



Crime and punishment the British way: Accountability channels following the MPs' expenses scandal



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ABSTRACT

Does democracy make politicians accountable? And which role does information play in the accountability process? There are several reasons making the 2009 UK expenses scandal an ideal setting to answer these questions. Our study of the scandal reaches two main conclusions: 1) the removal of corrupt politicians happens mostly at the pre-election stage; 2) information availability is a crucial ingredient in the accountability process. We also show that punishment was directed to individual MPs rather than their parties and that voters displayed a substantial partisan bias, not only at the voting stage but also by perceiving co-partisan MPs to be less involved in the scandal. *Ceteris paribus*, female MPs attracted more press coverage and, for the same amount of coverage, were more likely to stand down. Finally, we show that press coverage was ideologically balanced, i.e., newspapers with different ideological leaning devoted similar amount of news to each MP.

1. Introduction

An important function of democratic systems is to make public officials accountable to citizens.¹ This control works through the incumbents' fear of the next election and by offering voters the opportunity to “throw out the rascals”. A substantial theoretical literature has used the principal-agent model to formally investigate these ideas in an attempt to clarify what makes officials accountable and, ultimately, how politicians' behaviour can be aligned with citizens' interests.² Asymmetric information between citizens and policy-makers is a key ingredient of these models and an abundant literature has highlighted both theoretically and empirically the importance of information availability for keeping public officials accountable.³

Although most theories tend to study accountability mechanisms by focussing on a simplified voter-politician relationship, democratic processes rely on a number of actors who often play a crucial role in the process of “throwing out the rascals” in practice. The political punishment of corrupt politicians calls into question the functioning of party organizations, the information available from mass media, voters' awareness of political matters and their eventual response in the ballot box. Voters' choices are in turn mediated by their perceptions of events and by partisanship: first, heterogeneous prior beliefs can induce different perceptions of corruption even if voters receive similar information; second, when choosing whether or not to punish corrupt politicians, voters may trade off valence issues with ideological considerations. Without a systematic empirical exploration of these channels, our understanding of the functioning of democratic accountability remains in “reduced form”.

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¹ According to William Riker, for example, “the function of voting is to control officials” (Riker, 1982, p. 9).

² For a synthesis of this literature, see Besley (2006).

³ We will discuss related literature and place our contribution into the big picture in the discussion in Section 7.

The scandal that erupted in the United Kingdom (UK) in May 2009 concerning MPs' abuse of expenses allowances constitutes an ideal setting to study accountability channels in some detail and to identify the causal links at play. First, the scandal involves a well-defined set of political actors, namely the members of parliament (MPs) who were in office in May 2009, who all faced the same rules and constraints regarding their expenses. Second, the scandal erupted within a very short time frame for all MPs involved and focused on the same issue for all MPs, namely abusing the allowance system. These two features make scandal involvement comparable across MPs and provide a marked identification advantage compared to either cross-country studies or studies that, even within a country, compare scandals which occurred in different periods, concerning different sorts of political actors and different types of wrongdoing. Moreover, the scandal was salient in public debate for several months and it was followed by an election only one year after it began.

Following the scandal, an investigation was held that led to an accurate reconstruction of the amount misappropriated by each MP in the February 2010 "Review of past ACA payments" (hereafter "the Legg Report"). This provides another characteristic of the scandal that makes it particularly suitable for empirical study: the availability of an objective, accurately defined measure of monetary wrongdoing. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that MPs could not have anticipated the level of detail at which information on their expenses was eventually offered to the public. Although aggregate expenses were already publicly available since 2004 because of the Freedom of Information Act (2000), each individual claim became public after May 2009: this information was leaked to the *Daily Telegraph* by a 'mole' working for a contractor in Whitehall in exchange for a payment of 110,000 pounds. The House of Commons even appealed for a criminal investigation about the leak. Hence, it would have been hard to forecast the events of May 2009, which makes them a genuine shock that can be used for identification purposes: if the scandal was hard to forecast, then revelations on individual MPs' usage of their allowance provides accurate information about politicians' type and how likely they are to be corrupt in the future, which is what matters if voters are prospective.⁴

Compared with existing studies of the electoral punishment of corrupt politicians, usually focussing on a single mechanism, our empirical analysis takes the complexity of the accountability process into account and studies the scandal from a variety of angles. The conceptual framework that we bring to the data, illustrated in Fig. 1, puts together in a simple way ideas that have been rigorously scrutinized both by economists and political scientists. The classic works of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) lay the foundation of political agency models, where politicians are regarded as agents of a representative principal (for example the median voter in a Downsian model). Asymmetric information plays a key role in all principal-agent models and it becomes then natural to extend the simple political agency model by endogenizing information supply, hence introducing the mass media. A model along these lines can be found for example in Besley and Prat (2006). This raises questions about the accuracy of information supply and the possibility of media bias which has also been extensively investigated using both rational choice theory and behavioural economics (see for example Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005 and Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). This bias could be supply driven like in the model of Baron (2006)⁵, or demand driven, for example because of cognitive dissonance, like in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). In either case pre-existing partisanship is a key variable and may induce journalists to treat co-partisan politicians more leniently and voters to give lower weight to corruption news involving ideologically closer representatives.⁶

To simplify, we have three key steps in our accountability framework of Fig. 1: 1) following revelations of politicians' misbehaviour⁷ media outlets decide how much coverage to devote to the event and specifically to each politician; this is likely to be the main channel (although not necessarily the only one) through which citizens learn about the abuses; with respect to this link we will ask questions about possible media bias and the role performed by media outlets as watchdogs of power; 2) citizens process received information and update their beliefs; perception of a politician's wrongdoing can be mediated by a number of individual characteristics, and notably by partisanship: we now ask how partisanship and other individual characteristics affect the way news are processed and incorporated into perceptions about politicians; 3) changed perceptions may lead to action, whereby voters punish corrupt politicians in the ballot box, or expected punishment induces politicians to stand down (or political parties to remove them). We also indicate with a direct arrow the fact that public outrage can induce politicians to step down even in the absence of a future election (for example Nixon during his second mandate as US president).

This paper analyses these links in reverse order, starting from the final outcomes and moving back to media coverage, trying also to quantify their relevance in the accountability process. A constant theme in our analysis is the contrast between media reporting and the actual monetary damage to taxpayers as gauged by the Legg Report. Our conclusion is that what matters for voters' punishment is only the former, although media coverage is also partially explained by the amount of money misappropriated.

We find that an MP's scandal involvement, when measured by media coverage, led to a higher probability to leave Parliament in 2010. On the other hand, the monetary measure of wrongdoing does not relate to the probability to remain in Parliament. Scandal-related media coverage both compelled the most involved MPs to stand down and reduced the voting share of standing MPs. We run placebo regressions to show that post-scandal media coverage does not predict pre-scandal retirements and does not predict 2001–2005 changes in vote shares. We also find that voters' punishment was directed to individual MPs rather than their parties: while the incumbent party was punished when a sitting MP was involved in the scandal their party was not punished in constituencies where MPs decided to stand down. Punishment of corrupt politicians in the ballot box, in any event, was not overwhelming and did not

⁴ We provide background information on the MPs' expenses scandal in the Appendix. An excellent overview of the events is also provided in chapter 1 of van Heerde-Hudson (2014).

⁵ See also the evidence in Larcinese et al. (2011), particularly their discussion of the case of the *Los Angeles Times*.

⁶ For a model of the impact of ideology on information acquisition, see Larcinese (2009).

⁷ We use the word "corruption" as a general term referring to a misalignment between the voters' preferences and the politician's actions. In our specific case this consists of the abuse of the expenses allowance system by some MPs.




Fig. 1. The democratic accountability process.

reduce their chances to be re-elected. Our conclusion is that what drives the accountability process is media coverage of the scandal rather than the amounts actually misappropriated by individual MPs and that most of the impact happens at the candidacy stage: hence focussing on electoral returns without considering the selection of candidates would underestimate the capacity of democracy to “throw out the rascals”.

We then use the British Election Study 2010 panel to gain some understanding of what drives voters’ perception of wrongdoing and how perceived involvement relates to actual voting behaviour. The perceived involvement of an MP turns out to be well explained by actual wrongdoing (as measured by the Legg report), but also by a few individual characteristics of the respondents: education and trust in other people, for example, are both negatively associated with MP’s perceived involvement, even when we restrict our attention to within-constituency variation (i.e., focussing on voters’ heterogeneity for given levels of misappropriation and media coverage).⁸ Punishment in the ballot box (in the form of a changed vote between 2010 and 2005) is directed to MPs who are perceived by their constituents to be involved in wrongdoing. We show, however, that partisanship plays a particularly important role in the accountability chain: perceived involvement of an MP is reduced, *ceteris paribus*, when the MP belongs to the political party the respondent feels closer to.

Given its importance in the accountability process we then turn to media coverage of the scandal. We find that the British press acted mostly as a watchdog. Controlling for the pre-scandal press coverage of each MP, we find that MPs who were later recognized by the Legg Report as more heavily involved were also more heavily covered by the press on average. *Ceteris paribus*, government members and frontbenchers of the main opposition party were more likely to be covered (in relation to the scandal) than backbenchers. We find no detectable partisan coverage, in the sense that patterns of coverage of specific newspapers do not appear to be related to their political leaning. Other variables turn out to be more important: for example, female MPs have, *ceteris paribus*, received more scrutiny than their male colleagues.

MPs’ personal characteristics did not matter in general, with the exception of gender: *ceteris paribus*, punishment has been heavier for female MPs. Hence, along with our findings on media coverage, we uncover a consistent pattern showing that female MPs were generally more vulnerable subjects during and after the scandal.

Not all links in Fig. 1 are estimable with our data; in particular, we are unable to estimate the impact of the expectation of punishment on candidates’ decisions to stand down (or on their de-selection). We indicate with solid arrows those links that we will be able to quantify and will report the estimates in Fig. 3 at the end of our empirical analysis. One advantage of our comprehensive approach to democratic accountability is that we will be able to provide some estimates in reduced form (for example a direct link from media coverage to voters’ punishment) and then delve into the mechanism by using survey data (which will allow us to estimate all the intermediate steps).

We present and discuss the data in Section 2 and our results in the Sections 3–5. We then provide an overall assessment of the accountability process and attempt to quantify the overall effects in Section 6. Section 7 discusses our findings, relates them to existing literature, and illustrates how they contribute to our understanding of the role played by elections and the press in keeping public officials accountable. Further background information on the scandal and summary statistics are reported in the Appendix.

⁸ Following the norm in British politics we call “constituency” the electoral district.

2. The data

Our study begins with extensive data collection, as well as bringing together a number of existing sources. Our main explanatory variable is the media salience of the coverage of the scandal for each individual MP. Data about media coverage of MPs were gathered using a series of searches on the Nexis database of UK newspapers. The research compiled data from seven UK newspapers (including the Sunday editions): the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Independent*, *The Sun*, *Daily Mail*, and the *Scotsman*. The sample of newspapers was selected to include widely read national broadsheets and widely read national tabloids, along with an important regional newspaper (the *Scotsman*), as well as in order to have sufficient ideological variety.⁹

To gauge the media salience of each individual MP's involvement in the expenses scandal we use the number of articles in which an MP's name appears alongside the word "expenses" in the period from 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 (i.e. for three months after the *Telegraph* revelations).¹⁰ However, since some MPs naturally had a higher profile, and therefore attracted more coverage, whether related to scandal or not, we also count the number of articles in which the MP's name appears during the three months preceding the scandal. To facilitate the interpretation of our coefficients we use the natural logarithm of both variables¹¹ and call them *news-post* and *news-pre* respectively. Our estimates are based on the idea that, controlling for *news-pre*, *news-post* captures the media salience of each MP in relation to the scandal.

The other key explanatory variable is represented by an objective measure of wrongdoing expressed in monetary terms from the Legg Report. We acknowledge that the seriousness of each individual misappropriation cannot be entirely captured by its monetary value. At the same time, the amount of money misappropriated is an important dimension of the scandal and it should be of concern for voters. From a practical point of view, this indicator represents the only objective measure of malfeasance available. We use the natural logarithm of this variable and call it *Legg-money*.¹²

Our analysis includes control variables for individual MPs extracted from the PublicWhip website: party, front or backbench status at various dates, incumbency status in 2005, gender, age, university degree (and in particular whether an Oxford or Cambridge graduate), seniority (using the year in which the MP was first elected to Parliament), and distance in miles from the MP constituency office to Westminster. To run placebo regressions, we collect analogous information for the 2001–2005 parliament.¹³ Data were also collected on the date that Members stood down or were deselected, using a number of online sources and local newspapers: we identified 65 MPs who announced their decision not to seek re-election in 2010 before the publication of detailed expenses, whilst 87 retired or were deselected after 8 May 2009. Finally, for each MP, votes cast in parliament were categorized as 'loyal' when the MP voted along with her/his party, 'rebel' when she/he did not, and 'absent' when the MP missed a vote. The frequencies for loyal, rebel, and missed votes were collected for each MP for two periods: the year prior to the scandal (8 May 2008–7 May 2009); and the time from the start of the scandal to the dissolution of Parliament (8 May 2009–12 April 2010).

To make reliable conclusions about differences in electoral returns between the 2005 and 2010 polls, we include information from [Rallings and Thrasher \(2007\)](#). There was a wholesale adjustment of constituency boundaries in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (but not in Scotland) between general elections. The notional boundary changes developed by [Rallings and Thrasher \(2007\)](#) were used to identify constituencies in which there were minor adjustments and would thus provide more reliable estimates of changing electoral behaviour. Our baseline estimates refer to constituencies whose boundaries changed by 10% or less. We conduct several robustness checks by varying maximum boundary changes.¹⁴

We omitted a number of MPs from our analysis. The party leaders for the three main political parties at the time of the expenses scandal and Speaker of the House Michael Martin were excluded, since they were mentioned frequently in newspaper reports independently of their own expenses. We also omit the four MPs from the House of Commons who were under police investigation at the time of the Legg Report, since they were not included in the audit.

We have used two datasets: the first merges our data with electoral results data compiled by Pippa Norris¹⁵ to create a constituency-level dataset. The second is obtained by merging our data with the 2010 British Election Survey (BES) internet panel data, which records the electoral constituency of each respondent. Robustness checks have been conducted by using the BES 2005–10 panel data, which have the advantage that questions about individual predispositions and party identification were asked before the scandal, but the disadvantage of attrition and smaller sample size. Detailed description and summary statistics for all variables are reported in the [Appendix](#).

3. The electoral consequences of the scandal

Were politicians involved in the scandal punished by the electoral process? We begin by analysing the key outcome of the accountability process: whether scandal involvement explains the likelihood to leave parliament. We will then move to a more

⁹ Readership of UK newspapers for 2009–2010 is summarized in the Appendix using National Readership Survey (NRS) estimated data.

¹⁰ We use the frequency as a proxy of the salience, instead of coding the discursive content of the articles (e.g., [Negrine and Bull, 2015](#)).

¹¹ $\log(N+1)$, where N is the number of articles.

¹² The amount of money reduced on appeal is subtracted from that recommended by the Report.

¹³ We updated the data of [Besley and Larcinese \(2011\)](#), which were collected for MPs elected in 2001. To allow a difference-in-difference analysis of electoral impact between the 2005 and 2010 general elections, we collected information on the MPs who were elected in the 2005 general election (and in 2001 for the placebo regressions) and identified individuals who have run in the same constituencies in both elections.

¹⁴ Percentages refer to the voters, not the physical boundaries of the constituencies.

¹⁵ http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/datafiles/British%20General%20Election%20May%202010/British_Parliamentary_Constituency_General_Election_2010_Version_5.xlsx

detailed consideration of the accountability mechanism by distinguishing between MPs who decided to stand down and MPs that stood for re-election.

3.1. Throwing out the rascals

Does scandal involvement correlate with the probability of not being in parliament after the 2010 election? We answer this question by estimating the following equation:

$$Left_i = \alpha + \beta Involvement_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $Left_i$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if MP i is not in parliament after the 2010 election. Involvement in the scandal is measured in two ways: the first is by using *news-post*, controlling for *news-pre*; the second is by using *Legg-money*. We also introduce a vector of control variables X_i to account for other factors that may determine the probability to leave parliament. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, where we report simple regressions without control variables, show that scandal-related news coverage is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of leaving parliament, while the amount of money misappropriated is not. In column 3, we include both indicators and again *news-post* displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This conclusion is not substantially altered when we control for MPs and constituency characteristics, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is now smaller. A 1% increase in *news-post* (controlling for *news-pre*) leads to about 0.03% higher probability of being out of parliament after the 2010 election.

The coefficients estimated in Table 1 suggest that the probability of leaving Parliament is positively related with press coverage; the actual amount of money that an MP has misappropriated has instead no independent effect. At this stage this relationship cannot be interpreted as causal. We will now distinguish between standing down and punishment in the ballot box, with the aim to provide causal estimates separately for the two channels.

3.2. Retirement decisions

An unprecedented number of MPs either retired or were deselected before the 2010 general election. Of the 152 MPs who did not run in the 2010 general election, 89 stepped down or were deselected in May 2009 or later. In this section we ask if standing down, whether due to party pressure or to avoid a likely defeat, has been one of the accountability channels that followed the scandal. We estimate the following equation by OLS:

$$Ret_i = \alpha + \beta Involvement_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where Ret_i is a dummy equal to one if the MP announces her decision to stand down after 8 May 2009. We use the MPs who announced their decision to retire before 8 May 2009, i.e. before the scandal erupted, as the control group. Hence, for each specification that uses post-scandal retirement decision, we run a placebo regression using pre-scandal retirement announcements.

Column 1 of Table 2 shows that MPs covered more in association with the expenses scandal (controlling for pre-scandal coverage and including a battery of individual and constituency-level control variables) were more likely to retire.¹⁶ In column 2, we perform a placebo regression: we repeat the estimation of column 1 but use as dependent variable a dummy for decisions to stand down announced before the scandal. The coefficient of *news-post* is now negative and significant at 10% level.

Retirement decisions are instead much less robustly associated with the amount of money actually misappropriated by MPs, as shown in columns 3 and 4. We again find a positive coefficient on post-scandal retirement and a negative one on pre-scandal retirements but these coefficients are much smaller and far from acceptable statistical significance. In columns 5 and 6, we include both *news-post* and *Legg-money*: once again what drives retirement is media coverage and not the amount of money misappropriated. The placebo regression displays no significant coefficients. In other words, reassuringly, there is no impact of post-scandal news on pre-scandal retirement, which makes it more likely that the positive effect found in columns 1 and 5 represent a causal effect of media coverage on the decision to retire. The control variables are mostly insignificant but it is worth noting that age has a positive impact on pre-scandal retirements but no effect on post-scandal retirement, which provides further evidence of the different nature of retirements (on average) in the two periods.

We then use interaction terms between *news-post* and individual and constituency-level variables to explore possible mechanisms for retirement. Table 3 reports the coefficients of the interaction terms only (direct effects and other control variables are always included but not reported). Results suggest that more rebellious MPs were less likely to step down after the scandal in the face of the same amount of newspaper coverage. Our placebo regression (column 2) shows that there is no relationship between rebelliousness and pre-scandal retirements. This finding suggests that parties were not able to use the scandal as an excuse to force less palatable MPs into retirement.¹⁷ The most noticeable difference between pre-scandal and post-scandal patterns can be found in gender: female MPs have a higher likelihood to stand down when facing news media pressure on the scandal. The placebo regression of column 2 indicates that no such pattern can be found for pre-scandal retirement.¹⁸ Other variables, including the marginality of a

¹⁶ We have first run simple regressions without control variables and then progressively included our controls. The estimated coefficients of interest are remarkably stable across different specifications. We only report here our benchmark results, with a full set of control variables. Other estimates are available from the authors.

¹⁷ More rebellious MPs are more likely to oppose a party's request to stand down and it is quite possible that MPs who are harder to remove (for example because they are very popular in their electoral constituency) can also afford to be more rebellious, indicating reverse causation.

¹⁸ We have also estimated specifications with interactions entered separately rather than jointly. Results are not affected, with the exception that the interaction

Table 1
Probability of leaving parliament.

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP left parliament					
news-post	0.0451*** (0.017)		0.0441** (0.017)	0.0307* (0.016)		0.0328** (0.016)
news-pre	-0.0541*** (0.016)		-0.0538*** (0.016)	-0.0244 (0.015)		-0.0246* (0.015)
Legg-money		0.0035 (0.005)	0.0016 (0.005)		-0.0034 (0.005)	-0.0045 (0.005)
conservative				-0.2147*** (0.049)	-0.2087*** (0.050)	-0.2108*** (0.050)
libdem				-0.1219* (0.070)	-0.1288* (0.070)	-0.1254* (0.070)
other				0.1596 (0.133)	0.1594 (0.133)	0.1607 (0.131)
age				0.0064** (0.003)	0.0069** (0.003)	0.0065** (0.003)
seniority				0.0036 (0.004)	0.0042 (0.004)	0.0035 (0.004)
Δfrontbench				-0.0565 (0.047)	-0.0659 (0.046)	-0.0569 (0.047)
frontbench				-0.0743 (0.061)	-0.0673 (0.057)	-0.0724 (0.061)
incumbent in 2005				0.1887*** (0.051)	0.1866*** (0.051)	0.1945*** (0.051)
degree				-0.0557 (0.049)	-0.0513 (0.049)	-0.0561 (0.049)
oxbridge educated				0.0858** (0.043)	0.0797* (0.043)	0.0857** (0.044)
female				0.1258*** (0.047)	0.1421*** (0.047)	0.1275*** (0.047)
marginality 2005				0.2952*** (0.042)	0.2935*** (0.043)	0.2969*** (0.042)
Constant	0.3516*** (0.039)	0.3172*** (0.027)	0.3473*** (0.042)	-0.2091 (0.170)	-0.2198 (0.165)	-0.2080 (0.170)
Observations	588	588	588	588	588	588
R-squared	0.0214	0.0008	0.0215	0.2433	0.2384	0.2444

Note: columns 4-5-6 also include dummy variables for UK regional standard regions.

Estimation by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01.

** p < 0.05.

* p < 0.1.

constituency, have generally little or no impact.¹⁹

(footnote continued)

with rebelliousness loses statistical significance. These estimates are available from the authors.

¹⁹ The only exception is that Liberal Democrat MPs appear to have been generally less induced to retire from scandal news. In specifications with fewer interactions this coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. This can be related to the finding by Eggers (2014) that the punishment of MPs involved in the scandal was heavier in constituencies where the two main contenders were Labour and Conservatives. The more “centrist” position of Liberal-Democratic MPs may have sheltered them from heavier punishment and the anticipation of more leniency by voters may have induced a lower effect of media coverage on the probability of retirement.

Table 2
Scandal involvement and standing down.

Dep. variable: standing down dummy (pre or post scandal)	post (1)	pre (2)	post (3)	pre (4)	post (5)	pre (6)
news-post	0.0502*** (0.018)	-0.0216* (0.013)			0.0499*** (0.018)	-0.0193 (0.013)
news-pre	-0.0131 (0.016)	0.0042 (0.011)			-0.0130 (0.016)	0.0037 (0.011)
Legg-money			0.0032 (0.006)	-0.0045 (0.004)	0.0004 (0.006)	-0.0034 (0.004)
conservative	-0.1078** (0.051)	-0.0380 (0.040)	-0.1125** (0.052)	-0.0319 (0.039)	-0.1083** (0.052)	-0.0335 (0.040)
libdem	-0.0856 (0.055)	-0.0548** (0.027)	-0.0905* (0.054)	-0.0552** (0.028)	-0.0853 (0.055)	-0.0575** (0.027)
other	0.0899 (0.130)	0.0052 (0.085)	0.1092 (0.132)	-0.0027 (0.083)	0.0899 (0.130)	0.0051 (0.084)
age	0.0012 (0.003)	0.0049** (0.002)	0.0009 (0.003)	0.0052** (0.002)	0.0011 (0.003)	0.0050** (0.002)
seniority	0.0041 (0.004)	0.0049 (0.003)	0.0060* (0.004)	0.0039 (0.003)	0.0041 (0.004)	0.0047 (0.003)
Δfront (el2010-el2005)	-0.0122 (0.055)	-0.0149 (0.031)	-0.0403 (0.054)	-0.0029 (0.030)	-0.0122 (0.055)	-0.0146 (0.031)
frontbench	-0.0289 (0.073)	-0.0165 (0.038)	0.0289 (0.068)	-0.0405 (0.028)	-0.0291 (0.073)	-0.0154 (0.038)
incumbent in 2005	0.0280 (0.050)	-0.0253 (0.036)	0.0169 (0.051)	-0.0160 (0.035)	0.0274 (0.051)	-0.0199 (0.035)
degree	-0.0168 (0.051)	-0.0226 (0.040)	-0.0063 (0.050)	-0.0282 (0.040)	-0.0166 (0.051)	-0.0245 (0.040)
oxbridge educated	0.0478 (0.044)	0.0237 (0.034)	0.0518 (0.044)	0.0212 (0.033)	0.0479 (0.044)	0.0231 (0.034)
female	0.0333 (0.051)	0.0366 (0.040)	0.0581 (0.055)	0.0271 (0.040)	0.0333 (0.051)	0.0364 (0.040)
marginality 2005	0.0041 (0.044)	-0.0145 (0.031)	-0.0062 (0.043)	-0.0076 (0.031)	0.0038 (0.043)	-0.0115 (0.031)
Constant	-0.0465 (0.184)	-0.2642** (0.111)	0.0067 (0.177)	-0.2926*** (0.110)	-0.0461 (0.185)	-0.2672** (0.110)
Observations	359	359	359	359	359	359
R-squared	0.1239	0.1537	0.1029	0.1500	0.1240	0.1557

3.3. Punishment in the ballot box

We now want to test whether MPs who were involved in the expenses scandal but decided to run saw their vote share decline compared to their 2005 performance. We restrict our sample to constituencies where the boundary change was less than 10%, MPs did not change party (i.e., MPs who become independent are omitted) and the same individual ran in the constituency in both general elections (i.e., the sitting MP was not from a by-election after 2005). The dependent variable is the difference in vote percentage between the 2005 and 2010 general elections for an incumbent MP (ΔV_i):

$$\Delta V_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Involvement}_i + \delta \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where, as before, *Involvement* is captured either by *news-post* (controlling for *news-pre*) or by *Legg-money*, and \mathbf{X} is a vector with the usual covariates. Table 4 shows that news coverage had a negative impact on electoral returns. This result is robust across specifications in which we incrementally include control variables. Our estimates indicate that a 1% increase in news decreased the electoral return of the incumbent party (compared to its 2005 returns) by about 0.007%. *Legg-money* has instead no effect on ΔV .

Table 3
Scandal involvement and standing down (interactions with news-post).

Dep. variable: standing down dummy (pre or post scandal)	post (1)	pre (2)
rebellions	-0.0441 [*] (0.025)	0.0111 (0.017)
absences	-0.0041 (0.004)	0.0040 (0.003)
marginality	-0.0185 (0.039)	0.0391 (0.029)
conservative	-0.0566 (0.133)	0.1397 (0.086)
labour	-0.0971 (0.139)	0.1375 (0.084)
libdem	-0.1568 (0.124)	0.1049 (0.082)
front-bench	-0.0202 (0.048)	-0.0280 (0.025)
age	0.0026 (0.003)	-0.0046 ^{**} (0.002)
female	0.1795 ^{***} (0.041)	-0.0034 (0.034)
seniority	0.0017 (0.004)	0.0028 (0.003)
oxgridge educated	-0.0276 (0.040)	0.0193 (0.027)
Observations	359	359
R-squared	0.2283	0.2290

All the variables included in Table 2 have been included in all regressions. Columns 1 and 2 also include the main effect of rebellion and absences. Each coefficient refers to the interaction term between the variable in question and news-post. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the MP announced decision to stand down at the next election. In the -pre- columns the announcement was made before 8 May 2009, in the -post- columns the announcement was made after 8 May 2009. Region dummies are included (referred to the 11 standard UK regions). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01.

** p < 0.05.

* p < 0.1.

Column 7 includes both *news-post* and *Legg-money* (with all the controls) and shows the same pattern: no effect of misappropriated money and a remarkably stable effect of the amount of news coverage.

Table 5 differentiates between seats in which the same individual ran in 2005 and 2010 and seats where the victorious MP in 2005 had stood down. From columns 1 and 2, it emerges that voters' punishment was personal: in constituencies where the incumbent MP is not standing, the vote share of the incumbent party is unaffected by the amount of scandal-related news coverage. This type of personal post-scandal electoral punishment is not evident in all contexts (see, for example, Kauder and Potrafke, 2015). The effect we found in Table 4 appears to be entirely driven by constituencies where the incumbent MP is standing again. The result is confirmed by column 3 where we use an interaction term between news coverage and a dummy for whether the incumbent MP is standing. In our benchmark specification with 10% boundary change, a 1% increase in *news-post* (controlling for *news-pre*) leads to a loss of about 0.008% of the votes for incumbent MPs.

Models were tested for different thresholds of boundary changes – no change, less than 10% change, and less than 25% change. The same pattern emerges independently of our sample choice, although magnitudes and statistical significance vary when we use our most restricted sample. We repeat the same exercise by using a binary re-election dummy as dependent variable. In these regressions *news-post* never achieves statistical significance showing that, in spite of some vote loss, MPs involved in the scandal and standing for re-election did not suffer a decreased probability of remaining in parliament.

Table 6 reports the results of placebo regressions where the dependent variable is the vote change between 2001 and 2005. If the scandal caused a decrease in vote share of involved MPs, rather than being driven by pre-existing trends, then media coverage of the scandal should have no effect on vote change at the previous election, i.e., between 2001 and 2005. Scandal-related media coverage is

Table 4
2010–2005 difference in vote percentage for incumbent party.

Dep. Variable	(1) Δvote	(2) Δvote	(3) Δvote	(4) Δvote	(5) Δvote	(6) Δvote	(7) Δvote
news-post	-0.9159** (0.358)		-0.7119*** (0.263)		-0.6445** (0.256)		-0.6458** (0.262)
news-pre	0.8556*** (0.313)		0.3152 (0.246)		0.3256 (0.260)		0.3258 (0.259)
Legg-money		-0.0623 (0.103)		-0.0578 (0.075)		-0.0312 (0.074)	0.0020 (0.075)
conservative			9.9324*** (0.699)	10.0204*** (0.689)	9.4089*** (0.796)	9.4717*** (0.799)	9.4062*** (0.800)
libdem			3.2794** (1.374)	3.2967** (1.419)	2.5812* (1.375)	2.6288* (1.396)	2.5827* (1.380)
other			1.3316 (2.257)	1.1926 (2.231)	0.9708 (2.314)	0.7909 (2.254)	0.9711 (2.317)
age					0.0597 (0.040)	0.0565 (0.040)	0.0596 (0.040)
seniority					-0.0155 (0.049)	-0.0342 (0.049)	-0.0154 (0.049)
Δfront (el2010-el2005)					0.2380 (0.765)	0.5132 (0.774)	0.2377 (0.768)
frontbench					0.7731 (1.221)	0.3202 (1.066)	0.7726 (1.218)
incumbent in 2005					-2.9338*** (0.811)	-2.7665*** (0.837)	-2.9370*** (0.835)
degree					0.7731 (0.716)	0.6132 (0.707)	0.7742 (0.717)
oxbridge educated					-0.1394 (0.694)	-0.1429 (0.692)	-0.1390 (0.694)
female					-1.0845* (0.627)	-1.4424** (0.639)	-1.0843* (0.628)
marginality 2005					0.4715 (0.655)	0.5998 (0.666)	0.4697 (0.660)
Constant	-1.6610** (0.773)	-1.4904*** (0.539)	-6.0227*** (1.163)	-6.7644*** (1.101)	-7.3164*** (2.406)	-7.4377*** (2.325)	-7.3146*** (2.406)
Region dummies	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356	356
R-squared	0.0273	0.0010	0.5342	0.5235	0.5594	0.5515	0.5594

Note: Region dummies are the 11 UK standard regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01.

** p < 0.05.

* p < 0.1.

never statistically significant across a number of specifications. Legg money is associated with an increase in votes between 2001 and 2005 only in a simple regression with no control variables. Statistical significance vanishes in all other specifications. These results make it more likely that our previous findings represent causal relations.

We conclude that scandal-related media coverage had a small but statistically significant negative impact on vote returns of involved MPs. The amount of money actually misappropriated did not. Voters' punishment was personally directed to involved MPs rather than to their party, probably a consequence of the fact that the scandal involved all parties more or less equally. In any event, patterns of representation of standing MPs cannot be expected to have been substantially altered by the scandal, as shown by the nil

Table 5
The personal punishment: sitting MPs vs open seats.

Dep. Variable	(1) Δvote	(2) Δvote	(3) Δvote	(4) Δvote	(5) Δvote	(6) re-election probability	(7) re-election probability	(8) re-election probability	(9) re-election probability	(10) re-election probability
news-post	0.0491 (0.515)	-0.7867** (0.314)	0.3823 (0.433)	-0.5859 (1.177)	0.3857 (0.319)	0.0396 (0.053)	-0.0083 (0.018)	0.0476 (0.038)	-0.0233 (0.077)	0.0416 (0.030)
news-pre	-1.0560* (0.604)	0.6887** (0.298)	-0.9780* (0.538)	-0.1414 (1.175)	-0.7803* (0.450)	-0.0487 (0.032)	0.0102 (0.014)	-0.0198 (0.032)	0.0070 (0.047)	-0.0043 (0.027)
sitting MP			1.6146 (1.349)	-0.1282 (3.468)	2.3650** (1.085)			0.1390 (0.089)	0.1143 (0.105)	0.1839** (0.083)
sitting MP x news-post			-1.2679** (0.541)	-0.3255 (1.262)	-1.4038*** (0.443)			-0.0614 (0.040)	0.0015 (0.082)	-0.0504 (0.034)
sitting MP x news-pre			1.6377*** (0.608)	0.4119 (1.266)	1.4754*** (0.517)			0.0293 (0.034)	-0.0352 (0.052)	0.0124 (0.030)
Control variables	All controls, regional dummies and a constant are included									
Sample max % boundary change	open seats 10	sitting mp 10	all 10	all 0	all 25	open seats 10	sitting mp 10	all 10	all 0	all 25
Observations	75	281	356	121	458	75	284	359	122	461
R-squared	0.7503	0.5682	0.5866	0.5721	0.5779	0.6231	0.4916	0.4909	0.6207	0.4207

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01.

** p < 0.05.

* p < 0.1.

Table 6
Voting returns: placebo regressions.

Dep. Variable	(1) Δvote (2001–05)	(2) Δvote (2001–05)	(3) Δvote (2001–05)	(4) Δvote (2001–05)	(5) Δvote (2001–05)	(6) Δvote (2001–05)
news-post	0.1325 (0.259)	0.0326 (0.261)	0.0112 (0.194)	0.0726 (0.243)	0.0626 (0.518)	0.1471 (0.205)
news-pre	0.4379* (0.250)	0.4766* (0.249)	0.1273 (0.178)	0.0436 (0.199)	-0.0678 (0.387)	0.0402 (0.168)
Legg-money		0.1453* (0.085)	0.0128 (0.062)	0.0260 (0.075)	0.0098 (0.160)	0.0553 (0.065)
Constant	-4.6912*** (0.594)	-5.0798*** (0.635)	-9.7208*** (2.300)	-10.4112*** (2.616)	-14.0841*** (5.216)	-9.0576*** (2.169)
Control variables	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	all	all	all	sitting mps 2010	sitting mps 2010	sitting mps 2010
Max boundary change (%)	10	10	10	10	0	25
Observations	352	352	352	277	98	349
R-squared	0.0172	0.0249	0.5400	0.5322	0.6022	0.5405

Note: control variables are those included in column 7 of Table 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01.

** p < 0.05.

* p < 0.1.

effect of re-election probabilities.

We also run regressions using turnout rates as dependent variable to see whether punishment was driven by abstention rather than voting for a different party. We found no significant effect of expenses scandal variables on turnout.²⁰

4. Perception, punishment and partisanship

We now turn to a more detailed analysis of voters' perceptions regarding their MPs. We use individual survey data from the British Election Study 2010 (BES), which contains questions regarding the scandal. In particular, the BES dataset contained two questions from which we construct a binary and a continuous measure to gauge the perceived level of MP malfeasance by individual voters. The binary measure is the individual response to the following question (AAQ142): "Now, thinking about the MP in your local constituency, has he or she claimed expense money to which they are not entitled?" [Yes=1, No=0, Don't Know=omitted]. The continuous measure was derived from the following question (AAQ143): "On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means a very small amount, and 10 means a very large amount, how much expense money do you think the MP in your local constituency has claimed that he or she was not entitled to?"²¹ The continuous measure for perceived wrongdoing was then calculated as: $\log(1+AAQ142+AAQ143)$.

4.1. Correlates of voters' perception of malfeasance

What determines perceived involvement of an MP in the expenses scandal? In Table 7, we report OLS estimates when the dependent variable is the continuous perceived involvement variable (similar results can be obtained if we use the binary indicator) and explanatory variables consists of respondents' characteristics and attitudes as well as of constituency characteristics. *Legg-money* and *news-post* are again the key explanatory variables. Column 1 shows that perceived involvement of an MP is positively related to the actual amount of money misappropriated. A 1% increase in *Legg-money* leads to an increase of about 0.07% in the perceived involvement of an MP. Perception of involvement is also positively related to the amount of media coverage. In column 2, we include constituency fixed effects and therefore remove all constituency-specific and MP-specific variables.²² This helps us focus our attention on the respondents' characteristics. Respondents that are generally more trusting perceive a lower level of involvement in the scandal by their MP as compared to respondents who tend to distrust others. Respondents who are more dissatisfied with democracy also perceive a higher involvement (the causation is clearly not obvious). More educated respondents tend to perceive lower involvement. This effect is particularly strong and statistically significant for respondents with a university degree. Other individual characteristics do not appear to have statistically significant effects.

In column 3, we include the response to the question "most MPs are corrupt" (with the possible answers being "agree" or "disagree") and show that perception of corruption of own MP is positively related to perceived corruption of all MPs. Although this is only a correlation, it provides evidence of the existence of some form of generalization, whereby a respondent perceiving that her MP is corrupt may be led to generalize this perception to all MPs, or conversely, a general distrust of MPs may lead to perceive that the local MP is corrupt. These results are derived from within constituency variation and cannot therefore depend on the identity of the MP, on her behaviour, or on any other event that might have happened at the constituency level.

An important question is whether perception of involvement may have been influenced by media exposure. For this purpose, we construct various indicators of exposure to television, the press or the internet. *Ceteris paribus* (in particular, we control for education levels), respondents that use the internet to gather political information have generally a more positive view of their MP's involvement in the scandal, while television viewers are more negative (column 4).²³

In all specifications partisanship appears to be particularly important. The partisan-match dummy variable (equal to 1 if the MP belongs to the political party indicated as closest by the respondent and zero otherwise) has a strong negative effect on perceived involvement in the scandal, even when constituency fixed effects are introduced and therefore perception cannot depend on any characteristic of the MP or of the constituency. An important concern is that partisanship, which is measured before the 2010 election but after the scandal, could depend itself on the perceived involvement of the local MP and therefore be an endogenous regressor. To address this concern we use the 2005–2010 BES panel data. In column 5, partisanship is measured in 2005, well before the expenses scandal. Despite a much reduced sample size, the partisan match coefficient remains statistically significant, negative and its size is actually larger than in other columns. In column 5, we include an interaction effect between the partisan match dummy and *Legg-money*. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the elasticity of perceived involvement to actual wrongdoing is much reduced for co-partisan MPs.²⁴ Our results show that perception of wrongdoing is significantly affected by partisanship. Further investigation is necessary to understand the reason of this partisan bias,

²⁰ Results are not reported in the interest of space but are available from the authors.

²¹ In both cases "don't know" respondents were omitted.

²² Only constituencies with at least four respondents were included.

²³ However, interaction terms between media exposure and media coverage of the scandal are statistically insignificant. Interaction terms between indicators of media exposure and *Legg-money* are equally insignificant. This is true whether we use newspaper readership, television exposure, or internet usage. In other words, the responsiveness of perceived involvement to either press coverage of the scandal or money owed does not appear to be affected by media exposure. In the interest of space we omit the table with these results. They are available from the authors upon request.

²⁴ This result holds when we use the 2005–2010 panel, measuring partisanship in 2005, but do not include constituency fixed effects. The negative sign of the interaction term remains but its statistical significance drops considerably if we include constituency fixed effects in the 2005–2010 panel, which is not surprising given the much reduced sample size.

Table 7
Correlates of involvement perception (British Election Study).

Dep. Variable	Perceived involvement					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Legg-money	0.0648*** (0.0043)					
news-post	0.1771*** (0.0143)					
news-pre	-0.0630** (0.0134)					
partisan match	-0.1873*** (0.0495)	-0.1773*** (0.0440)	-0.1710*** (0.0434)	-0.1805*** (0.0436)	-0.2705** (0.1098)	-0.1251** (0.0495)
Most MPs corrupt			0.1485*** (0.0129)	0.1454*** (0.0131)	0.0687* (0.038)	0.1449*** (0.013)
press usage				0.0151 (0.0107)	-0.0164 (0.0267)	0.0154 (0.0106)
television usage				0.0261** (0.0131)	0.0343 (0.0305)	0.0253* (0.0131)
internet usage				-0.0535** (0.0211)	-0.0246 (0.0562)	-0.0563*** (0.0212)
partisan match x Legg-money						-0.0172** (0.0074)
voted for the MP in 2005	-0.1498*** (0.0446)	-0.1122*** (0.0397)	-0.1107*** (0.0392)	-0.1036*** (0.0392)	-0.113 (0.1016)	-0.1005*** (0.0391)
trust others	-0.0261*** (0.0073)	-0.0215*** (0.0071)	-0.0056 (0.0071)	-0.0056 (0.0071)	0.0113 (0.0206)	-0.0047 (0.0071)
attention to politics	-0.0013 (0.0076)	0.0008 (0.0079)	0.0122 (0.0078)	0.0105 (0.0085)	0.0215 (0.0222)	0.0108 (0.0085)
fairly satisfied with democracy	-0.0137 (0.0652)	0.0764 (0.0598)	0.0511 (0.0606)	0.0495 (0.0606)	0.1753 (0.1963)	0.0483 (0.0603)
a little dissatisfied with democracy	0.1106 (0.0675)	0.1699*** (0.0617)	0.1178* (0.0612)	0.1184* (0.0613)	0.2094 (0.2016)	0.1117* (0.0613)
very dissatisfied with democracy	0.1526** (0.0735)	0.2408*** (0.0680)	0.1344* (0.0693)	0.1415** (0.0696)	0.335 (0.2161)	0.1425** (0.0694)
finished full time education 16	0.0318 (0.0538)	-0.0674 (0.0499)	-0.0402 (0.0485)	-0.0333 (0.0484)	-0.1021 (0.1218)	-0.0330 (0.0482)
finished full time education 17	-0.0956 (0.0660)	-0.1407** (0.0632)	-0.0923 (0.0628)	-0.0858 (0.0628)	-0.1799 (0.1574)	-0.0883 (0.0624)
finished full time education 18	-0.1388** (0.0612)	-0.1975*** (0.0639)	-0.1428** (0.0623)	-0.1334** (0.0633)	-0.2521 (0.1392)	-0.1331** (0.633)
finished ft educ. 19 or still at school	-0.1157* (0.0609)	-0.1729*** (0.0591)	-0.0974* (0.0574)	-0.0851 (0.0582)	-0.2657 (0.1371)	-0.0882 (0.058)
university degree	-0.1478** (0.0601)	-0.2090*** (0.0618)	-0.1218** (0.0608)	-0.1056* (0.0619)	0.0237 (0.1341)	-0.1054* (0.0616)
postgraduate	-0.1687*** (0.0634)	-0.2477*** (0.0672)	-0.1505** (0.0639)	-0.1291** (0.0641)	-0.1167 (0.1314)	-0.1333** (0.0638)
date partisanship measured	2010	2010	2010	2010	2005	2010

Always included: constant, respondent's party id, income, gender, age and age squared

(continued on next page)

Table 7 (continued)

Dep. Variable	Perceived involvement					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Fixed effects	Region	Const	Const	Const	Const	Const
Observations	3247	3115	3013	3097	596	3097
R-squared	0.2080	0.0614 (w)	0.1039 (w)	0.1086 (w)	0.1318	0.1101

Note: R-squared referred to within variation when constituency fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. In column 1 (specification without constituency fixed effects) we also include all constituency-level variables and cluster the standard errors at the constituency level.
 *** p < 0.01.
 ** p < 0.05.
 * p < 0.1.

which could be due to cognitive dissonance or to media exposure. Our results on media coverage of the scandal in Section 5 suggest that the first explanation is more plausible.

4.2. Voting behaviour

Does perceived involvement in the scandal relate to citizens’ decisions to vote or not for an incumbent MP? Whether in the binary or the continuous form, we find that perceived malfeasance of an incumbent MP decreased the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party, controlling for characteristics of the respondent, of the MP, and of the constituency. The results are summarized in Table 8. In this case, the result holds both when we include only constituencies with standing MPs and when we include all constituencies (provided the boundary change is within the 10% limit). These results are robust across specifications and change only marginally if we include constituency fixed effects, therefore focussing on within constituency variation in scandal involvement perception. Such variation cannot be due to constituency characteristics and therefore can be due neither to MPs actual involvement nor to overall media coverage (although individual media exposure may vary).

5. Media coverage of the scandal

Our results suggest that media coverage of the scandal played a key role in determining punishment patterns. In this section we analyse media coverage in more detail, asking in particular how it relates to monetary wrongdoing and whether it is possible to

Table 8
 Involvement perception and voting behaviour (British Election Study).

Dep. Variable	Voted for the party of the incumbent MP							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
perceived involvement (continuous)	-0.0386*** (0.0071)		-0.0372*** (0.0082)		-0.0452*** (0.0088)		-0.0401*** (0.0100)	
perceived involvement (binary)		-0.0656*** (0.0138)		-0.0610*** (0.0157)		-0.0758*** (0.0167)		-0.0685*** (0.0191)
voted for current MP in previous election	0.2835*** (0.0231)	0.2841*** (0.0232)	0.3002*** (0.0262)	0.3012*** (0.0262)	0.2818*** (0.0240)	0.2823*** (0.0241)	0.3020*** (0.0271)	0.3025*** (0.0272)
partisan match	0.4863*** (0.0250)	0.4887*** (0.0251)	0.4783*** (0.0267)	0.4797*** (0.0268)	0.4902*** (0.0258)	0.4928*** (0.0259)	0.4814*** (0.0273)	0.4829*** (0.0273)
constituency and MP control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
individual control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
fixed effects	region	region	region	region	const	const	const	const
sample includes constituencies where incumbent MP is not standing	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	no	no
Observations	3169	3169	2526	2526	3044	3044	2429	2429
R-squared	0.5163	0.5154	0.5223	0.5214	0.5082 (within)	0.5074 (within)	0.5146 (within)	0.5141 (within)

Note. All regressions contain a constant and constituency and individual control variables (see Table 7 for a complete list). In regressions with constituency fixed effects (columns 5–8) only constituencies with at least four observations are kept. There are 316 constituency fixed effects in columns 5 and 6 and 252 in columns 7 and 8. Region fixed effects consists of the 11 UK standard regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. In specifications without constituency fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the constituency level.
 *** p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1

detect any partisan bias in patterns of coverage. Newspapers in the UK have well-known partisan leanings. For example, the *Daily Telegraph* has endorsed the Conservative Party in every general election since 1945, whilst *The Independent* has endorsed either Labour or a Labour-Liberal Democrat pact to prevent the Conservatives from getting into power.²⁵ It is then legitimate to ask whether coverage of the scandal has been partisan, i.e. if newspapers traditionally leaning left or right have underreported wrongdoings of MPs of the left or right, respectively.²⁶

5.1. Aggregate coverage

A first analysis of overall patterns of coverage is given by Eq. (4), where the news variables refer to the total number of articles in the seven newspapers pulled together:

$$\text{news}_{post_i} = \alpha + \beta \text{newspre} + \gamma \text{party}_i + \text{Leggmoney}_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where variable names have the usual interpretations and i indicates MP i . OLS estimates are reported in Table 9. We only include party affiliation in column 1, we control for *Legg-money* and personal characteristics in column 2, and we include constituency characteristics in column 3. Our results show no significant difference in the overall coverage of MPs from different parties. Not surprisingly, we find a significantly higher coverage for senior and front-bench MPs and a strong positive correlation between coverage and *Legg-money*. Our result on gender is less obvious: we find a significantly higher coverage of female MPs. In column 4, we restrict our sample to include only constituencies whose boundaries changed by less than 10%. Our conclusions remain unaffected and the magnitude of the female dummy is now substantially larger. We have tried to restrict our sample using other thresholds of percentage change in constituency boundaries, and again, our conclusions remain unaffected.²⁷

Column 5 shows that coverage of Labour frontbenchers (the Government) was double the coverage of Conservative frontbenchers (the official Opposition) and both were significantly higher than the coverage of backbenchers. Although constituency marginality does not appear, on average, to have had any significant impact on press coverage, column 6 shows that Labour-held marginal constituencies were significantly less covered than non-marginal constituencies, while Conservative and Liberal-democratic marginal constituencies are not statistically distinguishable from non-marginals.²⁸

Finally, columns 7 and 8 include interactions between *Legg-money* and party affiliation. The elasticity of coverage to actual money misappropriated turns out to be larger for the Labour and (particularly) for the Conservative parties. In this case the coefficient for Conservative MPs is both larger and more robust, if we consider estimates restricted to constituencies which changed by less than 10%.

5.2. An analysis of media bias

In Table 10, we perform an analysis of individual newspapers' behaviour focussing on possible differences in their coverage patterns. This means that we now estimate Eq. (4) separately for each newspaper.

We report our results when the seven equations are estimated as a system of seemingly unrelated equations (SURE), which provides more efficient estimates than seven separate OLS regressions. The coverage of all newspapers is well explained by *Legg-money*. An increase of 1% in *Legg-money* leads to an increased coverage between 0.032% (*The Guardian*) and 0.056% (*The Times*). We then distinguish between different parties and between back-benchers and front-benchers for the two main parties. The omitted group is given by Labour backbenchers. It appears that all newspapers gave a much larger coverage of Labour front-benchers compared to all other MPs. Conservative front-benchers were also more covered than Labour back-benchers. Again, although the magnitudes of coefficients vary across newspapers, they do not follow a clear partisan divide. For example, if the Conservative-leaning *Daily Mail* has lower levels of coverage of Conservative front-benchers, we also have the Conservative-leaning *Times* providing the strongest coverage. The highest coefficients for coverage of Labour front-benchers come from the conservative *Times*, but also from the left-leaning *Guardian*.

The other coefficients show no significant differences across newspapers in the coverage of MPs from different parties, with the exception of a higher coverage of Liberal Democrats by *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mail* and a higher coverage of parties other than the main three by *The Guardian*. All newspapers devote more news to coverage of expenses regarding front-benchers and more senior MPs, and all, except the *Scotsman*, provide larger coverage of female MPs, although the magnitudes are decidedly higher for the *Times*, the *Guardian* and the *Sun*. Again, we cannot find a clear pattern for the over-coverage of female MPs, neither according to the partisan leaning of newspapers nor according to their broadsheet-tabloid status.

²⁵ Our sample contains right-leaning newspapers (*Daily Telegraph*, *Times*, *Daily Mail*), left-leaning newspapers (*Guardian*, *Independent*), broadsheet (i.e. quality newspapers: *Daily Telegraph*, *Times*, *Guardian*, *Independent*, *Scotsman*), and tabloids (entertainment and scandal-oriented newspapers: *Sun* and *Daily Mail*).

²⁶ For a discussion of agenda-setting theories in news-reporting and a description of how these can be scrutinized empirically using quantitative information on media coverage, see Larcinese et al. (2011) and Puglisi and Snyder (2011). For a study of partisan bias in the UK press, see Latham (2015). In particular, Table 7 in Latham (2015) provides an estimate of the ideological bias of UK newspapers.

²⁷ Results are available from the authors.

²⁸ The same is true of marginal constituencies held by the Scottish National Party and the Party of Wales (Plaid Cymru), which are classified as "Other marginal". These coefficients could clearly just capture some spurious correlation but also they cannot rule out the possibility that, although Government members were not spared press coverage, the party in government ultimately was. At the same time, if we believe that news coverage captures some dimension of malfeasance which is missed by *Legg-money*, then an alternative interpretation could be that the most vulnerable MPs are also those that were more disciplined by re-election perspectives. Since a swing was expected against the Labour party, Labour-held marginals were likely to be the most vulnerable seats.

Table 9
Total expenses news reporting.

Dependent variable:	Scandal-related news coverage 8 May–8 August 2009							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
news-pre	0.5223*** (0.0306)	0.4729*** (0.039)	0.4731*** (0.039)	0.4550*** (0.048)	0.4518*** (0.039)	0.4580*** (0.047)	0.4685*** (0.039)	0.4517*** (0.048)
Legg-money	0.0638 (0.0126)	0.0480*** (0.013)	0.0479*** (0.013)	0.0519*** (0.016)	0.0469*** (0.013)	0.0535*** (0.016)		
conservative MP		0.0703 (0.119)	0.0520 (0.134)	-0.0686 (0.169)	0.1191 (0.138)	-0.3254 (0.205)	-0.0591 (0.158)	-0.2590 (0.210)
libdem MP		-0.1336 (0.152)	-0.1476 (0.158)	-0.0334 (0.197)	0.0378 (0.148)	-0.1976 (0.288)	-0.1198 (0.188)	-0.0715 (0.258)
other MP		0.2673 (0.192)	0.2222 (0.200)	0.3091 (0.207)	0.2633 (0.197)	0.4845** (0.214)	0.1908 (0.279)	0.1242 (0.290)
female		0.3916*** (0.107)	0.4103*** (0.110)	0.5544*** (0.154)	0.4157*** (0.109)	0.5788*** (0.156)	0.4073*** (0.109)	0.5485*** (0.153)
age		0.0016 (0.007)	0.0026 (0.007)	0.0034 (0.009)	0.0039 (0.007)	0.0049 (0.009)	0.0027 (0.007)	0.0037 (0.009)
seniority		0.0288*** (0.008)	0.0265*** (0.009)	0.0286*** (0.010)	0.0255*** (0.008)	0.0306*** (0.010)	0.0259*** (0.009)	0.0275*** (0.010)
degree		0.1467 (0.107)	0.1469 (0.107)	0.2651** (0.129)	0.1382 (0.106)	0.2918** (0.133)	0.1395 (0.107)	0.2482* (0.132)
oxbridge		-0.0555 (0.114)	-0.0554 (0.114)	0.0234 (0.148)	-0.0295 (0.114)	0.0103 (0.148)	-0.0571 (0.115)	0.0321 (0.150)
marginal in 2005			-0.1410 (0.116)	-0.1990 (0.140)	-0.1480 (0.116)		-0.1438 (0.115)	-0.1784 (0.139)
turnout in 2005			-0.0003 (0.009)	0.0076 (0.012)	-0.0008 (0.009)	0.0129 (0.013)	-0.0008 (0.009)	0.0063 (0.013)
distance from Westm.			0.0011 (0.001)	0.0000 (0.001)	0.0012 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.0011 (0.001)	-0.0000 (0.001)
front-bench		0.5589*** (0.178)	0.5545*** (0.179)	0.4902** (0.244)		0.5244** (0.245)	0.5598*** (0.18)	0.4975** (0.2480)
conserv frontbench					0.4414* (0.259)			
labour frontbench					0.9641*** (0.239)			
labour marginal						-0.4794** (0.194)		
conservative marginal						0.2753 (0.235)		
libdem marginal						-0.0097 (0.337)		
other marginal						-0.7656** (0.355)		
Legg money x Lab							0.0397*** (0.015)	0.0325 (0.020)
Legg money x Con							0.0681*** (0.025)	0.0830*** (0.029)

(continued on next page)

Table 9 (continued)

Dependent variable:	Scandal-related news coverage 8 May–8 August 2009							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Legg money x Libdem							0.0248 (0.038)	0.0395 (0.047)
Legg money x Other							0.0481 (0.056)	0.0873 (0.059)
Constant	0.8177 (0.0833)	0.2950 (0.397)	0.2042 (0.682)	-0.3207 (0.900)	0.1617 (0.678)	-0.6603 (0.910)	0.2895 (0.697)	-0.1381 (0.928)
Sample	All	All	All	Restricted	All	Restricted	All	Restricted
Observations	600	600	600	370	600	370	600	370
R-squared	0.3702	0.4375	0.4408	0.4608	0.4527	0.4733	0.4423	0.4650

Note: Data do not include MPs from Northern Ireland and other MPs (details in the text). The restricted sample only includes MPs whose constituency boundaries changed by less than 10% according to Rallings and Thrasher (2007). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

- *** p < 0.01.
- ** p < 0.05.
- * p < 0.1.

If an understanding of possible partisan coverage of the scandal can be inferred from the significance and magnitude of the party coefficients and our prior knowledge of each newspaper’s leaning, another test is offered by the availability of an accurate and independent measure of corruption (*Legg-money*). Using this information our empirical specification becomes:

$$newspost_i = \alpha + \beta newspre_i + \gamma_{party_i} + \gamma_2 Legg_i + \gamma_3 party_i * Legg_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{5}$$

In other words, we ask whether the responsiveness of coverage to actual wrongdoing depends on the political affiliation of the MP, and whether different behaviour can be ascribed to different newspapers. We find that the interaction effect with *Legg-money* (γ_3) is positive for Labour and Conservatives MPs: in other words, responsiveness to money owed was larger for the two main parties. We report our estimates of γ_3 for Conservative and Labour MPs in Fig. 2, from which it is clear that γ_3 is larger for Conservatives than for Labour MPs (although the difference between the two parties is not statistically significant). In this case, it is worth highlighting that the two most left-oriented newspapers in our sample (the *Guardian* and *The Independent*) are those with lowest $\hat{\gamma}_3$ for Labour MPs, while the highest are those of the two tabloids, *The Sun* and the *Daily Mail*. Once again, however, there are no other discernible signals of partisan coverage across newspapers.

In order to take into account the possibly different levels of coverage of the scandal by different newspapers, all our regressions have been repeated using MPs’ coverage share (of expenses coverage with respect to total news) rather than number of articles. Results are substantively similar to those discussed here and therefore not reported.²⁹

To conclude, we find only limited evidence of partisan coverage of the expenses scandal across newspapers. For the seven newspapers examined, a number of patterns were evident, controlling for other explanatory variables: *ceteris paribus*, more senior MPs, front-bench MPs from the two main parties and female MPs were mentioned more frequently. The interaction effect with *Legg-money* (γ_3) is positive for Labour and Conservatives MPs and leads us to uncover a possible under-coverage of Labour MPs by *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. In general, however, the patterns we found hold equally for all newspapers with little variation. Given the substantially higher coverage of front-benchers belonging to Labour (the party in government) and, in second place, of the frontbenchers of the main opposition party (potential government members), we can conclude that the role of the press was mostly that of a watchdog placing under closer scrutiny the government and its potential replacement.

6. Quantifying the effects: an overall assessment

The path from corruption to voter punishment is complex. It is useful, therefore, to synthesize our many regressions in a few key quantities of interest. Fig. 3 quantifies the key links in our accountability framework, by choosing in each case our benchmark estimates. We report for each channel the impact of one standard deviation increase from the mean.³⁰ Using the Legg report as a benchmark of malfeasance, we estimate that an increase of one standard deviation above the mean in irregularly claimed expenses

²⁹ They are available from the authors upon request.

³⁰ In the regressions we use a logarithmic transformation for our key variables, hence our regression tables report local effects (marginal effects or elasticities, depending on whether the left-hand variable is also expressed in logs or not). To calculate the impact of a standard deviation from the mean for each the explanatory variable we proceed as follows. First, we calculate the percentage increase corresponding to changing the explanatory variable up from the mean by one standard deviation. If we call this percentage p then, in the linear-log models, the impact of a p% increase in the explanatory variable above the mean on the dependent variable can be calculated as $\beta \log[\frac{100+p}{100}]$. This is applied to our estimates in Tables 2, 5, and 8. For our results in Tables 7 and 9, which use a log-log specification, the effect is calculated as $e^{\beta c}$ where $c = \log[(100+p)/100]$.

Table 10
Coverage of the scandal by newspaper (SURE estimates).

Variable	Natural log of total expenses news (May 2009–May 2010)						
	(1) telegraph	(2) times	(3) guardian	(4) indep.	(5) scotsman	(6) sun	(7) daily mail
newspaper							
news-pre	0.1159 ^{***} (0.023)	0.1680 ^{***} (0.024)	0.2317 ^{***} (0.026)	0.1761 ^{***} (0.024)	0.1681 ^{***} (0.025)	0.1799 ^{***} (0.022)	0.1706 ^{***} (0.024)
Legg-money	0.0341 ^{***} (0.008)	0.0560 ^{***} (0.011)	0.0321 ^{***} (0.010)	0.0351 ^{***} (0.009)	0.0325 ^{**} (0.008)	0.0383 ^{**} (0.009)	0.0395 ^{***} (0.008)
cons. backbench	0.1455 (0.090)	0.0912 (0.123)	0.1719 (0.108)	0.0570 (0.095)	0.0905 (0.089)	0.1593 (0.102)	0.0943 (0.092)
cons. frontbench	0.4849 ^{***} (0.185)	0.7184 ^{***} (0.251)	0.4337 [*] (0.221)	0.4892 ^{**} (0.194)	0.5416 ^{***} (0.181)	0.4798 ^{**} (0.209)	0.3317 [*] (0.188)
labour frontbench	1.1262 ^{***} (0.128)	1.3965 ^{***} (0.173)	1.3074 ^{***} (0.152)	1.1852 ^{***} (0.133)	0.9176 ^{***} (0.123)	0.9648 ^{***} (0.143)	1.1651 ^{***} (0.130)
libdem	0.1803 (0.114)	0.0972 (0.155)	0.3060 ^{**} (0.136)	0.0700 (0.120)	0.1550 (0.112)	-0.0605 (0.128)	0.2130 [*] (0.116)
other	-0.1323 (0.173)	0.2004 (0.236)	0.4475 ^{**} (0.207)	0.1845 (0.182)	0.2535 (0.171)	-0.0217 (0.196)	0.0377 (0.177)
female	0.1569 ^{**} (0.077)	0.2560 ^{**} (0.105)	0.2604 ^{***} (0.092)	0.1634 ^{**} (0.081)	0.1196 (0.076)	0.2440 ^{***} (0.087)	0.1683 ^{**} (0.079)
age	0.0020 (0.004)	-0.0040 (0.006)	-0.0034 (0.005)	-0.0060 (0.005)	-0.0079 [*] (0.004)	0.0027 (0.005)	0.0029 (0.005)
seniority	0.0168 ^{***} (0.005)	0.0314 ^{***} (0.007)	0.0295 ^{***} (0.006)	0.0248 ^{***} (0.005)	0.0225 ^{***} (0.005)	0.0145 ^{**} (0.006)	0.0101 [*] (0.005)
degree	0.0753 (0.080)	0.0942 (0.108)	0.1048 (0.095)	0.0166 (0.084)	0.0814 (0.078)	0.1453 (0.090)	0.0510 (0.081)
oxbridge	0.1293 [*] (0.073)	0.1452 (0.100)	0.0547 (0.088)	0.1330 [*] (0.077)	0.0933 (0.072)	0.0391 (0.083)	0.0598 (0.075)
marginal in 2005	-0.0456 (0.075)	-0.1309 (0.102)	-0.1449 (0.089)	-0.0899 (0.079)	-0.0621 (0.073)	-0.0891 (0.084)	-0.1691 ^{**} (0.076)
turnout in 2005	-0.0061 (0.006)	0.0003 (0.008)	-0.0023 (0.007)	-0.0036 (0.006)	-0.0022 (0.006)	0.0044 (0.007)	-0.0035 (0.006)
distance from parl.	0.0012 [*] (0.001)	0.0006 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.0006 (0.001)	0.0007 (0.001)	0.0011 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)
Constant	0.6365 (0.455)	0.0777 (0.619)	0.2717 (0.546)	0.5378 (0.478)	0.3144 (0.448)	-0.7470 (0.515)	0.2578 (0.465)
Observations	600	600	600	600	600	600	600
R-squared	0.3248	0.3507	0.3803	0.3562	0.3558	0.3522	0.3452

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01.

** p < 0.05.

* p < 0.1.

leads to a 7.3% increase in reported news. In turn, a one standard deviation increase in press coverage leads to 5.8% higher probability to step down and to a fall of 0.92% in the votes of standing MPs. Combining the effect of expenses on press coverage and the effect of coverage on the electoral outcomes, we have that one standard deviation increase in irregularly claimed expenses leads to a 0.2% higher probability of resignation and to a 0.003% loss in votes. Any effect is entirely channelled through news-reporting, as there is no independent effect of *Legg-money* either on the probability to step down or on the vote share of standing MPs. Finally, any change that may have occurred in the vote share of MPs involved in the scandal and standing for re-election has led to no change in their probability to be re-elected, which is not surprising given the small magnitudes of the vote losses.




Fig. 2. $\hat{\gamma}_3$ for Conservative (grey) and Labour (black) MPs. The lines are 5% confidence intervals.




Fig. 3. Key channels in the accountability process: quantifying the effects on observables. Note: Squares and normal arrows refer to MP-level variables, circles and bold arrows to individual level variables (from BES). Numbers reported are approximations to the second decimal from our favourite specifications. A one standard deviation change refers to a change in the explanatory variable, the effect on dependent variables is expressed in percentages and reported next to arrows. For log-linear regressions we use the approximation $e^\beta \approx 1 + \beta e$.

Voters’ perception of wrongdoing is influenced by increased misappropriated money both via press coverage (+23% per standard deviation increase in coverage) and via other means (+9.2% per standard deviation increase in misappropriated money). Partisan leaning also has a substantial independent effect on the perceived wrongdoing of an MP (+27% per one standard deviation above the mean). One standard deviation increase above the mean in the perceived involvement of an MP would in turn decrease the probability of voting for him/her by 3.6%. Hence one standard deviation increase above the mean in misappropriated money made voters 1.16% less likely to vote for a standing MP (0.322×0.036). It is also worth noting that by combining the effect of the press on perceived involvement (+23%) with the effect of such perception on the probability of voting for an incumbent MP (-3.6%) we obtain an overall effect of an increase of one standard deviation from the mean in press coverage on the individual probability of voting for an incumbent MP (-0.83%) which is not too far for the (reduced form) impact of the press on aggregate vote shares (-0.92%, derived with constituency level data), showing that these independently estimated effects are consistent with each other.

If we consider how many factors can influence voting, the small effects that we estimate are not negligible. At the same time, punishment was not overwhelming and did not affect the probability of a standing MP to be re-elected. If the final aim of the process is “to remove the rascals”, then retirement of the most involved MPs has been in this case the only mechanism which has actually led to a statistically significant change in the identity of elected representatives. This fact does not reduce the importance of elections in any way, since standing down (or de-selection by local political party organisation) is likely to be driven by fear of punishment in the ballot box.

7. Discussion

Our evidence provides support for theories that stress the importance of information availability for a well-functioning democracy.³¹ The disclosure of information on MPs' detailed expenses items led to a wave of resignations and eventually to voters' punishment of the most involved MPs. Crucially, we find that, while information available on the press matters for resignations and electoral returns, an objective monetary measure of wrongdoing does not have any independent effect. Our findings point to the importance of mass media as watchdogs of power and also adds to a burgeoning literature on media bias and media effects which has been so far mostly focussed on the US press.³² We provide a rather benign assessment of the British press, whose coverage of the scandal appears to have been positively linked to monetary wrongdoing, and mostly focussed on government members.³³ This seems to corroborate other studies which found that media played an important role during the UK expenses scandal and that coverage focussed on high-profile MPs suspected of malfeasance (Graffin et al. 2013).

The question of whether voters punish corrupt politicians has been addressed by numerous previous works.³⁴ The most compelling evidence in this sense has been provided in a paper by Ferraz and Finan (2008), which exploits random audits of Brazilian municipalities carried out as a part of an anticorruption program. They find that corruption discovery substantially reduces mayors' probability of re-election and that this effect is enhanced by the presence of local radio stations. Our findings on mass media are mostly consistent with those of Ferraz and Finan (2008). Differently from them, however, we do not find an effect on the re-election probabilities of standing MPs.³⁵ This is in line with most existing evidence, showing that the electoral punishment is often small and insufficient to prevent the re-election of incumbent corrupt politicians.³⁶ Our analysis shows that partisanship can substantially affect perceptions of corruption and it may be reasonable to assume that partisanship matters most in national elections (where for example most decisions on taxation, public spending and redistribution are taken), while instead the valence of candidates can have a relatively higher impact in local elections, which is the setting of the investigation of Ferraz and Finan (2008).

Before us, evidence that partisanship matters for perceived corruption has been provided by Anduiza et al. (2013) for Spain. In their experimental paper, respondents face a simulated newspaper article after declaring which party they feel closer to. Our paper is the first to provide evidence of a partisan effect on perceived corruption by using observational data.

The importance of partisanship for accountability has also been stressed in Eggers (2014), also based on the British expenses scandal. With reference to England only, Eggers (2014) shows that in Labour-Conservative battlegrounds, where the partisan stakes were presumably higher, implicated MPs were less severely punished.³⁷ Compared with Eggers (2014) we provide evidence that the impact of partisanship on accountability does not only concern voting choices (for a given perception of corruption) where voters choose whether or not to remove a corrupt politician by trading off ideology with valence. Our results go one step further by showing that pre-existing partisanship may even affect the perceptions held by voters about the honesty of their MPs: in other words, cognitive dissonance may remove the trade-off between ideology and valence in the voters' mind. Our conclusion, pointing at the complexity of the role played by prior beliefs (partisanship) in the voters' mind, is that biased perceptions and sticky beliefs can represent formidable obstacles to accountability.³⁸

Two other factors contributed to an overall small electoral punishment: 1) the most involved MPs decided not to run; 2) punishment was "personal" rather than partisan, hence new candidates replacing MPs implicated in the scandal were not punished. This means that the selection effect of elections cannot simply be captured by looking at election results or voting behaviour since politicians may anticipate negative electoral outcomes and decide to stand down. Our conclusion is that elections do keep public officials accountable, at least in the case we study, but that the effect is mostly displayed at the candidacy stage. This echoes the findings of Hirano and Snyder (2012), who, for the US Congress, find that most of the punishment for corrupt incumbents happens in primary elections. The mechanism is clearly different from that operating in the UK, where deselection is determined only by party members and usually induced by party leaders, but highlights again the fact that looking at electoral punishment in general elections could substantially underestimate the capability of democratic systems to "throw out the rascals". Our analysis, together with the

³¹ See for example Ferejohn (1986) and Besley and Prat (2006). For an overview of these theories, see Persson and Tabellini (2000). A fast expanding empirical literature has recently added increasingly reliable evidence of the importance of information for accountability purposes. See for example Besley and Burgess (2002), Besley et al. (2005), Chang et al. (2010), and Ferraz and Finan (2008).

³² See Larcinese et al. (2011) and the references therein. Studies on non-US contexts have also highlighted the important monitoring role of media to help citizens 'disentangle' cases of real versus unfounded corruption, such as Spain (e.g., Costas-Pérez et al. 2012).

³³ Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find instead that the coverage of scandals by the US press follows their partisan leaning (as measured by their electoral endorsements). For more evidence on the US press see also Puglisi and Snyder (2015) and the references therein.

³⁴ See for example Peters and Welch 1980, Jacobson and Dimock (1994) and Hirano and Snyder (2012) for studies of the US Congress.

³⁵ This is unlikely to be due to institutional differences, since the electoral system in the two cases are quite similar and broadly comparable: Brazilian mayors are elected by simple plurality in cities with less than half million inhabitants.

³⁶ See for example Fernandez-Vazquez et al. (2015) and Riera et al. (2013) for Spain, and the survey in Golden (2006). A small electoral effect has also been found in other studies of the UK expenses scandal (see Eggers and Fisher (2011), Johnston and Pattie (2012), Vivyan et al. (2012), and Wagner et al. (2014)), although none of these studies addresses identification concerns.

³⁷ Although our paper and Eggers (2014) reach similar conclusions for what concerns the impact of partisanship on accountability, they differ on a number of dimensions. In particular, Eggers (2014) is exclusively focussed on the role of partisanship and represents the most accurate study on that issue. The scope of our paper is broader and we provide evidence on the whole accountability process (with a special focus on information), with partisanship representing only one of the variables of interest.

³⁸ Our evidence is difficult to entirely reconcile with spatial models of elections populated by rational voters and is more consistent with theories of cognitive dissonance, i.e. the idea that beliefs may be changed to achieve greater internal consistency (Festinger 1957). Other evidence of instances of voters' cognitive dissonance is provided in Beasley and Joslyn (2001) and Mullainathan and Washington (2009). Particularly relevant is the study of Dimock and Jacobson (1995), which studies the aforementioned US House banking scandal and reaches conclusions similar to ours.

evidence from US primaries, points to the importance of pre-electoral accountability. Although most efforts have been devoted to studying the role of elections (and particularly electoral competition) for democratic accountability, the processes that lead to candidate selection have been comparatively understudied, with the exception of the US primaries, which are also elections. Candidate selection in the US is highly decentralised, with parties having less influence than voters in the primary-based system (Ware, 1996). Candidate selection amongst major UK parties, by contrast, combines quite centralised political parties with decentralized selection of candidates by local branches of political parties (Denver, 1988). The general trend in reforms in candidate selection in the UK has both centralized more power with the national parties and yet given more voice to voters and local supporters (Webb, 1994), though party leaders ultimately remain more powerful (Hopkin, 2001). However, the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party in 2015 and in 2016, with widespread support amongst members and low support amongst the National Executive Committee and Parliamentary Labour Party, perhaps indicates that the pendulum has swung in the other direction in the party. There are also cross-country comparisons of candidate selection (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), with more recent scholarship attempting to distil factors that determine the features of candidate selection more generally (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). It is evident from our conclusion the need for a better understanding of the internal organization of political parties. From a practical point of view, improving the internal democracy of parties is probably as important for democratic accountability as having competitive elections. And precisely like in the case of US primaries, it might be important to regulate party organizations so that they can efficiently perform their important selection role.

There are two other contributions emerging from our paper deserving separate discussions. First, the results indicate a significant gendered effect: we provide robust evidence that female MPs were subject to higher scandal-related coverage in the press, had a higher probability to stand down as a reaction to press coverage, and suffered higher loss of votes in 2010 compared to 2005. At this stage we can only speculate on the underlying reasons for these findings. There is an extensive literature on the difference of the volume (Kahn, 1994a, 1994b; Jalazai, 2006) and tone (Romaine, 1999; Murray, 2010) of media coverage of female politicians compared to male politicians which is consistent with our findings on press coverage. Core attitudes about gender and morality can in turn both influence and be influenced by the media. An extensive literature analyses the different public expectations on ruthless, ambitious males contrasted with stereotypical “ethical” or “nurturing” females (Gilligan, 1982; Ones and Viswesvaran, 1998; Eagly and Crowley, 1986; Piliavin and Unger, 1985; Hoffman, 1977; Johnson and Aries, 1983). This contrast may have led to greater punishment of female MPs compared to their male counterparts.³⁹ A recent large-scale survey after the expenses scandal concluded that female British MPs in particular felt that their family lives were strained (Byrne and Theakston, 2015). Our findings can also be related to the work of Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), who find that the probability of early termination of Italian city councils is higher when the mayor is a female and that this gender effect increases in male-dominated legislatures, highlighting the hurdles faced by female politicians in a male-dominated environment.⁴⁰ A number of papers (not related to politics and election) also tend to show that females are on average less inclined to engage and perform well in more competitive situations (Gneezy et al 2003; Niederle and Versterlund, 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011), which could explain our findings that female MPs involved in the scandal were, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to retire.

Finally, although we have tried to highlight the general relevance of our findings for the literature on democratic accountability, our analysis is also related to the political science literature on the British political system. In particular we provide evidence of a “personal vote” (Cain et al. 1990), whereby MPs that have been deemed to have exploited the expenses system are punished if they stand for office in the 2010 general election, but there is no significant electoral punishment for a disgraced MP’s political party if she/he stands down or resigns. This suggests that, even in the British system, where voting behaviour has mostly been associated with partisanship and social class,⁴¹ the personal identities of candidates matter. However, as mentioned above, partisanship still mediates perceptions of wrongdoing, so that voter political party affinities affect the likelihood of sanctioning an incumbent MP for her/his behaviour.

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³⁹ Some scholars have concluded that an increase in accountability can be fostered through greater female political participation (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001), although this relationship may be spurious (Sung 2002).

⁴⁰ In subsequent work, Gagliarducci and Paserman (2014) stress females’ higher propensity to cooperate in legislatures.

⁴¹ See, for example, Evans (2000).

Appendix A

A1 The MPs' expenses scandal: background information

A1.1 Brief description of the MPs expenses allowance system

See Table A1–A3.

The annual salary of an MP at the time the scandal erupted was £64,766.⁴² In addition to annual salaries, Members are also able to claim expenses in a number of different ways. Members from constituencies outside London would be able to claim the Additional Costs Allowance (ACA), which would be compensation for staying away from their primary residence to conduct business related to

Table A1

Newspaper Readership (2009–2010).

Source: National Readership Survey

National daily newspapers	Total copies (thousands)	Share
The Sun	7700	15.5
Daily Mail	4739	9.5
Daily Mirror/Record	4004	8
The Daily Telegraph	1751	3.5
The Times	1613	3.2
Daily Star	1551	3.1
Daily Express	1423	2.9
The Guardian	1130	2.3
The Independent	556	1.1
Financial Times	391	0.8
<u>Regional daily newspapers (outside London)</u>		
Press & Jnl-Ab'deen	207	0.4
Yorkshire Post	177	0.4
Cour & Adtsr-Dundee	168	0.3
The Herald-Scotland	145	0.3
The Scotsman	131	0.3
Evening Times-Glasgw	151	0.3
<u>Sunday newspapers</u>		
News of the World	7628	15.3
The Mail on Sunday	4974	10
Sunday Mirror	3816	7.7
The Sunday Times	3050	6.1
Sunday Express	1518	3
The Sunday Telegraph	1518	3
The People	1291	2.6
Sunday Mail	1109	2.2
The Observer	1078	2.2
Daily Star Sunday	941	1.9
The Sunday Post	799	1.6
The Independent on Sunday	594	1.2
Scotland on Sunday	191	0.4
Sunday Herald-Scot	142	0.3

their Parliamentary duties. The ACA was £24,006 at the time of the scandal.⁴³ The Incidental Expenses Provision (IEP) could be used to meet the costs related to running offices or surgeries, including: accommodation; equipment; and communications. The IEP was £22,193. Members received a separate Staffing Allowance of £90,854. The IEP can also be used to offset certain costs related to staffing, and 10% of the Staffing Allowance can be channelled into the IEP if Members run a constituency office. Members received a Communications Allowance of £10,400 that could draw funds from the ACA, but not *vice versa*. MPs also received a number of benefits through travel allowances.⁴⁴

⁴² 'Members' pay, pensions and allowances' (Factsheet M5, revised), House of Commons Information Office, July 2011.

⁴³ Members from Inner London constituencies were eligible for a London Supplement, instead of the ACA. The Supplement was paid with the MP monthly salary, and was subject to tax and National Insurance, and could not be used to contribute to the Member's pension. Outer London MPs could choose to either claim an ACA or London Supplement. The London Supplement was £2,916.

⁴⁴ Rail and air travel between Westminster and the constituency for Parliamentary business would be paid, as well as claims for mileage. There was a similar category for travel allowances to places in the UK on Parliamentary business that were outside the constituency. Furthermore, MPs received travel and subsistence costs for up to three visits per year to EU institutions, EU agencies, the national parliaments of EU member states, European Free Trade Association states, or candidate countries. Immediate family members of the MP and MP staff were also covered by the travel allowances.

Table A2

Description of variables and summary statistics (constituencies and MPs).

	n	Mean	s.d.	min	max
Indicators of involvement in the scandal					
Total mentions of MP name+expenses, 8 May 2009 - 7 Aug 2010	359	27.03	59.35	0	563
Total mentions of MP name, 8 Feb - 7 May 2009	359	38.94	113.43	0	1387
Money owed according to Legg Report minus amount reduced in appeal	359	1568.94	4375.44	0	42,458.21
MP voting behaviour					
Number of loyal votes between 1 June 2008 and 7 May 2009 [loyal_before]	359	164.70	39.57	0	238
Number of vote rebellions between 1 June 2008 and 7 May 2009 [rebel_before]	359	4.41	5.83	0	52
Number of missed votes between 1 June 2008 and 7 May 2009 [absent_before]	359	81.73	37.54	10	252
Number of loyal votes between 8 May 2009 and 1 May 2010 [loyal_after]	359	173.03	47.40	0	256
Number of vote rebellions between 8 May 2009 and 1 May 2010 [rebel_after]	359	1.51	5.02	0	57
Number of missed votes between 8 May 2009 and 1 May 2010 [absent_after]	359	92.86	44.75	5	269
Media coverage					
Mentions of MP name in The Daily Telegraph - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [telegraph0]	359	4.09	13.38	0	171
Mentions of MP name in The Times - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [times0]	359	10.33	30.29	0	307
Mentions of MP name in The Independent - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [independent0]	359	3.78	11.69	0	126
Mentions of MP name in The Guardian - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [guardian0]	359	5.49	15.74	0	192
Mentions of MP name in The Scotsman - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [scotsman0]	359	3.60	18.72	0	312
Mentions of MP name in The Sun - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [sun0]	359	6.81	24.13	0	328
Mentions of MP name in The Daily Mail - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 [dailymail0]	359	4.84	14.31	0	210
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Daily Telegraph - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [telegraph]	359	4.12	8.41	0	80
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Times - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [times]	359	6.62	15.39	0	139
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Independent - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [independent]	359	3.14	6.93	0	55
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Guardian - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [guardian]	359	4.43	10.15	0	86
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Scotsman - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [scotsman]	359	2.49	5.73	0	54
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Sun - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [sun]	359	3.35	8.46	0	94
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Daily Mail - 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [dailymail]	359	2.88	7.73	0	87
Individual characteristics of MPs					
Age in years in 2009 [age]	359	54.91	9.28	29	79
Years in Parliament in 2009 [seniority]	359	13.30	8.12	4	45
Variables referred to electoral constituency					
Difference of party vote-share between 2005 and 2010 [dparty]	356	-1.72	7.12	-18.63	16.84
Winning majority % in the 2005 general election [maj05]	359	17.82	11.86	0.03	58.39
Distance from constituency office to Parliament [distance]	359	161.26	143.10	0	702
Voter turnout in MP constituency in 2005 election [turn05]	359	61.71	5.77	37.62	76.43
% boundary change since 2005 election	359	2.93	3.17	0	10

	n	Mean
Binary variables		
Labour MP [lab]	193	166
Conservative MP [con]	242	117
Liberal Democrat MP [libdem]	320	39
MP from other party [other]	349	10
Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat front bench on 7 May 2009 [front07052009]	313	46
Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat front bench on 11 April 2005 [front11042005]	319	40
Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat front bench on 12 April 2010 [front12042010]	312	47
MP stood down, resigned or was deselected between May 2009 and the 2010 general election [ret_affected]	310	49
MP stood down, resigned or was deselected before May 2009 [ret_notaff]	332	27
Female MP	294	65
MP has university degree	75	284
MP graduated from Oxford or Cambridge	256	103
Constituency with < 10% majority in 2005 election (marginal)	253	106
Constituency boundary change since 2005 election	122	237

Note. The number of observations (n) refers to the sample most commonly used in our regressions. We exclude abolished constituencies, constituencies where retiring MPs were replaced by sitting MPs for the 2010 election, Northern Ireland constituencies and constituencies with a boundary change greater than 10%. The PublicWhip profiles for each MP were used to identify which Members were on the front bench for Labour, Conservatives, or Liberal Democrats by compiling data on whether individuals had roles containing the following words: Minister of State; Foreign Secretary; Home Secretary; Chancellor; and Prime Minister. This would also include Shadow equivalents, such as “Leader of the Opposition” and “Shadow Chancellor”. The lists of front bench members for the three main political parties were compiled for three dates: 5 April 2005 (the date the 2001–2005 Parliament was dissolved); 7 May 2009 (the date before The Telegraph publication of detailed MP expenses); and 12 April 2010 (the date that the 2005–2010 Parliament was dissolved).

AI.2 Background information on the expenses scandal

The publication of detailed MP expenses and the public scandal that followed represents the culmination of a political process that was driven by two predominant factors: the slow implementation and political resistance to the Freedom of Information Act (2000) [FOIA]; and the non-transparent allowances system that relied on Members of Parliament to regulate their own claims.

The Parliament ratified FOIA in November 2000, with provisions of the legislation gradually coming into force, with full implementation on 1 January 2005. It contained far-reaching measures for freedom of information legislation that would apply to all public bodies, not only covering the two Houses of Parliament and devolved governmental bodies in Scotland and Wales, but also local authorities, the NHS, Armed Forces, education institutions, public broadcasters, and quasi-NGOs.⁴⁵

In a test of the newly-implemented FOIA, some journalists made a number of requests to Parliament to disclose Member expense claims, but these requests were rejected. After an appeal, the Information Commissioner ordered the House of Commons to provide detailed ACA claims with receipt. Despite the ruling, MPs continued attempts to block detailed disclosure of MP expenses. Speaker Michael Martin (whose expenses were under scrutiny) and a number of senior MPs appealed to the High Court in May 2008 to overturn the Information Commissioner's decision, but the Court ruled against the House of Commons appeal. The Government finally proposed a statement on reforming MP expenses claims, including the full disclosure of receipts from 1 July 2009. However, *The Daily Telegraph* published detailed expenses leaked to the newspaper by a "mole" in Whitehall who was working for a contractor. According to the Assistant Editor of *The Daily Telegraph*, the insider had been given a one-off payment of £110,000 for the data, which the newspaper felt was worthwhile on public interest grounds (Winnett and Rayner, 2009). The House of Commons appealed to the Metropolitan Police to start a criminal investigation about the leak, but the police refused to do so, since it would not serve the public interest.

The details of MP expenses shocked and angered the public, and forced leaders from all three major political parties to react immediately. Some of the claims became symbolic of political corruption and greed.⁴⁶ To restore confidence in MPs and the system of expenses, Sir Thomas Legg was commissioned to audit all MP expenses made under the ACA between 2004 and 2008. During the review, Sir Legg contacted certain MPs to request to justify the claims and asked some for repayment. The report into the ACA claims 2004–2008 was published in February 2010.

The detailed expenses claims published by *The Telegraph* also illustrated systematic exploitation of the allowances system that carried on without transparency and oversight. There were a number of "tricks of the trade" that MPs used to maximise the benefits of their allowances (see Rayner, 2009). Some of the MP activities were examined more closely as potential criminal cases. There were six Members of Parliament who were under police investigation before the 2010 general election: Lord Taylor and Lord Hanningfield from the House of Lords; and David Chaytor, Jim Devine, Eric Illsley, and Elliot Morley from the House of Commons. All six were eventually found guilty of charges related to expenses and sent to prison.

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⁴⁵ The White Paper was written before the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.

⁴⁶ Among these "Douglas Hogg included with his expenses claims the cost of having the moat cleared, piano tuned and stable lights fixed at his country manor house."; and "Sir Peter Viggers included with his expense claims the £1,645 cost of a floating duck house in the garden pond at his Hampshire home".
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstoppers/mps-expenses/5297606/MPs-expenses-Full-list-of-MPs-investigated-by-the-Telegraph.html>.

Table A3

Description of variables and summary statistics (British Election Study).

Variable	n	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
perceived involvement (continuous)	3247	2.439	3.381	0	11
perceived involvement (binary)	3247	0.425	0.494	0	1
voted for the party of incumbent MP	3169	0.441	0.497	0	1
voted for the MP in 2005	3247	0.484	0.5	0	1
income	3247	7.261	3.666	1	16
gender (male)	3247	0.567	0.496	0	1
trust others	3247	5.895	2.17	0	10
attention to politics	3247	7.107	2.064	0	10
age	3247	53.978	13.094	21	90
partisan match	3247	0.394	0.489	0	1
Respondent thinks most MPs are corrupt	3097	2.221	1.208	0	4
press usage	3097	3.343	1.472	1	5
television usage	3097	3.331	1.106	1	5
internet usage	3097	2.158	0.761	1	3
	n	%			
Education					
finished full time education 15 or younger	421	13.52			
finished full time education 16	687	22.05			
finished full time education 17	306	9.82			
finished full time education 18	382	12.26			
finished ft educ. 19 or still at school	408	13.1			
university degree	519	16.66			
postgraduate	392	12.58			
Party identification					
Labour	995	31.94			
Conservative	926	29.73			
Liberal Democratic	406	13.03			
Other	376	12.07			
None	412	13.23			
Democracy satisfaction					
very satisfied	171	5.49			
fairly satisfied	1,248	40.06			
little dissatisfied	1,053	33.8			
very dissatisfied	643	20.64			

Note: the sample size (n) refers to the largest number of observations used for a specific variable among the various specifications.

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