

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

Department of Economics

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GENDER: Male

CITIZENSHIP: German

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

2017 – 2018	Visiting PhD student	– Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
2017	Visiting PhD student	– Goethe University
2013 – 2015	MRes in Economics (with distinction)	– London School of Economics
2011 – 2012	MSc in Economics (with distinction)	– London School of Economics
2008 – 2011	BA in Philosophy, Politics & Economics (with distinction)	– Oxford University

DOCTORAL STUDIES

PhD Candidate in Economics, London School of Economics

DATE:	2015 – present
EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE:	May 2019
MAIN THESIS ADVISOR:	Jörn-Steffen Pischke

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES

Professor Jörn-Steffen Pischke (Advisor)
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Professor Alan Manning
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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Field: Labor Economics
Secondary Fields: Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2015 – 2017	EC201 Microeconomics (undergraduate, teaching fellow)
2016	Python Workshop (graduate, workshop teacher)
2011 – 2015	EC201 Microeconomics (undergraduate, TA)
2014	Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate summer school, TA)

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2018	Research Assistant for John van Reenen
2015 – 2017	Teaching Fellow, LSE Economics Department
2017	Research Assistant for Wouter den Haan
2016	Research Assistant for Steve Pischke
2011 – 2015	Graduate Teaching Assistant, LSE Economics Department
2012 – 2014	External Research Consultant, Deutsche Bundesbank
2012 – 2013	Trainee, Deutsche Bundesbank
2012	Research Assistant for Alan Manning

LANGUAGES

English (Fluent), German (Fluent), French (Good), Spanish (Good)

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2017 – 2018	Overseas Institutional Visit Grant, LSE Doctoral Training Centre
2017	Best Paper Award, Royal Economics Society Junior Symposium
2013 – 2018	ESRC Doctoral Scholarship
2012	LSE Department of Economics Teaching Award
2009 – 2011	Hertford College Scholar, University of Oxford

WORKING PAPERS:***Job Market Paper:*****Superstar Earners and Market Size: Evidence from the Roll-Out of TV**
Best Paper Award, Royal Economics Society Junior Symposium

This paper exploits a historic natural experiment to test a leading explanation for top income growth, the superstar theory. The superstar theory attributes rising top incomes to expanding market reach. A drastic expansion in market reach occurred in entertainment during the roll-out of television in the mid-20th century. Exogenous variation in the local deployment of television filming allows me to identify the effect on the entertainer wage distribution by comparing local labor markets with and without local TV show filming. I analyze newly collected data on local entertainer labor markets and find that markets where a TV station is launched experience sharp income concentration at the top of the distribution. Wages of stars grow nearly 20% in response to a fourfold increase in market size. A distinctive pattern of wage changes helps distinguish the superstar model from alternative explanations. Growth of top pay occurs simultaneously with widening income differences at the top, a decline in mid-income jobs, an increase in low-paid jobs and a fall in total entertainer employment. Labor market institutions that might mediate top income growth have little impact on the magnitude of superstar effects. Only employer monopsony power dampens top pay growth significantly.

Other Papers:**Reservation Wages and the Wage Flexibility Puzzle** (joint with A. Manning and B. Petrongolo)

Labor demand shocks lead to rising unemployment if wages adjust sluggishly. We show that canonical search models struggle to match the data, particularly reservation wages, even if wages are only occasionally renegotiated. We argue that this can be fixed with an alternative model of the reservation wage that considers that job search is reference dependent. We provide evidence that reservation wages significantly respond to backward-looking reference points, as proxied by rents earned in previous jobs. In a model calibration we show that backward-looking reference dependence markedly reduces the predicted cyclicity of both wages and reservation wages and can reconcile the canonical model with the observed cyclicity of wages and reservation wages.

Labor Supply and Innovation in Entertainment: Evidence from TV (joint with G. Fenton)

We test the effect of innovation in entertainment on labor supply. To identify the effect, we track TV signal during the introduction in the US and exploit variation from a regulated roll-out and terrain interference. Social security records show that the introduction of TV significantly reduced labor supply. The effects are largest for older workers. This confirms descriptive evidence that better leisure activities contributed to changes in retirement habits over the twentieth century. GDP relevant spending on free-to-use services like TV is notoriously low and likely understates the value added of such technology. We apply our estimates to quantify forgone earnings due to TV and find that the value of such time-investment is at least as large as the monetary expenditure on TV.

Can Helping the Sick Hurt the Able? Incentives, Information and Disruption in a Welfare Reform
(joint with N. Bagaria, B. Petrongolo, J. van Reenen)
*forthcoming at the **Economic Journal***

The UK Jobcentre Plus reform sharpened bureaucratic incentives to help disability benefit recipients (relative to unemployment insurance recipients) into jobs. In the long-run, the policy raised disability exits by 10% and left unemployment outflows roughly unchanged, consistent with beneficial reorganization effects for both groups, while bureaucrats shifted job-brokering efforts from the unemployed to disability benefit recipients. We account for about 30% of the decline in the disability rolls from 2003-2008. In the short-run, we detect a reduction in unemployment exits and no effect on disability exits, suggesting important disruption effects, and highlighting the difficulty of welfare reform for myopic policymakers.

WORK IN PROGRESS:

Occupational “White Flight” (joint with M. Tabellini and M. Nagler)

Natives respond to the inflow of migrants by changing jobs. We plan to test to what extent this is driven by a distaste for jobs that require interacting with migrants. The taste-based model can be tested using variation from the inflow of refugees in Germany. We distinguish our model from a model of sorting according to comparative advantage by exploiting that refugees are not allowed to work for an interim period. Employees in specific occupations and locations are more exposed to interaction with foreigners. We instrument the location of refugee reception centers with the location of empty barracks that arise from a draw-down schedule associated with the end of conscription in Germany.

Capitalists’ Flight

Top incomes have risen dramatically in recent decades in Anglo-Saxon countries, while such growth was more modest in many continental European countries. The paper tests to what extent such cross-country differences are explained by sorting of top earners across countries. Income tax returns on the full population of UK top earners are used to document that foreigners are over-represented at the top of the income distribution and account for a sizable share of the top earners. I plan to decompose top income growth into a component that comes from changing returns and a component that comes from sorting of top earners. Moreover, I will test what forces drive foreigners to come to the UK and how the inflow affects local communities. Special tax rules for non-domiciled residents give rise to differential tax rates for foreigners across years, income levels and time of residence and allow me to test the effect of tax rates. Incentives from tax rates can be compared to other incentives, such as political instability or rent extraction opportunities in the home country.