Conrad Heilmann

Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics (LSE), WC2A 2AE London, Email: c.heilmann at lse.ac.uk

I am a part-time teacher in philosophy and an associate with the Choice Group at the LSE. Currently, I am teaching the graduate seminars in Prof Nancy Cartwright's course PH423 'Evidence, Objectivity, and Policy'.

In January 2011, I will be joining EIPE and the Faculty of Philosophy at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam as an Assistant Professor for Philosophy of the Social Sciences (especially Economics).

Research Interests

I am working in the philosophy of economics and social science, especially the foundations of decision, rational choice and game theory. I have also interests in general philosophy of science, philosophy of public policy and political philosophy.

Papers

• Measurement-Theoretic Foundations of Time Discounting. LSE Choice Group Working Paper Series 4(6). (abstract) (pdf).
• Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction. LSE Choice Group Working Paper Series 5(3). (co-authored with Christian W. Bach, University of Maastricht) (abstract) (pdf).
• Two Types of Self-Censorship: Public and Private.  LSE Choice Group Working Paper Series 6(2).  (co-authored with Philip Cook, University of Leicester). (abstract) (pdf). Also at SSRN.

PhD Thesis

Recently, I have defended my PhD thesis 'Rationality and Time', supervised by Prof Richard Bradley and co-supervised by Dr Katie Steele and Dr Franz Dietrich.

My PhD thesis 'Rationality and Time' develops a multiple-self model of decision-makers to relax stability assumptions about their personal identity over time. This model complements normative decision theory and is used to provide new accounts of time discounting, backward induction and preference change. Download a one-page summary (pdf).

Organisation

• LSE Choice Group. Weekly Seminars: current schedule
• Preference Change Conference at LSE (report in The Reasoner 3(7), also published at loriweb.org) (jointly with Christian List and Franz Dietrich)
• Founder and co-organiser of the Decisions, Games & Logic (DGL) workshop series:
  - DGL07 at London School of Economics (LSE)
  - DGL08 at ILLC Amsterdam (report by Olivier Roy at loriweb.org)
  - DGL09 at HEC Lausanne (report in The Reasoner 3(7); report by Umberto Grandi in Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 10)
  - DGL10 at ENS Paris
  - DGL11 at University of Maastricht, Department of Quantitative Economics
• Co-organiser of Philosophy of Probability Conferences at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) at LSE:
  - Philosophy of Probability I
  - Philosophy of Probability II (report in The Reasoner 3(7))
  - Philosophy of Probability III (report in The Reasoner 4(8))

• LSE Choice Group
• LSE Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
• Weblog Choice & Inference
• Weblog Logic and Rational Interaction

Paper Abstracts

Measurement-Theoretic Foundations of Time Discounting.

Abstract.  The concept of time discounting introduces weights on future goods to make these less valuable.  Yet, both the conceptual motivation for time discounting and its specific functional form remain contested.  To address these problems, this paper provides a general measurement-theoretic framework of representation for time discounting.  The representation theorem characterises time discounting factors by representations of time differences.  This general result can be interpreted with existing theories of time discounting to clarify their formal and conceptual assumptions.  It also provides a conceptually neutral framework for comparing the descriptive and normative merits of those theories.

Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction. (co-authored with Christian W. Bach).

Abstract.  We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information.  A three-stage account is proposed, that specifies set-up, reasoning and play stages.  Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages.  The notion of agent connectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model.  Agent connectedness measures the extent to which agents' choices are sequentially stable.  Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand strategic interaction over time.  In particular, we provide sufficient conditions for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness.  Also, our framework reveals that the epistemic independence assumption involved in backward induction reasoning is stronger than usually presumed, and makes accessible multiple-self interpretations for dynamic games.

Two Types of Self-Censorship: Public and Private. (co-authored with Philip Cook).

Abstract.  We propose and defend a distinction between two types of self-censorship: public and private.  In public self-censorship, individuals restrain their expressive attitudes in response to public censors.  In private self-censorship, individuals do so in the absence of public censorship. We argue for this distinction by introducing a general model which allows us to identify, describe, and compare a wide range of censorship regimes.  We concentrate on the case of the publication of cartoons of Mohammed by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and clarify the debates surrounding the legitimacy of the various censorship regimes associated with this case through use of our model.  Our analysis of two types of self-censorship also reveals that private self-censorship may occur when an agent acts on behalf of a public censor (private self-censorship by proxy), or when individuals constitute their own censorship regime absent a public censor (private self-censorship by self-constraint).  Whilst our paper concentrates on clarifying self-censorship, it also has repercussions for normative analysis: principles of free speech can only be invoked in cases of public self-censorship because coercion is absent in private self-censorship.