

PROBLEM SET 8, JULLIANO

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The central bank solves

$$\max_{\{\pi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(y_t - \frac{\alpha}{2} \pi_t^2 \right)$$

$$s.t. \quad y_t = \bar{y} + b(\pi_t - \pi_t^e)$$

$$\pi_t^e = \begin{cases} \hat{\pi} & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} = \hat{\pi} \text{, then } \hat{\pi} \text{ is parameter} \\ \frac{b}{\alpha} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Tradeoff: $\pi \uparrow \rightarrow y_t \uparrow$, unless expected
 intuition goes through firm price setting
 and cost of labour

a) What is equilibrium if $\pi \neq \hat{\pi}$ in any period before time t ?

$$y_t = \bar{y} + b\left(\pi_t - \frac{b}{\alpha}\right)$$

since π^e constant, no interaction between private sector
 and central bank. Static problem

$$\max_{\pi_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \bar{y} + b\left(\pi_t - \frac{b}{\alpha}\right) - \frac{\alpha}{2} \pi_t^2 \right\}$$

$$\text{For } \pi_t: \beta^t \left\{ b - \alpha \pi_t \right\} = 0$$

$$\text{So } \pi_t = \frac{b}{\alpha} < 0, \text{ ok}$$

$$\pi_t^* = \frac{b}{\alpha} = \frac{b}{\alpha} \text{, so no surprise, so}$$

$$y_t = \bar{y}$$

if they expected inflation, you have to realize it

b) if π has always been at $\hat{\pi}$ till now, does cb have incentive to actually realize $\pi_t = \hat{\pi}$ or does he give inflation surprise?

if committed to $\hat{\pi}$, no maximization to solve for

$$w_t = \bar{y} + b(\underbrace{\pi_t - \hat{\pi}}_{\substack{\text{no surprise} \\ \text{under} \\ \text{commitment}}}) - \frac{\alpha}{2} \pi_t^2 = \bar{y} - \frac{\alpha}{2} \hat{\pi}^2$$

Suppose that the choice is at $t=0$. So

$$\begin{aligned} W^c &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t w_t = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (\bar{y} - \frac{\alpha}{2} \hat{\pi}^2) = \\ &= \frac{1}{1-\beta} (\bar{y} - \frac{\alpha}{2} \hat{\pi}^2) \end{aligned}$$

if deviates from $\hat{\pi}$ and solves for optimal π_t

consider that he optimizes at time zero.

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_0^e &= \hat{\pi} \\ \pi_t^e &= \frac{b}{\alpha}, \quad t \geq 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\pi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} & \quad \bar{y} + b(\pi_0 - \hat{\pi}) - \frac{\alpha}{2} \pi_0^2 + \\ & + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\bar{y} + b(\pi_t - \frac{b}{\alpha}) - \frac{\alpha}{2} \pi_t^2 \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{FOC } \pi_0: b - a\pi_0 = 0 \Rightarrow \pi_0^* = \frac{b}{a} \neq \hat{\pi}$$

$$\text{FOC } \pi_t: \beta^t [b - a\pi_t] = 0 \Rightarrow \pi_t^* = \frac{b}{a}$$

∴, it is optimal to surprise with inflation and then meet inflation expectations all the time. Is it welfare-improving?

$$\begin{aligned} w_0 &= \bar{y} + b(\pi_0 - \pi^e) - \frac{a}{2} \pi_0^2 = \\ &= \bar{y} + b\left(\frac{b}{a} - \hat{\pi}\right) - \frac{a}{2} \left(\frac{b}{a}\right)^2 = \\ &= \bar{y} + \frac{b^2}{2a} - b\hat{\pi} > \bar{y} - \frac{a}{2} \hat{\pi}^2 \text{ when not surprising} \end{aligned}$$

BENEFIT OF SURPRISE

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= \bar{y} + b\left(\pi_t - \frac{b}{a}\right) - \frac{a}{2} \left(\frac{b}{a}\right)^2 = \\ &= \bar{y} - \frac{b^2}{2a} < \bar{y} - \frac{a}{2} \hat{\pi}^2 \text{ when not surprising (under } \frac{b}{a} > \hat{\pi}) \end{aligned}$$

COST OF SURPRISE

$$\begin{aligned} W^0 &= \bar{y} + \frac{b^2}{2a} - b\hat{\pi} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\bar{y} - \frac{b^2}{2a} \right) = \\ &= \bar{y} + \frac{b^2}{2a} - b\hat{\pi} + \left(\bar{y} - \frac{b^2}{2a} \right) \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t = \\ &= \bar{y} + \frac{b^2}{2a} - b\hat{\pi} + \left(\bar{y} - \frac{b^2}{2a} \right) \cdot \beta \cdot \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t = \\ &= \bar{y} + \frac{b^2}{2a} - b\hat{\pi} + \left(\bar{y} - \frac{b^2}{2a} \right) \cdot \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} = \end{aligned}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1-\beta} \bar{y} - b\hat{\pi} + \frac{1-2\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{b^2}{2a}$$

c) (B chooses $\pi = \hat{\pi}$ if

$$W^c \geq W^p$$

$$\frac{1}{1-\beta} (\bar{y} - \frac{a}{2} \hat{\pi}^2) \geq \frac{1}{1-\beta} \bar{y} - b \hat{\pi} + \frac{1-2\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{b^2}{2a}$$

$$-\frac{a}{2(1-\beta)} \hat{\pi}^2 \geq -b \hat{\pi} + \frac{1-2\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{b^2}{2a}$$

$$-a^2 \hat{\pi}^2 \geq -2ab(1-\beta) \hat{\pi} + (1-2\beta)b^2$$

$$-a^2 \hat{\pi}^2 + 2ab(1-\beta) \hat{\pi} - (1-2\beta)b^2 \geq 0$$

$$a^2 \hat{\pi}^2 - 2ab(1-\beta) \hat{\pi} + (1-2\beta)b^2 \leq 0$$

$$\pi = \frac{ab(1-\beta) \pm \sqrt{a^2b^2(1-\beta)^2 - a^2(1-2\beta)b^2}}{a^2}$$

$$= \frac{ab(1-\beta) \pm \sqrt{a^2b^2 - a^2b^2\beta^2 - a^2b^2 + 2a^2b^2\beta}}{a^2}$$

$$= \frac{ab(1-\beta) \pm \sqrt{a^2b^2 + a^2b^2\beta^2 - 2a^2b^2\beta - a^2b^2 + 2a^2b^2\beta}}{a^2}$$

$$= \frac{ab(1-\beta) \pm ab\beta}{a^2}$$

$$= \begin{cases} \frac{b}{a} \\ \frac{b(1-2\beta)}{a} \end{cases} < \frac{b}{a}$$


> 0 if $\beta < \frac{1}{2}$

< 0 if $\beta > \frac{1}{2}$

$$W^D - W^C$$


$$(1-2\beta)b^2$$

$$\beta < \frac{1}{2}$$



$$W^D - W^C$$

$$\beta > \frac{1}{2}$$



Remember, $\pi^* = \hat{\pi}$ iff $W^D - W^C(\hat{\pi}) < 0$

$$\text{if } \beta > \frac{1}{2} \rightarrow \hat{\pi} \leq \frac{b}{a} \Rightarrow \pi^* = \hat{\pi}$$

$$\hat{\pi} > \frac{b}{a} \Rightarrow \text{deviate } \pi^* = \frac{b}{a}$$

$$\text{if } \beta < \frac{1}{2} \rightarrow (1-2\beta)\frac{b}{a} < \hat{\pi} < \frac{b}{a} \Rightarrow \pi^* = \hat{\pi}$$

$$\text{otherwise} \Rightarrow \pi^* = \frac{b}{a}$$

Also, $\hat{\pi} = 0$ implies $\pi^* = \hat{\pi} = 0$ iff $(1-2\beta)\frac{b}{a} \leq 0$, i.e., for

$b=0$: firm is aware no benefit from surprise

$a \rightarrow \infty$: inflation is infinitely costly

$R > 1$: ...

