Short Answer Questions (submit online)
- Explain the 'massive modularity' hypothesis as it has been proposed in evolutionary psychology.
- How does evolutionary psychology solve the problem of the prisoner's dilemma for gardeners and babysitters?
- Why problem does learned behaviour pose for the 'massive modularity' view of the mind?
For Further Discussion
- The prisoner's dilemma. As in the lecture, consider a town of gardeners and babysitters. They form an agreement to help each other out once per week.
- Why does it appear to be unreasonable to expect the participants in this agreement to keep their promise to help out?
- Why is this a problem?
- What is the "Leviathan" response to this problem? Why is it insufficient?
- What is the evolutionary psychology response to this problem? Is it sufficient?
- Can you think of any other reasonable response to the problem?
- Cheater-detection modules. Suppose humans evolved to have a "cheater-detection module" as evolutionary psychologists have suggested.
- What does this module amount to physically? Is it a region of the brain? A brain process? What?
- Would you consider such a module to be an evolved "organ" in the same sense as your lungs or liver?
- Evolution favouring mental modules. Woodward and Cowie argue that evolution does not favour mental modules.
- One of their arguments for this is that one cannot infer brain structure from brain function alone. Is that correct? Why or why not?
- Memory seems to draw on multiple distinct brain abilities. How is this relevant to the Woodward-Cowie critique?
- We appear to have some mental abilities that are learned. How does this support Woodward and Cowie's first point?
- A system of modules? The 'massive' part of the massive modularity hypothesis has to do with all cognitive abilities being expressible in terms of mental modules. This is supposed to provide a response to the "frame problem" for the perception of complex information.
- What is the frame problem?
- How does the massive modularity hypothesis propose to solve this?
- Does it really solve the problem? Why or why not?
- Is there reason to think that the mind is not massively modular? Should we be willing to consider the possibility that there is just one, or just a few, mental modules?
- The very definition of a module. How are we supposed to define a module? One might answer in terms of neural processes. What is the problem with that? Can you think of any plausible definition of a mental module?
- The Woodward-Cowie Critique. Woodward and Cowie argue that the mind is not a (massive) system of modules shaped by natural selection, because 1) Evolution does not favour mental modules; 2) The mind is not a system of genetically specified modules; and 3) the concept of a module is not well-enough defined.
- Which parts of their argument do you think are reasonable? Which ones are unreasonable?
- Is there any hope for evolutionary psychology in the face of these arguments?