

Quine Thesis," the differences in the scope and focus of the arguments of Duhem and Quine are so great that it makes little sense, historically, to link the names of the two men together as espousing a single, common thesis. Nonetheless, Gillies thinks that, historical considerations aside, we can assemble from the different but related views of Duhem and Quine a plausible version of holism that can aptly be named the Duhem-Quine thesis.

In "Demystifying Underdetermination" Larry Laudan launches a spirited attack on all versions of the underdetermination thesis that have been espoused by Quine and his followers. Laudan is especially critical of those who—like Kuhn, Hesse, and Bloor—have used Duhem-Quine-style arguments to bolster their view that science is governed to a large degree by sociological forces (not logic and scientific method) and can be understood only by taking these historical and social factors into account. Laudan argues that once one distinguishes different versions of the underdetermination thesis, underdetermination shows itself to be either true but innocuous or dramatic and false. All too often, he warns, philosophers take for granted a radical version of the underdetermination thesis without giving anything like a plausible argument to support it.

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Physical Theory and Experiment

1 | The Experimental Testing of a Theory Does Not Have the Same Logical Simplicity in Physics as in Physiology

The sole purpose of physical theory is to provide a representation and classification of experimental laws; the only test permitting us to judge a physical theory and pronounce it good or bad is the comparison between the consequences of this theory and the experimental laws it has to represent and classify. Now that we have minutely analyzed the characteristics of a physical experiment and of a physical law, we can establish the principles that should govern the comparison between experiment and theory; we can tell how we shall recognize whether a theory is confirmed or weakened by facts.

When many philosophers talk about experimental sciences, they think only of sciences still close to their origins, e.g., physiology or certain branches of chemistry where the experimenter reasons directly on the facts by a method which is only common sense brought to greater attentiveness but where mathematical theory has not yet introduced its symbolic representations. In such sciences the comparison between the deductions of a theory and the facts of experiment is subject to very simple rules. These rules were formulated in a particularly forceful manner by Claude Bernard, who would condense them into a single principle, as follows:

"The experimenter should suspect and stay away from fixed ideas, and always preserve his freedom of mind.

"The first condition that has to be fulfilled by a scientist who is devoted to the investigation of natural phenomena is to preserve a complete freedom of mind based on philosophical doubt."¹

FROM Pierre Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, trans. Philip P. Wiener (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), 180–95, 208–18.

If a theory suggests experiments to be done, so much the better: “. . . we can follow our judgment and our thought, give free rein to our imagination provided that all our ideas are only pretexts for instituting new experiments that may furnish us probative facts or unexpected and fruitful ones.”² Once the experiment is done and the results clearly established, if a theory takes them over in order to generalize them, coordinate them, and draw from them new subjects for experiment, still so much the better: “. . . if one is imbued with the principles of experimental method, there is nothing to fear; for so long as the idea is a right one, it will go on being developed; when it is an erroneous idea, experiment is there to correct it.”³ But so long as the experiment lasts, the theory should remain waiting, under strict orders to stay outside the door of the laboratory; it should keep silent and leave the scientist without disturbing him while he faces the facts directly; the facts must be observed without a preconceived idea and gathered with the same scrupulous impartiality, whether they confirm or contradict the predictions of the theory. The report that the observer will give us of his experiment should be a faithful and scrupulously exact reproduction of the phenomena, and should not let us even guess what system the scientist places his confidence in or distrusts.

“Men who have an excessive faith in their theories or in their ideas are not only poorly disposed to make discoveries but they also make very poor observations. They necessarily observe with a preconceived idea and, when they have begun an experiment, they want to see in its results only a confirmation of their theory. Thus they distort observation and often neglect very important facts because they go counter to their goal. That is what made us say elsewhere that we must never do experiments in order to confirm our ideas but merely to check them. . . . But it quite naturally happens that those who believe too much in their own theories do not sufficiently believe in the theories of others. Then the dominant idea of these condemners of others is to find fault with the theories of the latter and to seek to contradict them. The setback for science remains the same. They are doing experiments only in order to destroy a theory instead of doing them in order to look for the truth. They also make poor observations because they take into the results of their experiments only what fits their purpose, by neglecting what is unrelated to it, and by very carefully avoiding whatever might go in the direction of the idea they wish to combat. Thus one is led by two parallel paths to the same result, that is to say, to falsifying science and the facts.

“The conclusion of all this is that it is necessary to obliterate one’s opinion as well as that of others when faced with the decisions of the experiment; . . . we must accept the results of experiment just as they present themselves with all that is unforeseen and accidental in them.”⁴

Here, for example, is a physiologist who admits that the anterior roots of the spinal nerve contain the motor nerve-fibers and the posterior roots the sensory fibers. The theory he accepts leads him to imagine an exper-

iment: if he cuts a certain anterior root, he ought to be suppressing the mobility of a certain part of the body without destroying its sensibility; after making the section of this root, when he observes the consequences of his operation and when he makes a report of it, he must put aside all his ideas concerning the physiology of the spinal nerve; his report must be a raw description of the facts; he is not permitted to overlook or fail to mention any movement or quiver contrary to his predictions or to attribute it to some secondary cause unless some special experiment has given evidence of this cause; he must, if he does not wish to be accused of scientific bad faith, establish an absolute separation or watertight compartment between the consequences of his theoretical deductions and the establishing of the facts shown by his experiments.

Such a rule is not by any means easily followed; it requires of the scientist an absolute detachment from his own thought and a complete absence of animosity when confronted with the opinion of another person; neither vanity nor envy ought to be countenanced by him. As Bacon put it, he should never show eyes lustrous with human passions. Freedom of mind, which constitutes the sole principle of experimental method, according to Claude Bernard, does not depend merely on intellectual conditions, but also on moral conditions, making its practice rarer and more meritorious.

But if experimental method as just described is difficult to practice, the logical analysis of it is very simple. This is no longer the case when the theory to be subjected to test by the facts is not a theory of physiology but a theory of physics. In the latter case, in fact, it is impossible to leave outside the laboratory door the theory that we wish to test, for without theory it is impossible to regulate a single instrument or to interpret a single reading. We have seen that in the mind of the physicist there are constantly present two sorts of apparatus: one is the concrete apparatus in glass and metal, manipulated by him, the other is the schematic and abstract apparatus which theory substitutes for the concrete apparatus and on which the physicist does his reasoning. For these two ideas are indissolubly connected in his intelligence, and each necessarily calls on the other; the physicist can no sooner conceive the concrete apparatus without associating with it the idea of the schematic apparatus than a Frenchman can conceive an idea without associating it with the French word expressing it. This radical impossibility, preventing one from dissociating physical theories from the experimental procedures appropriate for testing these theories, complicates this test in a singular way, and obliges us to examine the logical meaning of it carefully.

Of course, the physicist is not the only one who appeals to theories at the very time he is experimenting or reporting the results of his experiments. The chemist and the physiologist when they make use of physical instruments, e.g., the thermometer, the manometer, the calorimeter, the galvanometer, and the saccharimeter, implicitly admit the accuracy of

the theories justifying the use of these pieces of apparatus as well as of the theories giving meaning to the abstract ideas of temperature, pressure, quantity of heat, intensity of current, and polarized light, by means of which the concrete indications of these instruments are translated. But the theories used, as well as the instruments employed, belong to the domain of physics; by accepting with these instruments the theories without which their readings would be devoid of meaning, the chemist and the physiologist show their confidence in the physicist, whom they suppose to be infallible. The physicist, on the other hand, is obliged to trust his own theoretical ideas or those of his fellow-physicists. From the standpoint of logic, the difference is of little importance; for the physiologist and chemist as well as for the physicist, the statement of the result of an experiment implies, in general, an act of faith in a whole group of theories.

2 | An Experiment in Physics Can Never Condemn an Isolated Hypothesis but Only a Whole Theoretical Group

The physicist who carries out an experiment, or gives a report of one, implicitly recognizes the accuracy of a whole group of theories. Let us accept this principle and see what consequences we may deduce from it when we seek to estimate the role and logical import of a physical experiment.

In order to avoid any confusion we shall distinguish two sorts of experiments: experiments of *application*, which we shall first just mention, and experiments of *testing*, which will be our chief concern.

You are confronted with a problem in physics to be solved practically; in order to produce a certain effect you wish to make use of knowledge acquired by physicists; you wish to light an incandescent bulb; accepted theories indicate to you the means for solving the problem; but to make use of these means you have to secure certain information; you ought, I suppose, to determine the electromotive force of the battery of generators at your disposal; you measure this electromotive force: that is what I call an experiment of application. This experiment does not aim at discovering whether accepted theories are accurate or not; it merely intends to draw on these theories. In order to carry it out, you make use of instruments that these same theories legitimize; there is nothing to shock logic in this procedure.

But experiments of application are not the only ones the physicist has to perform; only with their aid can science aid practice, but it is not through them that science creates and develops itself; besides experiments of application, we have experiments of testing.

A physicist disputes a certain law; he calls into doubt a certain theo-

retical point. How will he justify these doubts? How will he demonstrate the inaccuracy of the law? From the proposition under indictment he will derive the prediction of an experimental fact; he will bring into existence the conditions under which this fact should be produced; if the predicted fact is not produced, the proposition which served as the basis of the prediction will be irremediably condemned.

F. E. Neumann assumed that in a ray of polarized light the vibration is parallel to the plane of polarization, and many physicists have doubted this proposition. How did O. Wiener undertake to transform this doubt into a certainty in order to condemn Neumann's proposition? He deduced from this proposition the following consequence: If we cause a light beam reflected at 45° from a plate of glass to interfere with the incident beam polarized perpendicularly to the plane of incidence, there ought to appear alternately dark and light interference bands parallel to the reflecting surface; he brought about the conditions under which these bands should have been produced and showed that the predicted phenomenon did not appear, from which he concluded that Neumann's proposition is false, viz., that in a polarized ray of light the vibration is not parallel to the plane of polarization.

Such a mode of demonstration seems as convincing and as irrefutable as the proof by reduction to absurdity customary among mathematicians; moreover, this demonstration is copied from the reduction to absurdity, experimental contradiction playing the same role in one as logical contradiction plays in the other.

Indeed, the demonstrative value of experimental method is far from being so rigorous or absolute: the conditions under which it functions are much more complicated than is supposed in what we have just said; the evaluation of results is much more delicate and subject to caution.

A physicist decides to demonstrate the inaccuracy of a proposition; in order to deduce from this proposition the prediction of a phenomenon and institute the experiment which is to show whether this phenomenon is or is not produced, in order to interpret the results of this experiment and establish that the predicted phenomenon is not produced, he does not confine himself to making use of the proposition in question; he makes use also of a whole group of theories accepted by him as beyond dispute. The prediction of the phenomenon, whose nonproduction is to cut off debate, does not derive from the proposition challenged if taken by itself, but from the proposition at issue joined to that whole group of theories; if the predicted phenomenon is not produced, not only is the proposition questioned at fault, but so is the whole theoretical scaffolding used by the physicist. The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the propositions used to predict the phenomenon and to establish whether it would be produced, there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it does not tell us. The physicist may declare that this error is contained in exactly the proposition he wishes to refute, but is he sure it

is not in another proposition? If he is, he accepts implicitly the accuracy of all the other propositions he has used, and the validity of his conclusion is as great as the validity of his confidence.

Let us take as an example the experiment imagined by Zenker and carried out by O. Wiener. In order to predict the formation of bands in certain circumstances and to show that these did not appear, Wiener did not make use merely of the famous proposition of F. E. Neumann, the proposition which he wished to refute; he did not merely admit that in a polarized ray vibrations are parallel to the plane of polarization; but he used, besides this, propositions, laws, and hypotheses constituting the optics commonly accepted: he admitted that light consists in simple periodic vibrations, that these vibrations are normal to the light ray, that at each point the mean kinetic energy of the vibratory motion is a measure of the intensity of light, that the more or less complete attack of the gelatine coating on a photographic plate indicates the various degrees of this intensity. By joining these propositions, and many others that would take too long to enumerate, to Neumann's proposition, Wiener was able to formulate a forecast and establish that the experiment belied it. If he attributed this solely to Neumann's proposition, if it alone bears the responsibility for the error this negative result has put in evidence, then Wiener was taking all the other propositions he invoked as beyond doubt. But this assurance is not imposed as a matter of logical necessity; nothing stops us from taking Neumann's proposition as accurate and shifting the weight of the experimental contradiction to some other proposition of the commonly accepted optics; as H. Poincaré has shown, we can very easily rescue Neumann's hypothesis from the grip of Wiener's experiment on the condition that we abandon in exchange the hypothesis which takes the mean kinetic energy as the measure of the light intensity; we may, without being contradicted by the experiment, let the vibration be parallel to the plane of polarization, provided that we measure the light intensity by the mean potential energy of the medium deforming the vibratory motion.

These principles are so important that it will be useful to apply them to another example; again we choose an experiment regarded as one of the most decisive ones in optics.

We know that Newton conceived the emission theory for optical phenomena. The emission theory supposes light to be formed of extremely thin projectiles, thrown out with very great speed by the sun and other sources of light; these projectiles penetrate all transparent bodies; on account of the various parts of the media through which they move, they undergo attractions and repulsions; when the distance separating the acting particles is very small these actions are very powerful, and they vanish when the masses between which they act are appreciably far from each other. These essential hypotheses joined to several others, which we pass over without mention, lead to the formulation of a complete theory of reflection and refraction of light; in particular, they imply the following

proposition: The index of refraction of light passing from one medium into another is equal to the velocity of the light projectile within the medium it penetrates, divided by the velocity of the same projectile in the medium it leaves behind.

This is the proposition that Arago chose in order to show that the theory of emission is in contradiction with the facts. From this proposition a second follows: Light travels faster in water than in air. Now Arago had indicated an appropriate procedure for comparing the velocity of light in air with the velocity of light in water; the procedure, it is true, was inapplicable, but Foucault modified the experiment in such a way that it could be carried out; he found that the light was propagated less rapidly in water than in air. We may conclude from this, with Foucault, that the system of emission is incompatible with the facts.

I say the *system* of emission and not the *hypothesis* of emission; in fact, what the experiment declares stained with error is the whole group of propositions accepted by Newton, and after him by Laplace and Biot, that is, the whole theory from which we deduce the relation between the index of refraction and the velocity of light in various media. But in condemning this system as a whole by declaring it stained with error, the experiment does not tell us where the error lies. Is it in the fundamental hypothesis that light consists in projectiles thrown out with great speed by luminous bodies? Is it in some other assumption concerning the actions experienced by light corpuscles due to the media through which they move? We know nothing about that. It would be rash to believe, as Arago seems to have thought, that Foucault's experiment condemns once and for all the very hypothesis of emission, i.e., the assimilation of a ray of light to a swarm of projectiles. If physicists had attached some value to this task, they would undoubtedly have succeeded in founding on this assumption a system of optics that would agree with Foucault's experiment.

In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed.

We have gone a long way from the conception of the experimental method arbitrarily held by persons unfamiliar with its actual functioning. People generally think that each one of the hypotheses employed in physics can be taken in isolation, checked by experiment, and then, when many varied tests have established its validity, given a definitive place in the system of physics. In reality, this is not the case. Physics is not a machine which lets itself be taken apart; we cannot try each piece in isolation and, in order to adjust it, wait until its solidity has been carefully checked. Physical science is a system that must be taken as a whole; it is

an organism in which one part cannot be made to function except when the parts that are most remote from it are called into play, some more so than others, but all to some degree. If something goes wrong, if some discomfort is felt in the functioning of the organism, the physicist will have to ferret out through its effect on the entire system which organ needs to be remedied or modified without the possibility of isolating this organ and examining it apart. The watchmaker to whom you give a watch that has stopped separates all the wheelworks and examines them one by one until he finds the part that is defective or broken. The doctor to whom a patient appears cannot dissect him in order to establish his diagnosis; he has to guess the seat and cause of the ailment solely by inspecting disorders affecting the whole body. Now, the physicist concerned with remedying a limping theory resembles the doctor and not the watchmaker.

3 | A "Crucial Experiment" Is Impossible in Physics

Let us press this point further, for we are touching on one of the essential features of experimental method, as it is employed in physics.

Reduction to absurdity seems to be merely a means of refutation, but it may become a method of demonstration: in order to demonstrate the truth of a proposition it suffices to corner anyone who would admit the contradictory of the given proposition into admitting an absurd consequence. We know to what extent the Greek geometers drew heavily on this mode of demonstration.

Those who assimilate experimental contradiction to reduction to absurdity imagine that in physics we may use a line of argument similar to the one Euclid employed so frequently in geometry. Do you wish to obtain from a group of phenomena a theoretically certain and indisputable explanation? Enumerate all the hypotheses that can be made to account for this group of phenomena; then, by experimental contradiction eliminate all except one; the latter will no longer be a hypothesis, but will become a certainty.

Suppose, for instance, we are confronted with only two hypotheses. Seek experimental conditions such that one of the hypotheses forecasts the production of one phenomenon and the other the production of quite a different effect; bring these conditions into existence and observe what happens; depending on whether you observe the first or the second of the predicted phenomena, you will condemn the second or the first hypothesis; the hypothesis not condemned will be henceforth indisputable; debate will be cut off, and a new truth will be acquired by science. Such is the experimental test that the author of the *Novum Organum* [Francis Bacon] called the "*fact of the cross*," borrowing this expression from the crosses which at an intersection indicate the various roads.

We are confronted with two hypotheses concerning the nature of light; for Newton, Laplace, or Biot light consisted of projectiles hurled with extreme speed, but for Huygens, Young, or Fresnel light consisted of vibrations whose waves are propagated within an ether. These are the only two possible hypotheses as far as one can see: either the motion is carried away by the body it excites and remains attached to it, or else it passes from one body to another. Let us pursue the first hypothesis; it declares that light travels more quickly in water than in air; but if we follow the second, it declares that light travels more quickly in air than in water. Let us set up Foucault's apparatus; we set into motion the turning mirror; we see two luminous spots formed before us, one colorless, the other greenish. If the greenish band is to the left of the colorless one, it means that light travels faster in water than in air, and that the hypothesis of vibrating waves is false. If, on the contrary, the greenish band is to the right of the colorless one, that means that light travels faster in air than in water, and that the hypothesis of emissions is condemned. We look through the magnifying glass used to examine the two luminous spots, and we notice that the greenish spot is to the right of the colorless one; the debate is over; light is not a body, but a vibratory wave motion propagated by the ether; the emission hypothesis has had its day; the wave hypothesis has been put beyond doubt, and the crucial experiment has made it a new article of the scientific credo.

What we have said in the foregoing paragraph shows how mistaken we should be to attribute to Foucault's experiment so simple a meaning and so decisive an importance; for it is not between two hypotheses, the emission and wave hypotheses, that Foucault's experiment judges trenchantly; it decides rather between two sets of theories each of which has to be taken as a whole, i.e., between two entire systems, Newton's optics and Huygens' optics.

But let us admit for a moment that in each of these systems everything is compelled to be necessary by strict logic, except a single hypothesis; consequently, let us admit that the facts, in condemning one of the two systems, condemn once and for all the single doubtful assumption it contains. Does it follow that we can find in the "crucial experiment" an irrefutable procedure for transforming one of the two hypotheses before us into a demonstrated truth? Between two contradictory theorems of geometry there is no room for a third judgment; if one is false, the other is necessarily true. Do two hypotheses in physics ever constitute such a strict dilemma? Shall we ever dare to assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable? Light may be a swarm of projectiles, or it may be a vibratory motion whose waves are propagated in a medium; is it forbidden to be anything else at all? Arago undoubtedly thought so when he formulated this incisive alternative: Does light move more quickly in water than in air? "Light is a body. If the contrary is the case, then light is a wave." But it would be difficult for us to take such a decisive stand; Maxwell, in fact, showed that

we might just as well attribute light to a periodical electrical disturbance that is propagated within a dielectric medium.

Unlike the reduction to absurdity employed by geometers, experimental contradiction does not have the power to transform a physical hypothesis into an indisputable truth; in order to confer this power on it, it would be necessary to enumerate completely the various hypotheses which may cover a determinate group of phenomena; but the physicist is never sure he has exhausted all the imaginable assumptions. The truth of a physical theory is not decided by heads or tails.

4 | Criticism of the Newtonian Method. First Example: Celestial Mechanics

It is illusory to seek to construct by means of experimental contradiction a line of argument in imitation of the reduction to absurdity; but the geometer is acquainted with other methods for attaining certainty than the method of reducing to an absurdity; the direct demonstration in which the truth of a proposition is established by itself and not by the refutation of the contradictory proposition seems to him the most perfect of arguments. Perhaps physical theory would be more fortunate in its attempts if it sought to imitate direct demonstration. The hypotheses from which it starts and develops its conclusions would then be tested one by one; none would have to be accepted until it presented all the certainty that experimental method can confer on an abstract and general proposition; that is to say, each would necessarily be either a law drawn from observation by the sole use of those two intellectual operations called induction and generalization, or else a corollary mathematically deduced from such laws. A theory based on such hypotheses would then not present anything arbitrary or doubtful; it would deserve all the confidence merited by the faculties which serve us in formulating natural laws.

It was this sort of physical theory that Newton had in mind when, in the "General Scholium" which crowns his *Principia*, he rejected so vigorously as outside of natural philosophy any hypothesis that induction did not extract from experiment; when he asserted that in a sound physics every proposition should be drawn from phenomena and generalized by induction.

The ideal method we have just described therefore deserves to be named the Newtonian method. Besides, did not Newton follow this method when he established the system of universal attraction, thus adding to his precepts the most magnificent of examples? Is not his theory of gravitation derived entirely from the laws which were revealed to Kepler by observation, laws which problematic reasoning transforms and whose consequences induction generalizes?

This first law of Kepler's, "The radial vector from the sun to a planet sweeps out an area proportional to the time during which the planet's motion is observed," did, in fact, teach Newton that each planet is constantly subjected to a force directed toward the sun.

The second law of Kepler's, "The orbit of each planet is an ellipse having the sun at one focus," taught him that the force attracting a given planet varies with the distance of this planet from the sun, and that it is in an inverse ratio to the square of this distance.

The third law of Kepler's, "The squares of the periods of revolution of the various planets are proportional to the cubes of the major axes of their orbits," showed him that different planets would, if they were brought to the same distance from the sun, undergo in relation to its attractions proportional to their respective masses.

The experimental laws established by Kepler and transformed by geometric reasoning yield all the characteristics present in the action exerted by the sun on a planet; by induction Newton generalized the result obtained; he allowed this result to express the law according to which any portion of matter acts on any other portion whatsoever, and he formulated this great principle: "Any two bodies whatsoever attract each other with a force which is proportional to the product of their masses and in inverse ratio to the square of the distance between them." The principle of universal gravitation was found, and it was obtained, without any use having been made of any fictive hypothesis, by the inductive method the plan of which Newton outlined.

Let us again examine this application of the Newtonian method, this time more closely; let us see if a somewhat strict logical analysis will leave intact the appearance of rigor and simplicity that this very summary exposition attributes to it.

In order to assure this discussion of all the clarity it needs, let us begin by recalling the following principle, familiar to all those who deal with mechanics: We cannot speak of the force which attracts a body in given circumstances before we have designated the supposedly fixed term of reference to which we relate the motion of all bodies; when we change this point of reference or term of comparison, the force representing the effect produced on the observed body by the other bodies surrounding it changes in direction and magnitude according to the rules stated by mechanics with precision.

That posited, let us follow Newton's reasoning.

Newton first took the sun as the fixed point of reference; he considered the motions affecting the different planets by reference to the sun; he admitted Kepler's laws as governing these motions, and derived the following proposition: If the sun is the point of reference in relation to which all forces are compared, each planet is subjected to a force directed toward the sun, a force proportional to the mass of the planet and to the

inverse square of its distance from the sun. Since the latter is taken as the reference point, it is not subject to any force.

In an analogous manner Newton studied the motion of the satellites and for each of these he chose as a fixed reference point the planet which the satellite accompanies, the earth in the case of the moon, Jupiter in the case of the masses moving around Jupiter. Laws just like Kepler's were taken as governing these motions, from which it follows that we can formulate the following proposition: If we take as a fixed reference point the planet accompanied by a satellite, this satellite is subject to a force directed toward the planet varying inversely with the square of the distance. If, as happens with Jupiter, the same planet possesses several satellites, these satellites, were they at the same distance from the planet, would be acted on by the latter with forces proportional to their respective masses. The planet is itself not acted on by the satellite.

Such, in very precise form, are the propositions which Kepler's laws of planetary motion and the extension of these laws to the motions of satellites authorize us to formulate. For these propositions Newton substituted another which may be stated as follows: Any two celestial bodies whatsoever exert on each other a force of attraction in the direction of the straight line joining them, a force proportional to the product of their masses and to the inverse square of the distance between them. This statement presupposes all motions and forces to be related to the same reference point; the latter is an ideal standard of reference which may well be conceived by the geometer but which does not characterize in an exact and concrete manner the position in the sky of any body.

Is this principle of universal gravitation merely a generalization of the two statements provided by Kepler's laws and their extension to the motion of satellites? Can induction derive it from these two statements? Not at all. In fact, not only is it more general than these two statements and unlike them, but it contradicts them. The student of mechanics who accepts the principle of universal attraction can calculate the magnitude and direction of the forces between the various planets and the sun when the latter is taken as the reference point, and if he does he finds that these forces are not what our first statement would require. He can determine the magnitude and direction of each of the forces between Jupiter and its satellites when we refer all the motions to the planet, assumed to be fixed, and if he does he notices that these forces are not what our second statement would require.

The principle of universal gravity, very far from being derivable by generalization and induction from the observational laws of Kepler, formally contradicts these laws. If Newton's theory is correct, Kepler's laws are necessarily false.

Kepler's laws based on the observation of celestial motions do not transfer their immediate experimental certainty to the principle of univer-

sal weight, since if, on the contrary, we admit the absolute exactness of Kepler's laws, we are compelled to reject the proposition on which Newton based his celestial mechanics. Far from adhering to Kepler's laws, the physicist who claims to justify the theory of universal gravitation finds that he has, first of all, to resolve a difficulty in these laws: he has to prove that his theory, incompatible with the exactness of Kepler's laws, subjects the motions of the planets and satellites to other laws scarcely different enough from the first laws for Tycho Brahé, Kepler, and their contemporaries to have been able to discern the deviations between the Keplerian and Newtonian orbits. This proof derives from the circumstances that the sun's mass is very large in relation to the masses of the various planets and the mass of a planet is very large in relation to the masses of its satellites.

Therefore, if the certainty of Newton's theory does not emanate from the certainty of Kepler's laws, how will this theory prove its validity? It will calculate, with all the high degree of approximation that the constantly perfected methods of algebra involve, the perturbations which at each instant remove every heavenly body from the orbit assigned to it by Kepler's laws; then it will compare the calculated perturbations with the perturbations observed by means of the most precise instruments and the most scrupulous methods. Such a comparison will not only bear on this or that part of the Newtonian principle, but will involve all its parts at the same time; with those it will also involve all the principles of dynamics; besides, it will call in the aid of all the propositions of optics, the statics of gases, and the theory of heat, which are necessary to justify the properties of telescopes in their construction, regulation, and correction, and in the elimination of the errors caused by diurnal or annual aberration and by atmospheric refraction. It is no longer a matter of taking, one by one, laws justified by observation, and raising each of them by induction and generalization to the rank of a principle; it is a matter of comparing the corollaries of a whole group of hypotheses to a whole group of facts.

Now, if we seek out the causes which have made the Newtonian method fail in this case for which it was imagined and which seemed to be the most perfect application for it, we shall find them in that double character of any law made use of by theoretical physics: This law is symbolic and approximate.

Undoubtedly, Kepler's laws bear quite directly on the very objects of astronomical observation; they are as little symbolic as possible. But in this purely experimental form they remain inappropriate for suggesting the principle of universal gravitation; in order to acquire this fecundity they must be transformed and must yield the characters of the forces by which the sun attracts the various planets.

Now this new form of Kepler's laws is a symbolic form; only dynamics gives meanings to the words "force" and "mass," which serve to state it, and only dynamics permits us to substitute the new symbolic formulas for

the old realistic formulas, to substitute statements relative to “forces” and “masses” for laws relative to orbits. The legitimacy of such a substitution implies full confidence in the laws of dynamics.

And in order to justify this confidence let us not proceed to claim that the laws of dynamics were beyond doubt at the time Newton made use of them in symbolically translating Kepler’s laws; that they had received enough empirical confirmation to warrant the support of reason. In fact, the laws of dynamics had been subjected up to that time to only very limited and very crude tests. Even their enunciations had remained very vague and involved; only in Newton’s *Principia* had they been for the first time formulated in a precise manner. It was in the agreement of the facts with the celestial mechanics which Newton’s labors gave birth to that they received their first convincing verification.

Thus the translation of Kepler’s laws into symbolic laws, the only kind useful for a theory, presupposed the prior adherence of the physicist to a whole group of hypotheses. But, in addition, Kepler’s laws being only approximate laws, dynamics permitted giving them an infinity of different symbolic translations. Among these various forms, infinite in number, there is one and only one which agrees with Newton’s principle. The observations of Tycho Brahé, so felicitously reduced to laws by Kepler, permit the theorist to choose this form, but they do not constrain him to do so, for there is an infinity of others they permit him to choose.

The theorist cannot, therefore, be content to invoke Kepler’s laws in order to justify his choice. If he wishes to prove that the principle he has adopted is truly a principle of natural classification for celestial motions, he must show that the observed perturbations are in agreement with those which had been calculated in advance; he has to show how from the course of Uranus he can deduce the existence and position of a new planet, and find Neptune in an assigned direction at the end of his telescope. . . .

8 | Are Certain Postulates of Physical Theory Incapable of Being Refuted by Experiment?

We recognize a correct principle by the facility with which it straightens out the complicated difficulties into which the use of erroneous principles brought us.

If, therefore, the idea we have put forth is correct, namely, that comparison is established necessarily between the *whole* of theory and the *whole* of experimental facts, we ought in the light of this principle to see the disappearance of the obscurities in which we should be lost by thinking that we are subjecting each isolated theoretical hypothesis to the test of facts.

Foremost among the assertions in which we shall aim at eliminating the appearance of paradox, we shall place one that has recently been often formulated and discussed. Stated first by G. Milhaud in connection with the “*pure bodies*” of chemistry,⁵ it has been developed at length and forcefully by H. Poincaré with regard to principles of mechanics:⁶ Edouard Le Roy has also formulated it with great clarity.⁷

That assertion is as follows: Certain fundamental hypotheses of physical theory cannot be contradicted by any experiment, because they constitute in reality *definitions*, and because certain expressions in the physicist’s usage take their meaning only through them.

Let us take one of the examples cited by Le Roy:

When a heavy body falls freely, the acceleration of its fall is constant. Can such a law be contradicted by experiment? No, for it constitutes the very definition of what is meant by “falling freely.” If while studying the fall of a heavy body we found that this body does not fall with uniform acceleration, we should conclude not that the stated law is false, but that the body does not fall freely, that some cause obstructs its motion, and that the deviations of the observed facts from the law as stated would serve to discover this cause and to analyze its effects.

Thus, M. Le Roy concludes, “laws are verifiable, taking things strictly . . . , because they constitute the very criterion by which we judge appearances as well as the methods that it would be necessary to utilize in order to submit them to an inquiry whose precision is capable of exceeding any assignable limit.”

Let us study again in greater detail, in the light of the principles previously set down, what this comparison is between the law of falling bodies and experiment.

Our daily observations have made us acquainted with a whole category of motions which we have brought together under the name of motions of heavy bodies; among these motions is the falling of a heavy body when it is not hindered by any obstacle. The result of this is that the words “free fall of a heavy body” have a meaning for the man who appeals only to the knowledge of common sense and who has no notion of physical theories.

On the other hand, in order to classify the laws of motion in question the physicist has created a theory, the theory of weight, an important application of rational mechanics. In that theory, intended to furnish a symbolic representation of reality, there is also the question of “free fall of a heavy body,” and as a consequence of the hypotheses supporting this whole scheme free fall must necessarily be a uniformly accelerated motion.

The words “free fall of a heavy body” now have two distinct meanings. For the man ignorant of physical theories, they have their *real* meaning, and they mean what common sense means in pronouncing them; for the physicist they have a *symbolic* meaning, and mean “uniformly accelerated

tion." Theory would not have realized its aim if the second meaning were not the sign of the first, if a fall regarded as free by common sense were not also regarded as uniformly accelerated, or *nearly* uniformly accelerated, since common-sense observations are essentially devoid of precision, according to what we have already said.

This agreement, without which the theory would have been rejected without further examination, is finally arrived at: a fall declared by common sense to be nearly free is also a fall whose acceleration is nearly constant. But noticing this crudely approximate agreement does not satisfy us; we wish to push on and surpass the degree of precision which common sense can claim. With the aid of the theory that we have imagined, we construct together apparatus enabling us to recognize with sensitive accuracy whether the fall of a body is or is not uniformly accelerated; this apparatus shows us that a certain fall regarded by common sense as a free fall has a slightly variable acceleration. The proposition which in our theory gives the symbolic meaning to the words "free fall" does not represent with sufficient accuracy the properties of the real and concrete fall that we have observed.

Two alternatives are then open to us.

In the first place, we can declare that we were right in regarding the fall studied as a free fall and in requiring that the theoretical definition of these words agree with our observations. In this case, since our theoretical definition does not satisfy this requirement, it must be rejected; we must construct another mechanics on new hypotheses, a mechanics in which the words "free fall" no longer signify "uniformly accelerated motion," but a fall whose acceleration varies according to a certain law."

In the second alternative, we may declare that we were wrong in establishing a connection between the concrete fall we have observed and the symbolic free fall defined by our theory, that the latter was too simplified a scheme of the former, that in order to represent suitably the fall of our experiments we have reported it the theorist should give up imagining a weight falling freely and think in terms of a weight hindered by certain obstacles like the resistance of the air, that in picturing the action of these obstacles by means of appropriate hypotheses he will compose a more complicated scheme than a free weight but one more apt to reproduce the details of the experiment; in short, . . . we may seek to eliminate by means of suitable "corrections" the "causes of error," such as air resistance, which influenced our experiment.

M. Le Roy asserts that we shall prefer the second to the first alternative, and he is surely right in this. The reasons dictating this choice are easy to perceive. By taking the first alternative we should be obliged to destroy from top to bottom a very vast theoretical system which represents in the most satisfactory manner a very extensive and complex set of experimental laws. The second alternative, on the other hand, does not make us lose anything of the terrain already conquered by physical theory; in

addition, it has succeeded in so large a number of cases that we can bank with interest on a new success. But in this confidence accorded the law of fall of weights, we see nothing analogous to the certainty that a mathematical definition draws from its very essence, that is, to the kind of certainty we have when it would be foolish to doubt that the various points on a circumference are all equidistant from the center.

We have here nothing more than a particular application of the principle set down in Section 2 of this chapter. A disagreement between the concrete facts constituting an experiment and the symbolic representation which theory substitutes for this experiment proves that some part of this symbol is to be rejected. But which part? This the experiment does not tell us; it leaves to our sagacity the burden of guessing. Now among the theoretical elements entering into the composition of this symbol there is always a certain number which the physicists of a certain epoch agree in accepting without test and which they regard as beyond dispute. Hence, the physicist who wishes to modify this symbol will surely bring his modification to bear on elements other than those just mentioned.

But what impels the physicist to act thus is *not* logical necessity. It would be awkward and ill inspired for him to do otherwise, but it would not be doing something logically absurd; he would not for all that be walking in the footsteps of the mathematician mad enough to contradict his own definitions. More than this, perhaps some day by acting differently, by refusing to invoke causes of error and take recourse to corrections in order to reestablish agreement between the theoretical scheme and the fact, and by resolutely carrying out a reform among the propositions declared untouchable by common consent, he will accomplish the work of a genius who opens a new career for a theory.

Indeed, we must really guard ourselves against believing forever warranted those hypotheses which have become universally adopted conventions, and whose certainty seems to break through experimental contradiction by throwing the latter back on more doubtful assumptions. The history of physics shows us that very often the human mind has been led to overthrow such principles completely, though they have been regarded by common consent for centuries as inviolable axioms, and to rebuild its physical theories on new hypotheses.

Was there, for instance, a clearer or more certain principle for thousands of years than this one: In a homogeneous medium, light is propagated in a straight line? Not only did this hypothesis carry all former optics, catoptrics, and dioptrics, whose elegant geometric deductions represented at will an enormous number of facts, but it had become, so to speak, the physical definition of a straight line. It is to this hypothesis that any man wishing to make a straight line appeals, the carpenter who verifies the straightness of a piece of wood, the surveyor who lines up his sights, the geodetic surveyor who obtains a direction with the help of the pinholes of his alidade, the astronomer who defines the position of stars by the

optical axis of his telescope. However, the day came when physicists tired of attributing to some cause of error the diffraction effects observed by Grimaldi, when they resolved to reject the law of the rectilinear propagation of light and to give optics entirely new foundations; and this bold resolution was the signal of remarkable progress for physical theory.

9 | On Hypotheses Whose Statement Has No Experimental Meaning

This example, as well as others we could add from the history of science, should show that it would be very imprudent for us to say concerning a hypothesis commonly accepted today: "We are certain that we shall never be led to abandon it because of a new experiment, no matter how precise it is." Yet M. Poincaré does not hesitate to enunciate it concerning the principles of mechanics.⁸

To the reasons already given to prove that these principles cannot be reached by experimental refutation, M. Poincaré adds one which seems even more convincing: Not only can these principles not be refuted by experiment because they are the universally accepted rules serving to discover in our theories the weak spots indicated by these refutations, but also, they cannot be refuted by experiment because *the operation which would claim to compare them with the facts would have no meaning.*

Let us explain that by an illustration.

The principle of inertia teaches us that a material point removed from the action of any other body moves in a straight line with uniform motion. Now, we can observe only relative motions; we cannot, therefore, give an experimental meaning to this principle unless we assume a certain point chosen or a certain geometric solid taken as a fixed reference point to which the motion of the material point is related. The fixation of this reference frame constitutes an integral part of the statement of the law, for if we omitted it, this statement would be devoid of meaning. There are as many different laws as there are distinct frames of reference. We shall be stating one law of inertia when we say that the motion of an isolated point assumed to be seen from the earth is rectilinear and uniform, and another when we repeat the same sentence in referring the motion to the sun, and still another if the frame of reference chosen is the totality of fixed stars. But then, one thing is indeed certain, namely, that whatever the motion of a material point is, when seen from a first frame of reference, we can always and in infinite ways choose a second frame of reference such that seen from the latter our material point appears to move in a straight line with uniform motion. We cannot, therefore, attempt an experimental verification of the principle of inertia; false when we refer the motions to one frame of reference, it will become true when

selection is made of another term of comparison, and we shall always be free to choose the latter. If the law of inertia stated by taking the earth as a frame of reference is contradicted by an observation, we shall substitute for it the law of inertia whose statement refers the motion to the sun; if the latter in its turn is contraverted, we shall replace the sun in the statement of the law by the system of fixed stars, and so forth. It is impossible to stop this loophole.

The principle of the equality of action and reaction, analyzed at length by M. Poincaré,⁹ provides room for analogous remarks. This principle may be stated thus: "The center of gravity of an isolated system can have only a uniform rectilinear motion."

This is the principle that we propose to verify by experiment. "Can we make this verification? For that it would be necessary for isolated systems to exist. Now, these systems do not exist; the only isolated system is the whole universe.

"But we can observe only relative motions; the absolute motion of the center of the universe will therefore be forever unknown. We shall never be able to know if it is rectilinear and uniform or, better still, the question has no meaning. Whatever facts we may observe, we shall hence always be free to assume our principle is true."

Thus many a principle of mechanics has a form such that it is absurd to ask one's self: "Is this principle in agreement with experiment or not?" This strange character is not peculiar to the principles of mechanics; it also marks certain fundamental hypotheses of our physical or chemical theories.¹⁰

For example, chemical theory rests entirely on the "law of multiple proportions"; here is the exact statement of this law:

Simple bodies A, B, and C may by uniting in various proportions form various compounds M, M', . . . The masses of the bodies A, B, and C combining to form the compound M are to one another as the three numbers a, b, and c. Then the masses of the elements A, B, and C combining to form the compound M' will be to one another as the numbers xa, yb, and zc (x, y, and z being three whole numbers).

Is this law perhaps subject to experimental test? Chemical analysis will make us acquainted with the chemical composition of the body M' not exactly but with a certain approximation. The uncertainty of the results obtained can be extremely small; it will never be strictly zero. Now, in whatever relations the elements A, B, and C are combined within the compound M', we can always represent these relations, with as close an approximation as you please, by the mutual relations of three products xa, yb, and zc, where x, y, and z are whole numbers; in other words, whatever the results given by the chemical analysis of the compound M', we are always sure to find three integers x, y, and z thanks to which the law of multiple proportions will be verified with a precision greater than that of the experiment. Therefore, no chemical analysis, no matter how re-

finer, will ever be able to show the law of multiple proportions to be wrong.

In like manner, all crystallography rests entirely on the "law of rational indices" which is formulated in the following way:

A trihedral being formed by three faces of a crystal, a fourth face cuts the three edges of this trihedral at distances from the summit which are proportional to one another as three given numbers, the parameters of the crystal. Any other face whatsoever should cut these same edges at distances from the summit which are to one another as xa , yb , and zc , where x , y , and z are three integers, the indices of the new face of the crystal.

The most perfect protractor determines the direction of a crystal's face only with a certain degree of approximation; the relations among the three segments that such a face makes on the edges of the fundamental trihedral are always able to get by with a certain error; now, however small this error is, we can always choose three numbers x , y , and z such that the mutual relations of these segments are represented with the least amount of error by the mutual relations of the three numbers xa , yb , and zc ; the crystallographer who would claim that the law of rational indices is made justifiable by his protractor would surely not have understood the very meaning of the words he is employing.

The law of multiple proportions and the law of rational indices are mathematical statements deprived of all physical meaning. A mathematical statement has physical meaning only if it retains a meaning when we introduce the word "nearly" or "approximately." This is not the case with the statements we have just alluded to. Their object really is to assert that certain relations are *commensurable* numbers. They would degenerate into mere truisms if they were made to declare that these relations are approximately commensurable, for any incommensurable relation whatever is always approximately commensurable; it is even as near as you please to being commensurable.

Therefore, it would be absurd to wish to subject certain principles of mechanics to *direct* experimental test; it would be absurd to subject the law of multiple proportions or the law of rational indices to this *direct* test.

Does it follow that these hypotheses placed beyond the reach of direct experimental refutation have nothing more to fear from experiment? That they are guaranteed to remain immutable no matter what discoveries observation has in store for us? To pretend so would be a serious error.

Taken in isolation these different hypotheses have no experimental meaning; there can be no question of either confirming or contradicting them by experiment. But these hypotheses enter as essential foundations into the construction of certain theories of rational mechanics, of chemical theory, of crystallography. The object of these theories is to represent experimental laws; they are schematisms intended essentially to be compared with facts.

Now this comparison might some day very well show us that one of our representations is ill adjusted to the realities it should picture, that the

corrections which come and complicate our schematism do not produce sufficient concordance between this schematism and the facts, that the theory accepted for a long time without dispute should be rejected, and that an entirely different theory should be constructed on entirely different or new hypotheses. On that day some one of our hypotheses, which taken in isolation defied direct experimental refutation, will crumble with the system it supported under the weight of the contradictions inflicted by reality on the consequences of this system taken as a whole.¹¹

In truth, hypotheses which by themselves have no physical meaning undergo experimental testing in exactly the same manner as other hypotheses. Whatever the nature of the hypothesis is, we have seen at the beginning of this chapter that it is never in isolation contradicted by experiment; experimental contradiction always bears as a whole on the entire group constituting a theory without any possibility of designating which proposition in this group should be rejected.

There thus disappears what might have seemed paradoxical in the following assertion: Certain physical theories rest on hypotheses which do not by themselves have any physical meaning.

10 | Good Sense Is the Judge of Hypotheses Which Ought to Be Abandoned

When certain consequences of a theory are struck by experimental contradiction, we learn that this theory should be modified but we are not told by the experiment what must be changed. It leaves to the physicist the task of finding out the weak spot that impairs the whole system. No absolute principle directs this inquiry, which different physicists may conduct in very different ways without having the right to accuse one another of illogicality. For instance, one may be obliged to safeguard certain fundamental hypotheses while he tries to reestablish harmony between the consequences of the theory and the facts by complicating the schematism in which these hypotheses are applied, by invoking various causes of error, and by multiplying corrections. The next physicist, disdainful of these complicated artificial procedures, may decide to change some one of the essential assumptions supporting the entire system. The first physicist does not have the right to condemn in advance the boldness of the second one, nor does the latter have the right to treat the timidity of the first physicist as absurd. The methods they follow are justifiable only by experiment, and if they both succeed in satisfying the requirements of experiment each is logically permitted to declare himself content with the work that he has accomplished.

That does not mean that we cannot very properly prefer the work of one of the two to that of the other. Pure logic is not the only rule for our

judgments; certain opinions which do not fall under the hammer of the principle of contradiction are in any case perfectly unreasonable. These motives which do not proceed from logic and yet direct our choices, these "reasons which reason does not know" and which speak to the ample "mind of finesse" but not to the "geometric mind," constitute what is appropriately called good sense.

Now, it may be good sense that permits us to decide between two physicists. It may be that we do not approve of the haste with which the second one upsets the principles of a vast and harmoniously constructed theory whereas a modification of detail, a slight correction, would have sufficed to put these theories in accord with the facts. On the other hand, it may be that we may find it childish and unreasonable for the first physicist to maintain obstinately at any cost, at the price of continual repairs and many tangled-up stays, the worm-eaten columns of a building tottering in every part, when by razing these columns it would be possible to construct a simple, elegant, and solid system.

But these reasons of good sense do not impose themselves with the same implacable rigor that the prescriptions of logic do. There is something vague and uncertain about them; they do not reveal themselves at the same time with the same degree of clarity to all minds. Hence, the possibility of lengthy quarrels between the adherents of an old system and the partisans of a new doctrine, each camp claiming to have good sense on its side, each party finding the reasons of the adversary inadequate. The history of physics would furnish us with innumerable illustrations of these quarrels at all times and in all domains. Let us confine ourselves to the tenacity and ingenuity with which Biot by a continual bestowal of corrections and accessory hypotheses maintained the emissionist doctrine in optics, while Fresnel opposed this doctrine constantly with new experiments favoring the wave theory.

In any event this state of indecision does not last forever. The day arrives when good sense comes out so clearly in favor of one of the two sides that the other side gives up the struggle even though pure logic would not forbid its continuation. After Foucault's experiment had shown that light traveled faster in air than in water, Biot gave up supporting the emission hypothesis; strictly, pure logic would not have compelled him to give it up, for Foucault's experiment was *not* the crucial experiment that Arago thought he saw in it, but by resisting wave optics for a longer time Biot would have been lacking in good sense.

Since logic does not determine with strict precision the time when an inadequate hypothesis should give way to a more fruitful assumption, and since recognizing this moment belongs to good sense, physicists may hasten this judgment and increase the rapidity of scientific progress by trying consciously to make good sense within themselves more lucid and more vigilant. Now nothing contributes more to entangle good sense and to disturb its insight than passions and interests. Therefore, nothing will

delay the decision which should determine a fortunate reform in a physical theory more than the vanity which makes a physicist too indulgent towards his own system and too severe towards the system of another. We are thus led to the conclusion so clearly expressed by Claude Bernard: The sound experimental criticism of a hypothesis is subordinated to certain moral conditions; in order to estimate correctly the agreement of a physical theory with the facts, it is not enough to be a good mathematician and skillful experimenter; one must also be an impartial and faithful judge.

■ | Notes

1. Claude Bernard, *Introduction à [l'étude de] la Médecine expérimentale* (Paris, 1865), p. 63. (Translator's note: Translated into English by H. C. Greene, *An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine* [New York: Henry Schuman, 1949].)
2. Claude Bernard, *Introduction à [l'étude de] la Médecine expérimentale* (Paris, 1865), p. 64.
3. *ibid.*, p. 70.
4. *ibid.*, p. 67.
5. G. Milhaud, "La Science rationnelle," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, IV (1896), 280. Reprinted in *Le Rationnel* (Paris, 1898), p. 45.
6. H. Poincaré, "Sur les Principes de la Mécanique," *Bibliothèque du Congrès international de Philosophie*, III: *Logique et Histoire des Sciences* (Paris, 1901), p. 457; "Sur la valeur objective des théories physiques," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, X (1902), 263; *La Science et l'Hypothèse*, p. 110.
7. E. Le Roy, "Un positivisme nouveau," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, IX (1901), 143-144.
8. H. Poincaré, "Sur les Principes de la Mécanique," *Bibliothèque du Congrès international de Philosophie*, Sec. III: "Logique et Histoire des Sciences" (Paris, 1901), pp. 475, 491.
9. *ibid.*, pp. 472ff.
10. P. Duhem, *Le Mixte et la Combinaison chimique: Essai sur l'évolution d'une idée* (Paris, 1902), pp. 159-161.
11. At the International Congress of Philosophy held in Paris in 1900, M. Poincaré developed this conclusion: "Thus is explained how experiment may have been able to edify (or suggest) the principles of mechanics, but will never be able to overthrow them." Against this conclusion, M. Hadamard offered various remarks, among them the following: "Moreover, in conformity with a remark of M. Duhem, it is not an isolated hypothesis but the whole group of the hypotheses of mechanics that we can try to verify experimentally." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, VIII (1900), 559.