Research Areas

Macroeconomics, International Trade, Industrial Organization

Working Papers

The Impact of Contract Enforcement Costs on Outsourcing and Aggregate Productivity

Legal institutions affect economic outcomes, but how much? This paper studies how costly supplier contract enforcement shapes the patterns of intermediate input use and quantifies the impact of these distortions on aggregate productivity and welfare. Using the frequency of litigation between US firms to measure the potential for hold-up problems, I find a robust relationship between countries' input-output structure and their quality of legal institutions: in countries with high enforcement costs, firms have lower expenditure shares on intermediate inputs in sector pairs where US firms litigate frequently for breach of contract. I adapt a Ricardian trade model to the study of intersectoral trade, and show that the variation in intermediate input shares that is explained by contracting frictions is large enough to generate sizeable welfare increases when enforcement institutions are improved. (Updated 2016-09-20)

Work in Progress

Input Capabilities and the Direction of Product Change: Evidence from India

(with Swati Dhingra and John Morrow)

Misallocation in the Market for Inputs

(with Ezra Oberfield)

Teaching

KEPP 2385: Macroeconomics 2 (for Master Economics, Sciences Po, Spring 2015, 2016): see Moodle

BECO 1750: Money and Banking (Sciences Po, Fall 2014, 2015, 2016): see Moodle. Are you considering taking the course?

EC220: Introduction to Econometrics (LSE, 2009/10)

EC400: Introductory Course in Maths and Statistics (LSE, 2010/2011)

EC321: Monetary Economics (LSE, 2010/2011)

EC321: Money and Banking (LSE, 2010/2011)

EC210: Macroeconomic Principles (LSE, 2011/2012)

EC442: Macroeconomics for PhD (LSE, 2013/2014)