

**LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**Department of Economics**

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**GENDER:** Male

**CITIZENSHIP:** British, French

**PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:**

2013 – 2014 MRes Economics (with Distinction), London School of Economics  
2012 – 2013 MSc Economics (with Distinction), London School of Economics  
2007 – 2010 BSc Government and Economics (with First class honours), London School of Economics

**DOCTORAL STUDIES:** London School of Economics

DATES: 2014 – 2019 (expected)

THESIS TITLE: “Essays in information economics”

THESIS ADVISORS AND REFERENCES:

**Gilat Levy** (Supervisor)  
Department of Economics  
London School of Economics  
Houghton Street  
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**RESEARCH FIELDS:**

Political Economy, Applied Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE:**

2017 – (2019) Microeconomics for MSc students  
2016 – (2019) Political Economy for MSc students  
2016 – 2017 Political Economy of Public Policy (LSE Summer School)  
2014 – 2017 Intermediate Econometrics (Methods Summer School)  
2014 – 2016 Introduction to Econometrics (LSE Summer School)  
2015 – 2016 Behavioural Economics (undergraduate)  
2014 – 2015 Political Economy (undergraduate)  
2013 – 2014 Microeconomic Principles (undergraduate)  
2012 – 2013 Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate)

**RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:**

2016 – (2019) Teaching Fellow in Economics – LSE  
2012 – 2016 Graduate Teaching Assistant – LSE  
2013 – 2013 Course Director – LSE CHOICE (Widening participation programme)  
  
2016 – 2017 Research assistant to Dr. Ricardo Alonso and Dr. Odilon Camara  
2016 Research assistant to Prof. Gilat Levy, Prof. Ronny Razin, and Dr. Moreno de Barreda  
2014 Research assistant to Dr. Mareike Kleine and Prof. Robert Thomson  
2013 Research assistant to Dr. Jon Danielsson  
2010 Research assistant to Prof. Lucrezia Reichlin

**LANGUAGES:**

English, French

**HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:**

2016 – (2019) LSE Economics Teaching Fellowship  
2014 – 2017 ESRC Doctoral Training Award  
2014 – 2018 Department of Economics Class Teacher Prize (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018)

**CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:**

2018: Royal Economic Society Symposium of Junior Researchers, Midwest Political Science Association Conference, LSE–Oxford Graduate Student Conference in Political Economy, Queen Mary University Economics and Finance Workshop, Max Planck Institute Workshop in Advances in Political Economy and Public Economics (scheduled), Spanish Economic Association Symposium (scheduled), Royal Economic Society PhD Meetings (scheduled)

**JOB MARKET PAPER:**

**“The value of confidential policy information: persuasion, transparency, and influence” (2018)**

Transparency of the lobbying process is important to limit the influence of special interest groups, but should transparency also apply to the information obtained by policy makers? This paper extends theories of informational lobbying by explicitly modeling the choice of policy makers to obtain information ahead of interactions with lobbyists. This approach reveals a new channel for the value of confidentiality: extracting evidence from special interest groups. Confidential information benefits policy makers even in the absence of reputational concerns, and even if that information is very limited, but creates a trade-off between obtaining information internally and extracting it from lobbyists. As the policy maker's expertise and ideological alignment with special interest groups increase, this trade-off becomes too restrictive and confidential information becomes less valuable. These results shed light on the relationship between confidentiality, quality of governance, and influence.

**RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:**

**“Competition in persuasion between privately informed senders”**

The existing literature has shown that when agents compete to persuade a third party, they tend to reveal more information than when they collude. In this paper, I show that this is not necessarily true when these competing agents have private information. In equilibrium, the strategic choice of information generation mechanisms can reveal the private information of these agents. In addition, the incentives to signal that information differ when agents compete and when they collude. As a result, it is possible for competing agents to choose mechanisms that reveal less information than when they collude.

**“Overconfidence, political accountability and politician selection”**

A large body of evidence documents that voters are poorly informed about politics. In this paper, I focus on voters' overconfidence: the belief that their information is more precise than it really is. I show that overconfidence can make them better off by forcing politicians to exert more effort to guarantee re-election. This occurs only if voters are naïve, that is, if they think politicians share their incorrect beliefs. Overconfident voters are always worse at selecting competent politicians, but the additional effort they can elicit from politicians sometimes more than compensates for this loss. This paper therefore highlights the importance of considering higher-order beliefs when evaluating cognitive biases in political behaviour.

**PUBLICATIONS:**

**“Negotiating under political uncertainty: national elections and the dynamics of international co-operation” (with Mareike Kleine), *British Journal of Political Science* (2017)**

This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines empirically how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Applying duration analysis to the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that: (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level (2) this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes and (3) the effect is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. The findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research on the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations and legislative bargaining in the EU.