Rethinking the concept of citizenship – the challenge of migration

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Abstract

Migration is high on today’s political agenda. All over the world, people cross borders to find work, refuge, family life or new experiences. This movement of persons raises a number of key questions. Which rights should immigrants have? Who can become a member of a political community? What does interstate mobility mean for liberal democracy? These questions all touch upon the character of contemporary citizenship. The aim of this paper is to discuss how we should conceive of citizenship in an ‘age of migration’.

The concept of citizenship is rooted in classical liberalism and republicanism. In these central political grammars citizens are seen as subjects of rights, bound together by bonds of loyalty and affiliation and constituting the self-governing people. Citizenship thus serves as the normative ideal which ties together persons and political institutions within a given territory. When newcomers arrive, what happens to this model of politics? I argue that the static notion of political membership prevents us from adequately handling migration and mobility.

Instead I suggest we explore the more dynamic conceptions of citizenship found in two contemporary political theories - deliberative and agonistic democracy. Both recast citizenship as an ongoing and open-ended practice through which members and would-be members contest and reinterpret what it means to have rights and be part of political communities. They do so in very different ways, emphasizing, respectively, reasoned dialogue and passionate contest.

I argue that both perspectives capture important aspects of civic life, but each in their pure form are too reductive. I therefore advocate an analytical strategy which brings the two into an ‘agonistic dialogue’. Empirically, this can help us explore the different forms contemporary negotiations of citizenship and migration can take. Normatively, it provides valuable tools for critique. An agonistic dialogue between deliberative and agonistic conceptions of citizenship thereby enables us to capture and guide contemporary migration.

Key words

Citizenship, Migration, Liberalism, Republicanism, Deliberative democracy, Agonistic democracy
1. Citizenship in ‘an age of migration’

“[C]itizenship is a core concept in our political and moral vocabulary.” (Bosniak 2000, p.451) Dating back to ancient Greece it has preoccupied thinkers, politicians and activists in different times and regimes (Castles & Davidson 2000, Joppke 2010, pp.1, 6-8). The ideal of rights, duties and community it portrays remains central to contemporary political theorizing and public deliberation (Miller 2000, Kymlicka 1995, Lister 1997). To be a citizen, as we normally understand it, is to be a person of standing and rights in a state or state-like order. But the boundedness of civic communities is challenged by migrants who leave their country and settle in another (Benhabib 2004, Soysal 1994, Jacobson 1996).

Today, 214 million persons live outside their home state on a temporary or permanent basis (UN 2009). Some have fled war or political persecution. Others have gone in search for work, education, love or adventure. Their presence questions the ideal of a civic body residing within a given territory (cf. Jacobson 1996, Guild 2009, p.35). When a large group of migrants live in a country the population is not coterminous with the democratic people. Liberal democracies are then faced with the choice of either granting rights to foreigners or accepting a subclass of non-members in their midst (Walzer 1983). Either way, the civic ideals of liberty, equality and community are put into question. This predicament prompts us to ask if our present conceptions of citizenship are still adequate. Can they capture the political problematic of migration and provide us with the relevant normative guidance? Or do we need to rethink citizenship in “an age of migration” (Castles and Davidson 2000).

In this paper I examine our classical understandings of citizenship found in liberal (Locke [1690], 1980, Rawls 1993) and republican (Rousseau [1762] 1968, Pettit 1999) political theory. I argue that these conceptions, though they remain central to our political grammar, cannot adequately address the issue of migration. This is due to their static and state-centric understanding of political membership and rights. Instead I explore the more dynamic ideals of citizenship put forth in two contemporary theories: deliberative (Habermas 2001, Benhabib 2004) and agonistic democracy (Mouffe 2000, Honig 2001b). The two perspectives build on the classical traditions but refashion these in ways which provides us with a more open and changeable understanding of citizenship. They do so, however, very differently relying on opposing views of politics and civic life.
I discuss the relative merits of deliberative and agonistic approaches and show how both have significant contributions to offer. Each, however, presents us with a too reductive understanding which does not fully capture the complexities of civic engagements. Assessing different recent attempts to combine the two I advocate a strategy of ‘agonistic dialogue’. I set out this analytical double perspective and argue that it gives us a powerful conceptual and normative framework for understanding citizenship in the context of migration.

2. Classical concepts of citizenship

The main traditions within which the concept of citizenship is situated and developed are liberalism and republicanism (Schuck 2002, Dagger 2002). In this section I present the liberal and republican notions of citizenship and discuss the challenges they face in adequately addressing migration.

2.1. Liberal citizenship

The liberal concept of citizenship

The liberal tradition conceives of the citizen as an individual who on the one hand enjoys the protection of the state from violence perpetrated by other persons and one the other hand is safeguarded against the powers of the state by fundamental rights (Locke [1690], 1980, Rawls 1993). A broad school of thought, liberals disagree about the proper scope of the rights catalogue. Libertarians emphasize civic rights to for example private property, habeas corpus and freedom of religion, and perhaps political rights to vote and stand for office (Nozick 1974). Social-liberals also include socio-economic rights to education and a minimal standard of living to give all a fair chance to pursue their life plans (cf. Rawls 1971, Kelly 2005). Either way, individual rights are the core of liberal citizenship.

Membership-status

The rights of liberal citizenship, however, are of a dual nature. As moral rights they are ‘natural’ or universal - the rights pertaining to all persons in their capacity as human beings with reason and dignity. As legal rights they are particular - the rights of citizens of a given state (cf. Benhabib 2004, p. 55-57). The normative force of rights does not depend on a political community, but the
actual enforcement does. As the upholder of law and order the liberal state is seen as crucial for the defense of citizens’ rights (Locke [1690] 1980).

There is thus a ‘tension’ within liberal citizenship between moral universalism and political particularism (cf. Benhabib 2004, pp.43-45). If this is not always apparent it is because liberal theory tends to focus on what rights persons have, while leaving aside the bounded communities where these rights are upheld (Lomasky 2001, pp.55-56, Vincent & Plant 1984, pp.164-165). Thereby it glosses over the question of who can claim the status of citizenship when and where.

Presuming that, ideally, all persons are distributed into liberal states and stay put, no problem arises. Hence, for example John Rawls in his liberal work on justice “assumes a closed system” (Carens 1995, p.334, Rawls 1971, p.8, cf. Benhabib 2004, p.74), where we know who the people are. But political communities are not closed. People move – often because not all states do a good job of protecting their rights. By doing so, migrants activate the tension between bounded community and individual rights and thereby represent a challenge to the liberal concept of citizenship.

Rights

This challenge goes further still. Some migrants also engage in reinterpreting the rights of liberal citizenship (Benhabib 2004: 179-183, cf. Honig 2001). This can be due to the different cultural practices they might bring with them. For example some Muslim migrants and their children claim a right to wear special religious attire. When doing so, they draw upon and rearticulate the liberal rights to personal autonomy and religious freedom or reinterpret. What are at stake in such claims-making are not the rights of liberal citizens but how precisely we should understand these rights (Benhabib 2004: 179-180, 193). Such interpretative politics is not a new phenomenon - workers, women and racial minorities have a long history of challenging predominant understandings of rights and membership (Balibar 2004, p.50, Butler 1995). Feminists, for example, have re-interpreted the principle of equal dignity to imply a right to non-discrimination and equal pay for men and women. Yet the present claims by migrants stand out as a central component of contemporary European politics. It is a part which the liberal concept of citizenship cannot really grasp, because it presumes that just as we allegedly know who the people are, so we know or can deduce once and for all what rights they have.
2.2. Republican citizenship

The republican concept of citizenship

The starting point for the republican tradition is not individual rights but political community. The freedom of citizens is seen to depend on their being members of self-governing polities, taking part in public life and displaying a civic attitude (Miller 2000, p.53, Sandel 1996, p.27, Pettit 1999, Walzer 1983, Rousseau [1762] 1968). Opinions vary among republicans as to the purpose of participation (Sandel 1996, p.26). For some, collective action is a form of freedom valuable in itself (Arendt 1973). Others argue that only an active and engaged citizenry can prevent those in power from abusing their position and dominating the lives of others (Pettit 1999, p.8). They all agree, however, that citizens should be concerned not merely with their private interests but with the common good of the polity (Sunstein 1993, pp.19-23, Pettit 1999, pp.241-251). Working for and identifying with the political community is an essential part of citizenship.

Freedom, participation and identity

The focus on active participation makes the republican conception of citizenship more dynamic than the liberal. Philip Pettit in particular underlines this, arguing that “[t]he requirements of […] freedom are not fixed once and for all, as on tablets of stone. They are subject to constant reinterpretation and review as new interests and ideas emerge and materialize in society.” (Pettit 1999, p.147) The liberty and identity of citizens is the object of ongoing public deliberation. This makes it possible for different disadvantaged groups such as cultural and racial minorities, workers and women to “articulate diverse grievances” by appealing to the grammar of citizenship (ibid, cf. Miller 2000, pp.55-60).

The dynamic aspect makes the republican citizenship more capable of grasping the present political struggles, where migrants and citizens contests and refashion the rights, freedoms and affiliations of political membership. But it is still in some ways a static and state-centric concept.

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3 Views differ as to character and source of this public identity. Some favor a passionate “rooted republican patriotism” (Canovan cited in Viroli 1999, p.14) while others plead for a reasoned and tempered commitment to the constitution (Sunstein 1993, pp.20-23).
Democratic deliberation seems to take place within existing political communities, the boundaries of which are left largely intact.

Pettit for example argues that “[A republican state] will need to maintain limits on immigration, if it is to retain its current republican character and if it is to sustain the republican ethos that that requires.” (Pettit 1999, p.152) This may be true, though he does not offer us any reason why. Nor does he tell us about the character of these limits or why they should not be subject to democratic dispute. Pettit, however, hastens to add that a republic should “not show itself indifferent to the plight of immigrants and refugees, or to the difficulties endured by those countries who are struggling to cope with the movement of peoples.” (Ibid) But though he underlines the need to listen to the grievances of migrants, he does not explore the possibility that these might be articulated in the language of citizenship. The potential linkage between the struggles of feminists, unions and indigenous peoples on the one hand and immigrants on the other is not examined.

David Miller (2005) more specifically argues for a tight regulation of immigration. This, he claims is necessary to preserve a common national identity without which a just democratic community cannot function. Like Pettit, Miller insists that this civic identity is dynamic, inclusionary and compatible with the perspectives and interests of many different groups. But how much and how fast it changes should be up to the people (Miller 2005, p.200). The freedom of self-determination belongs to those who already hold citizenship status (Ibid., Walzer 1983, p.32).

**Membership-status**

In modern republicanism citizenship status is usually a birthright (cf. Walzer 1983, pp.34-35). Being born on the territory or belonging to a particular national community secures inclusion (cf. Brubaker 1992, pp.31-33). Naturalization, however, is also a possibility. As a political rather than cultural theory of membership, republicanism is often open to newcomers who will pledge allegiance to the constitutional values and take active part in public life (cf. Viroli 1999, p.13), though as mentioned above the precise regulation is left to those already members. This political assimilation on the part of immigrants is assumed to take the form of a conversion. The civic

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5 For critiques of citizenship status as birthright, see Carens 1995 and Shachar 2007.
status and loyalty of the new members should shift fully and permanently (cf. Miller 2005, pp.204-205, Walzer 1983, pp.62-63). But if it does so, they are welcome.⁶

Yet this republican conception is still inadequate. It reflects a simplistic understanding of migration: Some persons leave and give up their citizenship, while others arrive, renounce their previous attachments and gain a new status and political identity. Contemporary migration, however, seems far more complex. A substantial part of migrant work is seasonal or depends upon market fluctuation (Castles & Davidson 2000, p. 157, cf. Sassen 1999). This does not invite to permanent resettlement but rather temporary or circular migration. Expecting one day to return to their country of origin these migrants often maintain ties with the place they have left behind (Castles & Davidson 2000, p.157-159, Castles & Miller 2009, p.3). In the European Union, internal mobility highlights this tendency. EU-citizens moving between different member states do not necessarily give up their prior attachments. Nor need they develop an overarching European identity. Instead, migration and mobility in today’s Europe is characterized by multiple and overlapping political membership and modes of belonging (cf. Nanz 2009, p.424-425) which are hard to square with the republican image of citizenship.

In different ways, therefore, both liberal and republican citizenship seem challenged by migration and mobility. Liberalism has a static understanding of rights and membership. Republicanism, while more dynamic in this respect, still construes citizenship status in largely static terms and have a hard time dealing with multiple civic identities. There are therefore compelling reasons for rethinking our notions of citizenship in order to better grasp and guide the politics of migration.

3. Deliberative and agonistic democracy

Within migration studies different attempts are made at re-conceptualization of civic rights and political membership (Soysal 1994, Bauböck 1995, Joppke 2010). This work is situated within a wider, growing and interdisciplinary literature, which seeks to re-invent citizenship and democracy in light of the challenges from economic globalization, international human rights, and EU-integration (see Archibugi & Held 1995, Nussbaum 1996, Hutchings & Dannreuther 1998, Cheah & Robbins 1998, Habermas 2001b, Eder & Giesen 2001, Linklater 2002).

⁶See Etienne Balibar (2004, pp. 51-77) for a critical discussion of republicanism and immigration.
I focus on the theoretical innovation done by scholars in two contemporary strands of political philosophy - deliberative and agonistic democracy (Benhabib 2004, Honig 2001, Balibar 2004). I do so because these works are distinctively dynamic in their understanding of citizenship status, rights and identity. Hence they are well suited for addressing the changes arising from migration and mobility, which classical liberal and republican ideals have difficulties handling.

3.1. Re-conceptualizing citizenship

Deliberative democracy is a broad school of thought covering both continental and Anglo-American strands (Habermas 1996, Bohman 1996, Cohen 1988, Dryzeck 2002). In the following I focus on the version developed by Jürgen Habermas (1996, 2001a). I contrast it with the agonistic democratic theory of especially Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005).

Civic rights and participation in deliberative democracy

Habermas (2001a) situates deliberative democracy between liberalism and republicanism. He argues for a conception of democracy which is liberal in its commitment to individual rights and the rule of law, but republican in its emphasis on popular sovereignty and civic participation. Rather than privileging one over the other he argues that “[p]rivate and public autonomy require each other. The two concepts are interdependent.” (Habermas 2001a, p.767) Without a constitution which secures the personal freedom of all citizens, a majority can suppress a minority. But without a democratically engaged citizenry who legislate for themselves, the law becomes an alien force bereft of legitimacy. A vibrant democracy, he argues, needs both liberal and republican elements, and their relation is one of “co-originality”, not of conflict (Ibid).

This requires a particular understanding of civic rights and civic engagement. The former must not be read, to borrow Pettit’s formulation, as inscriptions on “tablets on of stone” but as the preconditions for and outcome of reasoned public deliberations. And the latter needs to be more than the mere aggregation of private interests. All participants should be willing to take into account the perspectives of others and change preferences if persuaded by “forceless force of the better argument” (Habermas 1999, p.332). This view is reflected in the discourse ethical principle, according to which “a regulation may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly affected by it could consent to it after participating in rational discourses” (Habermas quoted in Honig 2001a, p.803 n.6). This regulative ideal aims to secure the protection of individual rights in and through
public deliberation, while ensuring that these constitutional freedoms are also the product of the will of the people.

Integrating liberalism and republicanism Habermas thus presents us with an understanding of citizenship as rights and participation. It is dynamic in a dual sense. Firstly, the meaning of individual freedoms is not given once and for all but requires a continuing interpretative engagement. As Habermas puts it “[a]ll the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative substance of the system of rights laid down in the original document of the constitution.” (Habermas 2001a, p.774) Secondly, participation is not necessarily restricted to those already belonging to ‘the people’. The universalism of rights as reflected in the discourse ethical principle obliges us to take into account the arguments and perspectives of those not yet included (Habermas 2005, p.116-118). Habermas thus argues that European countries ought to pursue a liberal immigration policy which considers not just the wishes of their own citizens but also the needs of persons from poor third world countries hoping to improve their life chances (ibid). This argument is taken up and developed further by Seyla Benhabib (2004) in The Rights of Others. She insists that the boundaries of contemporary political communities are and should be ‘porous’. By this she means that citizens and migrants ought and in fact do engage in:

“… complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in civil society.” (Benhabib 2004, p.179)

This argument resembles the Pettit’s republican characterization of how the meaning of civic rights membership is continually negotiated. But deliberative democracy avoids Pettit’s statism by inviting non-members to participate as well, thus making the question of membership status itself part of the debate.

The civic engagement which is enabled by and contributes to the actualization of civic rights takes the form of a reasoned dialogue in the public sphere. Through the exchange of rational arguments participants should seek to persuade each other and achieve some form of consensus (Habermas 1999, p.332). Habermas recognizes that moral deliberations need support of formal legal institutions and bargaining politics to arrive at political decision. Still, the any decision and
institution could always be subjected to rational critique in the public sphere (Habermas 1999). This harmonious picture is challenged from various perspectives and particularly by theorists of agonistic democracy (Mouffe 2000, Honig 2001a, Connolly 1991).

Civic rights and participation in agonistic democracy

Chantal Mouffe develops her theory of agonistic democracy partly through a critique of Habermas’ deliberative democracy. She argues that it provides us with a flawed understanding of politics and hence democracy and citizenship. Instead, she presents us with a different conceptualization (2000, p.80-107).

Following Carl Schmitt (1996) Mouffe (2000, 36-44, 2005) sees the creation of friend-enemy distinctions as the essence of ‘the political’. Democracy needs a ‘demos’, and partisan politics needs partisans. We create these collective selves by drawing boundaries and mobilizing passion through evocative and rhetorical discourse. Conflict is therefore an ineradicable part of politics. Instead of seeking to overcome it through deliberation and a search for rational consensus, we should aim to transform it in democratic ways. We do this by treating the other not as “an enemy to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary’: i.e. as somebody whose idea we combat but whose right to defend these ideas we do not call into question” (Mouffe 2000, p.102).

This view of conflict makes Mouffe critical of Habermas’ claim to have solved the tension between civic rights and civic participation. She shares his commitment to both democratic engagement and individual freedom, but insists that “[t]here is no necessary relation between the two distinct traditions but only a contingent historical articulation.” (Mouffe 2000, p.3) Our rights as citizens are always in risk of being curtailed through the collective decisions we partake in as members of the civic body, just as our self-determination as a people can be invaded by the rule of law.

For Mouffe the “constitutive paradox” of liberal democracy is precisely that the tension between liberty and populism cannot ultimately be overcome (Mouffe 2000, p.11). All we can do as democratic citizens, according to Mouffe, is to engage in an ongoing political debacle over how to interpret their relationship, while acknowledging that any articulation is partisan and contestable. This, however, is no cause for despair, she claims. On the contrary, it provides us
with a more genuinely dynamic and pluralistic understanding of citizenship. Hence she argues that:

“By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied by the political constitution of ‘the people’ … the liberal discourse of human rights plays an important role in maintaining the democratic contestation alive. On the other side, it is only through the democratic logics of equivalence that frontiers can be established without which no real exercise of rights could be possible. (Mouffe 2000 p.10)"

The constitutive paradox of liberal democracy is thus productive. It enables us to create a community of citizens united by common rights, while keeping open the precise interpretation of these freedoms and allowing for a re-drawing of the boundaries of the civic body. Mouffe does not discuss the implications of this for migration. The issue, however, is discussed carefully by Bonnie Honig (2001b, 2009, see also Balibar 2004).

In Democracy and the foreigner (2001b) Honig provides us with a view of an immigrant as a “democratic taker” who grasps for the civic rights she does not yet possess (Honig 2001b, p.101 italics in original, cf. Rancière 2004). Instead of waiting politely to be granted the status of citizenship with liberties and access to participation, this character takes it herself. She underlines the ambiguity of this figure – the migrant ‘steals’ her rights after all – by casting the tale not as a love story with heroines and a happy ending. It is instead a “gothic romance” where the glory of the protagonist is checked by her own ambivalence and her dark and uncertain surroundings (Honig 2001b 109, 115-120). The civic engagement of migrants, as of all actors, can be progressive, reactionary or both, and immigrants often find themselves in a hostile political environment, where claiming rights is both difficult and risky. The democratic taker demonstrates the importance of power and conflict in agonistic account of democracy and migration. Inclusion is only achieved through struggle and in the face of opposition. Civic rights and participation is productive as well as disruptive. This narrative also illustrates the dynamic nature of citizenship where boundaries can be transgressed.

Hence, agonistic democracy gives us a conception of citizenship which, like the deliberative version, is dynamic and combines liberal civil rights and republican civic action. But it emphasizes conflict rather than consensus. Citizens participate not in a sober exchange of reasons over how
best to interpret our basic freedoms, but in a passionate and creative fight to re-imagine these liberties and establish a new hegemonic understanding. The ideals of freedom and equality are shared by partakers, but these are understood in different ways, and “so consensus is bound to be a conflictual-consensus” (Mouffe 2000, p.103).

3.2 Towards an agonistic dialogue

I have so far sought to show that deliberative and agonistic democracy presents us with two very different, indeed conflicting, ways of reinterpreting citizenship. Both re-conceptualizations are dynamic and can help us grasp and guide the politics of migration. Should we prefer one over the other? Or is there a constructive way of combining the two?

Habermas’ project of combining liberal and republic tradition seems to me a valuable enterprise. It takes seriously the way our understanding of citizenship is shaped by both of these grammars, which have become deeply entangled in the making of modern liberal democracy. He provides us with a theory which emphasizes our ability to exercise civil rights and participate in civic life through our capacity for reasoned inter-subjective communication.

Yet Habermas’ claim to have resolved the potential tension between liberty and democracy is less persuasive. His solution seems to rely on a predetermining the outcome of democratic deliberations (Honig 2001b). The conflict only disappears if the people in fact reaffirm the civil liberties set out in the constitution. But this is by no means certain. Even if a solution is achievable in principle, in practical politics we still need to deal with the constant balancing of the two ideals (Ibid). Is it, for example, legitimate for a government to regulate labour immigration in order to protect the jobs of the most vulnerable citizens? Or should the liberty of migrant workers to search for a better life prevail? Habermas’ strife for harmony, moreover, reflects his broader commitment to consensus which has also been challenges by supporters and opponents alike (for a good overview, see Norval 2007, p.20-38). In real life politics consensus is often very hard to achieve. Public debate is not necessarily reasonable but often characterized by strategy, rhetoric, and demonization of opponents (cf. Dryzek 2005, Norval 2007). Even if we read discourse ethics as a ‘regulative ideal’ to guide us, rather than a description of actual democratic practices, there are grounds for skepticism. Passion is an important motivational force. It is often our indignation or compassion that prompts us to take action. If these drivers first need to be
tempered by reason and translated into rational argument before allowed into the democratic debate we might miss out on an important element of what constitutes us as citizens (cf. Norval 2007). Furthermore, not all are able to express their grievances in this way. What counts as reasonable is often shaped by power and those on the margins therefore risk appearing irrational (cf. Young 1990, Butler 1995)

This suggests that Mouffe is right to point to the importance of passion and the difficulty of ever completely overcoming conflict in democratic politics. But despite these merits, her agonistic theory is not without problems of its own. Her conception of politics as fundamentally antagonistic is debatable at least. (cf. Kelly 2005, p.104-111). Collective and personal identity need not be constructed solely in relation to one or more others. It might also be narrative and consist in a weaving of experiences, real and imagined memories into complex storylines (cf. Ringmar 1996). Moreover, while aggression and passion are arguably important parts of our psychological makeup, so are temperance and the ability to reflect critically on our own life and actions (cf. Kelly 2005, p.110-111). Mouffe, quoting Wittgenstein, may be right that “at the end of reason comes persuasion” (Wittgenstein quoted in Mouffe 2000, p.98), but it can take a while before we get to the end. That is, the give and take of reasonable arguments could have an important part to play in civic life, even if it is not as paramount as Habermas believes. Finally, as Aletta Norval points out, Mouffe is a little vague about what makes democratic action democratic. What does it really mean to treat others as adversaries rather than enemies (Norval 2007, p.59, 159)? Is it merely that our actions should be non-violent, or is there a particular ‘grammar’ which characterizes democratic articulations (Norval 2007)? Mouffe main argument in this respect is that we should be weary of moralistic politics, which cast our opponents as evil and immoral (Mouffe 2005). But moral indignation is often a central element in the kind of passionately driven politics that she recommends, so this aspect needs further clarification.

There are thus reasons, I believe, to consider agonistic and deliberative democracy – in the pure forms represented by the work of Mouffe and Habermas – as in different ways useful but also reductive. Conflict is part of democratic politics, but it is not all there is to it. Nor need it have ontological primacy. The same goes for reasoned communication. But if each theoretical perspective captures an important aspect of civic life, then perhaps a combination is called for.
A few scholars are beginning to bring deliberative and agonistic democracy closer to each other. From a deliberative perspective John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer (2006) provide a thoughtful integration of pluralism and consensus (see also Dryzek 2005, Muldoon 2003). Benhabib (1992, 2004) has also taken on board some agonistic criticism. The fruitfulness of this enterprise is illustrated by the concept of “democratic iterations” she has developed with inspiration for poststructuralist theory in order to capture the processes of renegotiating civic rights and membership (Benhabib 2004, p.171-212). The strategy of these deliberative democrats is to attempt some form of theoretical incorporation where selected agonistic insights are brought into an overall deliberative framework.

Agonists are generally skeptical of such moves toward harmonious integration (see for example Schaap 2006). It suppresses difference and conflict. Honig (2009, p.128) thus questions Benhabib’s concept of democratic iterations which in her view domesticates the poststructuralist notion of ‘iterability’ and leaves it without critical edge. But Honig is also willing to acknowledge the relevance of the views of her opponents. Though defending a conflict-centered understanding of politics against justice based conceptions she suggests that the two might “represent not two distinct and self-sufficient options but two aspects of political life” (Ibid. p.201. See also Honig 2009 p.133). She handles this, however, in an agonistic fashion of mutual contestation. Constantly engaging with the claims of deliberative theorists she sharpens her own arguments and develops agonistic theory in new ways. But this also occasionally leads her to overstate the differences between the two perspectives (see especially Honig 2009, p.112-139).

This work already undertaken demonstrates, I think, the value in some kind of combination, and the strategies of integration and contest both have merits. But I would like to suggest a third way, which takes the form of an ‘agonistic dialogue’ between deliberative and agonistic theory. It consists in a political and analytical double-perspective. The two theories are brought into a reasoned conversation in the same analysis – hence the dialogical part. But the conversation is partial to one or the other theory and uses the contraposition to draw out the strengths and weaknesses of each analysis – hence the agonistic part. The aim is not a perfect theoretical integration. For this the basic assumptions about politics and subjectivity of the two traditions are too different (Schaap 2006, p.256-257). And I side with agonist in worrying about the loss such an exercise might entail. But some incorporation is taking place. By bringing both perspectives in
play in the analysis the two are brought closer together and similarities as well as differences drawn out.


As a normative strategy it also holds potential. Deliberative democracy and discourse ethics gives us a powerful tool for critiquing the procedures of conflicts over citizenship and migration. The idea that all persons potentially affected by a policy should have a say in it or have their interests considered may be impractical and unrealistic (Norval 2007). One can also be skeptical of its alleged universality (Butler 1995). Still, it resonates with the moral intuitions of many people, I think. But agonistic democracy also has a normative contribution to make. It reminds us of the complexities of political articulation where not everyone is equally able to present her views or have them recognized as reasonable; hence the need to examine and critique the inevitable exclusions. With the inequalities of power in actual democratic politics this is important. In such circumstances we have cause to be suspicious of any policy that presents itself as a reflective consensus.

4. Conclusion

In this paper I set out to examine the concept of citizenship and the challenges it faces in era of migration.

Exploring first the classical liberal and republican ideals I argued that these have serious shortcomings. Liberal citizenship provides us with the idea of individual rights, central to political fights for citizenship. But it assumes a closed political system which is not compatible with the increasing migratory crossing of borders. Moreover, liberalism is unable to grasp contemporary
struggles over the meaning of rights which citizens and migrants engage in, because it presumes that we can deduce analytically the content of civil liberties.

Republicanism provides us with the important ideal of civic participation, underlining how democracy requires active engagement. This, I argued, gives it a more dynamic character able to capture the ongoing reinterpretation of civil liberties. But republicanism, even in its most inclusive forms, remains too static and state-centric. The distribution of political membership is not subjected to democratic negotiations. In the end, only those already holding citizenship status are allowed to debate what citizenship entails. This leaves out the perspectives of migrants.

Instead I shifted focus to two contemporary political theories, deliberative and agonistic democracy, in order to assess the more genuinely dynamic conceptions of citizenship found there. I showed how both theories combine liberal civil rights and republican civic participation in ways which brings out the changeable character of citizenship. Citizenship is thereby re-conceived as an ongoing participatory process of reinterpreting our freedoms and political membership. But this self-referential process is not circular or closed. Outsiders can always take part and challenge the existing boundaries. In this way the grievances of migrants can be articulated and made sense of as part of struggles over citizenship.

In the discussion of deliberative and agonistic democracy I emphasized how their conceptualization of citizenship, though sharing important elements, also differs in fundamental ways. Deliberative democrats stress the rational, dialogical and consensus seeking character of civic participation, while agonists underline the importance of conflict, contestation and passionate rhetoric. Both elements, I argued, are central to political life, so neither perspective on its own is sufficient. I therefore discussed and criticized two different emerging strategies for combining the theories – harmonious integration vs. ongoing contest. In contrast to these I advocated the merits of a third approach of ‘agonistic dialogue’. This I presented as a normative and conceptual framework which brings in play deliberative and agonistic approaches in analyses of struggles over migration and citizenship. This, I suggested, could enable us to empirically examine and normatively critique different forms of civic participation. Agonistic dialogue thus offers us a fruitful way of rethinking citizenship in order to grasp and guide contemporary migration.
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