#### **LUKE IAN MINER**

### LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

**Department of Economics** 

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**DATE OF BIRTH**: 25 Mar 1978 **SEX**: M **CITIZENSHIP**: USA and UK

## **PREDOCTORAL STUDIES**:

M.Sc. in Economics London School of Economics 2005-2007

D.E.A. (Masters) in Philosophy of Science EHESS, Paris 2004-2005

B.A. in Modern Thought and Literature Stanford University 1996-2000

# **GRADUATE STUDIES**: LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

DATES: September 2007 - present

THESIS TITLE: "Essays on the Role of the Internet and Social Learning in Economic Development and

Political Change"

**EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: June 2012** 

## THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Prof. Robin Burgess (advisor)

Department of Economics

London School of Economics

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Dr. Gerard Padró i Miquel (advisor)

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## **LUKE IAN MINER**

#### **DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:**

Primary Fields: Development Economics, Political Economy

Secondary Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Experimental Economics, Public Policy

# **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**:

Microeconomics Principles I (2<sup>nd</sup> Year Undergraduate Course, LSE):

2009-10

Teaching Assistant to Margaret Bray and Erik Eyster

Assessing the Effects of Mergers using PCAIDS and ALM models in Mathematica (The Office of Fair Trade, London): Instructor

Summer 2007

### **LANGUAGES**

English (native), French (fluent), Japanese (intermediate), Spanish (basic)

## **RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE:**

#### The Office of Fair Trade, London, Summer Intern

Summer 2007

Programmed models for simulating the price effects of different mergers in Mathematica. Trained OFT economists in use of merger models. Created variation of the ALM model, which takes account of mergers where collusion results in price increases.

#### The New York Review of Books, Editorial Assistant

8/2001-12/2002

Edited submissions on topics such as philosophy, economics, politics, and physics. Authored reports on unsolicited manuscripts and helped select them for publication. Helped choose contributors and books for review.

### **OTHER EXPERIENCE**:

Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Visiting Scholar	2010
Research Assistant to Professor Georg Weizsäcker	2008
Research Assistant to Professor Danny Quah	2006

#### **COMPLETED PAPERS**:

# Job Market Paper:

Can the introduction of the internet bolster the opposition in a semi-authoritarian regime? I examine this question using evidence from Malaysia, where the incumbent coalition lost its 40-year monopoly on power in 2008. I match IP addresses with physical locations to construct a measure of internet growth in Malaysia from 2004 to 2008. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for endogenous internet placement, I find that areas with higher internet penetration experience higher turnout and higher turnover, with the internet accounting for one-third of the 11% swing against the incumbent party in 2008. In fact, the results suggest that, in the absence of the internet, the opposition would not have achieved its historic upset in the 2008 elections.

<sup>&</sup>quot;The Unintended Consequences of Internet Diffusion: Evidence from Malaysia", 2011

### Other Papers:

"To Whom Do We Pay Attention when Following the Crowd?", 2008

When observing the behavior of players in a sequence, from whom do we learn the most? To answer this question I draw on a meta-dataset of 13 laboratory experiments on social learning. I find that people behave contrary to the predictions of the prevailing models used to understand social learning and information cascades. Under Bayes Nash Equilibrium, the most informative signals come from the first player in the sequence. Under logit QRE a cascade break should be particularly informative, revealing the private signal. However, I find that agents learn most not from the first player but from the decision directly preceding their own. Furthermore, I find no evidence of learning from cascade breaks.

## **RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:**

"The Internet's Impact on Voter Mobilization: Evidence from the United States" with Valentino Larcinese (LSE)

The internet is said to have played a key role in the 2008 US presidential campaign both as a source of campaign funds and as a medium for connecting with younger voters. We plan to use a difference-in difference strategy to estimate these effects, focusing on the following dimensions: demographic changes in voting patterns; engagement and voter turnout; and campaign donations. This project will contribute to the literature by (a) using an exogenous variation in internet supply (b) providing new evidence of the effect of the internet on elections in the context of a democratic, industrialized nation.