, instability and threat to freedoms are more likely to resonate with domestic interests, exhibiting greater domestic issue proximity. These predications about the importance of policy are supported by recent large-N empirical studies. Andersson (2002) shows that democracies contributed more to UN peacekeeping missions over the period 1991-99, while Lebovic (2004) reaches the same conclusion for UN missions between 1993-2001.

Spatial Proximity

A second form of proximity considered here is locational and seeks to capture various aspects of the (potential) sending countries’ position in geographic space vis-à-vis the receiving one. Although largely ignored in previous large-N studies, we believe that there
are a number of ways in which spatial proximity might shape the incentives for states to participate in peace operations, along with their ability to legitimate intervention.

One way in which proximity potentially matters is by influencing the geo-strategic gains from intervention. Actual or aspirant regional powers may be more inclined to participate in “backyard” peace operations because such interventions are more compatible with their goal to maintain and/or extend their geopolitical influence over the critically important “near abroad” (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Lyons, 1998, Neethling, 2004, Pilger, 1999). Another, arguably more important, reason why spatially proximate countries might demonstrate a greater willingness to participate is that they are more likely to experience, or else, fear that they will experience, the negative spillovers from nearby conflict (Tuathail, 2000). Amongst the most visible of these real or imagined spillovers are refugees. Anecdotal evidence suggests that concerns over migrants have been an important factor in creating demand for peacekeeping from domestic publics, politicians and regional IGOs (Byman and Waxman, 2002, Mingst, 2003). More generally, fears about the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, and the accompanying economic and political turbulence, provides a further incentive for spatially proximate countries to volunteer peacekeepers (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). Indeed, precisely because of these more readily apparent material interests, governments will find it easier to secure public consent for sending peacekeepers (Dodds, 2000, O'Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002).

However, while there are compelling reasons to suspect a role for spatial proximity, less clear are what sorts of proximity matter. In reality, there are a number of different aspects of spatial proximity, and it is by no means clear that they have a similar
influence on the willingness or ability of states to participate in a particular host country operation. Three forms are examined here. The first, and most straightforward, is physical distance between the (potential) sending and receiving state. We anticipate distance to positively influence participation.

Another, more potentially ambiguous, dimension of spatial proximity is contiguity. At one level, there is a case for expecting contiguous countries to be more willing peacekeepers. To take one obvious point: as a first destination, international refugees cross into directly neighbouring countries, providing a strong incentive for contiguous states to address the source of instability by dispatching peacekeepers. Yet, as noted by Tir and Diehl (2002, pg.266), contiguity potentially supports hostile as well as peaceful interactions. As immediate neighbours, contiguous countries are more likely to be subject to boundary disputes, a well-known source of inter-state conflict (Anderson, 1999, Clark and Regan, 2003, Kinsella and Russett, 2002). Contiguity also provides increased opportunities for the projection of “unwelcome” power, influence and interference by one state over another state, giving rise to political tensions between contiguous dyads (Silberfein, 2004, Tir and Diehl, 2002). We might therefore expect one or both disputants in the host country to show a greater reluctance to sanction the involvement of neighbouring states, fearing the longer-term consequences of their involvement. IGOs and/or regional hegemons – both of which have played an important role in catalysing and legitimating peacekeeping during the post Cold-War period – might similarly be reluctant to involve immediate neighbours, keenly aware of their potentially subversive intentions, questionable neutrality and destabilising impacts (Lebovic, 2004).
We therefore include contiguity as a variable in our estimations, although largely in an exploring role.

A third dimension of spatial proximity is regional location. We hypothesise that countries are more likely to participate in peace operations where the target state is located in the same world region. Inevitably, regional “membership” is likely to pick-up a number of distance-related effects.\(^2\) Yet we anticipate that the regional influence will include several additional economic, political and social attributes which are not a simple function of distance. Included here are a whole set of economic (e.g. regional production networks) and political (e.g. membership in regional inter-governmental bodies) relationships (Murray, 2006). Also potentially included are shared cultural norms, institutions and diplomatic networks (Buzan, 2004). Together, these regional linkages, mutual dependencies and commonalities might plausibly foster recognition of shared interests, obligations and roles amongst countries located in the same region, increasing countries’ willingness to send peacekeepers. At the same time, a combination of heightened familiarity, mutual understanding and trust, might raise the willingness of domestic belligerents to sanction the involvement of a state located in the same vicinity. Indeed, the very fact that a growing number of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations have been orchestrated and staffed by members of regional IGOs, suggests that same region is likely to be positively correlated with participation (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Neethling, 2004).

**Relational Proximity**
While the concept of proximity in geography has traditionally been defined with reference to some aspect of spatial proximity, the past decade has witnessed heightened interest in relational forms. Underpinning this development is growing recognition of the importance of transnational relationships and their role in the production of spatially distanciated geographies (Murray, 2006). Accordingly, it is suggested that what matters is not simply spatial proximity, but proximity in terms of the strength of a country’s economic, political and social ties to others (Bathelt and Glückler, 2003, Neumayer and Perkins, 2005).

Consistent with these ideas, the IR literature has long emphasised the role of transnational relational ties in shaping countries’ foreign policies. Most famously in the present context is an influential stream of (classical) liberal thought, widely dubbed the “Kantian peace”. The basic premise of this school is that openness, interactions and integration have a pacifying influence (Oas, 2005). International exposure, relational ties and regularised contact facilitate the cross-border flow of information, development of shared norms and mutuality of interests which guide and constrain state behaviour (Kinsella and Russett, 2002). Although previously applied to explain the presence/absence of intra-state conflicts (e.g. see Oneal et al., 1996), similar arguments may well be relevant to the question of why states contribute to particular peacekeeping operations.

In the rest of this section, we point to several relational ties which might plausibly influence countries’ willingness to participate. It is our contention that the probability of participation rises where a country is more “closely” related, directly or indirectly, to a particular target state through one or more transnational linkages. We begin with one of
the classic Kantian suppressors of conflict: international trade. Within the classical liberal literature, the exchange of goods and services between countries is portrayed as creating a situation of mutually beneficial dependence, deterring cross-border aggression. We go further here by suggesting that the very same dependencies may well create positive incentives for peace-seeking interventions. More specifically, to the extent that conflict and instability threaten economically beneficial trade, it is likely to be in the self-interests of individual states to send peacekeepers to economically important trading partners. Needless to say, such ideas are controversial. They infer that, as opposed to a simple geopolitical expression of humanitarianism, peacekeeping can additionally be interpreted as an extra-territorial form of economic self-help. Indeed, this is a view espoused by several “popular” critics of peacekeeping, who point to the reluctance of Western countries to send troops to conflicts where they lack direct economic interests (Pilger, 1999).

Another set of relational linkages which might plausibly shape participation in a particular peace operation are rooted in colonialism. Although highly variable in its nature, modalities and impacts, the colonial experience left significant legacies (Gwynne et al., 2003). Amongst others, colonialism gave rise to a host of enduring social, economic and political linkages, ranging from joint educational programmes to foreign investments. As with trade, we anticipate these ties to create ongoing interests on the part of the former colonizing states in the welfare, stability and prosperity of their former colonies. Additionally, the legacy of colonialism has increasingly assumed normative dimensions, revealed in heightened moral expectations and obligations towards former colonies (Lyons, 1998). Partly in recognition of their historic culpability, countries have
faced growing pressures, both from domestic and international sources, to address conflict, instability and unrest in their ex-colonies.

For their part, ex-colonies might also be more willing to sanction the involvement of peacekeepers from their former colonial masters. Familiarity, trust and long-established diplomatic ties are all likely to play a role in this respect. Inevitably, there will be exceptions; for instance, where one or more of the belligerents believe that political advantages can be had from openly defying the will of their former colonial “oppressors.” Yet the weight of anecdotal evidence suggests that this is exception rather than the norm. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of high-profile peacekeeping missions in Africa have been initiated or staffed by former colonial powers (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Diehl, 1988).

A third relational tie which might plausibly influence countries’ participation decisions is diaspora linkages. According to the literature, diaspora communities perform a boundary-spanning role, linking countries where they reside with their historic homelands. Transnational allegiances of ethnic communities, it is suggested, create domestic political interests that transcend the boundaries of the host state. Specifically, through lobbying, strategic voting, media influence, etc., diaspora communities may seek to represent and advance the interests of their home country, exerting potentially significant pressure on governments (Popescu, 2005, Shain, 1994-95). Hence, several authors have documented how “diaspora politics” has been influential in moulding host countries’ foreign policies, particularly in areas involving self-determination, democracy and human rights (Carter, 2005, Dodds, 2000, Haney and Vanderbush, 1999). We
therefore expect countries home to a larger share of the diaspora of a particular target state to show a greater propensity to intervene.

As well as transnational ties between individual sovereign territories, bilateral relational linkages are also created at the supranational level through international organisations. Joint membership of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) is another of the classic pillars of the Kantian peace. IGOs are variously hypothesised to reduce conflict by lowering the transaction costs of cooperation, fostering a shared sense of identity and interests, and providing institutionalised fora, mechanisms and incentives for conflict resolution (e.g. see Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006).

Many of these same pathways and mechanisms might also increase the willingness of members of a particular IGO to send peacekeepers to a country to which they are linked through joint membership. Membership potentially ascribes new or heightened responsibilities upon countries, including a duty to assist other participants. A combination of increased peer monitoring, diplomatic communication and reputational considerations are likely to make it more difficult for a country to ignore the plight of fellow states whose populations are experiencing humanitarian distress. Joint membership of intergovernmental organisations might also reshape or reinforce states’ geographic sphere of self-interest. Through interaction, cooperation and joint problem solving, the stability, prosperity and well-being of other members may come to enter the strategic space of joint IGO participants. Again, the effect will be to increase states’ willingness to volunteer domestic resources for peacekeeping missions located in others members’ territories. By fostering dialogue, mutual understanding and trust, states might
additionally be more inclined to welcome intervention from countries who are members of a larger number of the same IGOs.

**METHOD**

**Estimation Approach**

Although we are centrally concerned with one aspect of peacekeeping, i.e. country participation in multilateral peace operations, we adopt a two-stage estimation method to control for sample selection bias. Within the present context, the possibility of non-random selection arises from the fact that the geography of peacekeeping is determined over two stages. The first stage involves a decision about whether a particular country qualifies for a multilateral peacekeeping mission. While a range of inter- and intra-state conflicts exist, only a small share of these conflicts have resulted in extra-territorial peacekeeping intervention. The second stage – and the primary focus of our study – centres on the decision by states to participate in a particular peace operation.

We model each of these stages simultaneously. In the first stage, we include characteristics of the country and conflict which are known to shape peacekeeping selection; while, in the second stage, we examine various geographic dimensions of proximity hypothesised above. The estimator employed, Heckman’s two-stage probit estimator, controls for potential selection effects by estimating both stages simultaneously and allowing the error terms of the first and second stage of the regressions to be correlated with each other. Standard errors are assumed to be clustered...
on country dyads (second stage) and on the location country (first stage), respectively. With nearly half a million observations, failure to cluster standard errors would lead to a large under-estimation of standard errors.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable deployed in the present paper is what is known as a dummy variable of directed country dyad years. Its value is set to one if the potential sending country participates in a peacekeeping mission in the receiving country in a particular year, or zero if it does not. Data for the dependent variable were extracted from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s ‘Multilateral Peace Operations Database’ (SIPRI, 2007). Amongst others, the database records the location of peace operations, as well as the identities of contributing states.

We restrict our focus to peacekeeping missions involving the deployment of military troops. As the most politically, economically and legally contentious aspect of multilateral peacekeeping, we expect countries’ troop sending actions to be especially revealing about the nature of extra-territoriality. Military troops are invariably armed and are at a far greater risk of casualties than is the case for other categories of peacekeepers. Certainly, their involvement is likely to say a great deal more than civilian personnel, especially in relation to geopolitically interesting questions, about the incentives and constraints governing the projection of state power, influence and control across sovereign borders.
It could be argued that our binary participation/no participation dependent variable ignores potentially significant differences in troop numbers and/or financial payments contributed by individual countries, and therefore the actual degree of commitment. Yet this argument needs to be set against the fact that the very act of sending troops is highly politically significant in its own right. Indeed, once a state has decided to commit, we expect the actual number of troops sent to be heavily influenced by its military capacity, per capita income or level of compensatory payments. Neither of these variables is of central interest in the present study.

**Independent Variables**

We include seven selection variables in the first stage regression. The first is a measure of conflict intensity which has been found to positively influence the likelihood of a multilateral peace operation (Fortna, 2004a, Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). Our specific variable, derived from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005), is the number of conflict deaths over the past five years. Along similar lines, we include a variable measuring the number of refugees relative to population size, based on data from UNHCR (various years). Again, we expect that peacekeeping operations are more likely to be established where conflicts are accompanied by a larger number of refugees, not least because of heightened self-interest motives. After Mullenbach (2005), who finds that ceasefire agreements increase the likelihood of a multilateral peace operation, we include a dummy variable to denote where there is a ceasefire treaty between belligerents (using data from Fortna, 2004b). We also include regional dummies to capture the geographic region in which a particular
country is located. The underlying idea, which receives a degree of empirical support in the statistical literature (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003), is that conflicts in some regions are more likely to be selected for a multilateral peace operation than others. Coding data for regional location is derived from World Bank (2006). A fifth variable is a dummy indicating whether a country is an ex-colony or former Soviet republic which we anticipate to raise the likelihood of a peace operation taking place. A resource abundance metric seeks to control for selection effects arising from the alleged heightened willingness of countries to actively intervene in resource-rich countries (Klare, 2005). We use the World Bank’s (2006) measure of energy and mineral rents relative to a country’s gross national income.

Our final variable, democratic polity, is proxied using the Polity IV Project’s polity2 indicator of a country’s level of democracy (Marshall et al., 2006). The variable is only coded for countries with populations of over 500,000, and furthermore, does not provide a measure of democracy for states occupied by a foreign nation, whose political system is in transition or is highly disrupted by armed conflict. As a result, the inclusion of the democratic polity variable leads to the loss of a substantial number of observations, and we therefore report two sets of estimations: one with and one without democracy in the first stage.

Our second set of variables, which comprise the main focus of the present article, capture various dimensions of geographic proximity hypothesised to influence a country’s participation in multilateral peacekeeping missions. We begin with variables capturing issue proximity. Democratic polity is again proxied by the Polity IV Project’s polity2 indicator (Marshall et al., 2006). Along similar lines, humanitarian concern and
commitment to human rights is proxied by a sending country’s respect for human rights, using a measure from Gibney (2007).

Three dyadic variables are used to explore the importance of spatial proximity. The first, physical distance, is measured according to kilometres between the two countries’ capital cities. A second, contiguity, is measured using a dummy variable for dyads sharing a land border or separated by less than 150 miles of sea. Distance and contiguity data are obtained from Bennett and Stam (2005). Finally, the World Bank’s (2006) classification of world regions is used to code whether the two countries are located in the same region.

A third set of main explanatory variables capture four dimensions of relational proximity. Bilateral trade is measured relative to the sending country’s GDP using data from Gleditsch (2002) and World Bank (2006). Colonial ties are captured using a dummy variable which denotes whether a potential sending state exercised colonial control over the country in which the peacekeeping mission is located. We include Russia in this definition since its imposition of political and military control over ex-Soviet territories was analogous to that exercised by the classic Western and Japanese colonisers. A third variable measures the share of the global diaspora stock – that is, migrants from the state hosting a particular peace operation – residing in a potential troop sending country. Bilateral migrant stock data are taken from Parsons et al. (2007).

Data for the joint membership of IGOs variable is from Hensel (2005). The variable measures the number of IGOs – and, more precisely, intergovernmental organisations requiring participants to settle disputes peacefully – in which country pairs are both members. We purposely chose this measure (over alternative ones which capture
all IGO memberships, regardless of the organisation’s security remit) in order to ensure that we specifically test the influence of IGO relationships which might plausibly influence the decision to intervene for peacekeeping purposes.

Control Variables

Our model features two control variables in the second stage. We include military power to take account of the possibility that militarily stronger countries – which presumably are better positioned to send, operate and maintain troops – will participate in a greater number of peacekeeping operations. Military power is measured according to the widely used Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) score, taken from the Correlates of War project (Singer et al., 1972). A country’s CINC score is a composite of its total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure. A second variable is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita which we include to control for relative income. All else equal, richer countries are likely to be better-positioned to absorb the costs of deploying troops, and therefore more willing and able to participate in a larger number of missions. Data are from World Bank (2006).

Sample

A lack of data for some variables means that our sample does not feature all countries in the world. Up to 154 developing countries are included in the first stage (note, we
exclude developed countries here, since none of them has hosted a peacekeeping mission. Over the period 1990-2005, multilateral peace operations – orchestrated under the UN, regional IGOs and “coalitions of the willing” – were held in 26 of these developing countries. In the second stage, our sample comprises 150 countries, both developed and developing. The number of dyad years in which a country contributes troops for peacekeeping missions ranges from zero (51 countries never send any troops) to 40 (the United Kingdom tops the list of sending countries in our sample). The average number of dyad years in which countries send troops is eight with a standard deviation of 10.3.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows our estimation results. We begin with the first-stage results concerned with the country attributes shaping the decision to establish a multilateral peace operation. Estimated coefficients for our variables measuring international refugees and ceasefire treaty are statistically significant with the anticipated (positive) sign. We find some evidence of a regional selection effect, with South Asia and Latin America less likely to receive a peace mission than sub-Saharan Africa, the omitted reference category in our estimations. Yet neither conflict deaths, colony nor primary resource rents emerge as statistically significant predictors of peace operations. If democracy in the location country is added to the analysis in the second column of table 1, then results hardly change for the other variables, despite losing approximately 20 per cent of the
observations. More democratic countries are statistically significantly more likely to receive international peacekeeping than more autocratic ones.

We now proceed to our second-stage. Broadly speaking, the estimation results support our a priori expectations that country participation in post-Cold War peace operations is shaped by a combination of domestic issue, spatial and relational proximity. Beginning with the former, our measure of sender democratic polity is positively and statistically significantly correlated with mission participation, a result consistent with previous statistical findings (Andersson, 2002, Lebovic, 2004). A plausible explanation for our finding is that domestic publics, opinion leaders and political elites in democratic polities are more likely to believe that restoring peace, stability and democracy in conflict spaces is a worthwhile goal, and part of the national interest. Along similar lines, the estimated coefficient for human rights protection is positive and statistically significant, confirming recent claims about the importance of humanitarian motives in contemporary peacekeeping operations (Dodds, 2005, Jakobsen, 2002, Popescu, 2005, Wheeler, 2002).

Our statistical findings also provide qualified empirical support for the idea that a country’s spatial proximity promotes participation. The estimated coefficient for distance is negative and statistically significant. This is entirely plausible. The “negative” spillovers of conflict (refugees, economic instability, etc.) are more likely to be experienced by nearby countries, creating domestic support in potential sending countries for peacekeeping. We additionally find statistically robust evidence that countries are more likely to send troops to peace missions located in their own region. Again, this is consistent with the idea that macro-regions constitute geographically distinctive spaces,

Yet our estimated coefficient for contiguity is statistically insignificant. At one level, this result is surprising, in that countries might be expected to face particularly strong incentives to tackle potentially costly conflict, instability and humanitarian crises in bordering states. However, it may be that these positive incentives are offset by historic animosities (e.g. over territorial claims) between contiguous countries, which constrain the ability of immediate neighbours to intervene (Kocs, 1995, Mitchell and Prins, 1999, Silberfein, 2004).

Turning to relational forms of proximity, we find mixed evidence for the role of distanciated forms of geographic influence. Confirming anecdotal observations, our dummy variable denoting former colonial powers (including the quasi-colonial status of Russia) is positively and statistically significantly correlated with participation (Diehl, 1988, Jones, 2004, Neethling, 2004, Silberfein, 2004). We also find that the share of the host state’s diaspora residing in a particular country positively influences the latter’s probability of intervening. The estimated coefficient for our diaspora variable is positive, although it is only marginally significant at the 10% level. Given the difficulties of estimating bilateral migrant stocks, Parsons et al.’s (2007) diaspora variable is inevitably measured with substantial (random) error, biasing the estimated coefficient toward zero and rendering it less likely that it will achieve statistical significance.

Our remaining two relational variables, bilateral trade and joint membership of IGOs, are both statistically insignificant. That countries which trade a larger share of their GDP with the state hosting a peace operation are neither systematically more nor less
likely to intervene goes against liberal thinking about the role of economic interdependencies in creating mutual interests in peace. It also contradicts several critical accounts which have portrayed international peacekeeping as a self-serving activity whose purpose is to advance narrowly-defined economic interests in the sending state. Based on relatively comprehensive dyadic data, our finding for trade cannot simply be ascribed to an overly aggregated trade measure, like the one used in at least one previous study (Khanna et al., 1999). In fact, it may simply be that the degree of bilateral trade dependence does not generally influence the decision to participate, a result which is unlikely to surprise certain scholars who have struggled to find systematic evidence for the pacifying influence of bilateral trade over inter-state conflict (Gartzke, 2007).

A similar conclusion applies to joint membership of IGOs. Again, a whole series of functional characteristics of IGOs are identified in the literature which could plausibly increase the willingness of countries to volunteer forces for an operation in a joint member, or for belligerents in the latter to sanction their involvement. Yet we find that countries linked to a host state via joint membership of a greater number of IGOs (incorporating a peace settlement function) are no more likely to participate in a peace operation. Although contrary to expectations, our statistically insignificant result mirrors similarly ambiguous research in the conflict studies literature, which has provided only mixed support for a role of IGO linkages in fostering peaceful interactions between states (Boehmer et al., 2004).

Finally, we turn to our control variables. Capturing the effect of superior capacity to project extra-territorial influence, our estimated coefficients for military capacity is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, consistent with the idea that richer
countries are better able to afford the costs of sending peacekeepers, we estimate a positive relationship between GDP per capita and participation.

**CONCLUSION**

Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations go to the heart of many contemporary themes in geopolitics. They are instructive in relation to debates about the changing nature of territorial sovereignty and conditions under which countries are able to legitimately exercise extra-territoriality (Agnew, 2005, Agnew and Corbridge, 1995, Hyndman, 1999, Tuathail, 2000). Multilateral operations also say a great deal about the spatiality of the “international community”, and specifically, the geographies of states willing to contribute towards the public goods of peace, security and human rights protection (Dodds, 2005, Oas, 2005, Roberts et al., 2003). Peacekeeping also reveals something very important about the characteristics of contemporary geopolitical interests, and geographically, how these interests are shaped by domestic and non-domestic attributes (Chopra, 1996, Silberfein, 2004).

Precisely for these reasons, peacekeeping is an issue that is of particular interest to scholars of political geography. Our contribution in the present paper picks-up on the above themes of extra-territoriality, multilateralism and geopolitical interests by examining the uneven geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping contributions. In particular, we seek to provide fresh insight into the nature of underlying geographic influences which shape countries’ participation in multilateral peace operations. Although previous work has acknowledged the importance of geography over extra-territoriality, it
has failed to fully explore (conceptually or empirically) how geography matters, particularly beyond territorially-bound, domestic attributes. The present paper seeks to begin to fill this gap in understanding. To do so, we invoke the notion of proximity, which we use to conceptualise, operationalise and explore different geographic dimensions hypothesised to influence the incentives and constraints governing states’ participation in peace multilateral operations.

Our methodological approach is quantitative. We utilise econometric estimation techniques to test the influence of a number of variables, each chosen to capture a particular dimension of geographic proximity, on states’ participation in peacekeeping missions. While the present study is not the first to investigate the statistical correlates of multilateral peacekeeping contributions, it is unique in its geographically disaggregated approach (Khanna et al., 1999, Lebovic, 2004, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2003). Advancing on previous work, we make use of a newly constructed dyadic data set, which allows us to investigate a whole series of locational and relational linkages between (potential) sending and receiving states.

We show that countries’ participation in peace operations can be understood in terms of three forms of geographic proximity, namely, issue, spatial and relational. Beginning with the first of these, we find that both of our variables capturing domestic issue proximity, democracy and commitment to human rights, positively influence participation in peace operations. Our results suggest that the decision to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping efforts is conditioned by the degree of proximity between the “liberal” goals of peacekeeping (freedom, defence of human rights, etc.), on the one hand, and domestically aligned norms, institutions and practices, on the other. Although
saying nothing about underlying causality, our findings are nevertheless consistent with
the idea that domestic preferences are an important influence on foreign policy
(Gourevitch, 2002, Mingst, 2003). Going further, they lend support to the idea that
democratic and humanitarian norms underpin a rescaling of the national interest,
expanding the geographically relevant policy space of countries (Dodds, 2000,

Yet it is not only territorially-bound, domestic attributes which influence
participation in peace operations. Going beyond previous contributions, we show that
go geography enters the calculus of peace contributions in other respects, notably in the way
that it defines countries’ linkages with the host state. Two forms of proximity are
important in this regard. The first is spatial. Despite the unprecedented geopolitical reach
of certain states, we find that distance continues to exert a positive influence over
participation. The idea that countries should have greater material interests in addressing
conflict in nearby states, and are therefore more willing to send troops to restore stability,
has been a common theme in the peacekeeping literature (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997,
Byman and Waxman, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). Our dyadic study is unique,
however, in providing systematic empirical support for the influence of distance. We also
find that regional location matters, with countries more likely to participate in peace
operations located in the same geographic region. In doing so, our study would appear to
highlight the role of macro-regions as distinctive containers of activity, interaction and
shared interests, and moreover, their status as a geopolitically relevant scale shaping
countries’ extra-territorial commitments (Dicken, 2003, Gwynne et al., 2003, Murray,
Another dimension of proximity which we find to have influenced the geography of peacekeeping is relational. Underscoring the ongoing importance of historically-derived linkages, interests and responsibilities, our statistical analysis strongly indicates that former colonial/imperial powers are more likely to participate where a particular peace operation is located in an ex-colony. Although the boundary conditions may have changed, the continued influence of colonial relationships suggests that the assumed “brave new world” of post-Cold War geopolitics continues to carry the imprint of the old (Reuber, 2000). Our estimations also suggest that transnational ethnic ties and the geographic distribution of diaspora communities shape countries’ willingness to deploy peacekeepers. We find that the probability of participation rises if a potential sending country is host to a larger share of the global stock of migrants from the state where the peace operation is located. Yet not all relational ties appear to influence countries’ participation in multilateral peacekeeping. Despite theoretical support, and the use of dyadic data to test their influence, neither bilateral trade ties nor joint membership of IGOS emerge as statistically significant determinants of participation in our estimations.

What are the wider implications of our findings? Most importantly, perhaps, they emphasize the need to think more geographically about extra-territoriality (Agnew, 2005, Dodds, 2000). It may well be that interests and legitimacy combine to influence countries’ foreign policy decisions. However, understanding the uneven geography of extra-territoriality requires us to go further, and unpack the constituent geographic dimensions and sources of these influences. As highlighted in this, and indeed previous studies, place-based characteristics matter (Dodds, 2005, Flint, 2004, Lebovic, 2004, O’Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002, Roberts et al., 2003). The capacity of sovereign entities
to project military power, and domestically-embedded preferences shaping the demand for extra-territoriality, both influence countries’ general propensity to participate in multilateral operations.

Yet states do not exist in a vacuum. A central implication of the present study is that, in thinking about how geopolitical interests, legitimacy and behaviour are produced, it is also necessary to consider countries’ position in relation to the geographic targets of cross-border influence. Understanding the geographies of extra-territoriality therefore necessitates consideration of the nature, degree and geometry of spatial and relational linkages. Advancing on certain streams of IR scholarship, which portray interests and legitimacy as derived from either the “domestic” or truly “international” level, we show that geographic relations between pairs of relevant states are profoundly important. Such insights question the extent to which peace operations can, in the words of Wheeler (2002), be understood as “saving strangers.” The importance of spatial proximity suggests that there is an element of “saving neighbours” in post-Cold War peacekeeping. Likewise, the influence of colonialism and diaspora draws attention to the role of transnational relational linkages in fostering familiarity, interests and commitment.

As is the case with similar large-N, inferential studies, it is not possible to draw definitive insights from our statistical estimations as to why the three forms of proximity identified in the present paper influence countries’ participation, although they do strongly hint at a range of underlying motives. Certainly, our findings that democracy and commitment to human rights are statistically significant predictors suggests a role for liberal motives, a conclusion broadly consistent with several previous quantitative and qualitative studies (Andersson, 2002, Lebovic, 2004, Lyons, 1998, O’Loughlin and
Yet it would seem difficult to ignore the possibility that more directly materialist, self-help motives might shape the geography of peacekeeping contributions. Of course, as demonstrated by the statistically insignificant result for bilateral trade, it would be wrong to overstate the influence of narrowly-defined economic interests. However, the statistically robust influence of distance, region, colonialism and possibly diaspora are difficult to square with the idea that peacekeeping is a wholly altruistic activity, whereby countries endeavour to unselfishly serve the wider interests of humanity at the international level.

All told, our findings suggest that peacekeepers are not drawn randomly from the global population of nation-states. The composition of states volunteering troops for multilateral peace efforts is shaped by a number of identifiable geographic factors. These factors cannot simply be reduced to income and go beyond crude North and South binaries (Dodds, 2000). Instead, the spatiality of the international community of peacekeepers is, for any one peace operation, founded on several dimensions of place-based, spatial and relational geographic variability. Together, these attributes would appear to influence the ability and/or willingness of countries to transgress the norm of territorial sovereignty, and therefore the geographies of extra-territoriality.

We finish with two implications about the study of geopolitics. The first is conceptual. We show that proximity can be usefully deployed to conceptualise and operationalise different geographic dimensions of influence. While different aspects of proximity have been usefully deployed in economic geography, we suggest that there is scope for applying the concept more widely within geopolitics. Indeed, our study points to the need for a more spatial and relational geopolitics, directed at unpacking, mapping
and qualifying the role of space-dependent and transnational linkages in shaping inter-state interests, authority and behaviour. A second implication, and a necessary complement to the first, is methodological. We believe that dyadic analyses are well-placed to illuminate the influence of the complex set of bilateral state linkages often clumped, sometimes misleadingly so, under the rubric of globalisation. Although political geographers have begun to make use of dyadic analyses (Tir and Diehl, 2002), we would invite other scholars to exploit new datasets, computing power and estimation methods to advance understanding of how spatial and relational ties combine to (re-)shape the geopolitical order.
REFERENCES


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Table 1. Estimation results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second stage dependent variable: Troops sent?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (sender)</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.11)**</td>
<td>(5.13)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights protection (sender)</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.55)**</td>
<td>(2.81)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.00)**</td>
<td>(6.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.161</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same region</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.62)**</td>
<td>(3.92)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former colonial link</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.76)**</td>
<td>(2.94)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral trade</td>
<td>5.289</td>
<td>4.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># common security IGOS</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of diaspora in sender</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>1.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.64)*</td>
<td>(1.85)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capacity (sender)</td>
<td>11.672</td>
<td>10.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.05)**</td>
<td>(5.28)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP p.c. (sender)</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.10)**</td>
<td>(3.00)**</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>First stage dependent variable: Peacekeeping mission in place?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle deaths 5-year sum (location)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees p.c. (location)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceasefire in place</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Former colony</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
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<td>Resources per GNI (location)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy (location)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wald test of indep. eqns. (p-value)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heckman’s two-stage probit estimator. S.e. clustered on dyad (second stage) and country of location (first stage). Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant included in both stages, but not reported. ** p < .01, * p < .1
Footnotes

1 We recognise that these two underlying determinants are not independent. Indeed, the need for legitimacy largely arises because it is in the self-interest of states to secure approval for extra-territoriality.

2 Note, our multivariate research design allows us to control for these distance effects.

3 Note, we do not include military observer contributions within this definition.

4 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/

5 For the estimations in column 1, the Wald test of independent equations signals that the two stages are not independent from each other, suggesting that our choice of Heckman’s two-stage probit estimator is appropriate. For the estimations in column 2, the Wald test suggests that modelling both stages simultaneously (allowing the error terms to be correlated) is not strictly speaking necessary.