Richard Bradley

Professor of Philosophy
London School of Economics
      London WC2A 2AE












I work broadly in decision theory and related fields such as formal epistemology and semantics. Much of my work is on individual decision making under uncertainty and the role of hypothetical reasoning in reaching judgements about what to do. But I am also interested in the nature of the intentional attitudes, belief and preference revision and social value and choice. I have recently begun working on the nature of chance and our attitudes to it (both as individuals and as a society). My other big project at the moment is decision making under severe uncertainty (see below). I am bringing a lot of this work together in a book entitled “Decision Theory with a Human Face”. Draft chapters can be found here.

Work in Progress

A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules (with Franz Dietrich and Christian List)

Ellsberg’s Paradox and the Value of Chances (longer version with material on social preferences)

Learning from Others: Conditioning versus Averaging

Desire Expectation and Invariance (with H. Orri Stefansson)

How Valuable are Chances? (with H. Orri Stefansson)

A Selection of Papers

Ellsberg’s Paradox and the Value of Chances, Economics and Philosophy (forthcoming)

Counterfactual Desirability, with H. Orri Stefansson, British Journal of Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)

Aggregating Causal Judgements, Philosophy of Science 81 (2014), 491-515 (with Christian List and Franz Dietrich)

Multidimensional Semantics for Conditionals, Philosophical Review 121 (4): 539-571, 2012

Revising Incomplete Attitudes, Synthese 171 (2): 235-256, 2009

Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8: 223-242, 2009

Belief as Desire Revisited (with Christian List), Analysis, 69: 29-35, 2009

Comparing Evaluations, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1): 85-100, 2008

Reaching a Consensus, Social Choice and Welfare 29: 609-632, 2007

The Kinematics of Belief and Desire, Synthese, 56 (3): 513-535, 2007

A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory, Theory and Decision  63:233-263, 2007

A Defence of the Ramsey Test, Mind, 116: 1-21, 2007

Taking Advantage of Difference of Opinion, Episteme, 3 (3): 141-155, 2006


Last modified June 2015
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