On the Biological Foundation of Risk Preferences*

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Abstract

This paper considers a continuous-time biological model in which the growth rate of a population is determined by the risk attitude of its individuals. We consider choices over lotteries which determine the number of offspring and involve both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. We distinguish between two types of aggregate risk: environmental shocks and natural disasters. Environmental shocks influence the death and birth rates, while natural disasters result in instantaneous drops in population size.

Our main result is a utility representation of the evolutionary optimal behavior. The utility is additively separable in the two types of aggregate risk. The term involving environmental shocks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility which induces the same attitude towards both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The term involving disasters cannot be interpreted as an expected utility maximization and induces less tolerance towards aggregate risk.

1 Introduction

Most models in economics take preferences as given and derive the choices induced by those preferences. This paper does just the opposite. We entertain the hypothesis that choice behaviours are genetically determined and shaped by natural selection. The underlying individual preferences are then merely the representations of those evolutionary optimal choice behaviours. We work from the basic premise that in the long-run context of evolution, only the fastest-growing genes survive. As this paper focuses on risk preferences, we consider choices over lotteries that affect the reproductive value of individuals. Our main result is a utility representation of the optimal choice behaviour.

The cornerstone of our analysis is a characterization of the long run dynamics of a population that inhabits a risky environment. Two types of aggregate risk are present, which we refer to as

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environmental shocks and natural disasters. Environmental shocks influence the birth and death rates of individuals, determining the rate of increase of the population size. Meanwhile, natural disasters cause discrete drops in population size, affecting the level as opposed to the slope. The reproductive fitness of an individual is also subject to idiosyncratic risk, that is, conditional on an environmental shock or a natural disaster, the birth rate and the survival probability are still random variables. Because the population is affected by aggregate shocks, it does not grow at a constant rate. Our key result consists of a characterization of the asymptotic growth rate as a function of the ergodic distributions of the various types of risk. The main theorem of this paper states that this function is the utility representation of the evolutionary optimal choice behaviour over lotteries in an environment where the risk is determined by individuals’ choices.

In order to better explain our contribution and to contrast our results with those in existence, we first describe Robson’s (1996a) seminal paper on the evolution of risk preferences. Time is discrete and individuals live for one period. The number of offspring an individual has is determined by the realization of a lottery. A lottery, \( L \), is described by a triple, \( (\Omega, G, \{F(\cdot|\omega)\}_{\omega \in \Omega}) \), where \( \Omega \) denotes the set of possible states of the world, \( G \) is the ergodic distribution on \( \Omega \), and \( F(\cdot|\omega) \) is the distribution on the number of offspring if the state of the world is \( \omega \). Conditional on \( \omega \), the realization of \( F(\cdot|\omega) \) is independent across individuals, so this element represents the idiosyncratic component of the risk. The distribution \( G \) represents the aggregate risk, since \( \omega \) determines the distribution of reproductive values in the population. Robson (1996a) shows that the asymptotic growth rate of the population is

\[
\mu(L) = \int \log \left( \int \eta dF(\eta|\omega) \right) dG(\omega). \tag{1}
\]

Since the gene inducing the choice of the lottery \( L \) grows at rate \( \mu(L) \) in the long run, Robson (1996a) interprets \( \mu \) as the utility representation of the evolutionary optimal behaviour. That is, the surviving gene chooses \( L \) over \( L' \) if and only if \( \mu(L) \geq \mu(L') \). The main implication of (1) is that the evolved attitude towards risk depends strongly on whether the risk is idiosyncratic or aggregate. In fact, individuals will be relatively less tolerant of aggregate risk, as compared to idiosyncratic risk. To illustrate this observation, consider two lotteries, \( L_1 \) and \( L_2 \). Suppose that both lotteries generate the same distribution of offspring, \( H \). However, the risk induced by \( L_1 \) is purely idiosyncratic while \( L_2 \) involves only aggregate risk\(^1\). By (1), \( \mu(L_1) = \log \int \eta dH(\eta) > \int \log \eta dH(\eta) = \mu(L_2) \). That is, even though \( L_1 \) and \( L_2 \) induce the same risk from the viewpoint of a single individual, \( L_1 \) is strictly preferred to \( L_2 \).

In contrast to Robson (1996a), we consider a continuous time model, which allows us to distinguish between two types of aggregate risk: environmental shocks and natural disasters. Recall that environmental shocks determine the rate of increase of the population size, while natural disasters cause instantaneous changes in the level. In discrete time, any aggregate shock necessarily results

\(^1\)Formally, \( L_1 = (\Omega, G, \{F_1(\cdot|\omega)\}_{\omega \in \Omega}) \) where \( F_1(\cdot|\omega) = H(\cdot) \) and \( L_2 = (\mathbb{R}_+, H, \{F_2(\cdot|\omega)\}_{\omega \in \Omega}) \) where \( F_2(\eta|\omega) = 0 \) if \( \eta < \omega \) and one otherwise.
in a discrete change in the population size. It then becomes natural to ask whether the results obtained by Robson (1996a) apply only to natural disasters, or to aggregate risk in general. Our somewhat surprising answer is that his results do not hold for environmental shocks: the evolutionary optimal behaviour induces the same attitude towards both idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk due to environmental shocks.

In order to state our representation theorem, let us describe our setup in detail. Time is continuous and population dynamics are determined by a lottery \( L = (\Omega, \lambda, F_n (|\omega|), F_e (|\omega|)) \). The set \( \Omega \) denotes the set of states of the world and \( G \) is the ergodic distribution on \( \Omega \). The function \( \lambda: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) is the arrival rate of a disaster. The c.d.f. \( F_n (|\omega|) \) denotes the distribution of the survival probability at the moment a natural disaster occurs. \( F_e (|\omega|) \) denotes the distribution of the net birth-rate (birth-rate minus death-rate) of an individual conditional on \( \omega \). Our main result is that the asymptotic growth rate, \( U(L) \), is

\[
U(L) = \int \int \varepsilon dF_e (\varepsilon|\omega|) dG (\omega) + \int \lambda (\omega) \log \left( \int \eta dF_n (\eta|\omega|) \right) dG (\omega).
\]

(2)

In order to show that the function \( U \) can indeed be interpreted as a utility function of the evolutionary optimal choice behaviour in this context, we introduce the stochastic arrival of choice problems over lotteries. A gene is defined to be a choice behaviour, that is, a mapping from choice sets into choices. At each moment in time, the dynamics of the population are determined by the lottery chosen in the most recent choice problem. We show that only those genes which behave as if they were maximizing the function \( U \) will survive.

The two additive terms in the utility representation (2) have very different economic interpretations. The first term, which is associated with environmental shocks, is a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern representation with Bernoulli utility as the identity function. This implies that the choice induced by \( U \) depends only on the expected value of the net birth-rate; it doesn’t matter whether the source of the risk is aggregate or idiosyncratic. The second term, which is associated with natural disasters, is analogous to (1) of Robson (1996a). Indeed, if \( \lambda (\omega) \equiv 1 \), which corresponds to the frequency of discrete changes in Robson (1996a), the two expressions coincide. Let us again point out that this term is not a von-Neumann Morgenstern representation of risk attitude. Interestingly, this term is formally identical to a smooth ambiguity-averse preference representation where the ambiguity is determined by \( G \) and the ambiguity aversion is determined by the logarithm function. For a discussion and axiomatic characterization of smooth ambiguity averse preferences, see Klibanoff et al. (2005).

Let us emphasize that in our model, environmental shocks do not by any means have to be associated with smooth changes. In fact, these shocks might have profound instantaneous effects.

\[ \text{2} \text{Since the lotteries directly determine net birth-rates, the Bernoulli utility is the identity function, and hence, these preferences exhibit risk-neutrality. However, it is not hard to generate risk-aversion in our model. If the lotteries were to determine reproductive resources instead of net birth-rates and these resources could be consumed and transformed into offspring according to a reproduction function, the Bernoulli utility would become the reproduction function. The concavity of such a reproduction function would induce risk-averse preferences.} \]
on death rates. The spread of a viral disease, for example, could triple the death-rate and wipe out a significant fraction of the population within a short period of time. Dramatic changes in weather conditions could also be modelled as environmental shocks. A long lasting drought reduces food sources, and a large proportion of the population might starve to death within a summer. What these examples have in common is that the increased number of deaths occur through a shift in the rate, and do not occur at a single point in time. Of course, the evolutionary optimal behaviour tries to eliminate the risk of increased death rates associated with such environmental shocks. However, our model predicts that this type of risk is not treated any differently from idiosyncratic risk.

There are, undoubtedly, events which cause the instantaneous death of many individuals at the same time. Such events might include earthquakes, forest fires and floods. It is less clear, however, that these events should be considered more important than environmental shocks in determining the evolution of risk preferences. At the end, we do interpret our representation theorem as, at least a partial, evolutionary justification for von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences.

**Literature Review**

Numerous papers use evolution to at least partially explain preferences. The first is probably Becker (1976), who adopts an evolutionary argument to explain altruism. Overviews of the theories on the relationship between biology and economic behaviour can be found in Robson (2001 and 2002). Here we review only selected papers concerned with the evolution of risk preferences.

Our continuous time assumption is not the only difference between our paper and Robson (1996a). Robson (1996a) considers finite populations and derives conditions under which the population does not go extinct with probability one. We consider continuum populations and, by assumption, they never go extinct. The assumption regarding the continuum population enables us to integrate out the idiosyncratic risk and sidestep problems related to extinction. We note that if a population grows at a constant rate asymptotically, it either goes extinct or it becomes very large. The former case is uninteresting from the evolutionary viewpoint and in the context of the latter one, the continuum assumption does not seem far-fetched.

Robson (1996b) analyses a strategic biological model. First, each male chooses a lottery. The outcome of the lottery is the male's income. After the outcomes of the lotteries are realized, each female decides which male to mate with. A male can mate with multiple females but not vice versa. The number of offspring of a female is a function of the male's income per females who chose him. This model provides a rationale for a particular form of risk taking. Males are willing to take fair bets which result in small losses with large probability and large gains with small probability. The intuition is that a large gain might enable the male to mate with more females. Small losses, on the other hand, might reduce slightly the number of offspring per female but unlikely to reduce the number of females the male can mate with. Under reasonable assumptions on the reproduction function, the positive effect on the number of females dominates the negative effect on the number of offspring.

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3 We consider an individual to be dead at the moment when her reproductive value drops to zero, and not when she is clinically dead.
Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) also analyze evolutionary optimal choices over lotteries in a strategic model. In their model, individuals participate in contests within groups. The outcome of a contest is determined by the realizations of the lotteries picked by the group members. The realizations of the lotteries are independent across individuals and the winner is the individual with the largest realization. The key assumption is that only the winner reproduces. Since the winner takes all, the evolutionary optimal behaviour will necessarily be risk-loving in some sense. However, the authors show that the evolutionary optimal behaviour cannot be represented by rational preferences.

Unlike Robson (1996b) and Dekel and Scotchmer (1999), our model does not involve strategic interactions; individuals only solve decision problems. Indeed, it is not clear to us how one might identify preferences and strategic components from equilibrium behaviour. It is, of course, not to say that the strategic nature of the environment does not influence the evolution of preferences.

Finally, the difference between the effects of idiosyncratic and aggregate risks on preferences are also emphasized by Robson and Samuelson (2009). The authors consider the evolution of intertemporal preferences in an age-structured biological model. Among other things, they show that if the effects of aggregate shocks on an individual do not depend on the age of the individual, then aggregate risk slows down population growth. It is not hard to show, that our main result imply that this conclusion is only true for natural disasters but not for environmental shocks.

2 Model

Time is continuous and is indexed by $t \in \mathbb{R}_+$. At each moment, a continuum of individuals make up the population. The population dynamics are governed by the lottery

$$L = \{ \Omega, G, \{ \lambda(\omega) \}_{\omega \in \Omega}, \{ F_e(\cdot|\omega) \}_{\omega \in \Omega}, \{ F_n(\cdot|\omega) \}_{\omega \in \Omega} \}. \quad (3)$$

$\Omega \subset \mathbb{R}$ is the set of possible states of the world. Let $\omega_t$ denote the state of the world at time $t$. The dynamic process $\{\omega_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}}$ is a Markov process with unique ergodic distribution $G^\pi$. We assume that $\omega_t$ is almost surely continuous in $t$ almost everywhere.

*Environmental shocks.*— The net birth-rate of an individual at time $t$ is $\varepsilon_t = b_t - \delta_t$, where $b_t$ denotes her birth rate and $\delta_t$ denotes her death rate. The variable $\varepsilon_t \in \mathbb{R}$ is distributed according to the conditional c.d.f. $F_e(\varepsilon_t|\omega_t)$ and it is measurable in $t$ almost surely. We allow the net birth rate of an individual, $\varepsilon_t$, to change over time even if $\omega_t$ stays constant. We assume that $\mathbb{E}(\varepsilon|\omega)$

\[ \int_{A} 1 dG(\omega) > 0 \text{ then for each } \omega' \in \Omega, \text{ conditional on } \omega_0 = \omega': \]

$\int I(\omega_t \in A) \, dt = +\infty,$

almost surely. That is, conditional on any initial condition, the process spends an infinite amount of time in every positive $G$-measure set with probability one (see e.g. Glynn (1994) and Duffie and Glynn (2004)).
is a bounded function of $\omega$, and $F_e(\varepsilon|\omega)$ is uniformly continuous in $\omega$. The realizations of $\varepsilon$'s are assumed to be independent across individuals conditional on $\omega_t$. We assume that the Law of Large Numbers holds, and hence, at time $t$ the population grows at rate

$$r(\omega_t) \equiv \int \varepsilon dF_e(\varepsilon|\omega_t).$$

**Natural disasters.**— Natural disasters hit the population stochastically according to a non-homogenous Poisson process. The arrival rate of the process at time $t$ is $\lambda(\omega_t) \in [0, \infty)$ where $\lambda : \Omega \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is a bounded, measurable function in $L^1(\Omega, G)$. If a natural disaster occurs at time $t$, an individual survives with probability $\eta_t \in [0, 1]$ and $F_n(\cdot|\omega_t)$ denotes the distribution of $\eta_t$ conditional on $\omega_t$. We assume that $F_n(\eta|\omega)$ is uniformly continuous in $\omega$. We also assume that $\mathbb{E}(\eta|\omega)$ is uniformly bounded away from zero, that is, the population never goes extinct. Again, the realization of $\eta_t$ is independent across individuals conditional on $\omega_t$. We appeal to the Law of Large Numbers once more and assume that the fraction of the population that survives a natural disaster is

$$j(\omega_t) \equiv \int \eta dF_n(\eta|\omega_t).$$

We further assume that for each individual, the shocks $\varepsilon_t$ and $\eta_t$ are independent at each time $t$ conditional on $\omega_t$.

In what follows, we describe the simple case in which each random variable is binary and all changes in the environment arrive according to Poisson distributions.

**Example.** Suppose that $\Omega = \{\omega^H, \omega^L\}$ and the state of the world switches according to a Poisson process with arrival rate $\mu > 0$. This process is assumed to be independent of all other random variables. So, the ergodic distribution of $\omega$ is given by $\Pr(\omega^H) = \Pr(\omega^L) = 1/2$.

The net birth rate of an individual is also binary, $\varepsilon_t \in \{\varepsilon^l, \varepsilon^h\}$ and its distribution is described by

$$\varepsilon_t = \begin{cases} 
\varepsilon^h & \text{with probability } p_e(\omega_t), \\
\varepsilon^l & \text{with probability } 1 - p_e(\omega_t),
\end{cases}$$

where $\varepsilon^h > \varepsilon^l$ and $p_e(\omega^H) > p_e(\omega^L)$. These inequalities imply that if the state is $\omega^H$, an individual reproduces at a higher rate in expectation. The net birth rate of an individual is constant over time unless the state of the world changes. When the state changes, the net birth rate of each individual is instantaneously redrawn according to the distribution described above.

Natural disasters arrive according to a Poisson process with rate one, that is, $\lambda(\omega^H) = \lambda(\omega^L) = 1$. The survival probability of an individual, $\eta_t$, can take one of two values from $\{\eta^l, \eta^h\}$ and its

\footnote{For our mathematical results to hold, we do not need $\eta_t$ to be less than one. We only make this assumption for the sake of interpretation.}
distribution is described by

\[ \eta_t = \begin{cases} \eta^h & \text{with probability } p_n(\omega_t), \\ \eta^l & \text{with probability } 1 - p_n(\omega_t), \end{cases} \]

where \( \eta^h > \eta^l \) and \( p_n(\omega^H) > p_n(\omega^L) \). These inequalities imply that if the state is \( \omega^H \), each individual is more likely to survive a natural disaster. At the moment when the state, \( \omega_t \), changes or a natural disaster occurs, the survival probability of each individual is redrawn according to the distribution described above. Otherwise, the survival probability of each individual is constant.

Finally, the aggregate net birth rates and the average survival rates in disasters are described by

\[ r(\omega) = \varepsilon^h p_e(\omega) + \varepsilon^l [1 - p_e(\omega)], \]  
\[ j(\omega) = \eta^h p_n(\omega) + \eta^l [1 - p_n(\omega)], \]  respectively.

### 3 Results

In this section we analyze the speed of population growth. Let \( y_t \) denote the size of the population at time \( t \) and let \( y_0 \) be normalized to one. If there is a natural disaster at time \( t \), \( y_t \) denotes the size of the surviving population. The basic difficulty is that, due to aggregate shocks, the population does not grow at a steady state rate. Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize a growth rate, \( g \), such that if \( t \) is large enough, the size of the population is approximately the same as if it were growing at a constant rate \( g \), that is,

\[ y_t \approx e^{gt}. \]  

Such a growth rate \( g \) is called the continuously compounded growth rate of the population and is formally defined in Section 3.2.

Next, we derive an expression for the law of motion of the population along a realized path of the random variables. In Section 3.2, we use this expression to prove our key result, which is a characterization of the continuously compounded growth rate in terms of the lottery \( L \). Finally, in Section 3.3 we introduce stochastically arriving choice problems. Each choice problem is a set of lotteries, and each lottery is just like \( L \) in (3). We show that only those genes which behave as if they were maximizing the continuously compounded growth rate will survive.

#### 3.1 Law of motion of the population

Let \( N(t) \) denote the number of natural disasters which occurred between time zero and time \( t \). In addition, let \( \tau_i \in [0, t], i \in \{1, ..., N(t)\} \), denote the arrival time of the \( i \)th natural disaster.
Proposition 1 The size of the population at time \( t \) is given by:

\[
y_t = \exp \left[ \int_0^t r(\omega_s) \, ds \right] \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)} j(\omega_{t_i}),
\]

where \( \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)} j(\omega_{t_i}) \) is defined to be one if \( N(t) = 0 \).

A notable property of the expression on the right-hand side of (9) is that it is multiplicatively separable in natural disasters and environmental shocks. To illustrate this observation, let us consider a population that grows at a constant rate for a unit amount of time. Suppose that this population is hit by a disaster and half of the population dies. Then, irrespective of the exact time of the disaster, the population at the end of the time period will be half as large as it would have been if the disaster had not occurred. Of course, this argument presumes that the disaster leaves the net birth rate of the surviving population unaffected. In our model, this assumption is satisfied because \( \varepsilon_t \) and \( \eta_t \) are independent conditional on \( \omega_t \).

Proof. We prove the proposition by induction with respect to the number of natural disasters, \( N(t) \). Suppose first that \( N(t) = 0 \). Then, by (4), the law of motion of the population is described by the following differential equation between time zero and time \( t \):

\[
\dot{y}_t = y_t r(\omega_t).
\]

The solution of this differential equation is\(^6\)

\[
y_t = \exp \left[ \int_0^t r(\omega_s) \, ds \right],
\]

which is just the statement of the proposition for \( N(t) = 0 \).

Suppose that the statement of the proposition is true for all \( t \) whenever \( N(t) \leq k \) and let us assume that \( N(t) = k + 1 \). By the inductive hypothesis,

\[
\lim_{\tau \to \tau_{N(t)}} \frac{y_{\tau}}{y_{\tau_{N(t)}}} = \exp \left\{ \int_0^\tau r(\omega_s) \, ds \right\} \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)-1} j(\omega_{t_i}).
\]

At time \( \tau_{N(t)} \) there is a natural disaster and, by (4), only a fraction \( j(\omega_{\tau_{N(t)}}) \) of the population survives. Hence,

\[
y_{\tau_{N(t)}} = \exp \left\{ \int_0^\tau r(\omega_s) \, ds \right\} \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)} j(\omega_{t_i}). \tag{11}
\]

The law of motion of the population for \( \tau \in [\tau_{N(t)}, t] \) is again described by the differential equation (10) and initial condition (11). The solution is

\[
y_t = y_{\tau_{N(t)}} \exp \left( \int_{\tau_{N(t)}}^t r(\omega_s) \, ds \right) = \exp \left\{ \int_0^t r(\omega_s) \, ds \right\} \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)} j(\omega_{t_i}),
\]

where the second equality follows from (11). □

\(^6\)The solution exists because \( r \) is continuous and bounded, see Coddington and Levinson (1955), Chapter 2.
3.2 Continuously compounded growth rate

Motivated by (8), we first provide a formal definition for the continuously compounded growth rate.

Definition 1 We call the number \( g \in \mathbb{R} \) the continuously compounded growth rate of the population if

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\log y_t}{t} = g
\]

almost surely.

In order to see that the continuously compounded growth rate is indeed a useful object in the evolutionary context, consider two populations, \( y^1_t \) and \( y^2_t \), with corresponding compounded growth rates \( g^1 \) and \( g^2 \). We show that if \( g^1 > g^2 \) then, asymptotically and with probability one, \( y^1_t \) is going to be infinitely large relative to \( y^2_t \). To see this, note that, by Definition 1,

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\log y^1_t}{t} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\log y^1_t}{t} - \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\log y^2_t}{t} = g^1 - g^2 > 0
\]

almost surely. But this can only be the case if \( y^1_t / y^2_t \) converges to infinity as \( t \) goes to infinity with probability one.

Next, we show that the continuously compounded growth rate exists and characterize it in terms of the lottery, \( L \). This is our main result.

Theorem 1 For almost all \( (\omega_t) \), \( \{N(0), \omega\} \in \mathbb{R} \),

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \left( \frac{\log y_t}{t} \right) = \int \int \varepsilon dF_{\varepsilon}(\varepsilon|\omega) dG(\omega) + \int \lambda(\omega) \log \left( \int \eta dF_{\eta}(\eta|\omega) \right) dG(\omega). \tag{12}
\]

Let us explain the basic idea of the proof. By Proposition 1,

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\log y_t}{t} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\int_0^t r(\omega_s) ds}{t} + \lim_{t \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^{N(t)} \frac{\log j(\omega_{\tau_i})}{t}, \tag{13}
\]

where the second term in the right-hand side is defined to be zero if \( N(t) = 0 \). Since \( \omega_t \) is an ergodic process, both \( r(\omega) \) and \( \log j(\omega) \) are also ergodic. As a consequence, the right-hand side of (12) is the sum of the time averages of two ergodic variables. Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem states that, under certain conditions, the time average of the realization of an ergodic variable converges to the expected value of the variable with probability one, where the expectations are formed according to the ergodic distribution. In the proof, we argue that Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem is applicable, and show that the time average of \( r(\omega) \) and \( \log j(\omega) \) converge to the first and second terms in the right-hand side of (12), respectively.

Proof. First, consider the time average of \( r(\omega_t) \). Since the state of the world has an ergodic distribution and \( r \) is continuous, Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem implies that

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\int_0^t r(\omega_s) ds}{t} = \int r(\omega) dG(\omega)
\]
that almost surely. From (16) and (17) the equation in (15) follows.

We now turn to the second expression on the right-hand side of (13) and rewrite it as

$$\frac{N(t)}{t} \sum_{i=1}^{N(t)} \log j(\omega_{\tau_i}).$$

If \( \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega) = 0 \) then \( \lambda = N(t) = 0 \) almost surely, so (14) implies (12). In what follows we restrict attention to the case when \( \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega) > 0 \). We first show that

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{N(t)}{t} = \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega)$$

almost surely. To this end, assume that \( t \in \mathbb{N} \) for simplicity and define \( X_i = N(i) - N(i-1) \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \). Since \( N(t) \) is a non-homogenous Poisson process, the random variables \( X_1, X_2, \ldots \) are independent conditional on the realization of \( \{\omega_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+} \), and \( \mathbb{E}X_i = \text{Var}(X_i) = \int_{t-1}^{t} \lambda(\omega) \, d\tau \). By Kolmogorov’s Strong Law of Large Numbers, we have

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{N(t)}{t} = \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega)$$

almost surely conditional on \( \{\omega_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+} \). Finally, notice that Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem implies that

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \int_0^t \lambda(\omega_s) \, ds = \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega)$$

almost surely. From (16) and (17) the equation in (15) follows.

Next, we show that

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N(t)} \log j(\omega_{\tau_i})}{N(t)} = \int \log j(\omega) \frac{\lambda(\omega)}{\int \lambda(\omega') \, dG(\omega')} \, dG(\omega)$$

almost surely. Recall that \( \tau_i \) denotes the time of the \( i \)-th natural disaster. For all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), define \( Z_i = \log j(\omega_{\tau_i}) \). By (15) and \( \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega) > 0 \) it follows that there are infinitely many disasters with probability one, so these variables are well-defined. The discrete time process \( \{Z_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \) is also an ergodic Markov process and its ergodic distribution, \( \hat{G} \), is given by

$$\int_{\{\omega : \log j(\omega) \in B\}} \hat{G}(\omega) = \frac{\int_{\{\omega : \log j(\omega') \in B\} \lambda(\omega') \, dG(\omega')}}{\int \lambda(\omega') \, dG(\omega')}$$

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7 See, for instance, Doob (1953), Chapter XI, for a version of Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem for continuous-time processes.

8 This theorem is indeed applicable since (See e.g. Feller (1950), Chapter X.7):

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \text{Var}[N(s_i) - N(s_{i-1})] = \lim_{i \to \infty} \frac{1}{i^2} \int_{0}^{i} \lambda(\omega) \, d\tau = \lim_{i \to \infty} \frac{1}{i} \int \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega) = 0 < \infty.$$
for all Borel subset $B$ of $(-\infty, 0]$. Therefore, Birkhoff’s Ergodic Theorem implies that

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Z_i}{n} = \int \log j(\omega) \, d\hat{G}(\omega)$$

with probability one. Substituting the definitions of $Z_i$ and $\hat{G}$ into the previous equation yields (18). Finally, notice that from (15) and (18) it follows that

$$\lim_{t \to 1} \frac{1}{t} \log \left( \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)} j(\omega_{\tau_i}) \right) = \int \lambda(\omega) \log j(\omega) \, dG(\omega) = \int \lambda(\omega) \log \int \eta dF_n(\eta|\omega_i) \, dG(\omega)$$

almost surely, where the second equality is just (5).

From equations (14) and (19) the statement of the theorem follows.

Example (Continued). We apply Theorem 1 to the example presented in Section 2. Recall that in this example, the ergodic distribution on $\Omega = \{\omega^H, \omega^L\}$ is given by $\Pr(\omega^H) = \Pr(\omega^L) = 1/2$. Then substituting (6) and (7) into (12) we get

$$\lim_{t \to 1} \frac{1}{t} \log \left( \prod_{i=1}^{N(t)} j(\omega_{\tau_i}) \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ r(\omega^H) + r(\omega^L) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \log j(\omega^H) + \log j(\omega^L) \right]$$

almost surely.

3.3 Endogenous growth and utility representation

As previously discussed, if the population corresponding to a particular gene has a higher continuously compounded growth rate than that of another population, it will eventually grow to be infinitely larger than that other population. Therefore, if the level of environmental risk is determined by choices made by individuals, and that choice behaviour is genetic, the continuously compounded growth rate is the evolutionary optimal decision criterion. That is, only those genes which generate the largest continuously compounded growth rate survive in the long run. This leads us to interpret

$$U(L) = \int \int \varepsilon dF_\varepsilon(\varepsilon|\omega) \, dG(\omega) + \int \log \int \eta dF_n(\eta|\omega) \, \lambda(\omega) \, dG(\omega)$$

as the utility representation of the evolutionary optimal choice behaviour. One concern which might arise with respect to our analysis thus far pertains to our implicit assumption that the choice of a lottery is made once and for all, and determines the growth rate of the gene forever.

\[^{10}\text{See Corollary 1 of Proposition 2 of Duffie and Glynn (2004).}\]
We have not yet demonstrated that the same utility criterion is used to solve individual choice problems if the overall risk is determined by a combination of various decisions. Next, we take our analysis one step further and formalize the claim that the function $U$ can indeed be interpreted as a utility function of the evolutionary optimal choice behaviour in this context.

To this end, we introduce the stochastic arrival of choice problems. Each choice problem is a set of lotteries. Each of these lotteries is like $L$ defined in (3). We define a gene to be a choice behaviour, that is, a mapping from choice sets into choices. We then consider the dynamics of the population corresponding to a certain gene. At each moment in time, the dynamics of the population are determined by the lottery chosen in the most recent choice problem. We show that only those genes which behave as if they were maximizing the function $U$ defined in (21) will survive.

Let $L$ denote an arbitrary set of lotteries of the form (3). The pair $(\{l_k\}_{k=1}^n, \{\mu_k\}_{k=1}^n)$ is called an environment where $l_k \subset L$, $|l_k| < \infty$ and $\mu_k (> 0)$ is the Poisson arrival rate of $l_k$ ($k = 1, \ldots, n$). A gene, $c$, in the environment $(\{l_k\}_{k=1}^n, \{\mu_k\}_{k=1}^n)$ is a mapping from choice sets to elements of these sets, that is, $c : \{l_1, \ldots, l_n\} \to L$, such that $c(l_k) \in l_k$ for all $k = 1, \ldots, n$. Note that a gene is defined to be simply a choice behaviour on a restricted domain.

In what follows, we investigate the population growth corresponding to a certain gene, $c$. The population dynamics in the environment $(\{l_k\}_{k=1}^n, \{\mu_k\}_{k=1}^n)$ are defined as follows. At $t = 0$, the population is normalized to one and a choice problem is drawn, $l_k$ with probability $\mu_k/\Sigma_{i=1}^n \mu_i$. If $t > 0$ and there is an $s < t$, such that (i) no choice problem arrived during the time interval $(s,t]$ and (ii) a choice problem $l$ arrived at $s$, and $c(l) = L$ then the dynamics of the population at time $t$ are determined by the lottery $L$. We say that a gene survives evolution if its induced continuously compounded growth factor is at least as large as that of any other gene.

**Theorem 2** For each set of lotteries $L$ and for each environment $(\{l_k\}_{k=1}^n, \{\mu_k\}_{k=1}^n)$, the surviving gene, $c^*$, satisfies

$$c^*(l_k) \in \arg \max_{L \in l_k} U(L), \quad (22)$$

for all $k = 1, \ldots, n$.

Let us emphasize that the decision criterion in (22) is robust in the sense that the utility of a lottery is independent of the environment. That is, it depends neither on the other potential choice problems, nor on their frequencies of arrival.

We have not allowed for idiosyncratic uncertainty in the arrival of choice problems. However, it would not be difficult to introduce some such heterogeneity, and allow for the possibility that at some points in time different individuals of the same population face different problems. We might allow, for example, the population to consist of many colonies and the choice problems to arrive independently across colonies. In this case the size of the total population is simply the sum of the sizes of the colonies, so Theorem 2 remains valid.
Proof. Fix an environment, \( \{ \{ k \}_{k=1}^n, \{ \mu_k \}_{k=1}^n \} \), and an arbitrary gene \( c \). Let
\[
L_k = \left( \Omega^k, G^k, \left\{ \lambda^k(\omega) \right\}_{\omega \in \Omega^k}, \left\{ F^n_k(\cdot|\omega) \right\}_{\omega \in \Omega}, \left\{ F^n_k(\cdot|\omega) \right\}_{\omega \in \Omega} \right)
\]
denote \( c \left( l_k \right) \). For notational convenience, assume that \( \Omega^k \cap \Omega^m = \emptyset \) if \( k \neq m \). We show that the continuously compounded growth rate of the gene is
\[
\sum_{k=1}^n \frac{\mu_k}{\mu_1 + \ldots + \mu_n} U \left( L_k \right).
\]
In other words, the asymptotic growth rate of the gene is the average of the continuously compounded growth rates induced by the chosen lotteries weighted by the frequencies of these choices. Note that the statement of the theorem follows from (23), because the fastest growing gene maximizes the summation in (23) pointwise, that is, it satisfies (22).

We show that the dynamics of this population can be described by a lottery of the form (3). The set of possible states of the world, \( \Omega^c \), is \( \bigcup_{k=1}^n \Omega^k \). Since choice problems arrive independently of \( \omega \) and according to constant arrival rates, the lottery \( L_k \) determines the dynamics during a fraction of \( \mu_k / (\mu_1 + \ldots + \mu_n) \) of the times. Therefore, the stationary distribution on \( \Omega^c, G^c \), is given by
\[
G^c(\omega) = \frac{\mu_k}{\mu_1 + \ldots + \mu_n} G^k(\omega)
\]
if \( \omega \in \Omega^k \). Similarly, conditional on \( \omega \in \Omega^k \), the distribution of net birth rates, the arrival rate of a natural disaster, and the distribution of survival probabilities are given by
\[
F^c_c(\varepsilon|\omega) = F^k_c(\varepsilon|\omega), \quad \lambda^c(\omega) = \lambda^k(\omega), \quad \text{and} \quad F^c_n(\eta|\omega) = F^k_n(\eta|\omega),
\]
respectively. By (21), the continuously compounded growth rate of the population is given by
\[
\int \varepsilon dF^c_c(\varepsilon|\omega) dG^c(\omega) + \int \log \int \eta dF^c_n(\eta|\omega) \lambda^c(\omega) dG^c(\omega)
\]
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^n \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega^k} \varepsilon dF^k_c(\varepsilon|\omega) dG^k(\omega) + \int_{\omega \in \Omega^k} \log \int \eta dF^n_k(\eta|\omega) \lambda^k(\omega) dG^k(\omega) \right]
\]
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{\mu_k}{\mu_1 + \ldots + \mu_n} \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega^k} \varepsilon dF^k_c(\varepsilon|\omega) dG^k(\omega) + \int_{\omega \in \Omega^k} \log \int \eta dF^n_k(\eta|\omega) \lambda^k(\omega) dG^k(\omega) \right],
\]
where the second equality follows from (24) and (25). Finally, notice that the last line of the previous equality chain is just (23). \( \blacksquare \)

Interpretation

The two terms on the right-hand side of (21) have very different behavioural implications. Observe that the lottery \( L \) can be viewed as the combination of two compound lotteries: \( \left( \{ F_c(\cdot|\omega) \}_{\omega \in \Omega}, G \right) \) and \( \left( \{ F_n(\cdot|\omega) \}_{\omega \in \Omega}, G \right) \), which are associated with environmental shocks and natural disasters respectively. Equation (21) implies that a decision maker who maximizes \( U \) reduces the compound lottery...
\( (\{F_e(\cdot | \omega)\}_\omega, G) \) to a simple one. That is, conditional on the risk associated with natural disasters, choices will be based only on the expected rate of reproduction. Whether environmental shocks are aggregate or idiosyncratic is irrelevant. Therefore, the first term is simply a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern representation.

In sharp contrast, the second term does not correspond to expected utility maximization. In particular, the compound lottery \( (\{F_n(\cdot | \omega)\}_\omega, G) \) is not reduced to a simple one in the utility function \( U \). This term is formally identical to the representation of smooth ambiguity-averse preferences. In the context of ambiguity \( (\Omega, G) \) corresponds to the subjective state space and beliefs, \( F_n(\cdot | \omega) \) describes uncertainty, and ambiguity-aversion is determined by the logarithmic function. Since the logarithmic function is concave, this representation implies that the decision maker with utility function \( U \) is less tolerant towards aggregate risk than towards idiosyncratic risk.

One notable feature of the function \( U \) is its additive separability in the risks due to environmental shocks and natural disasters. This arises from the fact that \( y_t \) is multiplicatively separable in these two types of aggregate risk. As previously mentioned, this separability is due to our assumption that, for each individual, \( \varepsilon_t \) and \( \eta_t \) are independent conditional on \( \omega_t \). We could relax this independence assumption and still obtain an additive representation similar to (21). However, the c.d.f. \( F_e \) would be replaced by an ergodic distribution of the birth rates which would depend on, among other objects, \( F_n \) and \( \lambda \). So, while the utility representation would still be additive, the term corresponding to environmental shocks would depend on the risks faced due to disasters.

4 On the difference between environmental shocks and natural disasters

Theorem 1 implies that environmental shocks and natural disasters affect growth in very different ways. We should perhaps shed some additional light on this observation, and we shall make it the objective of this section. To this end, we revisit Robson’s (1996a) discrete-time model with two goals in mind. First, we establish a mapping from our continuous-time models with only environmental shocks to Robson’s (1996a) discrete-time models. We make use of this mapping to provide a clear explanation for the divergence between the continuous and discrete models with respect to different types of risk: in the continuous model, individuals make no distinction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, while in the corresponding discrete model they do. Second, we investigate the limit of a discrete time model as the length of the time intervals shrinks to zero. Indeed, it seems quite reasonable to suspect that environmental shocks might be approximated arbitrarily well with a sequence of small natural disasters. In the context of a binary example, we show that, in the limit, the growth rate induced by a lottery does not depend on the decomposition of the risk. In this sense, there is no conflict between our results related to continuous-time models and the limiting behaviour of discrete-time models.
4.1 Mapping continuous models into discrete models

There is a natural mapping from continuous-time models with only environmental shocks into Robson’s (1996a) models. Indeed, one might simply evaluate the size of a continuously growing population at integer moments, and assume that all changes in population size happen at those moments. In the continuous model, in order to make the evolutionary optimal choice, an individual only needs to know the expected net birth rates generated by the lotteries. In contrast, in the discrete model the growth rate of the population is not determined by the expected number of offspring; before making her choice, an individual needs to know whether the risk she faces is aggregate or idiosyncratic.

It is straightforward to map a continuous model into a discrete model with similar aggregate population dynamics, but it is less clear how one might define a discrete-time lottery which individuals will view as similar to continuous-time lotteries. One notable feature of any continuous model is the fact that, within a given time period, an individual might produce not only offspring but also grandchildren. Since children and grandchildren are identical, population growth is determined by the distribution of an individual’s descendants (as opposed to her offspring). Therefore, the distribution of offspring specified by the discrete lottery should be equal to the one-period-ahead distribution of descendants in the continuous model.

There is clearly no distinction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risks in the continuous model. The fact that such a distinction does exist in the discrete model might at first seem puzzling. One might argue, naively, that the expected number of descendants induced by a discrete lottery is pinned down by the expected net birth rate generated by the corresponding continuous lottery. It therefore does not seem possible that, in the continuous model, this expected value provides an individual with enough information to make a choice, while in the discrete model it does not. This reasoning is false. An individual’s net birth rate determines only the distribution of her number of offspring, and does not in fact determine her expected number of descendants. The distribution of her number of descendants also depends on whether the risk she faces is aggregate or idiosyncratic. In particular, if an individual’s birth rate is high, then her offspring’s birth rate is more likely to be high under aggregate risk than under idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, an individual with a high birth rate expects to have relatively more descendants if the risk she faces is aggregate.

To resolve the puzzle, let us consider two continuous lotteries with the same expected net birth rate. On the one hand, the corresponding discrete time lotteries may have different expected values. In fact, a discrete lottery involving more aggregate risk will generate a higher expected number of descendants, which, in turn, promotes population growth. On the other hand, as Robson (1996a) showed, the larger the aggregate part of a discrete lottery, the slower the population will grow. It turns out that these two effects cancel each other out, and the two discrete lotteries, with their different expected values, will generate the same growth rate. Indeed, each of these discrete-time lotteries yields the same utility a’la Robson (1996a) defined by $U^i$. Let us now illustrate this argument with an example.
Example. Suppose that $\Omega = \{\omega^H, \omega^L\}$ and the state of the world can change only at integer moments. Suppose that $\omega$ is redrawn at each $t \in \mathbb{N}$ according to an i.i.d process defined by $	ext{Pr}(\omega^H) = \text{Pr}(\omega^L) = 1/2$. Assume further that the net birth rate of an individual is constant between integer moments and is determined by one of the following two lotteries:

$$L^c_A = \begin{cases} \log 4 & \text{if } \omega_t = \omega^H, \\ 0 & \text{if } \omega_t = \omega^L \end{cases}$$

and

$$L^c_I = \begin{cases} \log 4 & \text{with probability } 1/2, \\ 0 & \text{with probability } 1/2. \end{cases}$$

Note that $L^c_A$ involves only aggregate risk while $L^c_I$ involves only idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the expected net birth rate generated by both lotteries is $\log 2$, and hence, each period, the populations corresponding to these lotteries double in expectation. The continuously compounded growth rate of both populations is $\log 2$.

In what follows, we characterize the discrete-time lotteries, $L^d_A$ and $L^d_I$, corresponding to $L^c_A$ and $L^c_I$. We show that the expected number of offspring induced by $L^d_A$ is larger than that generated by $L^d_I$. However, we also show that the growth rates generated by these lotteries are the same, that is, $u(L^d_A) = u(L^d_I)$, where $u$ is defined by (1).

Consider first the case involving aggregate risk, that is, the lottery $L^c_A$. At each integer moment, the state of the world switches to $\omega^L$ with probability one-half, and an individual’s net birth rate is set to zero. So, after one unit of time, her expected number of descendants (including herself) is one. With equal probability, $\omega$ switches to $\omega^H$, and the individual’s net birth rate becomes $\log 4$. Because the risk is aggregate, within this time period the net birth rate of each of her descendants is also $\log 4$. Therefore, her expected number of descendants is $e^{\log 4} = 4$. To summarize, the discrete time lottery, $L^d_A$, corresponding to $L^c_A$ is defined by

$$L^d_A = \begin{cases} 4 & \text{if } \omega = \omega^H, \\ 1 & \text{if } \omega = \omega^L. \end{cases}$$

Since the two possible states are equally likely, the expected number of descendants is 2.5.

Let us next consider the case involving idiosyncratic risk, that is, the lottery $L^c_I$. At each integer moment, an individual’s net birth rate switches to zero with probability one-half, so after one unit of time her expected number of descendants is one (including herself). With the same probability, her net birth rate is set to $\log 4$ at the beginning of the period. In addition, the net birth rate of each of her descendants born within that period is $\log 4$ with probability one-half and zero otherwise. We do not characterize the distribution of the number of descendents but we observe that the expected number must equal three. Therefore, we conclude that the expected number of descendants generated by $L^d_I$ is 2.

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11 Because integer moments seem to play a special role, this example is not a special case of our model. However, it is easy to modify this example such that events occur according to a Poisson process with arrival rate one.

12 The reason is that an individual’s ex ante expected number of descendants is 2 because the population doubles in each period and the risk is idiosyncratic. Since the expected number of descendant of an individual with birth rate zero is one, the expected number of descendants of an individual with birth rate $\log 2$ must be 3.
Let us now examine the choice between \(L^c_A\) and \(L^c_I\) from a forward-looking perspective. Note that the lotteries \(L^d_A\) and \(L^d_I\) can be viewed as the summaries of the one-period-ahead consequences of \(L^c_A\) and \(L^c_I\), respectively. On the one hand, an individual will have more descendants after one unit of time if she chooses the aggregate lottery \(L^c_A\). Indeed, we have shown that \(EL^d_A = 2.5 > 2 = EL^d_I\). On the other hand, aggregate risk slows down population growth (by the main result of Robson (1996a)). It turns out that these two effects cancel each other out. Indeed, the two discrete lotteries corresponding to \(L^c_A\) and \(L^c_I\) induce the same growth rate. By the main result of Robson (1996a) (and our Theorem 2) the continuously compounded growth rates generated by \(L^d_I\) and \(L^d_A\) are both

\[ u \left( L^d_A \right) = \frac{1}{2} \log 4 + \frac{1}{2} \log 1 = \log 2 = \log EL^d_I = u \left( L^d_I \right). \]

In other words, the long term consequences of a continuous lottery depend on the decomposition of the risk into idiosyncratic and aggregate parts. Nevertheless, an individual does not need to know these consequences. The expected net birth rate captures all the information she needs to make an optimal choice.

### 4.2 On the limit of the model of Robson (1996a)

Let us consider discrete populations facing two different lotteries; one which is purely idiosyncratic and the other purely aggregate. Robson (1996a) shows that the population facing the idiosyncratic lottery grows faster. In what follows, we show that as the length of a time interval approaches zero, the growth rates of the two populations converge.\(^{13}\)

Suppose that time is discrete and indexed by \(t \in \mathbb{N}\). Assume that \(\Omega = \{\omega^H, \omega^L\}\) and the ergodic distribution of \(\omega\) is given by \(\Pr(\omega^H) = \Pr(\omega^L) = 1/2\). Each individual lives for one period, and her number of offspring is the realization of a lottery. In each period \(t\), the realization of the lottery is independent across individuals conditional on \(\omega_t\). We consider the following two lotteries

\[
L_A = \begin{cases} 
H & \text{if } \omega = \omega^H, \\
L & \text{if } \omega = \omega^L 
\end{cases}
\quad \text{and} \quad
L_I = \begin{cases} 
H & \text{with probability } 1/2, \\
L & \text{with probability } 1/2, 
\end{cases}
\]

where \(1 < L < H\). Note that the lottery \(L_A\) involves only aggregate risk and the lottery \(L_I\) involves only idiosyncratic risk. Also note that the risks induced by these two lotteries are the same from the viewpoint of a single individual; with probability one-half she produces \(H\) offspring, and with probability one-half she produces \(L\). Let \(g(L)\) denote the compounded growth factor of the population corresponding to the lottery \(L \in \{L_A, L_I\}\). The main result from Robson (1996a) implies

\[
\log g(L_A) = \frac{\log H + \log L}{2} < \log \left( \frac{H + L}{2} \right) = \log g(L_I),
\]

and hence, the population choosing \(L_I\) grows faster than the other.

\(^{13}\) We are able to prove the same result in the general model of Robson (1996a) but we believe that the binary example is sufficient to illustrate our point.
In what follows, we shrink the length of the time intervals from one to Δ, and examine the consequences on the speed of population growth as Δ approaches zero. If the time intervals are downscaled, and in each period individuals reproduce according to the lotteries $L_A$ and $L_I$, the populations grow faster, and they explode as Δ goes to zero. Therefore, in order to compare growth rates across different Δ’s, the lotteries governing population dynamics must be redefined. We consider two ways of doing so. First, we shrink the intensity of the shocks specified by the lotteries as Δ goes to zero. The idea of taking the limit this way is to spread the effect of the original lottery over many smaller time periods. Second, we change the frequency of reproduction. That is, if the length of a period is Δ, then only with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ does an individual have the opportunity to reproduce. However, conditional on the opportunity, individuals reproduce according to the original lotteries, $L_A$ or $L_I$. Taking the limit this way means we spread the number of reproducing individuals uniformly across the smaller time periods. In each of these cases, we show that the per-unit-period growth rates of the populations corresponding to idiosyncratic and aggregate lotteries converge to the same value as Δ goes to zero. In other words, the distinction between idiosyncratic and aggregate risk disappears.

The intuition behind these observations can be explained as follows. If Δ is small, the change in the size of the population is also small within a Δ-long period. This means that the logarithmic function in Robson’s (1996a) utility function, $U$, can be approximated by a linear function arbitrarily well as Δ goes to zero. Therefore, the logarithmic function can be replaced by the linear one in the limit.

Shrinking the intensity of the shocks.— For each Δ, we define the following two lotteries:

$$L_A^\Delta = \begin{cases} H^\Delta & \text{if } \omega = \omega^H, \\ L^\Delta & \text{if } \omega = \omega^L, \end{cases} \text{ and } L_I^\Delta = \begin{cases} H^\Delta & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{2}, \\ L^\Delta & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

The idea behind this rescaling is as follows. If the realization of the lottery is constant within a unit of time, the induced growth factor does not depend on Δ. To see why, note that if an individual produces $H^\Delta$ offspring in each Δ-long period, she will have $(H^\Delta)^{1/\Delta} = H$ genetic copies after one unit of time. We maintain the assumption that the ergodic distribution of $\omega$ is given by $Pr(\omega^H) = Pr(\omega^L) = 1/2$. Let $g_\Delta (L^\Delta)$ denote the compounded growth factor of the population corresponding to $L^\Delta (\in \{L_A^\Delta, L_I^\Delta\})$ per Δ-long time period. Again, from Robson (1996a) it follows that

$$\log g_\Delta (L_A^\Delta) = \frac{\log H^\Delta + \log L^\Delta}{2} < \log \left( \frac{H^\Delta + L^\Delta}{2} \right) = \log g_\Delta (L_I^\Delta).$$

Next, we take Δ to zero and compare the growth factors per unit interval of the populations corresponding to $L_A^\Delta$ and $L_I^\Delta$. Note that if the growth factor per Δ-long period is $g_\Delta$ then the growth factor per unit interval is $(g_\Delta)^{1/\Delta}$. Consider first the population governed by the aggregate

---

14 We emphasize that this does not mean that the state of the world switches more and more frequently as Δ goes to zero. One can assume, for example, that $\omega$ switches with only probability Δ in each Δ-long time period. Then the state of the world switches once per unit-period in expectation irrespective of Δ.
lottery $L_A^\Delta$. By (27),

$$\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \log g_{\Delta}^{1/\Delta} (L_A^\Delta) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{\log H^\Delta + \log L^\Delta}{2\Delta} = \frac{\log H + \log L}{2}. \quad (28)$$

Comparing this expression with the left-hand side of (26), we conclude that the population facing the aggregate lottery is unaffected by the time scaling. Consider now the population governed by the idiosyncratic lottery. Again by (27),

$$\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \log g_{\Delta}^{1/\Delta} (L_I^\Delta) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{\log \left( \frac{H^\Delta + L^\Delta}{2} \right)}{\Delta}. \quad (29)$$

On the right-hand side, both the numerator and the denominator converge to zero. We apply L’Hopital’s rule to obtain

$$\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \log g_{\Delta}^{1/\Delta} (L_I^\Delta) = \lim_{\Delta \to \infty} \frac{1}{\left( \frac{H^\Delta + L^\Delta}{2} \right)} \left( \frac{H^\Delta \log H + L^\Delta \log L}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \log H + \log L \right), \quad (29)$$

where the second equality follows from the observation that both $H^\Delta$ and $L^\Delta$ converge to one as $\Delta$ goes to zero. From (28) and (29), we conclude that, as $\Delta$ goes to zero, the population facing aggregate risk grows just as fast as the population facing only idiosyncratic risk.

In the limit, do these discrete models become continuous-time models with only environmental shocks? Define $h$ and $l$ such that $H = e^h$ and $L = e^l$ and note that $h$ and $l$ are the rates corresponding to the factors $H$ and $L$, respectively. The continuously compounded growth rates in (28) and (29) can then be written as $(h + l)/2$. In other words, the limits of $L_A^\Delta$ and $L_I^\Delta$ are lotteries involving only environmental shocks according to which the net birth rate of an individual is $h$ or $l$ with equal probability. The limit of $L_A^\Delta$ induces only aggregate risk and the limit of $L_I^\Delta$ generates only idiosyncratic risk. By Theorem 1, this distinction, however, has no impact on the growth rate.

**Shrinking the frequency of reproduction.**— Define:

$$\tilde{L}_A^\Delta = \begin{cases} H & \text{with probability } \Delta \text{ if } \omega = \omega^H, \\ L & \text{with probability } \Delta \text{ if } \omega = \omega^L, \text{ and } \\ 1 & \text{with probability } 1 - \Delta, \end{cases} \quad \text{and } \tilde{L}_I^\Delta = \begin{cases} H & \text{with probability } \Delta/2, \\ L & \text{with probability } \Delta/2, \\ 1 & \text{with probability } 1 - \Delta. \end{cases}$$

In each $\Delta$-long period, the probability that a certain individual does not reproduce is $1 - \Delta$, irrespective of the lottery she faces. We capture this by defining the lotteries such that they each result in one descendant (presumably the individual herself) with probability $1 - \Delta$. Otherwise, with probability $\Delta$, an individual reproduces according to the original lottery. Therefore, in each $\Delta$-long period, only a fraction of $\Delta$ of the total population will reproduce.

Applying the main result of Robson (1996a) to lotteries $\tilde{L}_A^\Delta$ and $\tilde{L}_I^\Delta$ yields

$$\log g_\Delta \left( \tilde{L}_A^\Delta \right) = \log \left( \frac{\Delta H + (1 - \Delta)}{2} \right) + \log \left( \frac{\Delta L + (1 - \Delta)}{2} \right) < \log \left( \frac{H + L}{2} + 1 - \Delta \right) = \log g_\Delta \left( \tilde{L}_I^\Delta \right).$$
Let us now compute the unit-period growth factors in the limit as \( \Delta \) goes to zero. Consider first the aggregate lottery \( \bar{L}_A^\Delta \). Then,

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \log \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( \bar{L}_A^\Delta \right) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{\log [\Delta H + (1 - \Delta)] + \log [\Delta L + (1 - \Delta)]}{2 \Delta} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \frac{H - 1}{\Delta H + 1 - \Delta} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{L - 1}{\Delta L + 1 - \Delta} \right] = \frac{H + L}{2} - 1,
\]

where the second equality follows from L’Hospital’s rule. Let us now turn our attention to the idiosyncratic lottery \( \bar{L}_I^\Delta \). Then,

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \log \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( \bar{L}_I^\Delta \right) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{\log (\Delta \frac{H+L}{2} + 1 - \Delta)}{\Delta} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{\frac{H+L}{2} - 1}{\Delta \frac{H+L}{2} + 1 - \Delta} = \frac{H + L}{2} - 1,
\]

where the second equality follows from the L’Hospital rule again. Comparing (30) and (31), we conclude that the growth rates of the populations corresponding to \( \bar{L}_A^\Delta \) and \( \bar{L}_I^\Delta \) converge to the same value as \( \Delta \) goes to zero.\(^{15}\)

5 Conclusion

We believe endogenizing preferences to be an important research agenda, and that adopting the biological approach, as we have done, might prove to be a fruitful enterprise. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that evolution did not influence only physical traits but also shaped choice behaviours. An advantage of this approach is that it has strong predictions about the relationship between fertility and choices which, in principle, can be tested empirically. We do recognize that many choice problems faced by individuals in modern times were unlikely to be faced in evolutionary times. Yet, we hypothesize that preferences, at least in part, are hardwired and that many choices made today reflect the evolutionary optimal behaviour.

In this paper, we have restricted our attention to risk preferences. In reality, a choice between risky alternatives is often linked to intertemporal trade-offs. Investment portfolios, for example, reflect both risk and time preferences. Our model excludes intertemporal trade-offs completely. Indeed, individuals are identical and, in particular, reproductive value does not depend on age. An important extension of our setup is the introduction of an age-structured population. If a lottery’s effect on an individual depends on her age, then the choices over these lotteries involve intertemporal trade-offs. Perhaps more importantly, we have also excluded choices that allow one to mitigate the impact of lotteries. Presumably, those inhabiting earthquake zones are more likely to construct earthquake resistant buildings. In other words, risk preferences seem strongly related to decisions regarding capital accumulation and the consumption of certain durable goods.

\(^{15}\)The limit of these examples does not correspond to our model with only environmental shocks. The reason is that, in our model, an individual has exactly one offspring at reproduction. In contrast, the number of offspring at reproduction is a random variable in these examples. We believe that it is not hard to generalize our model to allow the number of offspring to be a random variable.
Introducing these kinds of choices would again require the analysis of intertemporal trade-offs. In summary, we believe that the most important addition to our theory would be to establish a link between time preferences and risk preferences in the presence of both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks.

References


