Oslo, May 2014

 

 

Michael Otsuka

 

 

Curriculum Vitae | Contact details

Tribute at Jerry Cohen’s funeral

Wagner recommendations

 

 

Professor of Philosophy, London School of Economics (2013-22)

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University (2021-22 [remotely from London])

Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University (from Sept 2022)

B.Phil. 1988, D.Phil. 1990, Balliol College, Oxford

B.A. 1986, Yale University

Born 1964, in Palo Alto, California


 

Publications

(bold font = open access)

 

How to Pool Risks across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions (OUP Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics, forthcoming)

 

‘Prioritarianism, Population Ethics, and Competing Claims’, in J. McMahan, et al., eds., Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit (OUP, in press)

 

‘Does the Universities Superannuation Scheme Provide a Model of Reciprocity Between Generations?’ LSE Public Policy Review (in press)

 

If One Can’t Lose Such a Right in These Circumstances, One Never Had It in the First Place’, Criminal Law and Philosophy (2021, online first)

 

Appropriating Lockean Appropriation on Behalf of Equality’, in J. Penner and M. Otsuka, eds., Property Theory: Legal and Political Perspectives (CUP, 2018) (Open-access version.)

 

Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming, Erkenntnis, 83 (2018): 1229-1243

 

Equality versus Priority’, in Serena Olsaretti, ed., Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice (OUP, 2018) [co-authored with Alex Voorhoeve] (Open-access version.)

 

‘How it Makes a Moral Difference that One is Worse Off than One Could Have Been’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 17 (2018): 192-215 (Open-access version.)

 

How to Guard Against the Risk of Living Too Long: the case for collective pensions, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, v. III (OUP, 2017) (Open-access version.)

 

‘Why Even Diminishing Principles of Entitlement Must Be Regulated by Strictly Egalitarian Principles’, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 14 (2016): 158-68

 

‘Can an Incompatibilist Outfox a Compatibilist Hedgehog?’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 19 (2016): 456-69

 

‘The Moral Responsibility Account of Liability to Defensive Killing’, C. Coons and M. Weber, eds., The Ethics of Self-Defense (OUP, 2016)

 

‘Risking Life and Limb: How to Discount Harms by Their Improbability’, in I. G. Cohen, N. Daniels, and N. Eyal, eds., Identified versus Statistical Lives: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (OUP, 2015)

 

Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility, Journal of Political Philosophy, 23 (2015): 1-22

 

‘Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, Utilitas 24 (2012): 365-80 [for a special issue on ‘Why it Matters that Some are Worse Off than Others’]

 

Are Deontological Constraints Irrational?’, in R. Bader and J. Meadowcroft, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (CUP, 2011)

 

‘Licensed to Kill’, Analysis 71 (2011): 523-32

 

Reply to Crisp’, Utilitas 23 (2011): 109-14 [co-authored with Alex Voorhoeve]

 

Justice as Fairness: Luck Egalitarian, Not Rawlsian’, Journal of Ethics 14 (2010): 217-30

 

A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini’, Journal of Ethics 14 (2010): 37-42

 

Moral Luck: Optional, not Brute’, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 373-88

 

Owning Persons, Places, and Things’, in I. Carter, M. Kramer, and S. de Wijze, eds., Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice (Routledge, 2009)

 

Why it Matters that Some are Worse Off than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (2009): 171-99 [co-authored with Alex Voorhoeve]

 

The Kantian Argument for Consequentialism’, Ratio 22 (2009): 41-58

 

Freedom of Occupational Choice’, Ratio 21 (2008): 440-53

 

Double-Effect, Triple-Effect, and the Trolley Problem’, Utilitas, 20 (2008): 92-110

 

Prerogatives to Depart from Equality’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Political Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 58 (CUP, 2006), pp. 95-111

 

‘Comment être libertarien sans être inégalitaire’ and ‘Réponses’, Raisons Politiques, no. 23 (2006): 9-22 and 163-74

 

Leading article and replies (both in French translation) to other articles in an issue of the journal devoted to the version of left-libertarianism that I defend in Libertarianism without Inequality.

 

Replies, Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 55 (July 2006): 325-336

 

Replies to four articles of a symposium on Libertarianism without Inequality published in the same issue

 

‘Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals,[1] Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (2006): 109-35

 

Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant,[2] Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33 (2005): 201-15 [co-authored with Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner]

 

Skepticism about Saving the Greater Number,[3] Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32 (2004): 413-26

 

Liberty, Equality, Envy, and Abstraction’, in J. Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics (Blackwells, 2004), pp. 70-78

 

Equality, Ambition, and Insurance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary volume, 78 (2004): 151-66

 

Libertarianism without Inequality (OUP, 2003)

Review in the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Critical notice in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Review in Ethics

Pdf image of front and back book covers and book and chapter abstracts

 

Luck, Insurance, and Equality’, Ethics, 113 (2002): 40-54

 

‘Il personale è politico? Il confine fra pubblico e privato nella sfera della giustizia distributiva’, Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica anno XIV, n. 34, Dicembre 2001, pp. 617-23

 

This is a translation into Italian of a previously unpublished paper entitled ‘Is the personal political?: The boundary between the public and the private in the realm of distributive justice’. Click here for the paper in English.

 

Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One, Analysis, 60 (2000): 288-93

 

Making the Unjust Provide for the Least Well Off’, Journal of Ethics, 2 (1998): 247-59

 

Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame’, Ethics, 108 (1998): 685-701

 

Self-Ownership and Equality: A Lockean Reconciliation’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 27 (1998): 65-92

 

Kamm on the Morality of Killing’, Ethics, 108 (1997): 197-207

 

Quinn on Punishment and Using Persons as Means’, Law and Philosophy, 15 (1996): 201-08

 

Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 23 (1994): 74-94

 

The Paradox of Group Beneficence’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20 (1991): 132-49

 

Edited books

 

James Penner and Michael Otsuka, eds., Property Theory: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

 

G. A. Cohen, Finding Oneself in the Other (Princeton University Press, 2013)

 

G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 2011)

 


 

 

This page last modified 30 June 2021 by Michael Otsuka

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Current Research

 

My current research interests encompass the value and metaphysics of risks and chances of benefits; reciprocity and cooperation; risk-pooling, pensions, and insurance; property ownership and the nature of money; left-libertarianism versus social democracy and socialism; prioritarianism, egalitarianism, and the separateness of persons.

 

I am, however, happy to supervise a wide range of PhD dissertation topics in moral and political philosophy and philosophy and public policy that lie outside of my current research interests, including, but by no means limited to, topics on which I have published in the past.


Public Policy Blog

 

I post blogs on Medium on issues related to public policy. I post mainly on pensions but have also posted on public health (Covid), health insurance, higher education, and the measure of inflation.

 

My blog posts on the USS pension scheme gave rise to my ranking of #23 of 50 on the UK “Higher Education Power List” 2018 of those who had the most influence on this higher education sector that year.


 

 

 

                                   



[1] The definitive version of this article is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/papa.2006.34.issue-2/issuetoc.

[2] This is an electronic version of an article published in Philosophy & Public Affairs. Complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Philosophy & Public Affairs, is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1088-4963.

[3] See note 2 above.