

OLIVER VANDEN EYNDE

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

Department of Economics

Placement Officer: Professor Leonardo Felli +44 (0)20 7955 7525 lfelli@econ.lse.ac.uk
Placement Assistant: Mrs Samantha Keenan +44 (0)20 7955 7545 s.keenan@lse.ac.uk

HOME ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE:

471 MCH
119 Newington Causeway
London, SE1 6DT
Cell phone: +44(0)7726633927
<http://personal.lse.ac.uk/vandene/>

OFFICE ADDRESS, TELEPHONE & E-MAIL:

LSE, STICERD, R5z9c
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
+44(0)2079556687
o.w.vanden-eynde@lse.ac.uk

DATE OF BIRTH: 03 Oct 1984

SEX: M

CITIZENSHIP: Belgian

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

MRes in Economics, London School of Economics, 2006 - 2008, *Distinction*
MA in Economics, KULeuven (Belgium), 2002 - 2006, *Summa cum Laude*

DOCTORAL STUDIES:

London School of Economics

DATES: 2008 - present

THESIS TITLE: "Essays on the Role of Civil Conflict and the Military in Economic Development"

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: June 2012

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Dr Gerard Padro i Miquel
(Advisor)
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
g.padro@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7852-3554
Fax (44-20) 7831-1840

Professor Robin Burgess
(Advisor)
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
r.burgess@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7955-6676

Professor Tim Besley
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
t.besley@lse.ac.uk
Tel. (44-20) 7955-6702

DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Development Economics, Political Economy

Secondary Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Economic History

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2009-2012 Quantitative Approaches and Policy Analysis (Master of Public Administration), TA
2010-2011 Development Economics (LSE Summer School), TA
2009-2011 Development Economics (Master of Public Administration), TA
Teaching Evaluations 2009-2011: 70% Maximum score
2009-2011 Microeconomics, LSE, Marker for the External Programme
2008-2009 Microeconomic Principles II (undergraduate), TA
2007-2008 Microeconomic Principles I (undergraduate), TA

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2009-2012 Teaching Fellow, Economics, LSE
2010 Research assistant, AusAID and Emily Wylde Consulting, London
2008-2009 Research assistant for Dr Gerard Padro i Miquel, LSE, London
2008 Intern, NERA Economic Consulting, London Office
2007 Research assistant for Professor Geert Dhaene (KULeuven)

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2011 Banco de Portugal - Lisbon Meeting Best Paper Award, for "Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict"
2011 Bagri Fellowship (Asia Research Centre, LSE)
2011 Economic History Society New Researchers' Prize, for "Military Service and Human Capital Accumulation"
2011 LSE Postgraduate Travel Grant
2011 Michio Morishima Fund (STICERD, LSE)
2009-2012 LSE Teaching Fellowship
2006-2010 ESRC Quota Award (2+2)
2006 Stichting Fernand Lazard
2003,2004 Congratulations of the Exam Board, KULeuven

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), French (fluent), Dutch (native)

ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS (EXTERNAL):

RES Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, March 2011 (scheduled)
RES PhD Meeting, QMUL, January 2011 (scheduled)
Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, ISI Delhi, December 2011
Households in Conflict Network, IAE, Barcelona, November 2011
NEUDC Conference, Yale University, November 2011
University of Warwick, Applied Micro Workshop, November 2011
University of Sussex, Research in Progress Seminar, October 2011
LSE, STICERD-UCL Development and Growth Seminar, October 2011
Lisbon Meeting on Institutions and Political Economy, September 2011
European Political Science Association Annual Conference, Dublin, June 2011
Midwest International Economic Development Conference (MWIEDC), UW Madison, April 2011
Economic History Society Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, April 2011
FUNDP Namur, CRED Workshop, March 2011
Pacific Conference for Development Economics (PACDEV), UC Berkeley, March 2011
Paris School of Economics, Lunch Seminar, November 2010

COMPLETED PAPERS:

Job Market Paper:

“Targets of Violence: Evidence from India’s Naxalite Conflict”, 2011

Insurgents in civil conflict typically target both government forces and civilians. However, evidence on the causes of targeted violence against civilians is scarce. This paper examines the strategic choices of its targets and the intensity of violence by rebel groups. In a simple theoretical framework, negative labour income shocks are predicted to: (i) increase violence against civilians to prevent them from being recruited as police informers; (ii) increase the number of rebel attacks against the government, but only if the rebels’ tax base is sufficiently independent from local labour productivity. These theoretical predictions are confirmed in the context of India’s Naxalite conflict between 2005 and 2010. Exploiting variation in annual rainfall in a panel of district level casualty numbers, I find that negative rainfall shocks: (i) increase Maoist violence against civilians; (ii) increase Maoist violence against security forces, but only in those districts in which the Maoists have access to key mineral resources.

Other Papers:

“Military Service and Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Colonial Punjab”, 2011

Voluntary military service could provide rare educational opportunities to recruits from disadvantaged groups. However, there is little evidence on the relationship between military recruitment and educational outcomes in developing countries. This paper estimates the impact of military recruitment on human capital accumulation in colonial Punjab. The empirical strategy exploits the exogenous increase in recruitment by the Indian Army during the First World War. Higher military recruitment is found to be associated with increased literacy at the district-religion level. The direct acquisition of literacy skills by illiterate serving soldiers appears to be driving this impact.

“Coup-friendly Institutions and Apolitical Militaries: a Theory of optimal Military Influence”, 2011

Military coups often attract popular support. Certain constitutions even contain clauses that implicitly allow the military to intervene in domestic politics. Also, the punishments for leaders of failed coups tend to be mild. However, even in countries with coup-friendly institutions, military officers are typically not allowed to participate in political debates. Hence, the institutions that govern civil-military relations seem to simultaneously encourage and discourage military influence over politics. This paper offers a theoretical model that rationalises these seemingly paradoxical institutions by highlighting the role of factionalisation within the military.

21 December