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Jordi Blanes i Vidal
Lecturer (Assistant Professor)
Managerial Economics and Strategy |
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London School of Economics,
Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, UK;
+44 (0) 207 955 6041;
j.blanes-i-vidal@lse.ac.uk
Curriculum Vitae |
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Decision Making and Implementation in Teams,
with
Marc Moller;
Under revision
requested by Review of Economic Studies.
Examines joint decision-making in a team where members have a
common goal and exert individual effort to implement the
agreed decision. When it is important to keep motivation high, team
members are reluctant to disclose information against the initially
preferred project.
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Social Interactions and the Content of Legal Opinions, with
Clare
Leaver;
Forthcoming in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
English appellate judges randomly assigned to
work with the author of a given opinion are more (less) likely to
cite that opinion positively (neutrally) than judges without such an
interaction.
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Revolving Door Lobbyists,with
Mirko
Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen;
Forthcoming
in
American Economic Review.
Studies how ex-government officials use the revolving door to cash
in on the personal connections acquired during periods of public
service. Lobbyists with past working experience in the office of a
US Congressman command a premium in terms of generated
revenue, which increases with the political power held by that
Congressman. See coverage at:
Huffington Post,
Washington Post (and also
here),
Freakonomics,
Marginal Revolution,
VoxEU,
Cato Institute,
The Telegraph
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Tournaments without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records, with Mareike Nossol;
Management Science,
2011, 57: 1721-1736..
Workers in a field piece rate setting
work harder when provided with feedback on their relative
performance .
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Are Tenured Judges
Insulated from Political Pressure?,
with Clare
Leaver;
Journal of Public Economics, 2011, 95: 570-586.
Judges
do not favour candidates with elite backgrounds in
promotion decisions to the English Court of Appeal. When faced by
the prospect of losing autonomy, senior judges begin to favour
non-elite candidates, as well as candidates unconnected to
members of the promotion committee.
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When Should Leaders
Share Information with their Subordinates?, with
Marc Moller;
Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 2007, 16:
251-283.
The problem with sharing information is that decision-making will be
subject to a motivational bias; leaders make decisions their
subordinates want to see. This is less of a problem when the leader
is overconfident.
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Delegation of
Decision Rights and the Winner's Curse; Economics Letters;
2007, 94: 163-169.
Delegating
decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern
incentives by making their performance more transparent and
alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.
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