Party Organization in Multi-Level Contexts:
Theory and Some Comparative Evidence

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Introduction

In the last three decades, a number of Western European countries have adopted decentralizing institutional reforms, devolving political and administrative power to subcentral units (Jeffery 1997, Keating 1998). Often such reforms involve the creation of an additional level of electoral politics in which parties must compete for control over the new institutions. Along with the process of European integration, these decentralizing reforms imply that political parties must increasingly be analyzed in terms of multi-level electoral politics. However, few attempts have been made to assess the relationship between political decentralization and party organizational transformation, or the dilemmas faced by political parties which must compete for power at multiple levels.

This paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the ways in which decentralizing reforms influence and shape how parties organize at both the statewide and non-statewide level. In particular, it focuses on statewide parties which have to compete across the national territory, adapting their strategies and messages to different territorial realities in the context of multi-level electoral politics. We hypothesize possible party reactions and adaptations to these circumstances, looking at changes in candidate selection, competitive strategies and governing strategies (Hopkin 2003). We then go on to assess the emerging reality of party organization in multi-level conditions in two prominent Western European cases: Spain, where an extensive quasi-federal arrangement has developed over the past two decades, and the United Kingdom, where devolution to some of the component nations has been adopted more recently. This comparative analysis shows how multi-level electoral politics creates new organizational and political
strains for parties and has a significant impact on party competition and government formation at the statewide level.

Devolution and Party Adaptation: Three Arenas of Party Change

Multi-level electoral politics inevitably creates complications for statewide political parties which aspire to winning power at the national level. Decentralized political systems ‘create additional territorial-based citizen-agent relationships’ (Lancaster 1999: 64), meaning that statewide parties are obliged to interact with their voters in a variety of different ways: as ‘national’ parties seeking to run the government of the state, as local parties seeking power at the municipal level, and as ‘regional’ parties seeking to govern a particular territory or nation within the state.

The difficulty of the dilemmas this poses will depend on the degree to which diverse identities co-exist within the state. In relatively ethnically homogeneous states, decentralized and even strongly federal government may coexist with a high level of ‘nationalization’ (Caramani 1996) of the party system (Germany, Austria, and Australia for example). In such cases, statewide parties do not have to represent conflicting ethnic or regional identities within a single organization, and may be able to maintain internal cohesion at relatively little cost. In contrast, ethnically heterogeneous states often choose to decentralize power precisely because of the difficulties in representing conflicting identities through uniform institutional structures (for example in Belgium, Spain or the United Kingdom). Here statewide parties need to accommodate territorial diversity whilst
aspiring to govern the state, a difficult task when some territorial identities have been forged in opposition to the central state.

To some extent the problems posed by multi-level politics are universal. All statewide parties in decentralized states will have to accommodate interterritorial tensions over the distribution of resources, manage the relationship between party officials and representatives at various tiers of government, and speak for the ‘general’ interest whilst simultaneously representing potentially contradictory ‘particularistic’ interests. But these contradictions are likely to be much stronger in heterogeneous societies where strong ethnoregionalist parties (De Winter and Tursan 1998) are present. Ethnoregionalist parties will inevitably challenge statewide parties’ ethnoregionalist ‘credentials’, and seek to portray the regional representatives of the statewide parties as puppets of the national leadership. We should therefore expect the dilemmas of party adaptation to multi-level electoral politics to be particularly visible in cases such as Spain and the United Kingdom, where decentralizing institutional reform was a response to the growth of ethnoregionalist movements.

We have found it particularly useful to focus on three arenas of party activity where statewide parties have to address the tensions and contradictions emerging from multi-level electoral politics (see also Hopkin 2003). The rest of this section outlines the kinds of changes that can be expected in these three arenas as statewide parties adapt to the creation or strengthening of sub-central political institutions. This three-fold distinction will then inform our analysis of the comparative empirical evidence.
Candidate Selection

Political recruitment, and in particular the selection of candidates for political office, is one of the main sources of internal tension in political parties. Although selection as a candidate is only a first step towards elective office, most electoral systems give party organizations the chance to place their favoured candidates in ‘safe seats’ (in single-member systems) or electable positions on party lists (in many PR systems). In most parties, candidate selection has tended to be an opaque process – the ‘secret garden of politics’ (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). However, the increasing ‘democratization’ of candidate selection over recent years, through the adoption of membership ballots and internal ‘primaries’ has enhanced transparency, rendering intraparty tensions more visible and more difficult to control (Hazan and Pennings 2001).

In decentralized political systems, these tensions can easily acquire a territorial dimension. National-level party leaderships have a strong interest in candidate selection for national elections, since this will determine the composition of the party’s national parliamentary delegation, which has important implications if the party is in government. In most electoral systems, candidates stand for election in territorially defined constituencies, raising the issue of whether the national or local party leaders control candidate selection. Most statewide parties have mechanisms for ensuring that local parties select candidates acceptable to the national party leadership, but membership ballots and primaries provide opportunities for sub-national elites to mobilize grass-roots support in order to challenge or pre-empt central interference.
If sub-national tiers of government wield significant power, national leaders will be similarly concerned to ensure that the ‘right’ candidates are selected for elections to regional and local institutions. This is particularly the case when executive offices of symbolic importance as well as policy relevance are at stake (presidencies of regional governments or mayors of large cities). Again, it is likely that national and sub-national elites will enter into conflict over candidacies, but in this case national leaderships are at a disadvantage. The very existence of elective regional government is a recognition of the limited ability of statewide party politics to respond to the concerns of different territorial units, and heavy-handed intervention of national leaders in regional politics is easily challenged as ‘undemocratic’. In the presence of strong ethnoregionalist challengers, such intervention can prove electorally damaging to the statewide party.

The greater weight accorded to sub-national elites by strong regional governments also feeds back into internal party dynamics at the national level: party leadership may become more collective, with regional power brokers on the party national executive enjoying significant influence over electoral and political strategy at the national level. This may well undermine the kind of central control over candidate selection in national elections described earlier. For all these reasons, the nature of the candidate selection process is a useful barometer of changes in the internal balance of power of statewide parties following decentralizing reforms.

*Electoral Strategies*
Multi-level electoral politics, by its very nature, introduces greater complexity into statewide parties’ electoral strategies. When electoral politics is strongly ‘nationalized’, and the elections to the national state parliament monopolize the political attention of the electorate, statewide parties need only contemplate how to elaborate and ‘sell’ their programme for national government to the electorates of the various territories. Party candidates in different territories will act as ‘proxies’ for national party leaderships, and once elected, will be expected to behave as ‘delegates’ of the national party.

Multi-level politics, on the other hand, can create tensions between parties’ programmes for national government, and their programmes for regional government. In elections to sub-national institutions such as regional governments, party elites will be tempted to claim special priority for the interests of their region, potentially entering into conflict with the policy priorities of the national government. Whereas in ‘nationalized’ party politics national leaders will be able to claim a mandate to override particularistic claims from sub-national leaders, in multi-level contexts this becomes difficult. First, it could have electoral costs at the regional level, and second, regional party leaders will themselves have an electoral mandate on which to base their claims. Multiple elections imply multiple sources of legitimacy, undermining the kinds of hierarchical chains of command which statewide parties have often sought to develop.

There are two particular scenarios in which these tensions can become acute. The first is that, in the presence of a strong ethnoregionalist party, regional statewide party elites will often wish to assert their independence from the national party elite for electoral reasons. Allowing the ethnoregionalists to claim a ‘monopoly’ of concern for
the region’s particular problems can have important electoral costs. Second, even when
there is no ethnoregionalist party, regional elites will feel obliged to defend regional
interests on distributional issues. This may involve challenging the statewide party
leadership’s national priorities, for instance by appealing for spending concessions while
the national party is pushing through an austerity programme. In cases where regional
leaderships have autonomous electoral resources, such as a charismatic leader or control
over channels for the distribution of patronage, it can be difficult for national leaders to
resist, since the regional elites have a credible exit-option: they can leave the party and
create an alternative regionalist formation.

Parties can address these tensions in a variety of ways. First, national party
leaderships can attempt to impose tough discipline on regional elites, with the risk of
provoking damaging internal conflict. Second, parties can establish more or less formal
internal party institutions for resolving differences, for instance by integrating regional
leaderships into powerful national decision-making bodies, or establishing more informal
problem-solving and consultation routines. Finally, parties can accept the reality of
conflict, and allow sub-national party representatives to follow differential strategies and
policies, at the risk of the party appearing divided and incoherent at the national level
(Roller and van Houten 2003).

Governing Strategies

Similar problems arise regarding party strategies within the elective institutions.
Just as the existence of different levels of electoral politics creates the potential for
internal conflict, so does the existence of different legislative and executive institutions. Parties may find themselves in government at one level and in opposition at the other, meaning that the different tiers of the party organization have different strategic priorities. But this is probably the mildest problem statewide parties face: other combinations are much more complex.

First, if a party is in government at both regional and national level, there may be conflicting interests over policy. The regional government may favour an activist role requiring high public expenditure, whilst the central government seeks to limit spending: this is especially likely when the revenue function is controlled at the central level, as in most non-federal arrangements. These are the kind of distributional battles likely in any political system, but which acquire greater potency because of the democratic legitimacy enjoyed by elected regional institutions.

Regional governments in ethnically heterogeneous states may also adopt policies (often of a symbolic nature) which reinforce the territory’s cultural distinctiveness. If such policies are unpopular outside that territory, party leaders at the national level face a dilemma: opposing the policies will cause internal conflict in the party and alienate voters in the culturally distinctive territory, whilst supporting the policies may alienate voters in the rest of the state. One possible response is for statewide parties to recognize these tensions and adopt formally ‘federal’ internal structures (Roller and van Houten 2003). This runs the risk of undermining the party’s cohesion at the national level, and potentially threatens its continued existence as a single organization.

These kinds of tensions become particularly visible when statewide parties face different coalition dynamics at different levels. For instance, the party may be able to
govern alone at one level, but require the parliamentary support of an opponent at another. In such situations, one level of the statewide party adopts a conciliatory approach to a rival whilst the other has an incentive to follow a strategy of aggressive opposition. Such contradictions are not necessarily serious, because voters outside a particular region or territory may have little interest in its coalition politics. Problems are most likely to arise if the national party leadership seeks to prevent the sub-national elites from adopting a particular coalition arrangement; regional leaders will be reluctant to pass up opportunities for executive office in the name of the party’s national-level calculations, and may press for a reorganization of the party’s decision-making procedures. The democratic legitimacy enjoyed by sub-national leaders in multi-level electoral politics makes it difficult for national party leaders to suppress such demands.

The rest of this paper will assess the ways in which statewide parties have resolved these dilemmas of multi-level electoral politics in two cases: Spain and the United Kingdom. These two cases have a number of common features: both are large countries with a long history as unitary states, both have introduced significant decentralizing reforms relatively recently, and neither are formally federal states, having instead adopted forms of ‘asymmetric devolution’. Of course, there are also many differences: in Spain, decentralization has been under way for two decades, whilst devolution in Britain is more recent and still very much in process. Moreover, there are important differences in economic development and political tradition. The conclusions drawn from this comparison are therefore tentative.

Spain’s *Estado de las autonomías*: Centralized Parties in a Decentralized State
Spain is a fascinating case for the analysis of how statewide parties respond to decentralization. Two Spanish regions (the Basque Country and Catalonia) have a long tradition of cultural distinctiveness and strong nationalist movements seeking independence, or at the very least extensive self-government. Several others have regionalist formations capable of winning significant electoral support (Galicia, the Canary Islands, Aragon, and to some extent Andalusia). A quasi-federal arrangement established by the 1978 Constitution divides Spain into 17 comunidades autónomas (‘autonomous communities’), which all have significant powers, and in the case of the Basque Country and Catalonia, advanced arrangements for self-government. At the same time, politics at the national level is dominated by two large statewide parties, aligned on the classic left-right dimension: the Socialists (PSOE) and the conservative Popular Party. These parties’ ability to win parliamentary majorities in the Spanish Congress is strongly influenced by their success in resolving the organizational dilemmas of multi-level elections.

Candidate Selection

Despite the extensive powers granted to the Spanish autonomous communities, statewide parties have succeeded in centralizing control over candidate selection to a perhaps surprising extent. One of the reasons for this is that decentralization has been a rather gradual process in Spain (see Moreno 2001), and electoral politics in the immediate post-Franco era took place in a highly centralized institutional framework.
This has allowed parties to establish rather centralized internal arrangements which have become institutionalized in spite of the growing political and administrative power available to sub-national party elites (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986).

The winning party in the 1977 and 1979 elections, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) provides an illustration of the reasons for this centralization. The UCD was formed by Adolfo Suárez, the Prime Minister during the period of transition from dictatorship to democratic electoral politics, in alliance with a number of aspirant centrist and conservative political leaders. Suárez’s allies lacked organizational resources and had so few supporters that they were known as ‘taxi-parties’; as a result the emerging party had no grass-roots organization to speak of. In such circumstances it was relatively easy for Suárez, at the head of a highly centralized state, to direct the selection of candidates to represent the new party in the electoral districts (he did so through the mediation of the Civil Governors, the Francoist ‘prefects’ who represented the state at the provincial level [Hopkin 1999: 53-66]).

These arrangements, once institutionalized in the party statutes of 1978, became difficult to change. The UCD governments of 1979-82 were concerned to contain the upsurge in demands for regional devolution, and the party leadership therefore used the centralized party structure to rein in the UCD regional elites. Candidate selection for regional elections was governed by the same rules as for national elections: the provincial party leadership drew up their lists which were submitted to the national party for approval, bypassing completely the regional level which had no specific organization of its own (UCD 1978). The major drawback of this strategy was that UCD was perceived as a largely centralist party, and suffered serious electoral defeats in the first regional
elections to take place in the new democracy, contributing to its collapse and
disappearance in 1982 (Hopkin 1999: Ch.6).

The UCD’s rival on the right, the Popular Alliance (AP – later to become the
Popular Party [PP]), also adopted a centralized model, for similar reasons. AP was a
vehicle of former Franco minister Manuel Fraga, and its organization was built around
the personalized ties of the leader with local notables all around Spain, so that candidate
selection followed a similar pattern to the UCD. When the party adopted more formal
structures and routines, these reflected a high level of centralization, with all candidate
lists having to be approved by the party’s national electoral committee; this centralization
extends to candidates for regional elections and candidates for mayor of provincial
capitals (van Biezen 2003: 100). Formally speaking therefore, candidate selection at all
levels of electoral politics is under the control of the PP national leadership (although
informal dynamics place some constraints on central veto power).

The Socialist Party offers a different picture in a number of respects. First, unlike
UCD and the PP, it adopted an explicitly federal structure from the very beginning of the
transition. In the case of Catalonia, the Socialists are represented by a separate party, the
PSC (Party of the Socialists of Catalonia) which is federated to the PSOE but formally
independent. In theory therefore, candidate selection is less subject to central diktat than
in the parties of the right. However, even the PSOE’s federal structure envisages a central
electoral committee which can veto or modify candidate lists for national, regional and
local elections (the latter in the case of the larger municipalities). In practice, the initial
proposals of the local party federations can be completely overturned by the central
leadership, with no right of appeal (Méndez 1998: 195).
The case of the Socialists is also distinctive because of the degree of formal membership involvement in the candidate selection process. The adoption of internal party primaries after the resignation of Felipe González in 1997 has transformed the selection of candidates for personal elective offices (Prime Minister, regional presidents and mayors), although candidates for parliaments and assemblies are still selected by party elites. The adoption of primaries (which immediately produced the shock defeats of two high profile party leaders [Hopkin 2001a]) has opened up the process, creating the potential for candidates to mobilize party members in opposition to the party’s key decision-makers. So far established regional party elites have been able to win their primaries, suggesting that regional leaderships reflect the will of the membership rather than any central imposition. However in the event of conflict between regional and national leaderships, primaries will tend to protect the regional level from excessive central interference.

Electoral Strategies

The contentious nature of the devolution process in Spain has provided ample opportunity for regional and national-level elites in statewide parties to enter into conflict. Not only are there at least two autonomous communities with powerful ethnoregionalist parties; there are also many ambitious political entrepreneurs in less culturally distinctive areas of Spain who have been keen to gain control over key policy competences, exploiting the open-ended constitutional settlement of 1978. At the same time, national party leaderships have generally sought to restrict and contain the transfer
of power and resources to the autonomous communities, or at least slow down the process of devolution. This has created numerous intraparty conflicts.

Disagreement over the devolution process was one of the key triggers of the UCD’s dramatic collapse in 1982. Interestingly, the most serious problems the UCD faced were not in the two historic nationalities of Catalonia and the Basque Country, but in regions with a far weaker tradition of regionalist mobilization: Andalusia and Galicia. The 1978 constitution established two routes towards autonomy: a ‘fast route’ envisaged for the special cases of the historic nationalities, and a ‘slow route’ for the rest of the country (see Aja 1999: Ch.2). After the approval of the Catalan and Basque statutes in 1979, the UCD government hoped to draw a line and force the rest of the autonomous communities to accept the more limited levels of autonomy characteristic of the ‘slow route’.

The party’s inability to control its regional elites made this impossible. Galicia, having already obtained autonomous status during the Second Republic, was entitled to follow the ‘fast route’, but the weakness of its regionalist formations and the majority status of the UCD in the region encouraged the UCD government to impose a more restrictive autonomy deal. This failed when the UCD’s Galician parliamentarians helped vote the settlement down in the Madrid Congress (Hopkin 1999: 146). Having failed in Galicia, the government aimed to put the brakes on the process by restricting the autonomy of Andalusia, another region with limited a regionalist presence. Here local elites of all parties petitioned for a referendum to accede to autonomy through the ‘fast route’. The government’s response was to campaign for abstention, but here once more the party’s regional elite defied the national leadership by campaigning for a ‘yes’ vote.
The result (the ‘yes’ vote won, but was a handful of votes short of a quorum) discredited the UCD government, damaged the internal cohesion of the party in Andalusia, and fatally undermined the UCD’s position in the subsequent elections to the Basque and Catalan parliaments the same year. In both the Galician and Andalusian cases, the UCD leadership had sought to strike a deal with the PSOE, but the Socialists were equally unable to curb the autonomist demands of their own regional elites and failed to keep their side of the bargain (Hopkin 1999: 146-7). This suggests that other parties faced similar problems, but these problems were easier to deal with in opposition than in government.

Similar problems have continued to arise for both the main statewide parties in the period since the autonomous communities were fully established. The Socialists, on the basis of their federal structure, have tended to allowed regional party leadership some degree of leeway in choosing electoral strategies. Unlike the Popular Party, the Socialists have been successful in winning votes in the two historical nationalities where the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties have dominated the autonomous institutions. Differentiated strategies have emerged in these two autonomous communities.

In the Basque Country, where Basque nationalism has adopted a fairly hostile stance towards the Spanish central state, the Socialists (Socialist Party of Euskadi [PSE]) have mobilized support amongst the Spanish-speaking community (mostly made up of economic ‘immigrants’ from the rest of Spain and their descendants), and have made few concessions to the discourse of Basque national identity. This strategy was consistent with the tough line against Basque terrorism adopted by the González governments of the 1980s and early 1990s, and therefore created few internal problems. In the Basque case,
the Socialists have made no real attempt to penetrate the Basque nationalist electorate, and instead have focused on mobilizing their own support base, a strategy which enabled the party to participate in coalition governments with the nationalists between 1986 and 1998.

In Catalonia the situation is more complicated. First, as already mentioned, the Socialists are represented by a sister party, the PSC, and therefore the Madrid leadership has less formal control over the situation (although informal links are strong). The PSC originated in a complex merger of Socialists affiliated to the national party and activists in several Catalan nationalist left parties, and as a result is much more culturally sympathetic to the Catalan nationalist cause than its Basque counterpart (Ross 1996, Roller and van Houten 2003). Second, the PSC has been far more electorally successful than the PSE, winning the plurality of votes in Catalonia in every legislative election in the post-Franco period. The PSC has so far failed to win power at the regional level, however, and its strategic dilemma revolves around the need to translate its electoral dominance in national elections into control of the autonomous government (the Generalitat). Catalan nationalists have consistently sought to depict the PSC as little more than the Catalan branch of the PSOE, taking its orders directly from Madrid (Caminal 1998, Roller and van Houten 2003). This gives the PSC a strong incentive to adopt a distinctive, ‘Catalanist’ discourse in order to distance itself from the PSOE central leadership. Under Pasqual Maragall, it has successfully presented itself as a pro-federalist party (Keating 2001: 153), distinct from the PSOE, whose leadership has tended to be drawn from the Southern regions of Spain where sympathy for Catalan nationalism runs thin. So far this has not caused too many internal difficulties, largely
because the PSOE is firmly entrenched in opposition at the national level, helping to dim the inconsistencies in the Socialist message.

_Governing Strategies_

One of the main causes of internal difficulty in Spain’s statewide parties has been the pivotal role played by regionalist formations in the Congress of Deputies in Madrid. Spain’s electoral system, a form of PR with strongly majoritarian tendencies, has encouraged the development of a bipolar party system at the national level, but has frequently left the winning party short of an overall majority. In these cases, the non-statewide parties represented in the Spanish parliament hold the balance of power. Non-statewide parties have sustained minority governments in three cases since 1977: the 1979-82 UCD governments, the 1993-96 Socialist government, and the 1996-2000 Popular Party government.

These arrangements have often placed the regional representatives of the governing statewide parties in a difficult position. In the case of the UCD, regional party elites found themselves squeezed between ethnoregionalist and Spanish nationalist rivals: ethnoregionalists condemned the UCD for its attempts to contain the pace and extent of devolution, whilst the Spanish right (AP) attacked the government for its concessions to ethnoregionalists. The party’s collapse in 1982 testifies to its inability to manage these tensions successfully, although it should be noted that in one region, Galicia, the regional party was uniquely able to maintain the UCD vote at respectable levels, almost certainly as a result of its extensive clientelistic networks (Hopkin 2001b: 124-5).
After the long period of Socialist majorities, the 1993-2000 period saw a return to minority governments with non-statewide party support (Aguilera de Prat 2001, Heller 2002). In 1993-96, the Socialists’ electoral decline left them 17 seats short of a majority, forcing them into a deal with the Catalan and Basque nationalists, which relied particularly on the votes of the former. This arrangement placed the PSOE in a particularly difficult position in other regions of Spain, and particularly in the South, where much of the party’s core electorate is to be found. The Catalan nationalists used their strong bargaining position to win increased control of income tax revenue raised in Catalonia, and argued strongly for a reduction in the flows of resources from Catalonia to the poorer regions of Spain through the Fund for Interterritorial Compensation (FCI) (see van Houten 2003). This went down particularly badly in the South, although it does not seem to have disproportionately damaged the Socialists’ electoral showing there.

The 1993 pact was probably more damaging to the Socialists in Catalonia itself, where the PSC found itself in the awkward position of cooperating with the Catalan nationalists in the Madrid parliament, whilst acting as the main force of opposition to them in the Catalan parliament (Aguilera de Prat 2001: 12-3). Although this uncomfortable situation did not last long, it contributed to the PSC’s continued failure to win control of the Generalitat in the 1990s. The PSC’s schizophrenic relationship to CiU weakened the Socialists’ opposition role in Catalonia, whilst CiU’s ability to extract concessions from the PSOE government in Madrid strengthened their image as the most effective representatives of Catalonia (the PSC could not credibly claim it could have won similar concessions). In this case, therefore, the regional tier of the statewide party was sacrificed in order to maintain power at the national level.
After the 1996 elections the Popular Party found itself in an almost identical position to that of the Socialists in the previous parliament: 20 seats short of an overall majority. Short of a deal with the communist-dominated United Left (IU) or a grand coalition with the Socialists, the PP had no option but to govern with the non-statewide parties. The PP’s traditional hostility towards the ‘peripheral’ nationalism of Catalans and Basques made this a difficult deal to negotiate, although the prospect of winning government power after 14 years of opposition provided a strong incentive. The PP’s electoral weakness in the Basque Country and Catalonia facilitated the deal, as the party’s regional elites carried little weight in the party. The PP in Catalonia not only accepted the PP-CiU agreement in the Madrid Congress, but also provided parliamentary backing to the Catalan nationalist administration at the regional level as part of the deal. In fact, the subordination of the PP’s Catalan elites to the national leadership had already been demonstrated by the removal of the Catalan party leader, Aleix Vidal-Quadras, in 1995 (Vidal-Quadras had bitterly attacked the Catalan government over its linguistic policy and other cultural issues). This move cleared the way for a subsequent coalition at both regional and national level. These events illustrate the high degree of centralization of the PP’s internal organization, which subordinates the interests of the regional tier of party organization to those of the national leadership (van Biezen 2003: Ch.4).

Devolution in the United Kingdom: From ‘Control Freakery’ to Benign Neglect

Devolution in the United Kingdom has followed a quite different pattern to that of Spain, in that it has only affected Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (and to an extent
London), whilst England (with 85% of the population) continues to be governed from the Westminster parliament (with a limited form of regional authority envisaged in the future). In terms of the structure of party competition, however, the two cases are remarkably similar. Like in Spain, two large statewide parties compete for power at the national level, whilst ‘peripheral nationalist’ parties win substantial shares of the vote in particular territories (and, in the case of Northern Ireland, statewide parties are not even present). The dilemmas facing statewide parties under devolution in Britain and Spain are therefore quite comparable.

Candidate Selection

In the United Kingdom, all the major parties had begun to reform their candidate selection procedures well before devolution reforms were instituted (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The general direction of these reforms was to ‘democratize’ and ‘open up’ the process of selection of party candidates, in an attempt to attract new party members (Scarrow 1996: 167-9) and banish the image of ‘stitch-ups’ in smoke-filled rooms. In fact, although the reforms tended to involve the party membership more directly in the selection process, this did not necessarily imply that party leaders were relinquishing control (Hopkin 2001a). However, changes to candidate selection did pre-empt the national party leaderships’ responses to the dilemmas inherent in devolution, and contributed to a shift in the internal balance of power.

Tensions over candidate selection for the devolved institutions were most acute in the Labour party, which under Tony Blair has become synonymous with an almost
obsessive attention to internal party discipline (often referred to as ‘control freakery’, eg Jones 2001). Labour’s adoption of membership ballots (one member one vote, or OMOV) to choose party leaders and parliamentary candidates dates to 1993, and the limitations of this exercise in internal democracy were illustrated in 1995 when a prospective candidate for Westminster selected by OMOV, Liz Davies, had her candidacy revoked by the party executive because of her excessively leftist views. This determination to ensure that party representatives were aligned with the leadership provided a number of high-profile conflicts over candidacies for the devolved institutions.

The main way in which leadership intervened in the process was by excluding undesirables from the membership ballot in the first place. Labour’s arrangements for Westminster and European elections envisage that prospective candidates must be interviewed and ‘vetted’ by the party’s General Committee before being placed on the shortlist from which party members will choose candidates on the basis of OMOV. These procedures were also adopted for the 1999 Scottish and Welsh elections, and party officials exploited its potential by excluding large numbers of candidates, apparently on purely political grounds (see Shaw 2001, also Davies 2001: 31-2). This exclusion had the effect of severely curtailing the choices available to party members in the selection ballot. In Scotland, out of a total of 534 party members who applied to be candidates, 208 were excluded before the interview stage, and a further 159 after interview, leaving only 167 candidates to enter the membership ballot (Shaw 2001: 38-9). Given that the party would put up 129 candidates for election, members were being asked to eliminate just 38 candidates, after the party bureaucracy had already excluded 367! Moreover, the party’s
arrangements for ensuring adequate gender and ethnic balance on the party slate further diminished the decisiveness of the membership vote.

These rather restrictive arrangements, which had been relatively successful in maintaining party discipline in Westminster and the European Parliament, were tested to breaking point in the elections to the devolved institutions. In Scotland, Dennis Canavan, a left-winger and sitting Westminster MP, was kept out of the shortlist, but rebelled by standing as an independent in the Scottish elections. He was extraordinarily successful, winning his constituency seat comfortably (against the official Labour candidate) in 1999 and renewing his mandate in 2003. Although the Labour hierarchy in Scotland was otherwise successful in keeping out undesirables (Shaw 2001: 39-40), the Canavan case exposed the distance between the party apparatus and the Labour electorate in Scotland.

Although the selection of candidates to the new Welsh Assembly was less controversial, the Welsh Labour party went through a controversial leadership election to select its candidate for First Secretary of the Assembly. The resignation of Secretary of State for Wales Ron Davies in 1998 (after revelations about his private life) created a leadership vacuum, and the most prominent alternative leader, Rhodri Morgan, was unpopular with Labour’s Westminster leadership. In order to ensure Morgan’s defeat, the Labour NEC stipulated that the Welsh leader would be elected by an electoral college (a revival of pre-1993 arrangements), in which the OMOV membership ballot would account for only a third of the vote, whilst affiliated bodies (mainly trade unions) and Welsh elected representatives of the party would cast the remaining two thirds. As a result, Morgan was defeated by Alun Michael, despite winning a comfortable majority of membership votes (Osmond 2000: 39). Michael’s closeness to Blair, and his lack of
enthusiasm for devolution, compounded the unpopularity of this outcome with Welsh Labour members and large numbers of voters (Jones 1999: 323). Only a year after the new Assembly was elected, Michael’s leadership was overturned by a vote of no confidence and he was replaced by Morgan.

The first elections to the newly created Greater London Authority (see Pimlott and Rao 2002: 88-96, Alderman 2000, Rallings and Thrasher 2000) provoked an internal crisis of even greater magnitude. As in Scotland, there was unease about the exclusion of non-Blairite figures by the shortlisting committee (Shaw 2001: 41). But the first GLA elections also required a candidate for the position of London mayor, an office of considerable political visibility which the Labour leadership was determined to control. The former leader of the Greater London Council (abolished by the Conservatives in 1986), left-winger Ken Livingstone, was keen to stand, and the party leadership equally determined to stop him. Having reluctantly allowed Livingstone onto the shortlist (Davies 2001: Chs.7-8), the party leadership decided against allowing a simple OMOV ballot, and instead, as in Wales, revived the electoral college. As in Wales, this arrangement produced a narrow defeat for Livingstone on the overall vote, despite his winning an overwhelming majority in the membership ballot (Hopkin 2001a: 352). In a striking repeat of the Canavan case in Scotland, Livingstone abandoned the party, stood as an independent, and comfortably defeated the official Labour candidate in the London election.

What both the Livingstone and the Canavan cases have in common is the party dissidents’ success in appealing to grass-roots supporters and non-party members in order to overturn the decisions of the formal party organization. The indignation of party
workers in the face of the party leadership’s manipulation and subversion of the process undermined official candidates, who found they could not mobilize the party volunteers during the election campaign. Dissidents were able to campaign as ‘non-party’ figures, mobilizing voter discontent at the distant and untrusted party leaderships. The fact that this discontent was able to express itself so powerfully in the case of devolved elections suggests that decentralizing reforms create expectations that parties will also decentralize their own arrangements, making internal party ‘fixes’ less acceptable than in the case of national elections where party unity and coherence are perceived in positive terms. To some extent the ultimate success of Rhodri Morgan – who worked to overturn the decision of the national Labour leadership from within – also reflects this kind of dynamic.

Labour has been the main victim of such conflicts because as the party of government, both in Westminster and (in coalition) in the devolved institutions, it is much more concerned with ensuring internal party cohesion in order to govern effectively. The other main statewide parties (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) have similar internal arrangements (shortlisting and membership ballots), but there have been fewer cases of obvious heavy-handedness on the part of the national leadership. In the case of the Conservatives, this can be attributed to the lack of interest in London for the devolved territories, where the party receives few votes and has no chance at present of governing. Not surprisingly therefore, the most controversial issue for the Conservatives was the choice of a candidate for mayor of London: their first candidate, Jeffery Archer, was removed under heavy pressure from the party’s national leadership after scandalous revelations in the press, whilst its second choice, Steven Norris, was initially excluded
from running by the London party, before being reinstated after central pressure (Tomaney 2000: 257, also Alderman 2000). In the case of the Liberal Democrats, the parties’ federal structure makes such intervention very difficult, and candidate selection appears to have been left in the hands of the sub-national party structures. One consequence of this is that in Scotland, the Liberal Democrat parliamentary leadership faced sporadic discipline problems which undermined the party’s relationship with its Labour coalition partners.

Electoral Strategies

The electoral dilemmas facing the statewide parties in the United Kingdom are rather different from those of the Spanish case. First, much of the country is governed from Westminster and therefore (with the exception of London) posed no particular multi-level issues. Second, the nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales are in a rather weaker position to those of Catalonia and the Basque Country; in particular, neither the Scottish nor the Welsh nationalists have been able to win power at the devolved level, nor challenge the Labour party as the dominant electoral force in those territories. For these reasons the electoral dilemmas have taken a different form, although they have still posed significant problems for the statewide parties.

Scottish electoral politics was transformed by Labour’s general election victory in 1997. The intense hostility felt by many Scots towards the Conservative party in the 1980s and 1990s had dominated party competition in Scotland, with Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Nationalists (SNP) all lined up in favour of devolution and
against the Tories (Millar 1999: 302). In 1997 devolution became a reality whilst the Conservatives collapsed as an electoral force in Scotland (as well as acquiescing in the devolution settlement). The new, post-Conservative landscape pitted the three statewide parties against the SNP, the only major party in favour of independence (ibid.). The SNP responded by downplaying its central policy, independence, and emphasizing its intentions to make devolution work. However, the SNP was placed on the defensive by its new-found isolation and life was made easier for Labour, which felt less pressure to prove its Scottish credentials.

The 1999 Scottish parliament campaign saw Labour campaigning as ‘Scottish New Labour’, suggesting a close identification with the Blairite project represented by the Labour party in Westminster. Labour’s strategy was to ‘launch a wide-ranging attack on both the principle and the practicalities of nationalism’ (Millar 1999: 317), presenting itself in effect as the ‘Scottish arm’ of New Labour. This was confirmed by the fact that the Labour candidate for Scottish First Minister, Donald Dewar, was clearly identifiable as a member of the New Labour leadership in Westminster, and the Chancellor Gordon Brown played close attention to the elections, using his position as a Scottish MP to campaign on behalf of Scottish New Labour. This close association of Scottish and UK Labour came under attack, with the SNP in particular accusing Labour of taking their orders directly from Millbank, the Labour HQ in London (Ingle 2000: 278). Labour’s satisfactory (if unspectacular) electoral performance in 1999, and most importantly the SNP’s lack of progress, suggested that the ethnoregionalist challenge to the main statewide party in Scotland was relatively weak.
In contrast, the Welsh ethnoregionalist party Plaid Cymru (PC) did improve its position in the first Welsh elections by following a similar strategy to the SNP: it downplayed the aspiration for independence, and used the English translation ‘The Party of Wales’ as its official title during the campaign (Jones 1999: 325). Welsh Labour followed a similar strategy to its Scottish counterpart, attacking PC’s past support for independence and emphasizing the policies Labour had adopted at the national level (mainly increased investment in public services). In Wales this proved less successful, and PC was able to win over traditional Labour voters suspicious of the New Labour project and its focus on the English middle classes. Labour’s leadership difficulties probably contributed to this electoral decline.

The Labour response to these first elections was to relinquish the tight central control of party activity characteristic of the New Labour project, at least for the devolved territories. In Scotland, initial tensions between Scottish leader Donald Dewar and the Secretary of State for Scotland John Reid were resolved in favour of the former (Leicester 2000: 26). In Wales, the leadership issue quickly reemerged when Alun Michael was overturned as First Secretary and resigned as Welsh Labour leader; Millbank acquiesced in Morgan’s election to the leadership. As a result, the national party leadership was far more respectful of its intermediary elites’ independence during the campaigns for the second elections to the devolved bodies in 2003.

In Scotland, there were few changes to the basic Labour strategy, which drew on key New Labour policies at the national level: increased spending on public services, a tough attitude towards law and order, and a refusal to use Scotland’s limited fiscal powers to raise taxes. Labour’s key rivals in Scotland, the SNP and the Liberal
Democrats, dropped earlier proposals to use these tax-raising powers, suggesting that
Scottish Labour is able to dominate the political agenda, whilst the Scottish nationalists
remain on the defensive. The results of the 2003 election bear this out: Labour lost votes
not to the Scottish nationalists, but to radical left parties such as the Scottish Socialists.

Whilst Labour’s electoral performance has been weak, its electoral difficulties have little
to do with its status as a national party governing in Westminster. Instead, the relative
persistence of a traditional Labour electorate in Scotland puts Scottish Labour under
pressure to follow more traditional social democratic policies and distance itself from the
UK-wide New Labour project. The close attention Chancellor Gordon Brown pays to
Scottish politics restricts the Scottish party’s room for manoeuvre, but it has made
gestures towards ‘old’ Labour values, for instance by eschewing the use of private capital
for investment in public services under the PFI (Private Finance Initiative).

In Wales, Labour under Rhodri Morgan has been relatively successful in resisting
the threat from Welsh nationalism: in the 2003 election the party actually increased its
vote share, largely at the expense of Plaid Cymru. This success suggests that New
Labour’s initial ‘control freakery’ was a losing strategy in devolved elections. Morgan’s
popularity is based on a subtle mix of respect for Welsh distinctiveness and appeals to
traditional Labour values, which allow Welsh Labour to distinguish itself from both the
Welsh nationalists and the Blair government in London. Unlike Michael, Morgan argued
forcefully for greater devolution of power to Wales, describing the devolution settlement
as a framework for a ‘variable geometry UK’, and even citing the historical Welsh
nationalist figure Owyn Glyndwr (Morgan 2000). At the same time, Morgan is critical of
Plaid Cymru, and under his leadership Labour has adopted the slogan ‘Labour: the true
party of Wales’ (Osmond 2000: 61). Unlike in Scotland, where key national party leaders such as Brown have a foothold, Wales has far weaker links with London. Welsh Labour is therefore more difficult to control, and the national party leadership has dropped attempts at central control, leaving Morgan some autonomy to develop a distinctive strategy.

The other statewide parties face far simpler dilemmas. The Conservative party at the UK level has been too immersed in its own internal crisis to pay much attention to the devolved territories, where in 1997 it failed to win a single Westminster seat (it won only one, in Scotland, in 2001). Having opposed devolution in the first place, the Conservatives have had to adapt quickly, shifting their position to one of support for the devolved institutions whilst emphasizing firm opposition to Scottish or Welsh independence. Although there have been examples of central intervention (such as the choice of a sitting MP from an English constituency to lead the 2001 general election campaign in Wales [Jones and Tristan 2001]), Conservatives in the devolved territories have been more or less left alone by default to develop their own responses to the electoral dilemma. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, the party’s federal structure institutionalizes a significant degree of decentralization in decision-making, in which the independence of the Scottish and Welsh parties is celebrated as a competitive advantage. For instance, in the 2003 devolved elections, the Liberal Democrats in Scotland and Wales did not even exchange drafts of their respective manifestos before their publication⁴. This has caused few problems so far, for two reasons. First, the Liberal Democrats are not a governing party in Westminster, and therefore do not face the problem of possible contradictions and incoherences between policy choices at the
national and devolved levels. Second, the strategic situation they face at both levels are quite similar, in that the Liberal Democrat-Labour coalitions in Scotland and Wales reflected the relative closeness of the two parties’ policies at national level, which resulted in the creation of the joint Cabinet consultative committee by the Blair government in London.

Governing Strategies

Although Britain’s single-member district electoral system for the Westminster parliament has made coalition governments at the national level a rarity, the adoption of a form of Proportional Representation (the Additional Member System) for the devolved elections made it inevitable at the sub-national level. In Scotland, Labour has needed to form coalitions in order to govern in both of the first two legislative terms, and it also fell short of an overall majority in the first Welsh Assembly. Labour’s comfortable majority in Westminster has limited the strategic ramifications of coalitions at the devolved level. However these coalitions have the potential to create policy dissonance between Labour administrations at the different levels, and stretch the national party leadership’s acceptance of sub-national elites making their own strategic decisions.

Coalition formation in Scotland created little controversy. With just over 43% of the MSPs, Labour could not govern alone, and conveniently, the party politically adjacent to it, the Liberal Democrats, controlled 13% of the parliamentary votes. The closeness of the two parties’ national leaders precluded any ‘vertical’ tensions over the choice of coalition. Problems did inevitably arise over policy, however. As a condition for
supporting a Labour Scottish First Secretary, the Liberal Democrats won important concessions which set Scottish Executive policy against the policy of the Labour government in London. This was most striking over university tuition fees, an unpopular policy of the Labour government at the statewide level, which was reformed in Scotland to take the form of a graduate tax. Labour’s national leadership was very concerned that this could undermine its ability to implement tuition fees in the rest of the UK (Leicester 2000: 25). The relatively scarce attention paid to Scotland by the London-based media helped Labour overcome this consistency, but it did illustrate the potential for more serious policy divergence with broader political and electoral costs for the statewide party. The coalition has been revived for the 2003 Scottish Parliament, and this time Scottish Labour has been pushed into an electoral reform for Scottish local government elections, which exposes the national Labour party’s reluctance to move any further on electoral reform in England.

In Wales, Labour’s situation is more complicated. Labour’s traditional dominance of Welsh politics led party leaders to expect to govern alone in the Welsh Assembly, so its failure to achieve a majority in 1999 posed a strategic dilemma. An initial attempt to form a minority administration collapsed after just a year, and new Labour leader Rhodri Morgan opted to make a deal first with Plaid Cymru (which remained outside the Assembly Cabinet), and then with the Liberal Democrats (who took two ministerial posts). The limited powers of the Welsh Assembly meant that policy divergence with Westminster on the Scottish model was unlikely, although the Labour-Liberal agreement did provide for some minor public expenditures which gave Welsh residents a slightly more generous deal on some health and education issues than their English neighbours.
The lack of prominence of the Welsh Assembly in the statewide political battle meant that these divergences had little impact, and did not create significant party management issues. The greatest source of disagreement with London was the Assembly’s push to enhance its role by demanding similar law-making powers to the Scottish Parliament, but this had few ramifications for Labour in national government.

Conclusions

The comparative exploration presented here provides some useful insights into the ways in which decentralizing reforms affect party organization and strategy. Some of the findings are perhaps surprising. For instance, the rather limited form of decentralization adopted in the United Kingdom appears to have created far more internal tensions over candidate selection than in Spain, where potentially much more political power was at stake. Whilst Spanish parties centralized control over candidacies relatively effectively, British statewide parties faced very visible internal disputes in the first devolved elections. Party longevity may explain this. In Spain, decentralization got under way at the same time as the parties were building their organizations, and both the Socialist and the Popular Party leaderships were able to rein in their weakly rooted local elites and ensure central control (the UCD, with a weak and fragmented central leadership, was less successful). In the United Kingdom, parties were already strongly institutionalized at the time of devolution, so national leaderships had to overcome the resistance of relatively well organized local branches, many of which had years of experience of running local
government and organizing Westminster election campaigns. This suggests that party institutionalization is an important intervening variable between institutional reform and party adaptation.

In terms of electoral strategy, Spain and the UK differ again. In this case, Spain appears to be more centralized, with the Popular Party in particular leaving regional elites little autonomy in their competitive strategies. The Socialists, despite their federal organizational structure, have also tended to prioritize the national party’s strategic needs at the expense of the regional level, which in Catalonia has damaged the regional party’s electoral prospects. In the UK, statewide parties have also sought to ensure that national and sub-national levels of the party adopt similar strategies, but with significant concessions to regional autonomy. For instance, Labour’s national leadership has acquiesced in attempts by the Scottish, and particularly the Welsh party to appeal to traditional Labour values, rather than the modernizing ‘New Labour’ message of the Blair government. There are two features of UK devolution that may explain this. First, the devolved institutions have less power than in Spain, and therefore less is at stake. Second, the national media in the UK pay rather little attention to Scotland and Wales, whereas the Spanish media are much more focused on Catalonia and the Basque Country. In consequence, such intraparty inconsistency may be more costly in Spain than in Britain.

There are also important differences in governing strategies. Spain’s statewide parties have faced difficult dilemmas as a result of the sometimes decisive importance of non-statewide parties in the Spanish Congress. In the 1990s, both the PP and the Socialists had to make governing deals with non-statewide forces (in particular the
Catalan nationalists) placing their regional representatives in a difficult position. In both cases, the priorities of the centre won the day, with the need to control of the central governing apparatus overriding any difficulties in acceding to power in key autonomous communities. UK parties have yet to face similar problems, and with the majoritarian distortions of the Westminster electoral system, may be able to avoid them for some time. As things stand, devolution has created few governing dilemmas for Labour, which has a comfortable Westminster majority. The inconsistencies resulting from coalition deals in the devolved territories have been brushed under the carpet, encouraging the national leadership to view the strategic priorities of the sub-national party with a kind of benign neglect. The tendency of the London-based media to ignore Scottish and Welsh affairs has facilitated this move, and it is likely that the failure of Labour’s initial ‘control freakery’ over candidate selection has encouraged a more relaxed approach.

It is difficult to draw any firm generalizations from this kind of comparative analysis with (to paraphrase Lijphart) many variables and just two cases. What we can conclude is that the nature of party organizations will have an important impact on the choices available to statewide parties under conditions of political decentralization. The devolution of policy responsibilities to sub-national levels has the potential to rearrange the internal balance of power in statewide political parties, strengthening the regional elites at the expense of the national leadership. This paper has shown that such an outcome cannot always be automatically read off from the formal characteristics of devolution. The internal dynamics of parties are complex but important and should not be ignored by students of decentralizing reforms.
Notes

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1 Valuable exceptions to this include Thorlakson 2001, Deschouwer 2003, Roller and van Houten 2003.
2 In part because of the phenomenon of ‘dual voting’, in part because of the tendency of Spanish-speaking Catalans to abstain from voting in regional elections (see Pallarès and Keating 2003).
3 Traditionally Labour and the Conservatives; however the strong showing of the centrist Liberals (now Liberal Democrats) since the early 1970s has significantly reduced the share of the vote won by the big two parties.
4 Matthew Clark, general secretary, Scottish Liberal Democrats (presentation at British Council Seminar, Barcelona, July 2003).

Bibliography


