Week 7: Beebee, Free Will: An Introduction, Chapter 1.

  1. What do the terms determinism and indeterminism mean in physics (Section 1.2)? If we assume that fundamental physics is deterministic, why (in broad terms) does this present a problem for free will? Are the prospects for free will actually any better if fundamental physics is indeterministic?
  2. In Section 1.4, Beebee discusses the consequence argument. This argument sharply formulates the nature of the challenge to free will from physical determinism.

    Here is a simplified reconstruction of the argument:

    P = The initial condition of the universe
    L = The laws of physics

    1 (Assumption of physical determinism) P & L entails that I do action A at time t.
    2 (Premise) P & L is beyond my control.
    3 (From 1 and 2) The fact that I do A at t is beyond my control.
    4 (Premise) If the fact that I do A at t is beyond my control, then I do not have free will.
    5 (From 3 and 4) I do not have free will.

    Discuss the validity and soundness of this argument. The crucial move is the move from propositions 1 and 2 to proposition 3. Can you work out the rule of inference that is needed to make this move valid? Should we accept this rule of inference?

    [Further reading: The best known formal presentation of the consequence argument can be found in the article by van Inwagen.]
  3. (Optional). In Section 1.5, Beebee discusses manipulation arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. How do these arguments differ from the consequence argument? Are they more convincing or less convincing?