Volatility, Valuation Ratios, and Bubbles: An Empirical Measure of Market Sentiment

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Abstract

We define a sentiment indicator based on option prices, valuation ratios and interest rates. The indicator can be interpreted as a lower bound on the expected growth in fundamentals that a rational investor would have to perceive in order to be happy to hold the market. The lower bound was unusually high in the late 1990s, reflecting dividend growth expectations that in our view were unreasonably optimistic. We show that our measure is a leading indicator of detrended volume, and of various other measures associated with financial fragility. Our approach depends on two key ingredients. First, we derive a new valuation-ratio decomposition that is related to the Campbell and Shiller (1988) loglinearization, but which resembles the Gordon growth model more closely and has certain other advantages. Second, we introduce a volatility index that provides a lower bound on the market’s expected log return.

Ian Martin: London School of Economics, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/martiniw/ We thank John Campbell, Stefan Nagel, Patrick Bolton, Ander Perez-Orive, Alan Moreira, Paul Schneider, and seminar participants at Duke University and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for their comments. Ian Martin is grateful to the ERC for support under Starting Grant 639744.
This paper introduces a market sentiment indicator that exploits two contrasting views of market predictability.

A vast literature has studied the extent to which signals based on valuation ratios are able to forecast market returns and/or measures of dividend growth; early papers include Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Fama and French (1988). More recently, Martin (2017) argued that indexes of implied volatility based on option prices can serve as forecasts of expected excess returns; and noted that the two classes of predictor variables made opposing forecasts in the late 1990s, with valuation ratios pointing to low long-run returns and option prices pointing to high short-run returns.

Our paper trades off the two views of the world against one other. Consider the classic Gordon growth model, which relates the market’s dividend yield to its expected return minus expected dividend growth: \( \frac{D}{P} = \mathbb{E}(R - G) \). Very loosely speaking, the idea behind the paper is to use option prices to measure \( \mathbb{E}R \), and then to calculate the expected growth in fundamentals implicit in market valuations—our sentiment measure—as the difference between the option price index and dividend yield, \( \mathbb{E}G = \mathbb{E}R - \mathbb{E}(R - G) \).

Putting this thought into practice is not as easy as it might seem, however. For example, the Gordon growth model relies on assumptions that expected returns and expected dividend growth are constant over time. The loglinearized identity of Campbell and Shiller (1988) showed how to generalize the Gordon growth model to the empirically relevant case in which these quantities are time-varying. Their identity relates the price-dividend ratio of an asset to its expected future log dividend growth and expected log returns. It is often characterized as saying that high valuation ratios signal high expected dividend growth or low expected returns (or both).

But expected returns are not the same as expected log returns. We show that high valuations—and low expected log returns—may be consistent with high expected returns if log returns are highly volatile, right-skewed, or fat-tailed. Plausibly, all of these conditions were satisfied in the late 1990s. As they are all potential explanations for the rise in valuation ratios at that time, we will need to be careful about the distinction between log returns and simple returns.

Furthermore, we show that while the Campbell–Shiller identity is highly ac-
curate on average, the linearization is most problematic at times when the price-dividend ratio is far above its long-run mean. At such times—the late 1990s being a leading example—a researcher who uses the Campbell–Shiller loglinearization will conclude that long-run expected returns are even lower, and/or long-run expected dividend growth is even higher, than is actually the case.

We therefore propose a new linearization that does not have this feature, but which also relates a measure of dividend yield to expected log returns and dividend growth. Our approach exploits a measure of dividend yield $y_t = \log (1 + D_t/P_t)$ that has the advantage of being in “natural” units, unlike the quantity $dp_t = \log D_t/P_t$ that features in the Campbell–Shiller approach. As a bonus, the resulting identity bears a closer resemblance to the traditional Gordon growth model—which it generalizes to allow for time-varying expected returns and dividend growth—than does the Campbell–Shiller loglinearization.

The second ingredient of our paper is a lower bound on expected log returns. (This plays the role of $E_R$ in the loose description above.) The lower bound relies on an assumption closely related to the negative correlation condition of Martin (2017); it can be computed directly from index option prices so is, broadly speaking, a measure of implied volatility.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the link between valuation ratios, returns, and dividend growth; it analyzes the properties of the Campbell–Shiller loglinearization, introduces our alternative loglinearization, and studies the predictive relationship between the dividend yield measures and future (log) returns and (log) dividend growth. Section 2 derives the lower bound on expected returns. Section 3 combines the preceding sections to introduce the sentiment indicator. Section 4 explores its relationship with volume and with various other indicators of financial conditions. Section 5 concludes.

1 Fundamentals

We seek to exploit the information in valuation ratios, following Campbell and Shiller (1988). We write $P_{t+1}$, $D_{t+1}$ and $R_{t+1}$ for the level, dividend, and gross
return of the market, respectively: thus

\[ R_{t+1} = \frac{D_{t+1} + P_{t+1}}{P_t}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

It follows from (1) that

\[ r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = pd_{t+1} - pd_t + \log \left( 1 + e^{dp_{t+1}} \right), \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where we write \( dp_{t+1} = d_{t+1} - p_{t+1} = \log D_{t+1} - \log P_{t+1} \), \( pd_{t+1} = p_{t+1} - d_{t+1} \), and \( g_{t+1} = d_{t+1} - d_t \). Campbell and Shiller (1988) linearized the final term in (2) to derive a decomposition of the (log) price-dividend ratio

\[ pd_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t \left( g_{t+1+i} - r_{t+1+i} \right), \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where the constants \( k \) and \( \rho \) are determined by

\[ \rho = \frac{\mu}{1 + \mu} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{k}{1 - \rho} = (1 + \mu) \log(1 + \mu) - \mu \log \mu, \quad \text{where} \quad \mu = e^{pd}. \]

The approximation (3) is often loosely summarized by saying that high valuation ratios signal high expected dividend growth or low expected returns (or both). But expected log returns are not the same as expected returns.\( ^1 \) We have

\[ \mathbb{E}_t r_{t+1+i} = \log \mathbb{E}_t R_{t+1+i} - \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t r_{t+1+i} - \sum_{n=3}^{\infty} \frac{\kappa^{(n)}_t(r_{t+1+i})}{n!}, \]

where \( \kappa^{(n)}_t(r_{t+1+i}) \) is the \( n \)th conditional cumulant of the log return. (If returns are conditionally lognormal, then the higher cumulants \( \kappa^{(n)}_t(r_{t+1+i}) \) are zero for \( n \geq 3 \).) Thus high valuations—and low expected log returns—may be consistent

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\( ^1 \)We follow the convention in the literature in writing approximations such as (3) with equals signs. A number of our results below are in fact exact. We emphasize these as they occur. We also assume throughout the paper that there are no rational bubbles, as is standard in the literature. Thus, for example, in deriving (3) we are assuming that \( \lim_{T \to \infty} \rho T pd_T = 0. \)

\( ^2 \)And expected log dividend growth is not the same as expected dividend growth. This distinction is less important, however, as log dividend growth is less volatile than log returns.
with high expected arithmetic returns if log returns are highly volatile, right-skewed, or fat-tailed. Plausibly, all of these conditions were satisfied in the late 1990s. As they are all potential explanations for the rise in valuation ratios at that time, we will need to be careful about the distinction between log returns and simple returns.

Furthermore, the Campbell–Shiller first-order approximation is least accurate when the valuation ratio is far from its mean, as we now show.

**Result 1 (Campbell–Shiller revisited).** The log price-dividend ratio $pd_t$ obeys the following exact decomposition:

$$pd_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (gt_{t+1+i} - rt_{t+1+i}) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \psi_{t+1+i} (1 - \psi_{t+1+i}) (pd_{t+1+i} - \overline{pd})^2 ,$$

where the constants $k$ and $\rho$ are defined as above, and the quantities $\psi_{t+1+i}$ lie between $\rho$ and $1/(1 + e^{dp_{t+1+i}})$.

Equation (4) becomes a second-order Taylor approximation if $\psi_t$ is assumed equal to $\rho$ for all $t$,

$$pd_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (gt_{t+1+i} - rt_{t+1+i}) + \frac{\rho(1 - \rho)}{2} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (pd_{t+1+i} - \overline{pd})^2 ,$$

and reduces to the Campbell–Shiller loglinearization (3) if the final term on the right-hand side of (4) is neglected entirely.

Proof. Taylor’s theorem, with the Lagrange form of the remainder, states that (for any sufficiently well-behaved function $f$, and for $x \in \mathbb{R}$ and $a \in \mathbb{R}$)

$$f(x) = f(a) + (x - a)f'(a) + \frac{1}{2} (x - a)^2 f''(\xi) ,$$

for some $\xi$ between $a$ and $x$. (6)

We apply this result with $f(x) = \log (1 + e^x)$, $x = dp_{t+1}$, and $a = \overline{dp} = \mathbb{E} dp_t$ equal to the mean log dividend yield. Equation (6) becomes

$$\log (1 + e^{dp_{t+1}}) = k + (1 - \rho)dp_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} \psi_{t+1}(1 - \psi_{t+1}) (dp_{t+1} - \overline{dp})^2 ,$$

See, for example, Pástor and Veronesi (2003, 2006).
where \( \psi_{t+1} = 1/(1 + e^{\xi}) \) must lie between \( 1/(1 + e^{dp}) = \rho \) and \( 1/(1 + e^{dp_{t+1}}) \).

Substituting into expression (2), we have the exact relationship

\[
rt_{t+1} - gt_{t+1} = k - pd_t + \rho pd_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} \psi_{t+1}(1 - \psi_{t+1}) \left(pd_{t+1} - \bar{pd}\right)^2
\]

which can be solved forward to give the result (4). The approximation (5) follows.


This convexity correction is small on average. Take the unconditional expectation of second-order approximation (5):

\[
\mathbb{E}pd_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \frac{\mathbb{E}(g_t - r_t)}{1 - \rho} + \frac{\rho}{2} \text{var} pd_t,
\]

assuming that \( pd_t, r_t, \) and \( g_t \) are stationary so that their unconditional means and variances are well defined. Using CRSP data from 1947 to 2017, the sample average of \( pd_t \) is 3.483 (so that \( \rho \) is 0.970) and the sample standard deviation is 0.436. Thus the unconditional average convexity correction \( \frac{\rho}{2} \text{var} pd_t \) is about 0.0924, that is, about 2.65% of the size of \( \mathbb{E}pd_t \).

The convexity correction can be large conditionally, however. We have

\[
pd_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t \left(g_{t+1+i} - r_{t+1+i}\right) + \frac{\rho(1 - \rho)}{2} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t \left(pd_{t+1+i} - \bar{pd}\right)^2,
\]

and the final term may be quantitatively important if the valuation ratio is far from its mean and persistent, so that it is expected to remain far from its mean for a significant length of time.

For the sake of argument, suppose the log price-dividend ratio follows an AR(1), \( pd_{t+1} - \bar{pd} = \phi(pd_t - \bar{pd}) + \varepsilon_{t+1} \), where \( \text{var} \varepsilon_{t+1} = \sigma^2 \) so that \( \text{var} pd_t = \sigma^2/(1 - \phi^2) \); and set \( \sigma = 0.168 \) and \( \phi = 0.923 \) to match the sample standard deviation and autocorrelation in CRSP data from 1947–2017. The above expression
becomes

\[ pd_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t (g_{t+1+i} - r_{t+1+i}) + \frac{\rho (1 - \rho) \phi^2}{2 (1 - \rho \phi^2)} \left( \frac{(pd_t - \overline{pd})}{1 - \rho \phi} \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{(1 - \rho \phi^2)}. \]

At its peak during the boom of the late 1990s, \( pd_t \) was 2.2 standard deviations above its mean. The convexity term then equals 0.145: this is the amount by which a researcher using the Campbell–Shiller approximation would overstate \( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t (g_{t+1+i} - r_{t+1+i}) \). With \( \rho = 0.970 \), this is equivalent to overstating \( \mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1+i} - r_{t+1+i} \) by 14.5 percentage points for one year, 3.1 percentage points for five years, or 1.0 percentage points for 20 years.\(^4\)

The Campbell–Shiller approximation does not apply if \( dp_t \) follows a random walk (i.e., \( \mathbb{E}_t dp_{t+1} = dp_t \)). But in that case we can linearize (2) around the conditional mean \( \mathbb{E}_t dp_{t+1} \) to find\(^5\)

\[ \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) = \log (1 + e^{dp_t}) = \log \left( 1 + \frac{D_t}{P_t} \right). \]

Motivated by this fact,\(^6\) we define \( y_t = \log (1 + D_t/P_t) \). An appealing property of this definition—and one that \( dp_t \) does not possess—is that \( y_t = \log (1 + D_t/P_t) \approx D_t/P_t \). We can then rewrite the definition of the log return (2) as the (exact) relationship

\[ r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = y_t + \log \left( 1 - e^{-y_t} \right) - \log \left( 1 - e^{-y_{t+1}} \right). \]

\(^4\)The numbers are more dramatic if we use the long sample from 1871–2015 available on Robert Shiller’s website. We find \( \rho = 0.960, \sigma = 0.136, \) and \( \phi = 0.942 \) in the long sample, so that the convexity correction is 0.0596 when \( pd_t \) is at its mean, and 0.253 at the peak (which was 3.2 standard deviations above the mean). This last number corresponds to overstating \( \mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1+i} - r_{t+1+i} \) by 25.3 percentage points for one year, 5.5 percentage points for five years, 1.8 percentage points for 20 years, or 1.0 percentage points for ever.

\(^5\)Campbell (2008, 2018) derives the same result via a different route, but makes further assumptions (that the driving shocks are homoskedastic and conditionally Normal) that we do not require.

\(^6\)As further motivation, this measure of dividend yield also emerges naturally in i.i.d. models with power utility or Epstein–Zin preferences, as shown by Martin (2013).
In these terms, equation (7) states that

\[ y_t = \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}), \]  

(9)

which is valid, as a first-order approximation, if \( dp_t \) (or \( y_t \)) follows a random walk.

Alternatively, if \( y_t \) is stationary (as is almost always assumed in the literature) we have the following result. We write unconditional means as \( \bar{y} = \mathbb{E} y_t \), \( \bar{r} = \mathbb{E} r_t \) and \( \bar{g} = \mathbb{E} g_t \).

**Result 2** (A variant of the Gordon growth model). We have the loglinearization

\[ y_t = \left(1 - \rho \right) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (r_{t+1+i} - g_{t+1+i}), \]  

(10)

where\[ \rho = e^{-\bar{y}}. \] As there is no constant in (10), and as \( (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i = 1 \), this is a variant of the Gordon growth model: \( y \) is a weighted average of future \( r - g \).

To second order, we have the approximation

\[ y_t = \left(1 - \rho \right) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (r_{t+1+i} - g_{t+1+i}) - \frac{1}{2} \rho \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \left[ (y_{t+1+i} - \bar{y})^2 - (y_{t+i} - \bar{y})^2 \right]. \]  

(11)

We also have the exact relationship

\[ \bar{y} = \bar{r} - \bar{g}, \]  

(12)

which does not rely on any approximation.

**Proof.** Using Taylor’s theorem to second order in equation (8), we have the second-order approximation

\[ r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} y_t - \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} y_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\rho}{(1 - \rho)^2} \left[ (y_{t+1} - \bar{y})^2 - (y_t - \bar{y})^2 \right] \]

\( ^7 \)This differs slightly from the definition of \( \rho \) in Result 1 though they are extremely close in practice.
which can be rewritten
\[ y_t = (1 - \rho)(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) + \rho y_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} \left[ (y_{t+1} - \bar{y})^2 - (y_t - \bar{y})^2 \right], \]
and then solved forward, giving (10) and (11). Equation (12) follows by taking expectations of the identity (8) and noting that \( \mathbb{E} \log (1 - e^{-y_t}) = \mathbb{E} \log (1 - e^{-y_{t+1}}) \) by stationarity of \( y_t \).

We note in passing that equation (12) implies that \( \bar{r} > \bar{g} \) in any model in which \( y_t \) is stationary. Piketty (2015) writes that “the inequality \( r > g \) holds true in the steady-state equilibrium of the most common economic models, including representative-agent models where each individual owns an equal share of the capital stock.” Our result shows that the inequality applies much more generally and does not rely on equilibrium logic.

Given our focus on bubbles, we are particularly interested in the accuracy of these loglinearizations at times when valuation ratios are unusually high or, equivalently, when \( dp_t \) and \( y_t \) are unusually low. This motivates the following definition and result.

**Definition 1.** We say that \( y_t \) is far from its mean (at time \( t \)) if
\[ \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (y_{t+1+i} - \bar{y})^2 \right] \leq (y_t - \bar{y})^2 \text{ for all } i \geq 0. \] (13)

*Example.*—If \( y_t \) follows an AR(1), then a direct calculation shows that \( y_t \) is far from its mean if and only if it is at least one standard deviation from its mean.

**Result 3** (Signing the approximation errors). We can sign the approximation error in the Campbell–Shiller loglinearization (3):
\[ dp_t < -\frac{k}{1 - \rho} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t \left( r_{t+1+i} - g_{t+1+i} \right). \] (14)

The first-order approximation (10) is exact on average. That is,
\[ \mathbb{E} y_t = (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E} \left( r_{t+1+i} - g_{t+1+i} \right) \] (15)
holds exactly, without any approximation. But if \( y_t \) is far from its mean then (up to a second-order approximation)

\[
y_t \geq (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1+i} - g_{t+1+i}).
\]

**Proof.** The inequality (14) follows immediately from (4) and equation (15) follows directly from equation (12). To establish the inequality (16), rewrite

\[
\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \left[ (y_{t+1+i} - \bar{y})^2 - (y_{t+i} - \bar{y})^2 \right] = -(y_t - \bar{y})^2 + (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (y_{t+1+i} - \bar{y})^2 = (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i \left[ (y_{t+1+i} - \bar{y})^2 - (y_t - \bar{y})^2 \right].
\]

(17)

The inequality then follows from (11), (13), and (17). \qed

Dividend yields, whether measured by \( dp_t \) or by \( y_t \), were unusually low around the turn of the millennium, indicating some combination of low future returns and high future dividend growth. Result 3 shows that an econometrician who uses the Campbell–Shiller approximation (3) at such a time—that is, who treats the inequality (14) as an equality—will overstate how low future returns, or how high future dividend growth, must be: and therefore may be too quick to conclude that the market is “bubbly.” In contrast, an econometrician who uses the approximation (10) will understate how low future returns, or how high future dividend growth, must be. Thus \( y_t \) is a conservative diagnostic for bubbles.

To place more structure on the relationship between valuation ratios and \( r \) and \( g \), we will make an assumption about the evolution of \( dp_t \) and \( y_t \) over time. For now we will rely on an AR(1) assumption to keep things simple; in Section 3.1 we report the corresponding results assuming AR(2) or AR(3) processes.

The Campbell–Shiller approximation over one period states that \( r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = k + dp_t - \rho dp_{t+1} \). If \( dp_t \) follows an AR(1) with autocorrelation \( \phi \) then \( \mathbb{E}_t dp_{t+1} - \bar{dp} = \phi (dp_t - \bar{dp}) \), so

\[
\mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) = c + (1 - \rho \phi) dp_t,
\]

(18)
where we have absorbed constant terms into $c$.

Conversely, the first-order approximation underlying Result \ref{Result2} implies that

\begin{equation}
\mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) = \frac{1}{1-\rho} y_t - \rho \mathbb{E}_t y_{t+1}.
\end{equation}

(19)

If $y_t$ follows an AR(1) with autocorrelation $\phi_y$ then this reduces to

\begin{equation}
\mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) = c + \frac{1 - \rho \phi_y}{1 - \rho} y_t,
\end{equation}

(20)

where again we absorb constants into the intercept $c$. In view of (12), this can also be written without an intercept as

\begin{equation}
\mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) - (\bar{r} - \bar{g}) = \frac{1 - \rho \phi_y}{1 - \rho} (y_t - \bar{y}),
\end{equation}

so that the deviation of $y_t$ from its long-run mean is proportional to the deviation of conditionally expected $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ from its long-run mean. A further advantage of $y_t$ over $dp_t$ is that the expression (20) is also meaningful if $y_t$ follows a random walk: in this case, the coefficient on $y_t$ equals one and the intercept is zero, by equation (9).

Equations (18) and (20) motivate regressions of realized $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ onto $dp_t$ and a constant, or onto $y_t$ and a constant. The results are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RHS$_t$</th>
<th>LHS$_{t+1}$</th>
<th>$\hat{a}_0$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{a}_1$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_t$</td>
<td>$r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$</td>
<td>-0.067 [0.049]</td>
<td>3.415 [1.317]</td>
<td>7.73%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$r_{t+1}$</td>
<td>-0.018 [0.050]</td>
<td>3.713 [1.215]</td>
<td>10.51%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$-g_{t+1}$</td>
<td>-0.049 [0.028]</td>
<td>-0.298 [0.812]</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dp_t$</td>
<td>$r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$</td>
<td>0.417 [0.146]</td>
<td>0.107 [0.042]</td>
<td>7.58%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$r_{t+1}$</td>
<td>0.500 [0.138]</td>
<td>0.114 [0.041]</td>
<td>9.92%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$-g_{t+1}$</td>
<td>-0.083 [0.085]</td>
<td>-0.007 [0.024]</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where we also report the results of regressing $r_{t+1}$ and $-g_{t+1}$ separately onto $y_t$ and onto $d_{Pt}$. We use end-of-year observations of the price level and accumulated dividends of the S&P 500 index from CRSP. The table reports regression results in the form

$$LHS_{t+1} = a_0 + a_1 \times RHS_t + \varepsilon_{t+1},$$

with Hansen–Hodrick standard errors. (Under the AR(1) assumption, we could also use (18) or (20) as estimates of $\mathbb{E}_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$. This approach turns out to give very similar results, as we show in Table 11 of the appendix.)

The variables $y_t$ and $d_{Pt}$ have similar predictive performance and, consistent with the prior literature, we find, in the post-1947 sample, that valuation ratios help to forecast returns but have limited forecasting power for dividend growth. Table 2 reports results using cash reinvested dividends in the post-1926 period, which is the longest sample CRSP has. Tables 3 and 4 report similar results using semi-annual data. Tables 5 to 8 report results using the NYSE value-weighted index price and dividend data and compare them with market reinvested S&P500 data. Table 9 uses the price and dividend data of Goyal and Welch (2008) (updated to 2017 and taken from Amit Goyal’s webpage): this gives us a longer sample, as it incorporates Robert Shiller’s data which goes back as far as 1871. The predictability of $r$ relative to $g$ is to some extent a feature of the post-war period. In the long sample, returns are substantially less predictable and dividends substantially more predictable, perhaps because of the post-war tendency of corporations to smooth dividends (Lintner, 1956). Encouragingly, though, we find that the predictive relationship between $y_t$ (or $d_{Pt}$) and the difference $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ is fairly stable across sample periods and data sources.

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8We calculate the monthly dividend by multiplying the difference between monthly cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns by the lagged ex-dividend price: $D_t = (R_{\text{cum},t} - R_{\text{ex},t})P_{t-1}$. As we aggregate the dividends paid out over the year, to address seasonality issues, we reinvest dividends month-by-month until the end of the year, using the CRSP 30-day T-bill rate as our risk-free rate. In the appendix, we report similar results with dividends reinvested at the cum-dividend market return rather than at a risk-free rate; if anything, these results are somewhat more favorable to our $y_t$ variable than to $d_{Pt}$. 

12
2 A lower bound on expected log returns

High valuation ratios are sometimes cited as direct evidence of a bubble. But valuation ratios can be high for good reasons if interest rates or rationally expected risk premia are low. In other words, if we use $y_t$ to measure $E_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$ as suggested above, we may find that $y_t$ is low simply because $E_t r_{t+1}$ is very low, which could reflect low interest rates $r_{f,t+1}$, low (log) risk premia $E_t r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1}$, or both.

While interest rates are directly observable, risk premia are harder to measure. We start from the following identity, which generalizes an identity introduced by Martin (2017) in the case $X_{t+1} = R_{t+1}$:

$$E_t X_{t+1} = \frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} E_t^* (R_{t+1} X_{t+1}) - \text{cov}_t (M_{t+1} R_{t+1}, X_{t+1}) .$$

We have written $E_t^*$ for the time-$t$ conditional risk-neutral expectation operator, defined by the property that $\frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} E_t^* X_{t+1} = E_t (M_{t+1} X_{t+1})$, where $M_{t+1}$ denotes a stochastic discount factor that prices any tradable payoff $X_{t+1}$ received at time $t+1$. Assuming the absence of arbitrage, such an SDF must exist, and the identity above holds for any gross return $R_{t+1}$ such that the payoff $R_{t+1} X_{t+1}$ is tradable. Henceforth, however, $R_{t+1}$ will always denote the gross return on the market.

We are interested in expected log returns, $X_{t+1} = \log R_{t+1}$, in which case the identity becomes

$$E_t \log R_{t+1} = \frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} E_t^* (R_{t+1} \log R_{t+1}) - \text{cov}_t (M_{t+1} R_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1}) . \tag{21}$$

The first of the two terms on the right-hand side, as a risk-neutral expectation, is directly observable from asset prices, as it represents the price of a contract that pays $R_{t+1} \log R_{t+1}$ at time $t+1$. (Neuberger (2012) has studied this contract in a different context.) The second term can be controlled: we will argue below that it is reasonable to impose an assumption that it is negative. Thus (21) implies a lower bound on expected log returns in terms of a quantity that is directly observable from asset prices.

To make further progress, we make two assumptions throughout the paper.
As we will see below, we will use option prices to bound the first term on the right-hand side of the identity (21). Our first assumption addresses the minor technical issue that we observe options on the ex-dividend value of the index, \( P_{t+1} \), rather than on \( P_{t+1} + D_{t+1} \).

**Assumption 1.** *If we define the dispersion measure* \( \Psi(X_{t+1}) \equiv E^* f(X_{t+1}) - f(E^* X_{t+1}) \), where \( f(x) = x \log x \) is a convex function, *then the dispersion of* \( R_{t+1} \) is at least as large as that of \( P_{t+1}/P_t \):

\[
\Psi(R_{t+1}) \geq \Psi(P_{t+1}/P_t).
\]

(22)

This condition is very mild. Expanding \( f(x) = x \log x \) as a Taylor series to second order around \( x = 1 \), \( f(x) \approx (x^2 - 1)/2 \). Thus, to second order, Assumption 1 is equivalent to \( \text{var}^*_t R_{t+1} \geq \text{var}^*_t(P_{t+1}/P_t) \), or equivalently \( \text{var}^*_t(P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}) \geq \text{var}^*_t P_{t+1} \). A sufficient, though not necessary, condition for this to hold is that the price \( P_{t+1} \) and dividend \( D_{t+1} \) are weakly positively correlated under the risk-neutral measure.

Our second assumption is more substantive.

**Assumption 2.** *The modified negative correlation condition holds:*

\[
\text{cov}_t(M_{t+1} R_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1}) \leq 0.
\]

(23)

[2017] imposed the closely related negative correlation condition (NCC) that \( \text{cov}_t(M_{t+1} R_{t+1}, R_{t+1}) \leq 0 \). The two conditions are equivalent in the lognormal case, as we show below, and more generally the two are plausible for similar reasons: in any reasonable model, \( M_{t+1} \) will be negatively correlated with the return on the market, \( R_{t+1} \), and we know from the bound of [Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)] that high Sharpe ratios are

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\[9\] In fact, it is so minor that the distinction between options on \( P_{t+1} \) and options on \( P_{t+1} + D_{t+1} \) is often neglected entirely in the literature. For example, [Neuberger (2012)] “avoid[s] irrelevant complications with interest rates and dividends” by treating options on forward prices as observable, as do [Schneider and Trojan (2018)], and (essentially equivalently) [Carr and Wu (2009)] use options on stocks as proxies for options on stock futures. These authors effectively assume that our inequality (22) holds with equality.
available, that $M_{t+1}$ is highly volatile. The following two examples are adapted from Martin (2017).

Example 1.—Suppose that the SDF $M_{t+1}$ and return $R_{t+1}$ are conditionally jointly lognormal and write $r_{f,t+1} = \log R_{f,t+1}$, $\mu_t = \log \mathbb{E}_t R_{t+1}$, and $\sigma_t^2 = \text{var}_t \log R_{t+1}$. Then the modified NCC is equivalent to the assumption that the conditional Sharpe ratio of the asset, $\lambda_t \equiv (\mu_t - r_{f,t+1})/\sigma_t$, exceeds its conditional volatility, $\sigma_t$; and hence also to the original NCC, $\text{cov}_t(M_{t+1}R_{t+1}, R_{t+1}) \leq 0$.

Proof. By Stein’s lemma, $\text{cov}_t(M_{t+1}R_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1}) = \text{cov}_t(\log M_{t+1} + \log R_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1})$. By lognormality of $M_{t+1}$ and $R_{t+1}$, the fact that $\mathbb{E}_t (M_{t+1}R_{t+1}) = 1$ is equivalent to $\log \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} + \log \mathbb{E}_t R_{t+1} = -\text{cov}_t(\log M_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1})$. It follows from these two facts that $\text{cov}_t(M_{t+1}R_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1}) \leq 0$ if and only if $\text{var}_t \log R_{t+1} \leq \log \mathbb{E}_t R_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1}$: that is, if and only if $\lambda_t \geq \sigma_t$. This condition is equivalent to $\text{cov}_t(M_{t+1}R_{t+1}, R_{t+1}) \leq 0$ in the lognormal case, as shown by Martin (2017). \qed

The Sharpe ratio of the market is typically thought of as being on the order of 30–50%, while the volatility of the market is on the order of 16–20%. Thus the modified NCC holds in the calibrated models of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal et al. (2014) and Campbell et al. (2016), among many others.

We include the above example because the lognormality assumption is commonly imposed. But Martin (2017) argues that option prices are inconsistent with the assumption. This motivates our second example, which does not require lognormality.

Example 2.—Suppose that there is an unconstrained investor who maximizes expected utility over next-period wealth, who chooses to invest his or her wealth fully in the stock market, and whose relative risk aversion (which need not be constant) is at least one at all levels of wealth. Then the modified NCC holds for the market return.

Proof. The given conditions imply that the SDF is proportional (with a constant of proportionality that is known at time $t$) to $u'(W_t R_{t+1})$. We must therefore show that $\text{cov}_t(u'(W_t R_{t+1}) R_{t+1}, \log R_{t+1}) \leq 0$. This holds for the very strong reason—much stronger than is actually needed for the NCC or modified NCC to
hold—that \(u'(W_t R_t + 1) R_{t+1}\) is decreasing in \(R_{t+1}\): its derivative is \(u'(W_t R_{t+1}) + W_t R_{t+1} u''(W_t R_{t+1}) = -u'(W_t R_{t+1}) [\gamma(W_t R_{t+1}) - 1]\), which is negative because relative risk aversion \(\gamma(x) \equiv -x u''(x)/u'(x)\) is at least one.

We can now state our lower bound on expected log returns.

**Result 4.** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Write \(\text{call}_t(K)\) and \(\text{put}_t(K)\) for the time \(t\) prices of call and put options on \(P_{t+1}\) with strike \(K\), and \(F_t\) for the time \(t\) forward price of the index for settlement at time \(t+1\). Then we have

\[
\mathbb{E}_t r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1} \geq \frac{1}{P_t} \left\{ \int_0^{F_t} \frac{\text{put}_t(K)}{K} dK + \int_{F_t}^{\infty} \frac{\text{call}_t(K)}{K} dK \right\}. \tag{24}
\]

**Proof.** As \(\mathbb{E}^*_t R_{t+1} = R_{f,t+1}\) and \(\mathbb{E}^*_t P_{t+1} = F_t\), the inequality (22) can be rearranged as

\[
\frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} \mathbb{E}^*_t P_{t+1} \log R_{t+1} - \log R_{f,t+1} \geq \frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} \left[ \mathbb{E}^*_t \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \log \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right) - \frac{F_t}{P_t} \log \frac{F_t}{P_t} \right]. \tag{25}
\]

The right-hand side of this inequality can be measured directly from option prices using a result of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) that can be rewritten, following Carr and Madan (2001), to give, for any sufficiently well behaved function \(g(\cdot)\),

\[
\frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} [\mathbb{E}^*_t g(P_{t+1}) - g(\mathbb{E}^*_t P_{t+1})] = \int_0^{F_t} g''(K) \text{put}_t(K) dK + \int_{F_t}^{\infty} g''(K) \text{call}_t(K) dK.
\]

Setting \(g(x) = \frac{x}{P_t} \log \frac{x}{P_t}\), we have \(g''(x) = 1/(P_t x)\). Thus

\[
\frac{1}{R_{f,t+1}} \left[ \mathbb{E}^*_t \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \log \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right) - \frac{F_t}{P_t} \log \frac{F_t}{P_t} \right] = \frac{1}{P_t} \left\{ \int_0^{F_t} \frac{\text{put}_t(K)}{K} dK + \int_{F_t}^{\infty} \frac{\text{call}_t(K)}{K} dK \right\}. \tag{26}
\]

The result follows on combining the identity (21), the inequalities (23) and (25), and equation (26). \qed

We refer to the right-hand side of equation (24) as LVIX because it is reminis-
cent of the definition of the VIX index which, in our notation, is

$$VIX_t^2 = 2R_{f,t+1} \left\{ \int_0^{F_t} \frac{put_t(K)}{K^2} dK + \int_{F_t}^{\infty} \frac{call_t(K)}{K^2} dK \right\},$$

and of the SVIX index introduced by Martin (2017),

$$SVIX_t^2 = \frac{2}{R_{f,t+1}^2 P_t^2} \left\{ \int_0^{F_t} put_t(K) dK + \int_{F_t}^{\infty} call_t(K) dK \right\}.$$

We do not annualize our definition (24), so to avoid unnecessary clutter we have also not annualized the definitions of VIX and SVIX above. We will typically choose the period length from $t$ to $t+1$ to be six or 12 months. The forecasting horizon dictates the maturity of the options, so for example we use options expiring in 12 months to measure expectations of 12-month log returns.

VIX, SVIX, and LVIX place differing weights on option prices. VIX has a weighting function $1/K^2$ on the prices of options with strike $K$; LVIX has weighting function $1/K$; and SVIX has a constant weighting function. In this sense we can think of LVIX as lying half way between VIX and SVIX. (We could also introduce a factor of two into the definition of LVIX to make the indices look even more similar to one another, but have chosen not to.)

We calculate LVIX using end-of-month interest rates and S&P 500 index option prices from OptionMetrics. In practice, we do not observe option prices at all strikes between zero and infinity, so we have to truncate the integral on the right-hand side of (24) (as does the CBOE in its calculation of the VIX index). In doing so, we understate the idealized value of the integral. That is, our lower bound would be even higher if given perfect data: it is therefore conservative.

Figure 1 plots LVIX$_t$ over our sample period from January 1996 to December 2017.

### 2.1 Empirical evidence on the modified NCC

We have motivated the inequality of Result 4 via a theoretical argument that the modified NCC should hold. In this section, we assess the inequality empirically.

Specifically, we examine the realized forecast errors $r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1} - LVIX_t$ in
Figure 1: The LVIX index, which provides a lower bound on the market’s expected excess log return ($E_t r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1}$), by Result 4.

order to carry out a one-sided $t$-test of the hypothesis that the inequality (24) fails. With standard errors computed using a block bootstrap\textsuperscript{10} we find a $p$-value of 0.097. Thus despite our relatively short sample period—which is imposed on us by the availability of option price data—we can reject the hypothesis with moderate confidence. This supports our approach.

More optimistically, it is natural to wonder whether the inequality (24) might approximately hold with equality (though we emphasize that this does not need to be the case for our approach to make sense). For this to be the case, we would need both (22) and (23) to hold with approximate equality. As the conditional volatility of dividends is substantially lower than that of prices, it is reasonable to think that this is indeed the case for (22), and as noted in footnote 9, much of the literature implicitly makes that assumption. Meanwhile the modified NCC (23) would hold with equality if (but not only if) one thinks from the perspective of an investor with log utility who chooses to hold the market, as is clear from the proof provided in Example 2 above. The perspective of such an investor has been shown to provide a useful benchmark for forecasting returns on the stock

\textsuperscript{10}As our sample is 276 months long, we use a block length of seven months, following the $T^{1/3}$ rule of thumb for block length for a sample of length $T$. For comparison, the corresponding $p$-value using naive OLS standard errors would be 0.001.
market (Martin 2017), on individual stocks (Martin and Wagner 2019), and on currencies (Kremens and Martin 2019).

Table 10 in the Appendix reports the results of running the regression

\[ r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1} = \alpha + \beta \times \text{LVIX}_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \]  
(27)

at horizons of 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. Returns are computed by compounding the CRSP monthly gross return of the S&P 500. We report Hansen–Hodrick standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation that arises due to overlapping observations. If the inequality (24) holds with equality, we should find \( \alpha = 0 \) and \( \beta = 1 \). We do not reject this hypothesis at any horizon; and at the six- and nine-month horizons we can reject the hypothesis that \( \beta = 0 \) at conventional significance levels.

3 A sentiment indicator

We can now put the pieces together. We will measure expectations about fundamentals by subtracting \( \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \), as revealed by valuation ratios under our AR(1) assumption, from \( \mathbb{E}_t r_{t+1} \), as revealed by interest rates and option prices:

\[
\mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1} = r_{f,t+1} + \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1}) - \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \\
\geq r_{f,t+1} + \text{LVIX}_t - \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}).
\]  
(28)

The inequality follows (under our maintained Assumptions 1 and 2) because \( \mathbb{E}_t r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1} \geq \text{LVIX}_t \), as shown in Result 4.

We refer to the lower bound as the sentiment indicator, \( B_t \). Our central definition uses \( y_t \) to measure \( \mathbb{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \) via the fitted value \( \hat{a}_0 + \hat{a}_1 y_t \), as in Table 1, giving

\[
B_t = r_{f,t+1} + \frac{1}{P_t} \left[ \int_0^{F_t} \frac{\text{put}_t(K)}{K} dK + \int_{F_t}^{\infty} \frac{\text{call}_t(K)}{K} dK \right] - (\hat{a}_0 + \hat{a}_1 y_t). 
\]

We estimate the coefficients \( \hat{a}_0 \) and \( \hat{a}_1 \) using an expanding window: for example, at time \( t \) they are estimated using data from 1947 until time \( t \). Thus \( B_t \) is observable
at time $t$. If one thinks in terms of Example 2, above, to motivate the modified NCC, then $B_t$ is a lower bound on the expected dividend growth $\mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1}$ that must be perceived by an investor who has risk aversion higher than 1 and who is happy to hold the market.

If $\mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1}$ itself follows an AR(1)—as in the work of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and many others—then $B_t$ can also be interpreted, after rescaling, as a lower bound on long-run dividend expectations. For if we have $\mathbb{E}_{t+1} g_{t+2} - \bar{g} = \phi_g (\mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1} - \bar{g}) + \varepsilon_{g,t+1}$ then long-run expected dividend growth at time $t$ is

$$(1 - \rho) \sum_{i \geq 0} \rho^i (\mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1+i} - \bar{g}) = \frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \rho \phi_g} (\mathbb{E}_t g_{t+1} - \bar{g}),$$

where we have introduced a factor $1 - \rho$ in the definition of long-run expected dividend growth so that the weights $(1 - \rho)\rho^i$ sum to 1 and long-run expected dividend growth can be interpreted as a weighted average of all future periods’ expected growth.

Figure 2a plots $B_t$ over our sample period using the full sample from 1947 to 2017 to estimate the relationship between $y_t$ (or $dp_t$) and $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$. We work at an annual horizon, so that the value of $B_t$ at a given point in time is (subject to our maintained assumptions) a lower bound on the expected dividend growth.
over the subsequent year. Figure 2b shows the corresponding results using an expanding window to estimate the relationship, so that the resulting series is observable in real time. Encouragingly, the indicator behaves stably as we move from full-sample information to real-time information. Unless otherwise indicated, we will henceforth work with the series that is observable in real time.

The figures also show modified indicators, \( B_{dp,t} \), that use \( dp_t \) rather than \( y_t \) to measure \( E_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \), as in (18). These have the advantage of familiarity—\( dp_t \) has been widely used in the literature—but the disadvantage that they may err on the side of signalling a bubble too soon, as shown in Result 3. Consistent with this prediction, the two series line up fairly closely, but the \( B_{dp,t} \) series are less conservative—in that they suggest even higher \( E_t g_{t+1} \)—during the period in the late 1990s when valuation ratios were far from their mean.

Note, moreover, that net dividend growth satisfies \( E_t \left( \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} - 1 \right) > E_t g_{t+1} \), because \( e^{g_{t+1}} - 1 > g_{t+1} \). Thus our lower bound on expected log dividend growth implies still higher expected arithmetic dividend growth. If dividend growth were conditionally lognormal, for example, we would have \( \log E_t \left( \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} \right) = E_t g_{t+1} + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t g_{t+1} \). The variance term is small unconditionally—in our sample period, \( \text{var}_t g_{t+1} \approx 0.005 \)—but it is plausible that during the late 1990s there was unusually high uncertainty about log dividend growth.
Figure 3 plots the three components of the sentiment indicator $B_t$ from 1996 to 2017. LVIX and $E_t(\Delta^1 g_{t+1})$ moved in opposite directions for most of our sample period, with high valuation ratios occurring at times of low risk premia. But all three components were above their mean during the late 1990s.

It might seem strange that we rely on asset prices to provide a rational lower bound on expected log returns (via Result 4) while simultaneously arguing that the market itself was mispriced during part of our sample period. To sharpen the point, consider, for the sake of argument, the special case discussed in Section 2.1. Our volatility measure LVIX then directly measures the expected excess log return perceived by a log investor who chooses to hold the market.

Yet we simultaneously claim that there was a bubble in the late 1990s. These positions may appear to be inconsistent—why would a rational investor hold an overvalued stock market?—but they are not. The loglinearized identity $y_t = (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i (r_{t+i+1} - g_{t+1})$ shows that one can simultaneously have high short-run expected log returns $E_t(r_{t+1})$, high valuation ratios—i.e., low $y_t$—and make rational forecasts of fundamentals $\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i E_t g_{t+i}$, so long as future expected returns $\sum_{i>0} \rho^i E_t r_{t+i}$ are low. And, critically, the log investor does not care about expected returns in future: he or she is myopic, so can be induced to hold the market by high short-run returns $E_t r_{t+1}$ whatever his or her beliefs about subsequent expected returns.

But something has to give. For the investor to perceive high expected log returns and, simultaneously, low expected log dividend growth during the bubble period, he or she must have believed that the historical forecasting relationship between dividend yield and $E_t(\Delta^1 g_{t+1})$ had broken down. To see this, write $\hat{E}_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$ for the regression-implied time-$t$ forecast of $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$, which may differ from the agent’s rational forecast $E_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$. Then, from inequality (28), we have

$$E_t g_{t+1} = r_{f,t+1} + \underbrace{E_t(r_{t+1} - r_{f,t+1}) - \hat{E}_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) + \left[ \hat{E}_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) - E_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \right]}_{= B_t} \quad \geq \quad r_{f,t+1} + \underbrace{\text{LVIX}_t - \hat{a}_0 - \hat{a}_1 y_t + \left[ \hat{E}_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) - E_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \right]}_{= B_t} \cdot$$

An agent who believed, in the late 1990s, that $E_t g_{t+1}$ was lower than $B_t$ must
therefore have concluded that \( \hat{E}_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) < E_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) \). By the loglinearization (19), this is equivalent to \( E_t y_{t+1} < \hat{E}_t y_{t+1} \).

Such an agent’s beliefs were therefore consistent only if she expected \( y_{t+1} \) to remain, in the short run, lower—and valuations higher—than suggested by the historical evidence. This possibility is consistent with the findings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), who argued that in the late 1990s sophisticated investors such as hedge funds positioned themselves to exploit high short-run returns despite being skeptical about longer run returns, and with the view of the world colorfully articulated by former Citigroup chief executive Chuck Prince in a July, 2007, interview with the Financial Times: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”

### 3.1 Alternative stochastic processes for \( y_t \)

We have modelled \( y_t \) as following an AR(1) to avoid overfitting. Aside from the obvious advantages of parsimony, the partial autocorrelations of \( y_t \), shown in Figure 8 of Appendix C, support this choice: the partial autocorrelations of \( y_t \) at lags greater than one are close to zero.

The question of how to model \( y_t \) is not central to the point of this paper, however, so we also consider the possibility that \( y_t \) follows an AR(2) or AR(3)\(^{11}\). If \( y_t \) follows an AR(2) process, then from the linearization (19) we have

\[
    r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = \alpha + \beta y_t + \gamma y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t+1},
\]

while if \( y_t \) follows an AR(3) process, then

\[
    r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = \alpha + \beta y_t + \gamma y_{t-1} + \delta y_{t-2} + \varepsilon_{t+1}.
\]

The results of these regressions are reported in Table 12 of Appendix C.

\(^{11}\)Alternatively, our approach could easily accommodate, say, a vector autoregression for \( y_t \); the key is that one has an empirical procedure that is not prone to overfitting and that generates a sensible measure of \( E_t y_{t+1} \) to be used in (19).
Figure 4: Bubble indicators calculated on a full-sample or real-time basis, assuming $y_t$ follows an AR(1), AR(2) or AR(3) process.

The corresponding lower bounds on $E_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$ are shown in Figure 4. They are very similar to our baseline measure during the late 1990s, but they are lower during the crisis of 2008–9 and higher in its immediate aftermath. Once again, we note that the indicator behaves fairly stably as we move from full-sample information to real-time information.

3.2 Variations

3.2.1 What if the valuation ratio follows a random walk?

A true believer in the New Economy might have argued that our measure of $E_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$, which is based on an assumption that $y_t$ follows an AR(1)—or AR(2) or AR(3)—had broken down during the late 1990s. Perhaps the most aggressive possibility one could reasonably entertain is the “random walk” view that the price-dividend ratio had ceased to mean-revert entirely, as considered by Campbell (2008, 2018). This perspective might also be adopted by a cautious central banker to justify inaction on the basis that valuation ratios could remain very high indefinitely.

\footnote{These lower bounds are rely on regressions using expanding windows, so are observable in real time, like our baseline measure. Figure 4a in Appendix C shows the corresponding indexes using the full sample to estimate the AR processes.}
We now show how to accommodate this possibility by defining a closely related bubble index that was also high in the late 1990s. If $y_t$ follows a random walk then, from equation (9),

$$
E_t g_{t+1} = E_t r_{t+1} - y_t \geq LVIX_t + r_{f,t} - y_t, \tag{29}
$$

where we define a variant on our previous indicator,

$$
\tilde{B}_t = LVIX_t + r_{f,t} - y_t, \tag{29}
$$

that has the further benefit of not requiring estimation of any free parameters.

More generally, if all one knows is that $E_t y_{t+1} \geq y_t$—irrespective of the details of the evolution of $y_t$—then equation (19) implies that we have

$$
E_t g_{t+1} \geq \tilde{B}_t.
$$

Figure 5 shows the time series of $\tilde{B}_t$. Even if valuation ratios were expected to follow a random walk in the late 1990s—a dubious proposition in any case—the implied expectations about cashflow growth appear implausibly high.

Unlike our preferred indicator, $B_t$, the random walk version $\tilde{B}_t$ spiked almost as high during the subprime crisis as it did around the turn of the millennium. This
reflects the fact that implied volatility, and hence the LVIX index, rose dramatically during the last months of 2008, indicating that log returns were expected to be very high over the subsequent year (by Result 4). From the perspective of our notional policymaker who believed that valuation ratios follow a random walk, these high expected log returns could only have reflected high expected log dividend growth. This prediction is unreasonable, in our view, because the random walk assumption is unreasonable. The point is that even a policymaker who believed valuation ratios followed a random walk would have had to perceive unusually high expected dividend growth in the late 1990s.

3.2.2 What if dividend growth is unforecastable?

If dividend growth is unforecastable, as in the work of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and many others, then valuation ratios reveal long-run expectations of log returns while LVIX reveals the corresponding short-run expectations.

Specifically, if dividend growth is unforecastable and $y_t$ is stationary, then from equation (10)

$$y_t = (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i E_t[r_{t+1+i} - g_{t+1+i}] = (1 - \rho) E_t[r_{t+1}] + (1 - \rho) \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho^i E_t[r_{t+2+i}] - \bar{g}.$$  

This equation can be rearranged to give

$$E_t r_{t+1} - (1 - \rho) \sum_{i \geq 0} \rho^i E_t r_{t+2+i} = \frac{E_t r_{t+1} - y_t - \bar{g}}{\rho}.$$  

Finally, we can exploit the inequality $E_t r_{t+1} - r_{f,t} \geq$ LVIX$_t$ of Result 4 to conclude that

$$\underbrace{E_t r_{t+1}}_{\text{short-run returns}} - (1 - \rho) \sum_{i \geq 0} \rho^i \underbrace{E_t r_{t+2+i}}_{\text{long-run returns}} \geq \frac{\text{LVIX}_t + r_{f,t} - y_t - \bar{g}}{\rho} = \frac{\tilde{B}_t - \bar{g}}{\rho}.$$  

This inequality provides an alternative interpretation of the indicator $\tilde{B}_t = \text{LVIX}_t + r_{f,t} - y_t$ that we defined in equation (29) above, and which is plotted in
Figure 6: Bubble indicators calculated with linear, quadratic, and cubic specifications for the relationship between expected $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ and $y_t$.

If dividend growth is unforecastable, unusually high levels of $\tilde{B}_t$ indicate that short-run expected log returns are unusually high relative to subsequent long-run expected log returns.

### 3.2.3 Nonlinearity in the functional form

We can also allow for a nonlinear relationship between $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ and $y_t$. In Appendix D, we report the results of running regressions of the form

$$r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = a_0 + a_1 y_t + a_2 y_t^2 + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

and

$$r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = a_0 + a_1 y_t + a_2 y_t^2 + a_3 y_t^3 + \epsilon_{t+1}.$$
negative relationship between $y_t$ and forecast $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ around the then prevailing value of $y_t$. That is, given the then recent association of unusually low dividend yield with high realized returns, the cubic specification predicts extremely high returns going forward, as shown in Figure 9a, Appendix D. (It is important that the low dividend yields at the time were unusual, because the cubic specification makes it possible to associate high returns with extremely low yields without materially altering the long established relationship between low returns and low yields that prevails over the usual range of yields.)

We view this exercise as a cautionary tale. Given that bubbles occur fairly rarely, it is particularly important to avoid the possibility that an (over-)elaborate model achieves superior performance in-sample by overfitting the historical data. The ingredients of a bubble indicator should behave stably during historically unusual periods, as our simple linear specification does (Figure 9b, Appendix D).

4 Other indicators of financial conditions

We now compare the sentiment indicator to some other indicators of financial conditions that have been proposed in the literature.

4.1 Volume

We start by exploring the relationship with volume, which has been widely proposed as a signature of bubbles (see, for example, Harrison and Kreps 1978, Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen 2002, Cochrane 2003, Lamont and Thaler 2003, Ofek and Richardson 2003, Scheinkman and Xiong 2003, Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong 2006, Barberis et al. 2018). We construct a daily measure of volume using Compustat data from January 1983 to December 2017, by summing the product of shares traded and daily low price over all S&P 500 stocks on each day. (We find essentially identical results if we use daily high prices to construct the measure.)

As volume trended strongly upward during our sample period, we subtract a linear trend from log volume. We do so on using an expanding window, so that our detrended log volume measure, which we call $v_t$, is (like $B_t$) observable at time $t$.

Figure 7a plots detrended log volume, $v_t$, and $B_t$ over the sample period, with
both series standardized to zero mean and unit variance. There is a remarkable similarity between the two series, so it is worth emphasizing that they are each based on entirely different input data. The sentiment index is a leading indicator of volume: Figure 7b plots the correlation between (detrended) volume at time $t$, $v_t$, and the sentiment index at time $t + k$, where $k$ is measured in months. The shaded area indicates a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. The correlation between the two peaks at more than 90% for $k$ around $-10$ months. Figure 10, in the appendix, leads to the same conclusion using full-sample, as opposed to real-time, information to compute both $B_t$ and the detrended volume measure.

4.2 The probability of a crash

One expects that the probability of a crash should be higher during a bubble episode; if not, the episode is perhaps not actually a bubble.\footnote{Greenwood, Shleifer and You (2018) document, at the industry level, that sharp increases in stock prices do indeed signal a heightened probability of a crash.} We use a measure of the probability of a crash derived by Martin (2017, Result 2) that can be computed in terms of option prices:

$$
P(R_{t+1} < \alpha) = \alpha \left[ \text{put}'_t(\alpha P_t) - \frac{\text{put}_t(\alpha P_t)}{\alpha P_t} \right]
$$

where $\text{put}'_t(K)$ is the first derivative of put price as a function of strike, evaluated at $K$. This represents the probability of a market decline perceived by a log investor who holds the market. The probability of a crash is high when out-of-the-money put prices are highly convex, as a function of strike, at strikes at and below $\alpha P_t$. By contrast, the measure of volatility that is relevant for our sentiment indicator is a function of option prices across the full range of strikes of out-of-the-money puts and calls.

Figure 7c plots the crash probability over time. The probability of a crash was elevated during the late 1990s, consistent with standard intuition about bubbles.\footnote{Each $k$ defines an original sample of size $N_k$. We draw 10,000 bootstrap samples of size $N_k$ by sampling from the original sample with replacement, and compute the correlation coefficient in each case, then use the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles to define the edges of the confidence interval. We use the same procedure in the correlation plots shown in Figures 7, 10b, and 11.}
Figure 7: The sentiment indicator, volume and crash probability. Shaded areas in the right-hand panels indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
But it was also high in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, an episode that we would certainly not identify as bubbly. Figure 7d plots the correlation between the two series at different leads and lags. The sentiment measure is a leading indicator of crash probability at horizons of about two years. The correlation flips sign for positive values of $k$, indicating that there is a tendency for the sentiment indicator to be high following periods in which the crash probability is low.

4.3 Other measures

In the interest of completeness, we report results for various other measures of financial conditions in Appendix E. The panels of Figure 11 explore the relationship between the bubble index and three other measures of financial conditions: the excess bond premium (EBP) of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), and the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) and Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI) generated on a weekly basis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (converted to monthly data by taking the last week’s observation in each calendar month).

Finally, Table 14 reports the correlations between $B_t$ and various other sentiment measures, together with $p$-values that indicate that each of the correlations is significantly different from zero; and Figures 12 and 13 plot the corresponding time series. We have relegated these to the end because we only have incomplete sample periods for the measures in question (2000:Q2 to 2017:Q4 in the case of the Graham–Harvey series, and 2003:Q1 to 2015:Q3 for the De la O–Myers series). In particular, all the series are missing what is, from our point of view, the most interesting period around and before the turn of the millennium.

Specifically, $ER_{1yr}$ and $ER_{10yr}$ are, respectively, the cross-sectional average subjective expectations stock market returns over 1- and 10-year horizons, as reported by respondents to the surveys studied by Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013); $EER_{1yr}$ and $EER_{10yr}$ are the corresponding average subjective expected excess returns; and $ERstd_{1yr}$ and $ERstd_{10yr}$ are disagreement measures at the same horizons (that is, are the cross-sectional standard deviations of reported subjective expected returns). Lastly, DM survey indicates a time series of average subjective expectations of dividend growth that has been constructed by De la O.
The measures of mean subjective expected returns, and of mean subjective expected dividend growth, are positively correlated with $B_t$, while the measures of mean subjective expected excess returns, and of disagreement, are negatively correlated with $B_t$.

5 Conclusion

We have presented a sentiment indicator based on interest rates, index option prices, and the market valuation ratio. The indicator can be interpreted in various ways; perhaps the simplest is as a lower bound on the expected dividend growth that must be perceived by an investor who (i) is rational, (ii) has relative risk aversion at least one, and (iii) is happy to invest his or her wealth fully in the stock market.

The bound was very high during the late 1990s, reflecting dividend growth expectations that in our view were unreasonably optimistic—hence our description of it as a sentiment indicator—and that were not realized ex post. We also show that it is a leading indicator of detrended volume and of various measures of stress in the financial system.

In simple terms, we characterize the late 1990s as a bubble because valuation ratios and short-run expected returns—as revealed by interest rates and our LVIX measure—were simultaneously high. Both aspects are important. We would not view high valuation ratios at a time of low expected returns, or low valuation ratios at a time of high expected returns, as indicative of a bubble: on the contrary, the latter scenario occurs in the aftermath of the market crash in 2008.

Our measure does not point to an unreasonable level of market sentiment in recent years, as it interprets high valuation ratios as being justified by the low level of interest rates and implied volatility. A skeptic might respond that the low level of implied volatility is in itself indicative of unreasonable complacency. This is, in principle, a possibility. In the terminology of Shiller (2000), we are measuring “bubble expectations” rather than “confidence.” Valuation ratios, interest rates and volatility could be internally consistent in our sense—so that our measure would not signal that anything is amiss—while also being mispriced. The measure
should be viewed as a test of the internal coherence of valuation ratios, interest rates, and option prices, rather than as a panacea.

Our approach also requires an appeal to the good judgment of policymakers: we have not addressed the hard question of how to identify whether a given level of expected dividend growth is reasonable. More generally, our hope is that the indicator might become one of several inputs into the policy decision process, rather than becoming the basis for a deterministic rule for action. We do not see a way to avoid some degree of expert judgment in identifying market-wide bubbles; but we do believe that the approach proposed in this paper would make it easier for such judgment to be applied in a focussed and disciplined manner.

Volatility and valuation ratios have, of course, long been linked to bubbles. A novel feature of our approach is that we use some theory to motivate our definitions of volatility and of valuation ratios, and to make the link quantitative. Our approach also satisfies the requirement noted by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) that practically useful risk measures should be “measurable in a timely fashion.” There are various choices to be made regarding the details of the construction of the indicator: we have tried to make these choices in a conservative way to avoid “crying bubble” prematurely, in the hope that the indicator might be useful to cautious policymakers in practice.

References


## A Regression tables

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Table 5: Predictive regressions for NYSEVW, annual data, 1947–2016.

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<td>0.391</td>
<td>[0.135]</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>[0.039]</td>
<td>7.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( r_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>[0.158]</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>[0.047]</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( -g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>[0.117]</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>[0.035]</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Predictive regressions for NYSEVW, annual data, 1926–2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RHS&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>LHS&lt;sub&gt;t+1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>( \hat{a}_0 )</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>( \hat{a}_1 )</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( y_t )</td>
<td>( r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>[0.042]</td>
<td>2.972</td>
<td>[1.135]</td>
<td>8.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( r_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>[0.049]</td>
<td>2.798</td>
<td>[1.153]</td>
<td>4.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( -g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>[0.040]</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>[1.010]</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( dp_t )</td>
<td>( r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>[0.132]</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>[0.038]</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( r_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>[0.144]</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>[0.043]</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( -g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>[0.121]</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>[0.036]</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RHS&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>LHS&lt;sub&gt;t+1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>( \hat{a}_0 )</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>( \hat{a}_1 )</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( y_t )</td>
<td>( r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>[0.042]</td>
<td>4.453</td>
<td>[0.980]</td>
<td>12.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( r_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>[0.039]</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>[0.881]</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( -g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>[0.031]</td>
<td>3.525</td>
<td>[0.778]</td>
<td>22.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( dp_t )</td>
<td>( r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>[0.127]</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>[0.038]</td>
<td>8.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( r_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>[0.110]</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>[0.033]</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( -g_{t+1} )</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>[0.095]</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>[0.028]</td>
<td>12.97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizon</th>
<th>( \hat{\alpha} )</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>( \hat{\beta} )</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3m</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>[0.018]</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>[3.629]</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6m</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>[0.021]</td>
<td>3.128</td>
<td>[1.514]</td>
<td>3.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9m</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>[0.041]</td>
<td>2.948</td>
<td>[1.439]</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12m</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>[0.063]</td>
<td>2.493</td>
<td>[1.613]</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Coefficient estimates for regression 27, 96:01–17:12.
B \( AR(1) \) vs. linear regression

If \( y_t \) follows an \( AR(1) \) with autocorrelation \( \phi \), then the linear approximation (19) reduces to

\[
E_t(r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}) = \left( \frac{\rho(\phi - 1)}{1 - \rho} \right) \widehat{y} + \frac{1 - \rho \phi}{1 - \rho} y_t. \tag{31}
\]

In the body of the paper, we estimate the predictive relationship between \( r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} \) and the predictor variable \( y_t \) (and \( dp_t \)) via linear regression. Under our \( AR(1) \) assumption, we could also estimate the constant term and the coefficient on \( y_t \) directly, as in (31), by estimating \( \rho \) and the autocorrelation \( \phi \). Table 11 shows that both approaches give similar results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>3.415</td>
<td>7.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( AR(1) )</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>3.807</td>
<td>7.63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Comparison of \( AR(1) \) parametrization and linear regression. Annual price and dividend data, 1947–2017, from CRSP (cash reinvestment), as in Table 1.

C \( AR(2) \) and \( AR(3) \) specifications

Recall that if \( y_t \) follows an \( AR(2) \) process, then from the linearization (19) we have

\[
r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = \alpha + \beta y_t + \gamma y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t+1},
\]

while if \( y_t \) follows an \( AR(3) \) process, then

\[
r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = \alpha + \beta y_t + \gamma y_{t-1} + \delta y_{t-2} + \varepsilon_{t+1}.
\]

Table 12 reports the results of these regressions.
Figure 8: Partial autocorrelations of $y_t$. Annual data, 1947–2017, cash-reinvestment method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\hat{a}$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{\beta}$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{\gamma}$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{\delta}$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR(1)</td>
<td>−0.067</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>3.415</td>
<td>1.317</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(2)</td>
<td>−0.056</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>6.098</td>
<td>3.378</td>
<td>−2.991</td>
<td>3.339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(3)</td>
<td>−0.040</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>6.473</td>
<td>3.313</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>3.231</td>
<td>−4.457</td>
<td>2.373</td>
<td>11.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


D Nonlinear specifications

In this section we consider the effect of allowing for quadratic or cubic functional relationships between $r_{t+1} - g_{t+1}$ and $y_t$. We run the regressions

$$r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = a_0 + a_1 y_t + a_2 y_t^2 + \varepsilon_{t+1}$$

and

$$r_{t+1} - g_{t+1} = a_0 + a_1 y_t + a_2 y_t^2 + a_3 y_t^3 + \varepsilon_{t+1}.$$

E $B_t$ vs. other financial indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\hat{a}_0$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{a}_1$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{a}_2$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$\hat{a}_3$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>linear</td>
<td>−0.067</td>
<td>[0.049]</td>
<td>3.415</td>
<td>[1.317]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quadratic</td>
<td>−0.072</td>
<td>[0.111]</td>
<td>3.740</td>
<td>[6.348]</td>
<td>−4.390</td>
<td>[81.25]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cubic</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>[0.23]</td>
<td>9.35</td>
<td>[20.96]</td>
<td>−166.4</td>
<td>[576.0]</td>
<td>1402.8</td>
<td>[4821.3]</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Correlation coefficients, computed using quarterly data between 2000:Q2 and 2017:Q4 (Graham–Harvey series) or between 2003:Q1 and 2015:Q3 (De la O–Myers series), with bootstrapped p-values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>corr($B_t$, ·)</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ER$_{1yr}$</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER$_{10yr}$</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM survey</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EER$_{1yr}$</td>
<td>−0.567</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERstd$_{1yr}$</td>
<td>−0.224</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EER$_{10yr}$</td>
<td>−0.278</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERstd$_{10yr}$</td>
<td>−0.270</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Forecasting with cubic and linear specifications at the beginning (01/96) and end (12/17) of our sample, and around the market highs in 12/99. Lines indicate the estimated functional relationship between $E_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$ and $y_t$, and dots indicate the specific values of $y_t$ and $E_t (r_{t+1} - g_{t+1})$ that happened to prevail on the relevant dates.
(a) Sentiment indicator and detrended volume.

(b) Correlation between $B_{t+k}$ and detrended volume at time $t$.

Figure 10: Sentiment indicator vs. detrended log volume (using the full sample to construct each series). The shaded area in the right-hand panel indicates the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.
Figure 11: The relationship between $B_t$ and various measures of financial conditions. Shaded areas in the right panels indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 12: $B_t$ plotted against other sentiment measures (I).
Figure 13: $B_t$ plotted against other sentiment measures (II).