I am interested in
theories of causation and particularly
'exclusion arguments' regarding causation in
multi-level systems such as social or cognitive
systems. According to such arguments,
causation at a lower ('micro') level (e.g., an
individual or neural level) competes with, and
in fact excludes, causation at a higher
(e.g., a social or mental one) and/or
Together with Peter Menzies, I
defence of higher-level difference-making
causation against the exclusion problem.
In a structurally similar way, I have also
defended certain forms of
methodological holism in
the social sciences
(in joint work with Kai Spiekermann).
Marcus Pivato, I have recently been developing a
metaphysics and the philosophy of science, in
which some issues related to causation and
scientific laws can be formalized.
Richard Bradley and Franz Dietrich, I have worked on the
aggregation of causal judgements
across multiple individuals (e.g., in an expert
panel), where causal judgments are represented
using Bayesian networks.
Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism? (with D.
Stoljar), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 96-108, 2017 [preprint
Dynamic and stochastic
systems as a framework for metaphysics and the
philosophy of science (with M. Pivato)
My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument against free will, and
what’s wrong with it (with P. Menzies), in
H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (eds.),
Making a Difference, Oxford (Oxford University
(with R. Bradley and F.
Dietrich), Philosophy of Science 81: 491-515, 2014
Methodological Individualism and Holism in
Political Science: A Reconciliation (with K.
Spiekermann), American Political Science Review
107(4): 629-643, 2013
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a
philosophy-of-science perspective (with F.
Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of
the Exclusion Principle (with Peter Menzies), Journal of
Philosophy CVI(9): 475-502, 2009
The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences (with Peter Menzies),
in C. Mcdonald and G. Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence in
Oxford (Oxford University Press)
Other papers on scientific
Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed,
7: 28-39, 1999