

Why the EU Should Have a Single President, and How She Should be Elected

Simon Hix
London School of Economics and Political Science
(s.hix@lse.ac.uk)

Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU for the UK Cabinet Office, Oct. 2002

Contents

1. Why the EU is Unaccountable, and Why a Contest for Executive Power is Essential
2. Options for the Design of the EU Executive
 - 2.1. A Single or Dual Executive (Why a Single Executive is Always Better)
 - 2.2. Fused or Separated-Powers (Why Separated-Powers is Better for the EU)
3. Options for a Separate Election of an EU President
 - 3.1. Direct Election
 - 3.2. Indirect Election by a Congress of National and European Parliamentarians
 - 3.3. Indirect Election by National Parliaments
4. Conclusions/Summary

1. Why the EU is Unaccountable, and Why a Contest for Executive Power is Essential

In modern political science there are two necessary requirements for accountable government (e.g. Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999). First, government institutions should make decisions/produce policies in the interests the majority of the citizens – an *output* requirement (e.g. Weber, 1918). These majorities should also shift across issue area and time, otherwise there would be a permanent dictatorship of a particular political or ethnic majority (e.g. Almond, 1956; Lijphart, 1977).

Second, the holders of governmental office should be chosen ‘by the people’, through contests between rival policy agendas and candidates – an *input* requirement (e.g. Schumpeter, 1943). Also, this contest is essentially about executive rather than legislative office, as the holders of executive power play the dominant roles of policy leadership and agenda-setting and external representation.¹

But, why would is the input requirement necessary, if the output requirement is met? If someone gives me the policies I want, why should I care about the source of these policies? The problem, however, is that without the constraints of a regular contest for power, there would be no guarantee that a government would continue to supply the best policies or act in a non-corrupt manner (e.g. Fearon, 1999). As a result, only regular elections can guarantee a high congruence between the preferences of voters and office-holders (e.g. Powell, 2000). Put another way, enlightened despotism may be preferable to non-enlightened autocracy, yet democratic government is universally preferable to enlightened despotism!

The problem of the EU is that it is essentially an enlightened despotic regime, not a fully-democratic one. On the output side, because of the institutional design of the EU – where policies can only pass with the support of an oversized majority of states, a parallel majority of population (in the European Parliament), and where there are several checks-and-balances on the governing majority (the Commission and the Court are ‘veto players’) – the EU produces policies that are generally in the public interest, except in a few policy areas, such as the CAP (e.g. Majone, 1996; Moravcsik, 2002).

On the input side, however, the process of rewarding good policies or sanctioning bad policies is far removed from what citizens think about European policy issues. The reward (or sanction) of the EU executive office-holders (the Commission President or a prospective single Council President) is removed from citizens’ opinions by a long ‘chain of delegation’: i.e. voters elect parliaments, parliaments elect prime ministers, prime ministers choose the members of the governments, and the governments then collectively choose the holders of executive office in the EU.

Hence, in no sense can European citizens either choose or punish those people who exercise power at the European level on their behalf. So, a key issue for the Convention on the Future of Europe – or even THE key issue, if the most pressing aim is to improve the accountability of the EU – should be how to design a contest for executive power in the EU.

¹ In indication of the importance of executive over legislative office is that voter turnout is considerably higher in elections that lead to the formation of government than in elections for non-executive-forming parliaments – e.g. US presidential compared to congressional elections, elections for national parliaments in Europe compared European Parliament elections, and Swiss parliamentary elections (where the executive is fixed by a formula) compared to other national elections in Europe.

2. Options for the Design of the EU Executive

But, how a contest for executive power should be held depends on how the EU executive is organised:

First, should the EU have a ‘dual executive’, where agenda-setting and leadership is split between two institutions (the Council and Commission), or should it have a single executive, where these roles are concentrated in a single institution (either the Council or the Commission, with the other institution playing a subservient leadership role)?

Second, should the holders of executive office – the Presidents of the Commission and the Council – be chosen by the same majorities that enact legislation (a fused-powers model), or should they be chosen by a separate contest (a separated-powers model)?

2.1. A Single or Dual Executive (Why a Single Executive is Always Better)

Not a single new democracy has copied the French model of government, where executive powers are split between two offices: a powerful President and a Prime Minister. This is for obvious reasons: with two “chief executives”, who compete for leadership, there are inevitable questions of who is accountable for what, who ultimately decides, and who should be blamed. Instead, every new democracy has chosen a single executive model: either a classic presidential system (where the cabinet is chosen by the president not the parliament), or a parliamentary system (where the cabinet is chosen by a parliamentary majority).

In an ideal world, then, the EU should have a single “EU President”. But, a single EU President is unlikely to be accepted in the Convention – either because a President would most likely come from a large state, or because a single President would reduce the power of the governments. Nevertheless, if a dual-executive structure is maintained, with parallel Council and Commission Presidents, two things need to be considered.

First, the chain of command between the two offices should be clarified. For example, if a single Council President is created without any change in the current roles of the Council and the Commission, there would be an undesirable conflict: between a Council President with all the prestige and little agenda-setting power (i.e. no formal legislative initiative rights), and a Commission President with no prestige but all the power (of legislative initiative).

Giuliano Amato, the Vice-President of the Convention, has on several occasions compared the “parallel EU Presidents model” with the French model of government.² But, from the point of view of a political scientist, this is a misleading analogy. The chain of command in the proposed model for the EU would be even more confusing and inefficient than under the (already flawed) French model. Unlike the French President vis-à-vis the French Prime Minister, the Council President would not have the power to hire and fire the Commission President. As a result, the only way that the Council President could force the Commission to act in a particular area would be to use the very blunt instrument of Treaty reform – by persuading the member state governments to unanimously agree to add new articles instructing the Commission to initiative legislation in a particular area.

² For example, in June 2002, Professor Amato put forward this argument both in a seminar at the LSE and at a speech to a group in the House of Commons.

Second, how the two Presidents would be chosen would determine the relative legitimacy, and hence authority, of the holders of the two offices. The worst possible scenario would be to have both posts chosen by the same method, such as a qualified-majority in the European Council. Presumably if the governments control the selection of both posts, this could enable the governments to deliberately create a balanced-ticket (with one President from the centre-left and the other from the centre-right). But, regardless of whether the posts are both chosen by the governments, both chosen by the European Parliament, or both directly-elected, it would be impossible to determine which of the two office-holders is really responsible for leadership and agenda-setting in the EU.

Alternatively, if a Council President were chosen by a majority of governments and the Commission President were chosen by any direct or indirect form of election (such as by the European Parliament, by national parliaments, or by a direct election), the Commission President would be more legitimate than the Council President. [nb. I do not understand why some governments think that choosing a Council President from amongst the current heads of government would endow this person with the authority and legitimacy that the Commission President does not have. Weren't Santer and Prodi previous heads of EU government, and hence "chosen by their peers"?].

In addition, if the Commission President were chosen by a majority in the European Parliament and the Council President by a majority of governments, the holders of these two posts would inevitably be from opposite political camps because the partisan majority in the Parliament is always opposite to the partisan majority in the Council (since European elections are mid-term contests in the national election cycles and so are won by opposition parties and lost by governing parties).

Hence, if the dual-executive structure is maintained, there should be, at the very least:

(1) a clearer hierarchy between the two roles – either with enhanced power for the Commission President over the agenda of the Council, or with the ability of the Council President to delegate to, and enforce his/her decisions on, the Commission President; and

(2) a method of selecting these offices which mirrors this hierarchy, with the more powerful office being chosen by the more democratic method.

Nevertheless, it would be much better in terms of identification, accountability and effectiveness if there were a single EU President, who both controls the Commission (and hence initiates legislation) as well as works with the Heads of Government in setting the medium-term policy agenda. In a sense, it does not matter whether this office is an enhanced President of the Commission, who plays a key role in setting the agenda of the Council, or a new single President of the Council, with a powerful influence over the Commission (including selecting its members). In practice, the effect would be the same: there would be a single identifiable chief executive, to either support or oppose.

2.2. Fused or Separated-Powers (Why Separated-Powers is Better for the EU)

Under the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, different coalitions are required for choosing the Commission President and for passing legislation: unanimity amongst the governments ('common accord') for choosing the Commission President, and a qualified-majority in the Council for passing legislation (in most areas). In constitutional terms, this is a separated-powers model, since no single majority in the Council can control both the selection of the executive and the enactment of the legislation proposed by this body.

The Nice Treaty, if ratified, would change this model. The Commission President would be elected by a qualified-majority in the Council – i.e. the same majority that can also enact legislation. Hypothetically, this could lead to a 'government-opposition' split in the EU: where the (governing) states who voted for the President would then be able to vote through his/her legislative proposals, while the losing (opposition) states in the election of the President would then most likely also lose in the legislative process. In other words, the Nice Treaty would introduce a fundamental constitutional change in the design of EU government: from a separated-powers model of government to a fused-powers model.

Whether or not this shift is desirable is debatable. Political scientists are split over whether a fused- or separated-powers model is superior (e.g. Lijphart, 1992). However, there is consensus about what are the trade-offs between these two models. And, from these trade-offs, a judgement can be made about which method of selecting the chief executive is most appropriate for the EU.

In particular, in terms of the policy implications of the two designs, a separation-of-powers usually leads to less policy change than a fusion-of-powers (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). With separated-powers, the executive cannot force the legislative majority to support its policy agenda (e.g. Shugart and Carey, 1992). In contrast, with a fusion of the legislative and executive majorities, the executive can force the legislative majority to support its policy agenda by threatening to resign, and hence risk a battle over the formation of a new executive (cf. Huber, 1996; Diermeier & Feddersen, 1997). The result, in policy terms, is that fused-powers regimes tend to have less under-provision of public goods (such as public healthcare) and more centralisation of policy competences. In contrast, separated-powers regimes tend to have more powerful minorities, who can block the establishment of redistributive policies, and less centralisation of policy competences (cf. Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000).

For example, in the middle of the twentieth century, the separation-of-powers in the United States was the main reason why a centrally-funded welfare state could not be passed by Roosevelt, whereas universal healthcare and social security regimes were passed by centre-left majorities in the fused-government systems of Canada and Europe (cf. Dahl, 2001).

In other words, a fusion of powers in the EU (where the same majority elects the executive and enacts legislation) would probably lead to faster European integration, through the centralisation of more policy competences, and more redistributive policies – such as tax harmonisation, greater labour market regulations, and a larger EU budget. In contrast, a separation of executive and legislative majorities would favour more moderate policies and constrain the further integration of policies at the EU level.

Put this way, at the current stage of development of the EU, a separated-powers model is probably preferable, since redistributive policies at the EU level and greater policy

centralisation could have a destabilising effect. Also, anyone who might fear that a separation-of-powers in the EU might lock-in neo-liberal policies (as such a model has done in the US) should remember that the fused-powers models at the domestic level in Europe already produce high levels of social protection and public goods (unlike the separated-powers models at the state level in the US).

Furthermore, whether a majority in the Council or a majority in the European Parliament elects the EU executive, the effect would be the same – since a single political majority would still be able to choose the executive and enact legislation. The only difference would be that the majority in the European Parliament would be a partisan majority rather than a nation-state majority, because voting in the Parliament is increasingly along party lines, and greater powers for the Parliament have increased rather than undermined this trend (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002). Because a significant portion of the political establishment in every member state would most likely be part of the majority in the European Parliament, an all-powerful majority in the European Parliament would be less destabilising than an all-powerful majority in the Council.

Nevertheless, a majority in the European Parliament with the power to elect the executive and enact legislation, would also be able to centralise policy competences and introduce radical policy change in the EU – either through more social regulation and redistribution, or through radical deregulation. Either way, these policies would not be the choice of the average voter in Europe, and separating the election of the EU executive from the majority in the European Parliament would force the parliamentary majority to negotiate compromises with the executive, and hence lead to more moderate policy outcomes.

In sum, the best design for the EU is a single President, who is not chosen either by the majority in the Council or by the majority in the European Parliament.

The question then is how should a separate election for a single EU President be conducted?

3. Options for a Separate Election of an EU President

Three possible options for holding a separate contest for an EU President have been proposed to the Convention:

- a direct election by voters;
- an indirect election by a ‘congress’ of national and European parliamentarians; or
- an indirect election by national parliaments.

3.1. Direct Election

The most popular plan for a direct election would be to elect an EU President at the same time as electing the European Parliament (e.g. Laver et al., 1995). The strategy of electing the head of the executive and the legislature at the same time is a common recommendation of political scientists (e.g. Shugart & Carey, 1992). This allows the terms of office of the two branches of government to run in parallel. This design also gives a choice to voters of whether they want divided or unified government. If voters want unified government, they can support the same political majority in both institutions. But if they want divided government, they can split their votes and support different political majorities for each institution.

But, such a direct election is highly problematic in the EU. First, a direct election of an EU President would almost certainly suffer from the same ‘mid-term election’ problem as European Parliament elections. As with European Parliament elections, there would be little incentive for national parties and the national media to fight an EU Presidential election on European issues. Instead, the contest would be dominated by the positions of national parties on non-European issues, and voter turnout would be extremely low, as few people would be motivated to vote. Also, because governing party supporters would stay home and opposition party supporters would be motivated to protest against their government, the candidate supported by the opposition parties would probably do considerably better than the candidate supported by the governing party. Consequently, the elected President would not be able to claim that he or she has a genuine popular mandate.

Second, the direct election of an EU President would suffer from some of the problems associated with the fused-powers model of government centred on the Council. In a straight direct election, where every citizen’s vote is treated equally, the outcome would be decided by the more populous member states. Candidates would only focus their campaigns in the larger member states, in the knowledge that winning a majority in the larger states would easily outweigh losing in all the smaller states.

In a sense, then, a direct election of an EU President might combine the problems inherent in European Parliament elections with the problems inherent in choosing the head of the EU executive by a majority of governments, and so could be the worst of both worlds!

3.2. Indirect Election by a Congress of National and European Parliamentarians

One possible indirect method would be to elect the EU President by a simple majority in a specially-formed ‘congress’, composed of equal numbers of member of the national parliaments and the European Parliament. The majority in such a congress would at least be partially-separated from the legislative majority in either the Council or the Parliament (imagine the US President being elected by a special assembly composed of the members of the House of Representatives and an equal number of members for the state legislatures!).

Moreover, this model would be an improvement on a direct election. First, if the public are not ready for a ‘first-order’ direct election, it would be logical to involve national parliaments instead: as the main representative and sovereign institutions in Europe’s democracies. Giving national parliaments the right to choose the EU President would be a straightforward way of both granting national parliaments a significant role in the EU system as well as anchoring this contest in the most democratically-accountable institutions in the EU polity.

Second, a congress composed of an equal number of national MPs and MEPs from each member state allow a balance of populations and states. As a result, and in contrast to a direct election (as discussed above), candidates for the President would have an incentive to campaign in all member states.

Not surprisingly, the idea of a congress of national and European MPs is growing in popularity in debates surround the Convention, either for the election of a single Council President (e.g. Grant, 2002, and recent statements by Giscard), or for the election of a more powerful Commission President (e.g. Duff, 2002).

Nevertheless, there are some significant problems with this model. First, a congress of national and European MPs, probably meeting in Brussels, would almost certainly be removed from the domestic media debate. The Brussels-based media would no-doubt cover the debates and the contest between the rival candidates. However, with such a small proportion of national MPs going to the convention, the national parliament-focussed political correspondents in each of the member states would have little incentive to be interested. On the other side, with such a small proportion of MPs represented in the congress, there would be few incentives for the candidate to sell their ideas directly to national parliaments, and to engage with national political debates and national media concerns.

Second, there would be considerable technical problems in staging such an event, since there is no purpose-built parliamentary chamber anywhere in Europe large enough to seat the over 1,400 members the congress, let alone house the hoards of interpreters and supporting staff. As a result, the event would probably have to be held in a convention hall rather than in a purpose-built hemicycle, which would severely restrict serious debate and the usual parliamentary interaction (although perhaps a ‘virtual congress’ could be held, where each national group of MPs and MEPs meets and votes in their own national parliaments).

Third, and above all, if it is decided that a separate contest should be held for an EU President, and that this contest should be conducted as close as possible to national voters, then there is little justification for giving MEPs a role in this contest. MEPs are already powerful legislators at the European level, and hence do not need to be involved in the election of an EU President to have significant influence over policy outcomes. Moreover, the second-order nature of European Parliament elections means that there is a much weaker

connection between voters' preferences and MEPs' votes (for an EU President) than between voters' preferences and national MPs' votes. [n.b. Maybe some British and French members of the Convention like the idea of a congress because combining their proportionally-elected MEPs with their majoritarian-elected national MPs would balance the often skewed character of representation in the British and French national parliaments!]

3.3. Indirect Election by National Parliaments

So, a better model for the EU would be an indirect election by national parliaments (e.g. Hix, 2002). An election of an EU President by national parliaments alone would have all the strengths of the 'congress model', yet none of the weaknesses.

First, national parliaments, as the main representative institutions in European democracies, are an even better proxy for voters' choices than a combined congress of national and European parliaments.

Second, if each national parliament is given a particular number of 'presidential votes' equivalent to their number of MEPs, and these votes are allocated to candidates in proportion to the support they receive in the national parliaments, then the system of representation would be an equally-good balance of population and states as in the combined congress of national and European parliamentarians.

Third, unlike the congress model, a proportional election amongst national parliament would probably ensure that any elected President would be supported by at least a certain proportion of the parliamentary elite in every member state of the EU – who could then be held accountable for the actions of the President.

Fourth, unlike the congress model, a contest amongst national parliamentarians is the only way to guarantee a political debate at the *national level* about the candidates and their manifestos for action at the European level. Each candidate would probably be invited to present his/her manifesto to each parliament, and since the media in every member state is almost exclusively-focused on national parliamentary politics, these manifestos, and the ensuing positions of the national parties, would receive considerable media coverage. For the first time, there would be a genuine Europe-wide debate on the policy direction of the EU.

Fifth, if the ultimate goal would be a fully-democratic and open direct election on an EU President, an election by national parliaments could more easily contain an '*evolutionary mechanism*' than the congress model. For example, each national parliament could be free to decide whether to replace a parliamentary vote with a direct election in their state. Gradually, as more parliaments respond to voter and media demands to democratise the election process, pressure would grow on the remaining parliaments to replace parliamentary ballots with direct elections. Through such an evolutionary mechanism, instead of a direct election being imposed on a European public that is not interested or ready for such a contest, a direct election would be introduced in response to voters' demands.

Finally, the practical effect of a contest amongst national parliamentarians (and perhaps also of the congress model) would be that candidates would be chosen by the main transnational political parties: the Party of European Socialists (PES), the centre-right European People's Party (EPP), the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), and the European

Federation of Green Parties (EFGP). These Euro-parties, meeting at the level of national party leaders (in the “party leaders’ summits”), would be the ideal vehicles for building alliances behind a particular candidate, drafting and agreeing the manifestos of the candidates, and recruiting senior national figures to their campaign teams. These Euro-parties would be essential lubricants of the electoral process.

Over time, the indirectly-elected EU President may emerge as the effective ‘European Party Leader’ of their particular Euro-party, making policy recommendations to their parties’ group in the European Parliament and to their national party leaders in the European Council. In return, the elected EU President would be held accountable to their manifesto promises because the national member parties of the Presidents coalition could threaten to support a different candidate in the next election.

In sum, although a separation contest is preferable to allowing the Council or the Parliament to elect an EU President, the EU is not ready for a direct election. Electing an EU President in a ‘congress’ of national and European parliamentarians would be better than a direct election, but is unlikely to lead to a widespread debate and coverage in the national media; and why should MEPs be involved anyway? Instead, the best solution is an indirect-election of an EU President by national parliaments. Only such a contest would force all nationally-elected politicians to be accountable for the candidate their support, would result in an EU President with support in every national parliament, and could contain a mechanism for the evolution of a fully-democratic direct election.

4. Conclusions/Summary

- Although the EU might produce moderate policies, these policies will only be accepted as legitimate if there is a genuine contest for the key executive positions that determine the direction of the policy agenda: the Presidents of the Commission and/or Council.
- A single locus of executive power – a single EU President, who both chairs the European Council and hires and fires the Commissioners – would be the ideal. But, if a dual-executive model is maintained, a clearer hierarchical relationship between the Presidents the Commission and Council needs to be established, and the office with the most power should be elected by the more democratic method.
- In terms of the selection of an EU President (or the more senior of the two Presidents), a separated-powers model is better than a fused-powers model – in other words, the chief executive should *not* be chosen by the same political majority, in either the Council or the Parliament, that can enact legislation.
- In terms of how to organise a separate election for a single EU President, an indirect election amongst national parliamentarians, with the possibility of the gradual evolution towards a fully-direct model, is preferable to the immediate imposition of direct elections on a reluctant European public, or an indirect election by a congress of MPs and MEPs.
- Only an election by national parliamentarians would ensure a national-level public debate about the direction of EU policy, that national political parties take positions on the candidates, that there is a clear mandate for action at the European level, and hence that there is an effective way of rewarding (or sanctioning) the actions of the President.

The challenge, then, is for the members of the Convention on the Future of Europe to create a model of government in the EU that is both accountable and sustainable, and hence in the long-term interests of all of Europe rather than in the short-term interests of each government.

If Europe's leaders fail to create such a model, the EU polity will probably be consigned to the scrap-heap of history: either saddled by an inability to act because of constant battles about who controls the agenda and who is responsible for governing (as a result of the absence of a single executive figurehead), or dominated by a small group of politicians who are bent on turning the EU into something undesirable for most of Europe (as a result of a concentration of power in the hands of a majority in the Council or the European Parliament).

References

- Almond, Gabriel (1956) 'Comparative Political Systems', *Journal of Politics*, 18: 391-409.
- Dahl, Robert A. (2001) *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Diermeier, Daniel and Timothy J. Feddersen (1998) 'Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure', *American Political Science Review*, 92: 611-621.
- Duff, Andrew (2002) *A Model Constitution for a Federal Union of Europe*, London: Andrew Duff MEP (CONV 234/02),
<http://www.andrewduffmep.org/Convention/Federal%20Union%20Constitution.doc>
- Fearon, James (1999) 'Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance', in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds) *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grant, Charles (2002) 'The European Union Needs a New Leader', *The Financial Times*, 7 October 2002.
- Hix, Simon (2002) *Linking National Politics to Europe*, London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland (2002) 'Understanding the European Parliament: Party Cohesion and Competition, 1979-2001', unpublished mimeo (available on: <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/HIX>).
- Huber, John (1996) 'The Impact of Confidence Votes on Legislative Politics in Parliamentary Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 90: 269-282.
- Laver, Michael, Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh, Robert Singh and Ben Tonra (1995) *Electing the President of the European Commission*, Trinity Blue Papers in Public Policy: 1, Dublin: Trinity College.
- Lijphart, Arend (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend (1992) 'Introduction', in Arend Lijphart (ed.) *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Majone, Giandomenico (1996) *Regulating Europe*, London: Routledge.
- Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes (1999) 'Elections and Representation', in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds) *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2002) 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40: 603-24 (forthcoming).
- Persson, Torsten, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997) 'Separation of Powers and Political Accountability', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112: 1163-1202.
- Persson, Torsten, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (2000) 'Comparative Politics and Public Finance', *Journal of Political Economy*, 108: 1121-1161.
- Powell, G. Bingham (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph (1943) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Tsebelis, George (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Weber, Max (1946 [1918]) 'Politics as a Vocation', in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.