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JUSTICE, CARE, GENDER BIAS

CAROL GILLIGAN poses two separable, though in her work not separate, challenges to moral theory. The first is a challenge to the adequacy of current moral theory that is dominated by the ethics of justice.¹ The ethics of justice, on her view, excludes some dimensions of moral experience, such as contextual decision making, special obligations, the moral motives of compassion and sympathy, and the relevance of considering one's own integrity in making moral decisions. The second is a challenge to moral theory's presumed gender neutrality. The ethics of justice is not gender neutral, she argues, because it advocates ideals of agency, moral motivation, and correct moral reasoning which women are less likely than men to achieve; and because the moral dimensions excluded from the ethics of justice are just the ones figuring more prominently in women's than men's moral experience.

The adequacy and gender bias charges are, for Gilligan, linked. She claims that the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are two different moral orientations.² Whereas individuals may use both orientations, the shift from one to the other requires a Gestalt shift, since "the terms of one perspective do not contain the terms of the other" (*ibid.*, p. 30). The exclusion of the care perspective from the ethics of justice simultaneously undermines the adequacy of the

¹ In referring to the 'ethics of justice' and the 'ethics of care', I do not assume that either one is some monolithic, unified theory; rather, I use these terms, as Gilligan suggests, to designate different orientations—loosely defined sets of concepts, themes, and theoretical priorities—which we understand sufficiently well to pick out who is speaking from which orientation, but which are not so rigid as to preclude a great deal of disagreement within each orientation.

² Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," in *Women and Moral Theory*, Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987).

ethics of justice (it cannot give a complete account of moral life) and renders it gender-biased.

Some critics have responded by arguing that there is no logical incompatibility between the two moral orientations.³ Because the ethics of justice does not in principle exclude the ethics of care (even if theorists within the justice tradition have had little to say about care issues), it is neither inadequate nor gender-biased. Correctly applying moral rules and principles, for instance, requires, rather than excludes, knowledge of contextual details. Both orientations are crucial to correct moral reasoning and an adequate understanding of moral life. Thus, the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are not in fact rivaling, alternative moral theories. The so-called ethics of care merely makes focal issues that are already implicitly contained in the ethics of justice.

Suppose the two are logically compatible. Would the charge of gender bias evaporate? Yes, so long as gender neutrality only requires that the ethics of justice could, consistently, make room for the central moral concerns of the ethics of care. But perhaps gender neutrality requires more than this. Since the spectre of gender bias in theoretical knowledge is itself a moral issue, we would be well advised to consider the question of gender bias more carefully before concluding that our moral theory speaks in an androgynous voice. Although we can and should test the ethics of justice by asking whether it could consistently include the central moral issues in the ethics of care, we might also ask what ideologies of the moral life are likely to result from the repeated inclusion or exclusion of particular topics in moral theorizing.

Theorizing that crystallizes into a tradition has nonlogical as well as logical implications. In order to explain why a tradition has the contours it does, one may need to suppose general acceptance of particular beliefs that are not logically entailed by any particular theory and might be denied by individual theorists were those beliefs articulated. When behavioral researchers, for example, focus almost exclusively on aggression and its role in human life, neglecting other behavioral motives, their doing so has the nonlogical implication that aggression is, indeed, the most important behavioral motive. This is

³ The logical compatibility thesis is, for example, advanced by Jean Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986); Owen Flanagan and Kathryn Jackson, "Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited," *Ethics*, xcvi (1987): 622-637; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "The Importance of Autonomy," in *Women and Moral Theory*; George Sher, "Other Voice, Other Rooms? Women's Psychology and Moral Theory," in *Women and Moral Theory*.

because only a belief like this would explain the rationality of this pattern of research. Such nonlogical implications become ideologies when politically loaded (as the importance of aggression is when coupled with observations about women's lower level of aggression).

When understood as directed at moral theory's nonlogical implications, the gender-bias charge takes a different form. Even if the ethics of justice could consistently accommodate the ethics of care, the critical point is that theorists in the justice tradition have not said much, except in passing, about the ethics of care, and are unlikely to say much in the future without a radical shift in theoretical priorities; and concentrating almost exclusively on rights of noninterference, impartiality, rationality, autonomy, and principles creates an ideology of the moral domain which has undesirable political implications for women. This formulation shifts the justice-care debate from one about logical compatibility to a debate about which theoretical priorities would improve the lot of women.

I see no way around this politicization of philosophical critique. If we hope to shape culture, and not merely to add bricks to a philosophical tower, we will need to be mindful of the cultural/political use to which our thoughts may be put after leaving our wordprocessors. This mindfulness should include asking whether our theoretical work enacts or discredits a moral commitment to improving the lot of women.

Starting from the observation that the ethics of justice has had centuries of workout, I want to ask what ideological implications a concentration on only some moral issues might have and which shifts in priorities might safeguard against those ideologies. This particular tack in trying to bring the ethics of care to center stage has the double advantage of, first, avoiding the necessity of making charges of conceptual inadequacy stick, since it does not matter what the ethics of justice *could* consistently talk about, only what it *does* talk about; and, second, of avoiding the question of what, from an absolute, ahistorical point of view moral theory ought to be most preoccupied with.

The following reflections on moral theorizing about the self, knowledge, motivation, and obligations are not meant to be exhaustive but only to suggest some reasons for taking the charge of gender bias in ethics seriously. I shall sometimes stray rather far afield from the ethics of care, since my aim is not to defend the ethics of care but to advocate some shifts in theoretical priorities.

I. THE MORAL SELF

One concern of moral theory has been with broadening our sensitivities about who has morally considerable rights and interests. The

ordinary individual confronts at least two obstacles to taking others' rights and interests seriously. One is his own self-interest, which inclines him to weigh his own rights and interests more heavily; the other is his identification with particular social groups, which inclines him to weigh the rights and interests of co-members more heavily than those of outsiders. Immanuel Kant had a lot to say about the former obstacle, David Hume about the latter. Sensitivity to our failure to weigh the rights and interests of all members of the moral community equally led moral theorists to focus, in defining the moral self, on constructing various pictures of the moral self's similarity to other moral selves in an effort to underscore our common humanity and thus our entitlement to equal moral consideration. Kant's identification of the moral self with the noumenal self, thus minus all empirical individuating characteristics, is one such picture. Emphases on shared human interests in life, health, etc., serve a similar purpose. And so does John Rawls's invocation of a "veil of ignorance."

Providing us with some way of envisioning our shared humanity, and thus our equal membership in the moral community, is certainly an important thing for moral theory to do. But too much talk about our similarities as moral selves, and too little talk about our differences has its moral dangers. For one, unless we are also quite knowledgeable about the substantial differences between persons, particularly central differences due to gender, race, and class, we may be tempted to slide into supposing that our common humanity includes more substantive similarities than it does in fact. For instance, moral theorists have assumed that moral selves have a prominent interest in property and thus in property rights. But property rights may have loomed large on the moral horizons of past moral theorists partly, or largely, because they were themselves propertied and their activities took place primarily in the public, economic sphere. Historically, women could not share the same interest in property and concern about protecting it, since they were neither legally entitled to hold it nor primary participants in the public, economic world.⁴ And arguably, women do not now place the same priority on property. (I have in mind the fact that equal opportunity has had surprisingly little impact on either sex segregation in the workforce or on women's, but not men's, accommodating their work and work schedules to

⁴ Annette Baier makes a similar point in "Trust and Antitrust," *Ethics*, xcvi (1986): 231–260. There she argues that understanding moral relations in terms of contracts and voluntary promises reflects the social lives of male moral theorists: "Contract is a device for traders, entrepreneurs, and capitalists, not for children, servants, indentured wives, and slaves" (p. 247).

childrearing needs. One explanation is that income matters less to women than other sorts of considerations. The measure of a woman, unlike the measure of a man, is not the size of her paycheck.) Seyla Benhabib⁵ summarizes this point by suggesting that a single-minded emphasis on common humanity encourages a "substitutionalist universalism" where universal humanity "is defined surreptitiously by identifying the experiences of a specific group of subjects as the paradigmatic case of all humans" (*ibid.*, p. 158).

In addition to encouraging us to overlook how our basic interests may differ depending on our social location, the emphasis on common humanity, because it is insensitive to connections between interests, social location, and power, deters questions about the possible malformation of our interests as a result of their development within an inegalitarian social structure. Both dangers plague the role-reversal test, some version of which has been a staple of moral theorizing. Although the point of that test is to eliminate egoistic bias in moral judgments, without a sensitivity to how our (uncommon) humanity is shaped by our social structure, role-reversal tests may simply preserve, rather than eliminate, inequities. This is because role-reversal tests either take individuals' desires as givens, thus ignoring the possibility that socially subordinate individuals have been socialized to want the very things that keep them socially subordinate (e.g., Susan Brownmiller⁶ argues that women have been socialized to want masochistic sexual relations); or, if they take into account what individuals ought to want, role-reversal tests typically ignore the way that social power structures may have produced an alignment between the concept of a normal, reasonable desire and the desires of the dominant group (so, for example, much of the affirmative action literature takes it for granted that women ought to want traditionally defined male jobs with no consideration of the possibility that women might prefer retailing those jobs so that they are less competitive, less hierarchical, and more compatible with family responsibilities).

In short, without adequate knowledge of how very different human interests, temperaments, lifestyles, and commitments may be, as well as a knowledge of how those interests may be malformed as a result of power inequities, the very egoism and group bias that the focus on common humanity was designed to eliminate may slip in as a result of that focus.

⁵ "The Generalized and Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in *Women and Moral Theory*, p. 158.

⁶ *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975).

The objection here is not that a formal, abstract notion of the moral self's common humanity is wrong and ought to be jettisoned. Nor is the objection that a formal notion of the moral self logically entails a substitutionalist universalism. The objection is that repetitive stress on shared humanity creates an ideology of the moral self: the belief that our basic moral interests are not significantly, dissimilarly, and sometimes detrimentally shaped by our social location. Unless moral theory shifts its priority to knowledgeable discussions of human differences—particularly differences tied to gender, race, class, and power—lists and rank orderings of basic human interests and rights as well as the political deployment of those lists are likely to be sexist, racist, and classist.

II. MORAL KNOWLEDGE

Central to moral theory has been the issue of how moral principles, and hence moral decisions in particular cases, are to be justified. We owe that interest in justification in large measure to the modern period's concern to find foundations for knowledge that are, in principle, accessible to any rational individual. The concern with justifying moral knowledge meant that some questions, but not others, were particularly important for moral theory to address. First, how should an adult who has acquired a wide variety of moral views as a result of his socialization into a particular cultural tradition go about evaluating those views? That is, how do we distinguish mere inherited prejudices from legitimate moral beliefs? Second, given that the correctness of particular moral judgments depends, in part, on the correctness of the general moral principles that we bring to bear on particular cases, how do we justify those general moral principles? In either case, the answer involves showing that our moral views and principles can survive various tests of rationality, e.g., that they are consistent and universalizable.

The danger of asking these questions lies not in their being the wrong questions, but in their being only some of the right questions for a moral epistemology. As adults, moral theorists may naturally find questions about distinguishing learned prejudices from justified moral beliefs more pertinent to their own lives. And certainly one of the capacities that we hope moral agents will acquire is the capacity to draw just those kinds of distinctions. But we may pay a price by too strongly emphasizing the acquisition of moral knowledge through individual, adult reflection. For one, this emphasis contributes to the idea that the self who is capable of moral knowledge is, in Benhabib's caustic words, "a mushroom behind a veil of ignorance"; that is, that the moral knower, like a mushroom, has neither mother nor father, nor childhood education (*op. cit.*, p. 166). Thus, we may lose sight of

the fact that our adult capacity for rational reflection, the size of our adult reflective task, and quite possibly our motivation to act on reflective judgments depend heavily on our earlier moral education. Whereas moral theory has not been altogether blind to the importance of moral education, few have given moral education a role comparable to that of adult reflection in the acquisition of moral knowledge. (Francis Hutcheson comes to mind as a notable exception.) The result is an ideology of moral knowledge: the belief that moral knowledge is not only justified but also acquired exclusively or most importantly through rational reflection. Women have special reason to be concerned about this ideology. Women's traditional role has included the moral education of children. The significance of women's work in transmitting moral knowledge and instilling a moral motivational structure (either well or poorly) is likely to remain invisible so long as the theoretical focus remains on adult acquisition of moral knowledge.

More importantly, stressing the corrective efficacy of individual, rational reflection creates a second ideology of moral knowledge: the belief that individual reflection, if it conforms to canons of rationality, guarantees the truth of one's moral judgments. It is untrue that any rational individual who applies sufficient reflective elbow grease can adequately assess the justifiability of his moral views or go behind a veil of ignorance and come out with the correct moral principles. Our being motivated to raise questions of justification in the first place and our ability to address those questions once raised depends at least partially on the social availability of moral criticisms and of morally relevant information. The nineteenth century's moral injunction against women's pursuing advanced education was not simply the product of failed rational reflection. It was tied, on the one hand, to a societal assumption that women's unequal status was morally unproblematic; and, on the other hand, to medical misinformation about the connection between women's intellectual activity and the healthy functioning of their reproductive organs. Thus, moral questions about the policy of barring women from higher education were unlikely to be raised, since rationality does not require indiscriminately questioning any and all policies but only those reasonably open to question. Even if raised, they were unlikely to be answered in women's favor, since, at the time, there appeared to be morally relevant differences between men and women. Only women could harm themselves and produce mentally and physically defective children as a result of education.

Without an equal theoretical stress on the social determinants of moral knowledge—particularly the potential alignment of moral and

factual beliefs with social power structures—the very reflective processes that were designed to criticize cultural prejudices may simply repeat those prejudices. In emphasizing moral interdependency over moral autonomy, the ethics of care provides the kind of theoretical focus that could make moral education and the social determinants of moral knowledge salient.

III. MORAL MOTIVATION

Moral theorizing, particularly though not exclusively in the Kantian tradition, has focused on the motivating role of thoughts of duty, of what is right or what contributes to general happiness. Moral action should stem from a regard for morality itself rather than from non-moral thoughts, self-interest, or happily altruistic emotions, since only a regard for morality itself provides a reliable spur to moral action, and only a regard for morality focuses our attention on the kinds of considerations that ensure right action.

One bone of contention in the justice-care debate has been over whether the requirement to have duty as one's motive necessarily excludes being motivated by care, sympathy, compassion, or the personally involved motives of love, loyalty, and friendship. Marcia Baron⁷ has argued forcefully for the compatibility of duty with more personally involved motives. Central to her argument is the distinction between primary and secondary motives.

A primary motive supplies the agent with the motivation to do the act in question, whereas a secondary motive provides limiting conditions on what may be done from other motives. Although qua secondary motive it cannot by itself move one to act, a secondary motive is nonetheless a motive, for the agent would not proceed to perform the action without the "approval" of the secondary motive (*ibid.*, p. 207).

Being motivated by duty as a secondary motive amounts to no more than the realization that one would not act on one's love or one's compassion if doing so conflicted with what morally ought to be done. Thus, being morally motivated by duty does not require taking an emotionally uninvolved, alienated stance toward others. It merely requires cautious willingness to refrain from action that conflicts with what one ought to do. Moreover, Baron argues that doing what one ought to do may well include cultivating one's capacity for sympathy and compassion, since merely "going through the motions" is often less than what duty requires.

I find Baron's argument convincing, and truer to Kant. But, even if a duty-centered ethics can consistently accommodate caring atti-

⁷ "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty," this JOURNAL, LXXXI, 4 (April 1984): 197–220.

tudes, one can still object that the repeated opposition of duty to self-interest creates an ideology of moral motivation: the belief that we are psychologically so constructed that duty must usually supply a *primary* motive.

Almost invariably in moral theory, it is the lack of other-directed attitudes which is cited as the largest motivational obstacle to doing what morality requires. Agents find it difficult to behave morally because (1) they are egoistic and are inclined initially to be motivated by self-interest and to weigh their own interests more heavily than others'; and (2) even where they stand to gain nothing by acting immorally, they are initially indifferent to others' welfare. Moral thoughts, particularly the thought of duty, combat egoism and indifference by supplying a primary motive to do what morality requires which we otherwise would lack. Thus, moral theory constructs an image of the moral agent as psychologically so constituted as to require that duty be his primary motive. Conceding, in the way Baron does, that duty may operate as a secondary motive in some people or on some occasions does nothing to counter this image of the agent's psychology.

The narratives of the women in Gilligan's study, however, suggest a very different motivational picture for women.⁸ At the earliest stage of moral development, women may share this egoistic psychology. But, at later stages, it is an unreflective and often self-excluding sympathy for others which poses the main motivational obstacle. Far from the lure of self-interest, the motivational problem for adult women is how to place proper limits on the inclination to respond to others' needs. The problem is not one of getting duty to operate as a primary motive, but of how to get it to function properly as a *secondary* motive. Moral theories that emphasize conquering self-interest by cultivating a sense of duty (or by cultivating sympathy) only reinforce women's inclination to act on caring attitudes unchecked by considerations of duties to self or overriding duties to others. If women's elective underparticipation in the workforce, overassumption of familial duties, and nonreportage of date rape and marital abuse concern us morally and politically, we might do well to shift theoretical priority from the conflict between duty and self-interest to that between duty and care.

IV. MORAL OBLIGATIONS

The concern of traditional moral theory with impartiality emerges variously out of a concern with countering self-interest, enlarging our sentiments, and introducing greater consistency into moral

⁸ *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1982).

judgments. This, too, has been a bone of contention in the justice-care debate: Does a fully impartial ethics necessarily exclude special moral obligations to friends and family and thus exclude considerations that are more likely to figure centrally in women's actual moral thinking given their traditional and ongoing familial role? In defending the adequacy of the ethics of justice, George Sher⁹ argues from a Rawlsian contractarian point of view that the selection of impartial rules may well include selecting rules that dictate special obligations.

The contractors' ignorance does rule out the choice of principles that name either specific agents who are allowed or required to be partial or the specific recipients of their partiality. However, this is irrelevant; for the question is not whether any *given* person may or should display partiality to any other, but rather whether *all* persons may or should be partial to their wives, husbands, or friends. The relevant principles, even if licensing or dictating partiality, must do so impartially. Hence, there is no obvious reason why such principles could not be chosen even by contractors ignorant of the particulars of their lives.

Similarly, Kantians might argue from the idea of implicit promises made to family or friends, and utilitarians might argue from considerations of maximizing welfare, that it is possible to give preference to friends and families without giving up the idea that no one counts for more than one. I want to concede this point that the ethics of justice leaves logical room for special obligations.

But, when moral theory is largely silent about special obligations or brings them in as addenda, two ideologies of moral life get created: the first is the belief that it is self-evident that general obligations are morally more important than special obligations. This ideology is troubling, because the division of the moral world into general obligations governing public relations with relative strangers and special obligations governing personal relations with family and friends so closely parallels the genderized division of spheres into public and private. The value of women's private domestic work has been too quickly dismissed in the past by those who assumed that public productive labor is self-evidently more important than private reproductive labor. One might, then, reasonably worry about the way moral theory, perhaps inadvertently, confirms this quick dismissal of the private realm as "of course" less important.

The second ideology created by the repeated focus on general obligations is the belief that general obligations are experientially more frequently encountered; they deserve more attention because

⁹ "Other Voices, Other Rooms?" *op. cit.*, p. 186.

questions about them come up more often. Women, however, in addition to typically being more involved in familial caretaking, overwhelmingly dominate service and caring jobs; and the interpersonal relationships in those jobs bear many of the same characteristics as do private, familial relationships. They are often ongoing, dependency relations and/or involve heightened expectations that the worker will have a special concern for and advocacy relation to the client/employer (e.g., teaching, daycare, nursing, social work, secretarial work, and airline stewardessing). Even in traditionally male jobs, both employers and clients may expect, in virtue of women's caring social role, more from women workers (for example, to be warmer and more supportive) than general moral obligations require. Given these kinds of considerations, theoretical emphasis on general obligations (which would incline one to think that special obligations are experientially less frequently encountered) quite naturally evokes the question "Whose moral experience is being described?" Moreover, so long as moral theory continues to depict public moral relations as though they were governed almost exclusively by general obligations, which leave a good deal of latitude for the pursuit of self-interest, we are unlikely to see that women's public moral lives, not just their private ones, leave less scope for the pursuit of self-interest than men's.

THE CHARGE OF GENDER BIAS

I have argued that repeated focusing in moral theorizing on a restricted range of moral problems or concepts produces ideologies of the moral life which may infect our philosophical as well as our popular, cultural beliefs. I want to emphasize that this results from the cumulative effect of moral theorizing rather than from errors or omissions in particular ethical works considered individually. I also want to re-emphasize that those ideologies need have been neither explicitly articulated nor believed by any serious moral philosopher (though some surely have). They are, rather, "explanatory beliefs" whose general acceptance would have to be supposed in order to explain the rationality of the particular patterns of philosophical conversation and silence which characterize moral theory. The charge of gender bias is thus not addressed to individual thinkers so much as to the community of moral theorists or, alternatively, to a tradition of moral theorizing.

The call for a shift in theoretical priorities is simultaneously a call for a shift in our methods of evaluating moral theories. Evaluation is not exhausted by carefully scrutinizing individual theories, since in the process of theorizing in a philosophical community we unavoidably contribute to the establishment of a tradition of moral thinking

which may implicitly, in virtue of common patterns of talk and silence, endorse views of the moral life which go beyond those of individual contributors. The nonlogical implications of theorizing patterns require evaluation as well.

But, if moral theory suffers from a lopsidedness that produces ideologies of the moral life, why be particularly concerned with eliminating *gender* bias? Would not the more basic, and broader, philosophical task be to eliminate bias in general? Would not a bias sensitive (but gender insensitive) critique do all the work? There is indeed an interesting coincidence between the critiques stemming out of Gilligan's work with critiques having no clear connection to it or feminist theory.¹⁰ The call, coming out of the ethics of care, for a de-emphasis on the role of reflective, principled reasoning curiously coincides with an independent resuscitation of virtue ethics. Similarly, Gilligan's attention to personal integrity coincides with comparable but independent worries about the threats posed by an overly demanding moral theory to personal integrity. The same is true of philosophical demands for moral attention to the good life, compassion, and special obligations. Thus, sensitivity to gender issues would seem unnecessary for philosophical critiques whose consequence, though not intent, would be a gender neutral moral theory.

Perhaps, but I suspect not. Some moral issues are arguably more critical for women, and thus achieving gender neutrality is partly a matter of prioritizing those issues. But eliminating gender bias cannot be equated (though possibly reducing gender bias can) with simply prioritizing those "women's issues" irrespective of the content of the analysis of those issues. These same issues also have a place in men's moral experience. For that reason, male moral philosophers too may have cause to regret moral theory's neglect of special relations, virtue ethics, compassion and the problem of limiting compassionate impulses; and it is thus no surprise that some of the same critiques of moral theories are coming from both feminist and nonfeminist quarters. But, given that our lives are thoroughly genderized, there is no reason to suppose that gender bias cannot recur in the discussion of these "women's moral issues." Which virtues, after all, will we make focal—intellectual virtues or inter-

¹⁰ I have in mind Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality" and "Moral Luck," in *Moral Luck* (New York: Cambridge, 1981); and "Integrity," in *Utilitarianism: For and Against*, J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, eds. (New York: Cambridge, 1973); Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," this JOURNAL, LXXIX, 8 (August 1982): 419–429; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," this JOURNAL, LXXIX, 4 (April 1982): 173–193; Lawrence Blum, *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

personal virtues? And what will we say about individual virtues? Will we, as Annette Baier does (*op. cit.*), examine how virtues may undergo deformation in different ways depending on our place in power structures? Which kind of compassion will become paradigmatic: the impersonal, public compassion for strangers and unfortunate populations, or the personal, private compassion felt for friends, children, and neighbors? Will we repeat the same militaristic metaphors of conquest and mastery in describing conflicts between compassion and duty which have dominated descriptions of the moral agent's relation to his self-interest? And, in weighing the value of personal integrity against the moral claims of others, will we take into account the way that gender roles may affect both the value we attach to personal integrity and the weight we attach to others' claims?

The possibility of gender bias recurring in the process of redressing bias in moral theory derives from the fact that philosophical reasoning is shaped by extra-philosophic factors, including the social location of the philosophic reasoner and his audience as well as the contours of the larger social world in which philosophic thought takes place. It is naive to suppose that a reflective, rational, but gender-insensitive critique of moral theory will have the happy outcome of eliminating gender bias. So long as we avoid incorporating gender categories among the tools for philosophical analysis, we will continue running the risks, whether we work within or counter to the tradition, of importing gender bias into our philosophical reflection and of creating an ideology of the moral life.

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