Richard Bradley

Professor of Philosophy
London School of Economics
      London WC2A 2AE












I work broadly in decision theory and related fields such as formal epistemology and semantics. Much of my work is on individual decision making under uncertainty and the role of hypothetical reasoning in reaching judgements about what to do. But I am also interested in the nature of the intentional attitudes, belief and preference revision and social value and choice. I have recently begun working on the nature of chance and our attitudes to it (both as individuals and as a society). My other big project at the moment is decision making under severe uncertainty (see below)

Work in Progress

A Selection of Papers

Counterfactual Desirability, with H. Orri Stefansson, British Journal of Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)

Aggregating Causal Judgements, with Christian List and Franz Dietrich, Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)

Multidimensional Semantics for Conditionals, Philosophical Review 121 (4): 539-571, 2012

Proposition-valued Random Variables as Information, Synthese 175: 17-38, 2010

Revising Incomplete Attitudes, Synthese, 171 (2): 235-256, 2009

Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8: 223-242, 2009

Belief as Desire Revisited (with Christian List), Analysis, 69: 29-35, 2009

Comparing Evaluations, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1): 85-100, 2008

Reaching a Consensus, Social Choice and Welfare 29: 609-632, 2007

The Kinematics of Belief and Desire, Synthese, 56 (3): 513-535, 2007

A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory, Theory and Decision  63:233-263, 2007

A Defence of the Ramsey Test, Mind, 116: 1-21, 2007

Taking Advantage of Difference of Opinion, Episteme, 3 (3): 141-155, 2006


Last modified May 2014
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