Richard Bradley

Professor of Philosophy
London School of Economics
      London WC2A 2AE

 

 

 

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Research

I work broadly in decision theory and related fields such as formal epistemology and semantics. Much of my work is on individual decision making under uncertainty and the role of hypothetical reasoning in reaching judgements about what to do. But I am also interested in the nature of the intentional attitudes, belief and preference revision and social value and choice. I have recently begun working on the nature of chance and our attitudes to it (both as individuals and as a society). My other big project at the moment is decision making under severe uncertainty (see below). A lot of this work is brought together in a book entitled “Decision Theory with a Human Face”, recently published with Cambridge University Press: see here.

 

Work in Progress

Social Ethics under ambiguity

Million Dollar Questions: Why Deliberation Is More Than Information Pooling (with Daniel Hoek)

Making Insurance Decisions under Ambiguity

Interpretation of Chance

Separable Additive Representations in the Bolker-Jeffrey Framework.

Ellsberg’s Paradox and the Value of Chances (longer version with material on social preferences)

 

A Selection of Recent Papers

Probabilities of Counterfactuals, Argumenta, forthcoming 2021

Following the Science: Pandemic Policy and Reasonable Worst-case Scenarios (with Joe Roussos), LSE Public Policy Review 1(4), p. 6, 2021

Making confident decisions with model ensembles (with Joe Roussos and Roman Frigg), Philosophy of Science, 88(3): 439-460, 2021

Conditionals: Truth and Safety (with Hugh Mellor), Mind and Language 1 – 14, 2020

What is Risk Aversion? (with Orri H. Stefánsson), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1): 77-102, 2019

Learning from Others: Conditioning versus Averaging, Theory and Decision 85 (1): 5-20, 2018

What is Risk Aversion? (with H. Orri Stefánsson), British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 70 (1): 77-102, 2019

Probability with Qualitative Degree-of-Certainty Assessment (with Casey Helgeson and Brian Hill), Climatic Change 149 (3-4): 517-525, 2018,

Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability and Decision (with Casey Helgeson and Brian Hill), Philosophy of Science 84(3): 500-522 (2017)

Counterfactual Desirability (with H. Orri Stefánsson), British Journal of Philosophy of Science 68(2): 485-533, 2017

Belief Revision Generalised: A joint characterisation of Bayes’s and Jeffrey’s rules (with Franz Dietrich and Christian List), Journal of Economic Theory 352-371, 2016

Desire Expectation and Invariance (with H. Orri Stefánsson), Mind 125(499): 691-725, 2016

Ellsberg’s Paradox and the Value of Chances, Economics and Philosophy 32(2): 231-248, 2016

How Valuable are Chances? (with H. Orri Stefánsson), Philosophy of Science 82(4): 602-625 (2015)

Aggregating Causal Judgements, Philosophy of Science 81 (2014), 491-515 (with Christian List and Franz Dietrich)

Multidimensional Semantics for Conditionals, Philosophical Review 121 (4): 539-571, 2012

Revising Incomplete Attitudes, Synthese 171 (2): 235-256, 2009

Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8: 223-242, 2009

Belief as Desire Revisited (with Christian List), Analysis, 69: 29-35, 2009

Comparing Evaluations, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1): 85-100, 2008

Reaching a Consensus, Social Choice and Welfare 29: 609-632, 2007

The Kinematics of Belief and Desire, Synthese, 56 (3): 513-535, 2007

A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory, Theory and Decision  63:233-263, 2007

A Defence of the Ramsey Test, Mind, 116: 1-21, 2007

 

 

Last modified June 2021
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