

## THE STATE'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL ORDER IN NATIONAL SOCIETIES: SOMALIA AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

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*There is growing evidence that the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in dyads and small groups is possible without external enforcement. This has led some to conclude that social order is possible without the state. We criticize this conclusion by first drawing a distinction between local and global orders, and then noting that the mechanism producing local orders might be different from that producing global orders. In large and complex societies with a variety of groups with necessarily conflicting goals, higher local orders in some groups reduce those in others. The paper will conclude that the state, acting as a third-party enforcer, is necessary for the maintenance of global order in heterogeneous societies; external enforcement is necessary for the production of global orders precisely because local orders are possible without it. We will use evidence from the recent events in Somalia to illustrate our argument.*

Sixty years of tyranny are better than one hour of civil strife.

An Islamic Saying (quoted in Edgerton, 1985:246)

Axelrod's (1984) discovery that the endogenous production of cooperation within dyads is possible has spawned a large number of supportive empirical studies. In laboratory experiments and field observations, social scientists have shown that the successful production of collective goods through cooperation is possible without the intervention of the state. On the basis of their empirical findings, they conclude that, because cooperation in dyads and small groups is possible without the state, *social order* is possible without it. There appears to be an emerging consensus among those concerned with the problem of order that the state is at least unnecessary and at most undesirable for the production of social order.

We challenge this consensus. We attempt to show that the state is necessary for the production of social order, first by drawing a distinction (made earlier in Hechter et al., 1992) between global and local orders, and then by noting that the mechanism behind the production of global orders may be different from that behind the production of local orders. Our argument involves somewhat of a paradox: *Coercive intervention of a central state is necessary to produce and*

*maintain social order precisely because cooperation within groups is possible without it.* We use the recent events in Somalia to illustrate our argument.

### EMERGING CONSENSUS

Theory of repeated games (Axelrod 1984) endogenously explains spontaneous cooperation within dyads. Through the use of contingent strategies like Tit-For-Tat that is only possible in supergames with "the shadow of the future" (Axelrod, 1984), a player in a two-person prisoner's dilemma game can control the other's choices to produce and sustain Pareto-optimal mutual cooperation. Whereas Axelrod's theory accounts for cooperation within dyads, Hechter's (1987) theory of group solidarity explains the endogenous production of cooperation within small groups. When individuals are dependent on the group for its collective goods, the group can control their behavior through the threat of expulsion from the group and thus from the consumption of the collective goods. The more dependent the members are on the collective goods (due to higher value they place on the goods or fewer alternative sources for them), the more compliant they are with the group obligations. Members are also more compliant if the group has more efficient system of monitoring and sanctioning to detect and punish defectors. And the more compliant the members are to the collective normative obligations, the higher the group solidarity.

Empirical studies have supported Axelrod's and Hechter's theories for the endogenous production of cooperation. Ostrom (1990) has analyzed published studies of both successful and failed common-pool resources (CPR) projects (such as irrigation systems, fisheries, and forests) throughout the world. She asks "how a group of principals who are in an interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically" (29), and answers it by inducing eight "design principles." These are institutional arrangements which almost universally characterize the successful CPRs and very few failed ones. Ostrom argues that, as long as the individuals design their CPRs with most of these institutional features, they can overcome the free-rider problem and produce their collective goods for a long time. Consistent with Hechter's theory, some of these design principles promote effective monitoring and sanctioning. Ostrom's (1990) study supports Hechter's contention that the endogenous production of group solidarity is possible.

Ostrom and her collaborators (Ostrom et al., 1992) reach a similar conclusion in a series of laboratory experiments. Actors in their CPR games often honor their ex ante commitments to mutually agreed-upon strategies even when there are no sanctions against defections. Given the opportunity, they even agree to institute and pay for their own sanctioning system endogenously to punish defectors. Ostrom et al. (1992) thus demonstrate that actors are able to

overcome both the first-order and the second-order free-rider problems without the third-party enforcement.

Ellickson (1986; 1991) studies how neighboring cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, resolve their disputes involving trespasses by livestock by resorting to informal norms rather than formal state laws. "In open-range areas, the norm that a livestock owner should supervise his animals dominates the legal rule that a cattleman is not legally liable for unintentional trespasses on unfenced land. Trespass victims mainly employ negative gossip and physical reprisals against trespassing stock to discipline cattlemen who violate this norm" (1986:685). Ellickson concludes that "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another" (1991:167), and can do so without the third-party intervention and enforcement.

Kollock (1994) shows that actors can often develop committed exchange relations based on trust and benefit from mutual cooperation even when external enforcement of the terms of contract is absent. Faced with a high degree of uncertainty in a simulated market, actors invest heavily in their reputations of trustworthiness by advertising the quality of their goods truthfully, even when there are no external sanctions against deceitful advertisement to increase profit. As a result, mutually beneficial exchange relations based on trust emerge spontaneously.

These are ingenious studies on the mechanisms for the endogenous production of cooperation in different settings, and we have nothing against their conclusion that such endogenous production of cooperation is possible without third-party enforcement. However, we do take issue with the *implications for social order and the necessity of the state* that these researchers draw from their findings. Ostrom et al. (1992) conclude that "self-governance" and "covenants without a sword" are possible: "Our findings challenge the Hobbesian conclusion that the constitution of order is only possible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by being above subjects, by monitoring them, and by imposing sanctions on all who would otherwise not comply" (414). The title of Ellickson's (1991) book *Order Without Law* refers to "coordination to mutual advantage without supervision by the state" (4), and all the evidence in his book suggests that it is possible. Kollock (1994:338-340) notes that "there may be some drawbacks to a system that relies on an outside party to provide guarantees even when the monitoring system works perfectly.... To the extent this finding is robust, one implication is that in some situations an external, formal regulatory system might work against the emergence of trust within a group or result in the atrophy of already existing trust.... There is an argument

to be made against the inevitable *necessity* of formal controls as a solution to *N*-Person social dilemmas."<sup>1</sup>

To show why we disagree with the implication that the state is not necessary for the production of social order, or even sustained cooperation within groups, we will present a new solidaristic theory of social order (Kanazawa, 1997) and illustrate the key theoretical points with accounts on the recent events in Somalia. In order to reinterpret the empirical findings discussed above from this theoretical perspective, we will draw a distinction between cooperation within groups (which we term *local orders*) and social order at the societal level (*global order*), and show why findings pertinent to the former have few direct implications for the latter.

Ordinarily, it is impossible to study nonexperimentally the implications of local orders for global orders in the absence of the state because it has been thousands of years since the Hobbesian state of nature existed (if it ever existed historically); every society now has a state. However, the recent events in Somalia simulate the state of nature quite well and what happens under such conditions. Somalia is an excellent illustrative case for another reason. Critics have objected to an earlier use of the solidaristic theory to explain high levels of order in Japan (Hechter and Kanazawa, 1993) by saying that Japan's cultural homogeneity must account for some of its orderliness, even though Hechter and Kanazawa specifically argue against this normative perspective. As it turns out, Somalia is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically very homogeneous, with few of the ethnic and tribal divisions that exist in other African nations (DeLancey et al., 1988:xiii-xv; Sheehan, 1993:40). The current civil war is between subclans within a single clan, the Hawiye (Gregory, 1992:34; Geekie, 1993:11; Sheehan, 1993:41). The normative perspective loses much of its explanatory power if a complete breakdown of social order can occur in Somalia despite its extremely high degree of cultural homogeneity.

### BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON SOMALIA

In July 1960, Somalia gained independence, reunifying the British protectorate in the north and the Italian protectorate in the south.<sup>2</sup> Parliamentary democracy ruled the country from the first elections in 1961 until October 1969, when Major General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power through a "bloodless"

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<sup>1</sup>Taylor (1982) also forcefully argues that social order is possible without the state. However, Taylor himself limits the applicability of his theory to small and homogeneous "communities." Since our focus in this paper is global order in large and complex national societies, we will not discuss his theoretical work here (but see below).

<sup>2</sup>We draw on DeLancey et al. (1988), Gregory (1992), and Sheehan (1993), *inter alia*, for the following brief history of Somalia.

coup with popular support. With the Soviet military backing, Siad Barre pursued "scientific socialism" and authoritarian dictatorship. After the war broke out between Somalia and the Marxist regime in Ethiopia in 1977, however, the Soviet Union abandoned Siad Barre, who was then promptly supported by the American military aid.

Throughout the 1980s, as disgust with Siad Barre's corrupt and brutal rule increased among the populace, rival clans united in their opposition against the Barre regime. In May 1988, civil war broke out when the anti-Siad Barre Somali National Movement (SNM) launched attacks in the northern region. The fighting quickly spread to the central and southern regions of the country, where the Hawiye and allied clans formed a second rebel group, the United Somali Congress (USC). In January 1991, after three years of intense war, Mohammed Siad Barre's regime collapsed under the concerted attacks from the USC. Siad Barre fled the country to Kenya and then to Nigeria, and thus reverted Somalia to the true state of nature.

Forces that rallied behind USC in their opposition to Said Barre quickly turned on each other. The interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the USC chair General Mohamed Farah Aidid engaged in a military contest for the political control of the government, while SNM seceded to establish an independent (albeit hitherto internationally unrecognized) nation of Somaliland in the north. Fighting continued on the streets of Mogadishu between Ali Mahdi and Aidid forces, until the US military intervention in December 1992. Subsequent to the international intervention, most military confrontations were between the Aidid supporters and the combined US-UN forces. In October 1993, Aidid's militia brought down two US helicopters, killing 18 Army rangers. Public outcry and increasingly dangerous situations forced the US and UN forces to withdraw from Somalia completely in March 1995. Aidid died in August 1996.

### THE SOLIDARISTIC THEORY

*Global order* is the extent to which citizens comply with the important norms of society (Taylor, 1982:49-50; Kanazawa, 1997:Definition 16). The solidaristic theory explains global order at the macro level as a partial function of local orders at the meso level, which are synonymous with group solidarities (Hechter, 1987). Group solidarity is the extent to which a group achieves its goals (Kanazawa, 1997:Definition 2).

The state delegates the task of producing global order to groups, which are responsible for controlling individual behavior; it freerides on the social control activities of the groups to produce global order (Hechter et al., 1992).

Individuals have limited resources (such as time and energy), and the production of group solidarity requires that the members comply with collective normative obligations (Hechter, 1987). Therefore, *ceteris paribus*, the higher the average level of group solidarities in a society, the higher the level of its global order because more of its citizens are in compliance with collective normative obligations of their groups in order to achieve their solidarity.

However, it matters for the level of global order what sort of collective normative obligations citizens comply with. The novel concept of *group productiveness* captures the nature of collective normative obligations (dictated by group goals) and their effect on global order. Group productiveness is the extent to which a group's goals are conducive to the production of global order (Kanazawa, 1997:Definition 17). *Productive* groups require their members to behave in ways which do not violate the important norms of society, whereas *counterproductive* groups demand that their members comply with their group norms which violate the important norms. There are two principal types of counterproductive groups (Hechter, 1993). *Oppositional* groups threaten global order by endangering the state's survival and aiming to replace it. *Predatory* groups threaten global order by imposing negative externalities on other groups. Global order is a direct function of solidarities among productive groups, and an inverse function of solidarities among counterproductive groups. The higher the solidarities among productive groups and/or the lower the solidarities among counterproductive groups, the higher the global order.

To the extent that they are solidary and their members comply with the collective normative obligations, counterproductive groups reduce the overall level of global order.<sup>3</sup> There are two separate mechanisms for this. First, oppositional groups threaten the state autonomy and decrease its resources, because the state must expend its scarce resources to combat the threat. Less resourceful states are less able to ward off the challenges of other oppositional groups and provide more opportunities for them to flourish. *Ceteris paribus*, the higher the proportion of counterproductive groups in society, the lower its level of global order. Second, predatory groups impose negative externalities on other groups. When groups must expend some of their collective resources to protect themselves from others, to monitor and sanction nonmembers, it necessarily detracts from the monitoring and sanctioning of their own group members (Kanazawa, 1997). Because groups cannot produce and sustain high local orders without an efficient system of monitoring and sanctioning within the groups (Hechter, 1987), and because the level of global order correlates with the average level of local orders among productive groups, counterproductive

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<sup>3</sup>Hardin (1995) chronicles numerous examples of solidary counterproductive groups -- from the Mafia in Sicily to ethnic groups in Bosnia -- which decrease global order precisely because their members comply with their counterproductive norms so well.

groups decrease global order through their negative externalities on other groups.

While negative externalities on *any* productive group decrease global order by decreasing their local orders, there is an additional effect when the victim groups have power over the state (Hechter et al., 1992). There is a curious bilateral relationship between the state and the powerful groups in society. While the latter are less dependent on the former than other groups for its protection,<sup>4</sup> the former is more dependent on the latter than on other groups for contribution to its survival, chiefly in the form of taxes. So when a predatory group imposes negative externalities on powerful groups, the state expends its scarce resources to control the predatory group's activities to curb their negative externalities on the powerful groups. Thus when the victims are powerful, the negative externalities of a predatory group have an additional negative effect on global order, through their effect on the state's resources, above and beyond their effect on local orders (although, to the extent that the state successfully intervenes on their behalf, powerful groups need not expend their own collective resources for protection).

The recent events in Somalia illustrate three logical implications of the solidaristic theory. First, because it holds that the state functions as a societal referee to control groups' negative externalities upon each other, to prevent "the war of all *groups* against all *groups*" (Kanazawa, 1997), it predicts that, contrary to Ostrom (1990; Ostrom et al., 1992), Ellickson (1986; 1991), and Kollock (1994), sustained global order is impossible without the state. Second, a direct implication of the theory is that, in the absence of the state, local orders also decline as groups, now unable to count on the state for protection against negative externalities from other groups, must fend for themselves and expend their own resources to do so. This diversion of collective resources from internal to external monitoring and sanctioning hampers the production of local orders. This is in even starker contradiction to the conclusion by Ostrom (1990; Ostrom et al., 1992), Ellickson (1986; 1991), and Kollock (1994) about the possibility of cooperation without the external intervention of the state. We maintain that, *in an environment where there are multiple groups in potential*

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<sup>4</sup>This is because, left to themselves without the state intervention, the resourceful groups are better able to defend themselves against the negative externalities of other groups than less resourceful groups (as the evidence from Somalia below shows). The state acting as an arbitrator among groups thus tends to decrease the relative advantage of resourceful groups over less resourceful groups. We believe that this is why conservatives, who are almost invariably the most resourceful in any society, tend to prefer a smaller state.

*conflict*, not only global orders but sustained local orders are also impossible without the state. Finally, another implication of the theory is that, given the initial inequality of resources among groups, those with more collective resources are better able to produce and maintain local orders in the absence of the state than those with less. We now turn to each of these theoretical predictions in the case of Somalia after the collapse of the state.

### *THE EFFECT OF THE STATE ON GLOBAL ORDER*

The solidaristic theory defines the state as a unitary actor who functions as a third-party enforcer of norms and arbitrator of group conflict at the societal level (Kanazawa, 1997:Definition 11). The state is an agent, which the groups as principals establish to curb their negative externalities upon each other so that they may devote more of their collective resources on the production of local orders rather than on the effort to protect themselves against other groups (Kanazawa, 1997). It is an "executive committee" of all groups in society. This is a very abstract conception of the state, which does not capture all of its complexities. For this reason, many social scientists would probably not share this particular conception. The solidaristic theory, however, explains only one narrow function of the state: its behavior toward groups within its jurisdiction. For this purpose, we believe that this conception of the state suffices.

In the absence of the state to act as a third-party enforcer or referee among the groups, they are free to impose negative externalities upon each other, and they are left to defend themselves against the predatory acts of other groups. This is why we believe that the empirical findings of the endogenous production of local orders that we cite earlier, *all of which study only one group at a time*, may have few implications for the production of global order in heterogeneous societies. In such societies, groups simultaneously pursue conflicting goals, and the successful production of collective goods by one group has negative externalities on others. In the absence of the state, groups can still produce local orders (as the empirical studies discussed above suggest), but higher local orders in some groups impose negative externalities on others and reduce their local orders. Our theoretical contention is that the state is necessary to maintain global order precisely because local orders (cooperation within groups) are possible without it.

This process is best seen in the events immediately following the collapse of the state in Somalia. Counterintuitive though it may seem, looting is an act of cooperation. "Looting is not a random occurrence, though its perpetrators plan to be as unpredictable as possible, to make defense as difficult as possible. Looting is organized" (De Waal, 1993:28). To the extent that successful looting requires a concerted effort of multiple individuals, it is an act of n-person cooperation, but it is cooperation with severe negative externalities on others. The solidaristic theory predicts that the state deters and punishes cooperation by

such counterproductive groups as looters. This is why "the most comprehensive and profitable looting was carried out *immediately after the flight of Siad Barre*, with subsequent bouts whenever there has been a new round of fighting, as each militia loots property belonging to the others" (De Waal, 1993:28; emphasis added). One reporter notes that most homes and shops were already looted, forcing looters to loot other looters, in the first six days after the flight of Siad Barre (Press, 1991:16). Global order in Somalia has decreased precisely because local orders of predatory groups (such as looters and armed militias) have increased in the absence of the state.

### *THE EFFECT OF THE STATE ON LOCAL ORDERS*

While groups are able to produce local orders without the state, another implication of the theory is that the level of local orders will eventually decrease without the state. As groups must spend increasing amounts of their collective resources on monitoring and sanctioning outsiders, in order to fight them, they can spend proportionately less of their collective resources on internal control essential for the production of local orders (Hechter, 1987).

Because the federal government often collects the most reliable statistics, it has been very difficult to obtain quantitative data on Somalia since January 1991 (Little, 1992:119n). We therefore must rely on international organizations (such as the EC or the UN) for recent statistics. Further, even some UN agencies (such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)) and other international bodies (such as the World Bank) have ceased collecting statistical information on Somalia in recent years (no doubt due to its extremely dangerous domestic situations). What we present below is what little is available most recently.

In order for a nation to export goods, group members must engage in successful cooperation to produce commodities to export. If meso-level economic cooperation becomes difficult as a result of the collapse of the state, one would expect the amount of export to decrease. Table 1 shows the monthly figures on Somali export to EC across all commodities from January 1988 to December 1992, in thousand ECUs (European Currency Units) which take inflation into account. From 1988 through 1990, the volume of the trade is stable or slightly on the increase, as the cumulative percentages (computed on the cumulative total from January of each year through a given month) are generally above 100, indicating growth. Then it plummets in January 1991 and stays at this low level through 1991 and most of 1992, until it bounces back in December 1992, *when the US military forces intervene and act as a provisional*

TABLE 1

**SOMALI EXPORT TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NATIONS  
TOTAL TRADE  
JANUARY 1988-DECEMBER 1992**

1,000 ECUs (Cumulative % of previous year)

1988			1989		
January	3644	(119)	January	4084	(112)
February	4009	(132)	February	3235	(94)
March	2722	(107)	March	6471	(131)
April	5414	(126)	April	3308	(107)
May	2791	(120)	May	3968	(112)
June	3534	(126)	June	2581	(106)
July	3507	(127)	July	4209	(107)
August	4354	(139)	August	3389	(103)
September	1795	(130)	September	3586	(108)
October	3620	(133)	October	4391	(109)
November	2890	(118)	November	3946	(107)
December	2235	(112)	December	3379	(108)
1990			1991		
January	5858	(143)	January	3800	(65)
February	4453	(141)	February	1617	(53)
March	5213	(113)	March	2231	(50)
April	3937	(114)	April	631	(43)
May	4475	(114)	May	1926	(43)
June	1569	(108)	June	1101	(45)
July	4192	(107)	July	383	(40)
August	1768	(101)	August	976	(40)
September	2726	(98)	September	1430	(41)
October	3751	(97)	October	303	(38)
November	4371	(98)	November	1241	(37)
December	4402	(100)	December	1050	(36)
1992					
January	1792	(47)			
February	120	(35)			
March	1565	(45)			
April	569	(49)			
May	82	(40)			
June	224	(38)			
July	3372	(66)			
August	91	(61)			
September	1595	(66)			
October	312	(67)			
November	103	(63)			
December	41959	(309)			

Source: European Community 1988-1993

*state*. The complete resumption of Somali export required a third-party to act as a referee among groups.

The monthly statistics indicating a sudden drop in export to EC in January 1991 are important because they rule out two alternative explanations: drought and the civil war. Drought in Somalia and the rest of East Africa had been persistent for decades (DeLancey et al., 1988:xxvii), and the civil war between rival subclans had been going on for almost three years prior to January 1991 (Gregory, 1992:34; Sheehan, 1993:40-41). Neither affected the trade with EC very much; Somali export to EC gradually grew in the face of these hardships. The only thing that happened in January 1991 to produce such a dramatic change was the collapse of the state.

Table 2 provides further supportive evidence. Agriculture is the largest sector in Somali economy, accounting for 66% of GDP and 71% of the labor force in 1990 (Europa, 1992:2443). Table 2(a) shows that the food and, especially, crops and cereals production went down dramatically in 1991. Table 2(b) indicates that the Somali cereals production as a percentage of the previous five years plummeted in 1991 and stayed at that level in 1992. Once again, although Somalia has experienced widespread drought in recent years, one cannot attribute these sudden drops in agricultural production in 1991 to drought. "Drought has played only a minor role" in the "exceptionally severe famine" (De Waal and Omaar, 1992:62). Table 2(c) presents more comprehensive figures on Somali economy (annual growth in GDP). It shows that the Somali economy was gradually expanding from 1985 to 1990, but the growth turned negative in 1991 and 1992. The statistical evidence in Tables 1-2 collectively indicates that solidarities of many economic groups in Somalia plummeted in January 1991, when the state collapsed.

Another type of meso-level cooperation still observed in Somalia after the collapse of the state is the activities of the international relief agencies (such as the Red Cross and the UN). Members of these groups aim to provide the collective good of aid and relief to impoverished Somalis. Available evidence shows that their local orders in the absence of the state have been reduced by negative externalities imposed by other groups.

According to David Bassiouni, UN coordinator for humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, during the first six months of this year only 30,000 tons of foodstuffs had been brought to Mogadishu through his organization, a mere 40% of what had been promised by donors for the first half of the year. United Nations spokesmen blame the inadequate reaction on continued fighting and a lack of safety guarantees for aid workers.

**TABLE 2**  
**ANNUAL MEASURES OF MESOLEVEL COOPERATION**

		(A) Agricultural Production					Unit: 1979-1981=100 (per capita)	
		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Food		114 (96)	114 (93)	119 (93)	124 (94)	127 (93)	124 (88)	113 (78)
Crops		146 (123)	144 (117)	144 (113)	154 (117)	167 (122)	149 (106)	96 (67)
Cereals		168 (142)	191 (156)	177 (139)	196 (149)	218 (161)	192 (137)	83 (58)

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1992a

(B) Cereal Production  
as Percentage of Previous Five Years

1989	119%	646,000 tons
1990	100%	574,000 tons
1991	43%	255,000 tons
1992	39%	205,000 tons

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1992b

(C) GDP Annual Growth Rates

1985	3.5%
1986	3.2%
1987	5.3%
1988	-1.3%
1989	2.9%
1990	3.6%
1991	-3.0%
1992	-7.0%

Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization 1991, 1992, 1993

. . . Except in the south, near the Kenyan frontier, no truck convoys have managed to penetrate the Somalian interior. The "fees" imposed in Mogadishu by the various armed clan factions for unloading cargo reportedly add up to more per ton of aid supplies than commercial port costs in New York City. According to UN official Alistair Dawson, never in the history of humanitarian action has it been so expensive as it is in Somalia to provide a child with a 250-gram ration of rice (Haefliger, 1992:13).

Although heterogeneity of groups is sufficient to impose negative externalities upon each other through their attempt to increase local orders, heterogeneity is not necessary. Even if all groups in a society have the same goal, higher solidarity in one group necessarily impacts other groups negatively *if* resources are too scarce to satisfy the goals of all groups. Two capitalist firms in the same product market trying to increase their market shares have similar goals, but the success of one necessarily produces the failure (or reduces the success) of the other because the society's resources (the number of potential consumers) are finite. In Somalia, this process manifests itself when the success of one group of looters translates into the failure (or reduced success) of other looters, because there is a limited amount of goods to be looted in the country.

Since group heterogeneity and/or scarcity of resources characterize all extant societies, increased local orders for all groups do not translate into an increase in global order. In order for the mechanism for the endogenous production of local order to have a direct implication for global order (as Ostrom, Ellickson, and Kollock seem to argue), the society must *both* be completely homogeneous with respect to goals of its groups *and* have unlimited resources. In a chapter entitled "Social order without the state," Taylor (1982) argues that the state is not necessary to produce order in small and homogeneous societies, where the "community" produces order instead. However, in order for his community to work as the guarantor of social order, the society must not only be small and homogeneous but also be affluent without limit.

#### ***NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND RESOURCE INEQUALITY***

One final implication of the solidaristic theory is that, in the absence of the state, resourceful groups are better able to victimize and impose negative externalities on less resourceful groups; the latter must spend a larger proportion of their collective resources on protection than the former. Then local orders

among resourceful groups should remain higher in the absence of the state than among less resourceful groups.

There is some indication that this might be true in post-1991 Somalia. Bananas are the principal cash crop in Somalia, accounting for more than 40% of export earnings in 1988 (Europa, 1992:2443; DeLancey et al., 1988:xxiv). Banana plantations in Somalia began as an Italian colonial project under Mussolini before World War II (Sheehan, 1993:40), and they continued to receive large foreign investment even after the collapse of the state (Samatar, 1993). If banana growers as a group are more resourceful than other farmers because of the larger profit from export and the support of the foreign investors, we predict that they are better able to maintain their local order than other groups after the collapse of the state. Statistics from the FAO of the United Nations show that, while production across all crops decreased by 35% from 1990 to 1991, the production of bananas went *unchanged* (FAO, 1992a:168). The production of sugarcane, another major cash crop in Somalia, also did not decrease in 1991 (FAO, 1992a:156).

Journalistic accounts substantiate these sketchy statistical evidence. Banana and sugarcane plantation owners have long dispossessed weaker clans, such as the descendants of former slaves, the Rahanweyn and Bantu groups, in their attempt to expand their plantations.

As disadvantaged groups, the [Rahanweyn and Bantu] farmers had great difficulty in obtaining firearms and making alliances on equal terms with the forces fighting Siad Barre. Thus when the collapse of government came in 1991, they were ripe for plunder by their better armed neighbors. The Juba and Shebelle valleys and the dryland farming region of Bay were pillaged on at least three separate occasions by different armies from other contending clans, most consistently and devastatingly by the forces of Siad Barre. The inhabitants were unable to resist. They lost their crops, their livestock, and many of their possessions....

The wealthy and powerful were able to protect their investments. Merchants maintained a tight grip on the food market, ensuring that their profits were maintained by keeping prices high. They continued to trade in all parts of the country, paying protection money to cross the battle lines if necessary. The trade in the stimulant *qat* alone is worth several million dollars per week. Plantation owners ringed their land with armed guards. Villagers in Qorioley starved next to huge banana plantations; if they gathered grass from between the trees, they were likely to have their hands tied together and a bullet put through their palms.

It will come as no surprise to learn that the Rahanweyn and the Bantu are the two groups most stricken by the famine. (De Waal and Omaar, 1992:63)

About 60% of the Somali population are nomadic herders (DeLancey et al., 1988:xxiv). The sale of livestock is therefore an important facet of Somali economy, accounting for approximately 79% of the country's export earnings in 1983, although its importance for export has declined somewhat in recent years (DeLancey et al., 1988:xxiv). Still, breeding livestock accounted for more than 35% of GDP in 1988 (Europa, 1992:2443). Consistent with the theoretical prediction, FAO statistics show that the livestock production decreased only very slightly (1.7% in total production) from 1990 to 1991 (FAO, 1992a:45).

### CONCLUSION

We challenge the current consensus that cooperation and *hence perforce* social order is possible without the state. We draw a distinction between local and global orders, and argue that the state intervention is necessary for the production of global order precisely because local orders are possible without it. We question the theoretical implications drawn by Ostrom, Ellickson, and Kollock, precisely because we believe in the validity of their empirical results. In the absence of the state, in the proverbial Hobbesian state of nature, individuals can still form and join groups to produce their desired collective goods through mutually-beneficial cooperation; they can produce local orders. However, in societies characterized by group conflict or resource scarcity (essentially all societies in human history), increased local orders eventually decrease global orders through the groups' negative externalities upon each other. Hence the paradox: The state intervention is necessary to produce global order precisely because local orders are possible without it. Ultimately, local orders themselves decrease in the absence of the state because the groups must expend a larger portion of their resources for external surveillance and protection, which could otherwise augment the efficiency of internal monitoring and sanctioning to produce local orders.

This, we believe, is the reason for the disorder we witness in Somalia. The collapse of the state allowed predatory groups in Somalia to increase their local orders freely. Their heightened negative externalities took away from the resources of other groups and lowered their local orders. As the average level of local orders plummeted, individual Somalis became less compliant with norms, and global *disorder* resulted. The solidaristic theory provides an alternative explanation for Somali disorder to more widely accepted explanations: drought and intergroup violence. Drought has been constant for the last few decades, both in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa (DeLancey et al., 1988:xxvii), while interminable intergroup violence has not led to total chaos in

other African nations such as South Africa. What we uniquely observe in Somalia is the simultaneous coexistence of the absence of the state and chaotic disorder.

While limited in scope and depth, the available evidence from Somalia supports the solidaristic theory and to cast some doubt on the current consensus that global order is possible without the state. The evidence is circumstantial, and we would have liked to have more and better evidence from Somalia to support our theoretical claims. But such data do not exist since no organizations are currently collecting systematic data in Somalia (ironically supporting our contention that no sustained group activities are possible without the state). Of course, all theories must ultimately be tested experimentally, and the effort toward this direction is under way.

Further theoretical work is also necessary. The solidaristic theory posits that two factors jointly determine the level of global order: the average level of local orders and the ratio of productive and counterproductive groups. We may know the determinants of group solidarity (Hechter, 1987), but what affects the mixture of productive and counterproductive groups? How can the solidaristic theory endogenize this determinant of global order?

The history of Somalia illustrates another key theoretical mechanism of the solidaristic theory. The logic behind our claim that global order is impossible without the state is the contention that group solidarities decrease in the state of nature because groups must expend their collective resources to monitor and sanction outsiders and this expenditure decreases solidarity. Given limited resources, monitoring and sanctioning outsiders (necessary for intergroup conflict) *and* insiders (necessary for the production of local orders) simultaneously are impossible. The solidaristic theory is a general theory which cuts across different levels of aggregation (Kanazawa, 1997:87), and the collection of "insiders" might be a group or it might be a whole nation state.

Somalia and the neighboring Ethiopia have had a long history of border conflict over the small region of Ogaden (DeLancey et al., 1988:xvi-xviii). With the superpower support on each side, Somalia's Siad Barre and the Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam had been at war over Ogaden since 1977 (Sheehan, 1993:40). However, the civil war began in Somalia in 1988 around the same time as a series of civil wars took place in Ethiopia. "The two despots predictably struck a deal, abandoning support for insurgent groups waging war from their respective territories." (Clark, 1993:111) "Neither dictator could any longer spare troops to face down each other. They both wished to transfer their soldiery to counter escalating civil conflicts." (Greenfield, 1991:17-18) It is very difficult for a country to be at war with another when the internal turmoil

consumes so much of its collective resources, and vice versa.<sup>5</sup> Radical students in the 1960s essentially understood this, when they attempted to subvert the US government when the latter's resources were depleted due to a long war in Vietnam, and captured this with the slogan, "One, two, many Vietnams." From the perspective of the solidaristic theory, Somalia and Ethiopia had to abandon their external cause of territorial expansion for the same reason as the agricultural production fell in Somalia after the collapse of the state: limited collective resources.

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<sup>5</sup>The same principle might provide an alternative explanation to Skrentny's (1998) finding that the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union facilitated the success of the black civil rights movement. While Skrentny's cultural analysis emphasizes the notion of legitimacy in the eyes of the international audience, his findings are also consistent with the more materialist (i.e. resource-based, not ideology-based) prediction of the solidaristic theory. The US simply did not have sufficient resources left to repress the black civil rights movement when its limited collective resources were largely drained by the Cold War. The solidaristic theory also provides an alternative explanation to one anomaly in the history of the civil rights movement which Skrentny notes: Why the state governments in the Deep South continued to repress the civil rights movement while the branches of the federal government (the White House and the State Department) were more accommodating. From the solidaristic theory's perspective, this is because the state governments did not expend any resources on the Cold War.

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