

IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS AND RESEARCH DYNAMICS

Andrew Ellis & Ran Spiegler

LSE

TAU & UCL

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INTRODUCTION

- How should research / learning be conducted?
 - ▶ **Bayesianism**: well-studied rational model of learning
- In research communities, acceptance of result requires identification, which requires an (untestable) assumption
- Assumptions **do not** have any special role in Bayesianism
- How does **assumption-based learning** differ from Bayesian learning?

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- Assumptions **do not** have any special role in Bayesianism
- How does **assumption-based learning** differ from Bayesian learning?

ASSUMPTION-BASED LEARNING

- Model where research conducted \iff an “**identifying assumption**” is **sufficiently plausible** & beliefs updated as if assumption held
- Rationales:
 - ▶ Complexity of processing and communicating all uncertainties
 - ▶ Impracticality of strict Bayesianism
 - ▶ The need for consensus
- Two key **frictions** relative to Bayesianism:
 - ▶ Not all informative research conducted
 - ▶ Uncertainty about assumption not incorporated in update

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RESULTS

- ① Application to stylized examples of research methodologies
- ② Impossibility of (certain) research speed up
- ③ Sufficient condition for constant research speed
- ④ Characterization of limiting beliefs

MODEL

- Fixed parameter $\omega = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n) \in \Omega \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ drawn once
- Representative researcher wants to answer a **research question**, represented by a subset Q of $\{1, \dots, n\}$ that indicates which of the fixed parameters they are trying to learn
 - ▶ $\omega_Q \equiv (\omega_i)_{i \in Q}$ is the answer to the question
- Researcher has a prior belief μ over Ω
 - ▶ Independence across components of ω
 - ▶ Admits probability density function (also denoted μ)

Running example, a contaminated experiment:

Fixed parameters are a true effect ω_1 and a “friction” ω_2

Researcher wants to know true effect: $Q = \{1\}$

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MODEL

Time is discrete & infinite: $t = 1, 2, 3, \dots$

In period t :

- beliefs entering period have been updated using history h^t
- **context** $\theta^t \in \Theta$ is drawn (iid) and observed by researcher
- **latent variable** $u^t \in U$ also drawn (iid) but **not** observed
- Researcher decides whether to conduct research
- If they conduct research, they observe **statistic** $s^t \in S$; otherwise move on to next period with same beliefs

Beliefs over $x^t = (s^t, u^t, \theta^t, \omega)$ have density

$$P(x^t) = \mu(\omega) \cdot p_\theta(\theta^t) \cdot p_u(u^t) \cdot p(s^t | u^t, \theta^t, \omega)$$

For results/definitions: S, U are finite, conditional distribution of s^t has full-support, & Ω, Θ are compact, convex

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MODEL

Running example, continued:

- a^t is whether to conduct experiment
- $s^t \in \mathbb{R}$ is result of experiment
- No unobserved variables
- $\theta^t \in [0, 1]$ is quality of experiment
- Data-generating process:

$$s^t = \omega_1 + \theta^t \omega_2 + \varepsilon^t$$

- ▶ Result of experiment is true effect plus friction plus noise
- ▶ Bias from friction larger in lower quality (higher θ^t settings)

MODEL: ASSUMPTIONS

- An **assumption** is a value θ^* of the context parameters

DEFINITION

An **assumption** θ^* is **identifying** w.r.t Q if for every $\omega, \omega' \in \Omega$:

$$\omega_Q \neq \omega'_Q \implies p(s|\omega', \theta^*) \neq p(s|\omega, \theta^*) \text{ for some } s$$

- **Interpretation:** Under the assumption, repeated observation of the statistic gives a definitive answer to the question
 - ▶ **Running example:** $\theta^* = 0$ is identifying (no friction)
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MODEL: DECISION

- Researcher makes the identifying assumption in period t **iff**

$$D\left(P(s, u \mid \theta^t, h^t) \parallel P(s, u \mid \theta^*, h^t)\right) \leq K$$

for some constant $K > 0$

- ▶ D is an f -divergence:

$$D(p(x) \parallel q(x)) = \mathbb{E}_q \left[f \left(\frac{p(x)}{q(x)} \right) \right]$$

where f strictly convex & $f(1) = 0$.

- ▶ In examples, $D = D_{KL}$ is Kullback-Leibler: $f(y) = y \ln y$
 - ▶ **NB:** between beliefs about **both s and u**
- $\Theta^R(\mu')$ – contexts where learning occurs given belief μ' over Ω

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MODEL: UPDATING

- If they conduct research, then they observe s^t and update via Bayes' rule **given** θ^* :

$$\mu(\omega|h^{t+1}) = \frac{p(s^t|\theta^*, \omega) \mu(\omega|h^t)}{p(s^t|\theta^*, h^t)}$$

for (almost) every ω

(even if $\theta^t \neq \theta^*$!)

- If they don't, then they pass over the opportunity to learn

$$\mu(\cdot|h^{t+1}) = \mu(\cdot|h^t)$$

CONTAMINATED EXPERIMENT

- $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2)$ & $\omega_Q = \omega_1$
- $s^t = \omega_1 + \theta^t \omega_2 + \varepsilon^t$
- ε^t is noise: zero mean, unit variance, & indep. of all other vars
- $\theta^t \in [0, 1]$ so $\theta^* = 0$ is an identifying assumption

- If $\omega_1, \omega_2, \varepsilon^t$ are indep. Normals w/ means $m_1, m_2, 0$, then
- $\theta^* = 0$ is the **unique** identifying assumption

Assumes the friction can be **neglected**

NB: under θ^* , s^t reveals nothing about ω_2

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CONTAMINATED EXPERIMENT

- In period t given h^t :

$$s^t | \theta^t \sim N \left(m_1(h^t) + \theta^t m_2, (\sigma_1(h_t))^2 + (\theta^t)^2 \sigma_2^2 + 1 \right)$$

$$s^t | \theta^* \sim N \left(m_1(h^t), (\sigma_1(h_t))^2 + 1 \right)$$

- KL Divergence of assumption equals

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[(\theta^t)^2 \frac{\sigma_2^2 + m_2^2}{1 + (\sigma_1(h_t))^2} - \ln \left(1 + \frac{(\theta^t)^2 \sigma_2^2}{1 + (\sigma_1(h_t))^2} \right) \right]$$

- **only** non-constant terms are $(\sigma_1(h_t))^2$ & θ^t
 - ▶ D_{KL} **decreases** with $\sigma_1^2(h^t)$
more precise beliefs \implies more change from θ
 - ▶ D_{KL} **increases** with θ^t , so $\Theta^R(\mu(\cdot|h^t)) = [0, \bar{\theta}(h^t)]$
more different contexts \implies less similar distributions

CONTAMINATED EXPERIMENT

- $(\sigma_1(h_t))^2$ shrinks deterministically each time research occurs

$\implies D_{\text{KL}}$ **increases** over time for **any given** θ

$\implies \bar{\theta}(h^t)$ **decreases** over time (to some $\bar{\theta}^* > 0$)

- Therefore research **slows down** over time
(but never entirely stops)

- If ω^* is true parameter, then beliefs converge a.s. to

$$\omega_1^* + \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\theta^t | \theta^t \leq \bar{\theta}^* \right] \omega_2^*$$

RESULT I: IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCELERATING RESEARCH

PROPOSITION

Suppose that $D(P(s, u|\theta^t, h^t) || P(s, u|\theta^*, h^t))$ is always quasi-convex in θ .

If $\Theta^R(\mu(h^{t+1})) \setminus \Theta^R(\mu(h^t)) \neq \emptyset$ with positive probability then $\Theta^R(\mu(h^t)) \setminus \Theta^R(\mu(h^{t+1})) \neq \emptyset$ with positive probability.

- If the propensity to research goes up from period t to period $t + 1$, then it might have gone down
- Θ^R might contract for sure but it can never expand for sure
- The proof is based on the convexity of f -divergences
- Similar but weaker result without quasi-convexity assumption

PROOF

- Let $q(\theta, h) = P(\cdot|\theta, h)$ and suppose that $\exists \theta^1, h^t, s$ so that

$$D\left(q\left(\theta^1, h^t\right) \parallel q\left(\theta^*, h^t\right)\right) > K > D\left(q\left(\theta^1, h^t, s\right) \parallel q\left(\theta^*, h^t, s\right)\right)$$

- There exists $\theta = \beta\theta^1 + (1 - \beta)\theta^* \in \Theta^R(\mu(\cdot|h^t))$ so that

$$D\left(q\left(\theta, h^t\right) \parallel q\left(\theta^*, h^t\right)\right) = K,$$

- Quasi-convexity gives that $D\left(q\left(\theta, h^t, s\right) \parallel q\left(\theta^*, h^t, s\right)\right) < K$
- Also: $\sum_{s^t \in S} q\left(\theta, h^t, s^t\right) \left(s^{t+1}\right) p\left(s^t|\theta^*, h^t\right) = q\left(\theta^*, h^t\right) \left(s^{t+1}\right)$
- But D is convex, so

$$\begin{aligned} K &= D\left(q\left(\theta, h^t\right) \parallel q\left(\theta^*, h^t\right)\right) \\ &\leq \sum_{s^t} D\left(q\left(\theta, h^t, s^t\right) \parallel q\left(\theta^*, h^t, s^t\right)\right) p\left(s^t|\theta^*, h^t\right) \end{aligned}$$

- Hence $\theta \in \Theta^R(\mu(\cdot|h^t)) \setminus \Theta^R(\mu(\cdot|h^t, s'))$ for some s'

CAUSAL INFERENCE

- $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2) = (\beta, \sigma) \in \mathbb{R}^2$:
Causal effect of x on y & variance of potential confounder
- Researcher wants to know causal effect:

$$\omega_Q = \beta$$

- $s^t = (x^t, y^t) \in \mathbb{R}^2$: observed cause & effect
- $u^t \in \mathbb{R}$: unobserved confounder
- $\theta^t \in [0, 1]$: strength of confounding
 $\theta^* = 0$ is identifying assumption

Data-generating process:

$$\begin{aligned}x^t &= \theta^t \sigma u^t + \varepsilon_x^t \\y^t &= \beta x^t + u^t + \varepsilon_y^t\end{aligned}$$

CAUSAL INFERENCE

$$x^t = \theta^t \sigma u^t + \varepsilon_x^t \quad y^t = \beta x^t + u^t + \varepsilon_y^t$$

- $\varepsilon_x^t, \varepsilon_y^t$ are independent Normals & the support of Ω and the variance of $\varepsilon_x^t, \varepsilon_y^t$ are chosen so that $x^t, y^t \sim N(0, 1)$
- **only relevant observable** is their correlation, ρ_{12}
- But ρ_{12} reflects both β & confounding by u
- Overall strength of confounding unknown (because of σ), so no $\theta > 0$ can identify β
- $\theta^* = 0$ is the **unique** identifying assumption

Assumes the confounding effect can be **neglected**

NB: under θ^* , s reveals nothing about σ

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$$\begin{aligned}
 & D_{\text{KL}}(P(s, u | \theta, h^t) \| P(s, u | \theta^*, h^t)) \\
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- $P(x|u, \theta)$ depends **only on the constant** beliefs about σ

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- $P(x|u, \theta)$ depends **only on the constant** beliefs about σ

CAUSAL INFERENCE

- D_{KL} for assumption is **independent of history**, so propensity to conduct research is time-invariant and positive
- Research whenever θ^t in the interval $[0, \bar{\theta}]$

- Given true (β^*, σ^*) , beliefs converge a.s. to

$$\beta = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[(\theta^t)^2 \sigma^{*2} \beta^* + \theta^t \sigma^* \sigma_U | \theta^t \leq \bar{\theta} \right] + \beta^*$$


RESULT II: CONSTANT RESEARCH

- Let $x^t = (s^t, u^t, \theta^t, \omega) \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and N^s s.t. $x_{N^s}^t = s^t$
- Say that **data-generating process has recursive structure** $G = (\{1, \dots, m\}, R)$ if G is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with no edge into j for any $j \notin N^s$ and x^t has density

$$\mu(\omega) p_{\theta}(\theta^t) p_u(u^t) \prod_{i \in N^s} p(s_i^t | x_{R(i)}^t)$$


where $R(i)$ is all nodes pointing into i

- Every p has **some** recursive structure (not unique)



RESULT II: CONSTANT RESEARCH

- In both examples, $R(i)$ equals the variables on the RHS of the equation for s_i
- DAG G satisfies a conditional independence property if all data-generating processes having structure G satisfy it
- DAG lit gives graphical characterization of these properties
- In CI Example, G satisfies $\beta \perp x|(y, u)$ but not $\beta \perp y|(x, u)$:



RESULT II: CONSTANT RESEARCH

- The set of **active parameters** Q^* is the smallest set of indexes of ω that affect the distribution of s under θ^*
 - ▶ In CI Example, $\omega_{Q^*} = \beta = \omega_Q$
 - ▶ In CE Example, $\omega_{Q^*} = \omega_1 = \omega_Q$
- Say that θ and ω_{Q^*} are **G-separable** if for every i , G satisfies $s_i \perp \omega_{Q^*}$ whenever it satisfies $s_i \not\perp \theta^t | (s_{-i}, u)$
 - ▶ any **statistic** that is **context-dependent** (conditional on the other variables) is **unaffected by the active parameters**
 - ▶ context and active parameters have separate observable effects
 - ▶ CI Example satisfies but CE Example does not

RESULT II: CONSTANT RESEARCH

PROPOSITION

If data-generating process has a recursive structure G for which θ and ω_{Q^*} are G -separable, then Θ^R is constant.

- Hypothesis on the structure of the distribution, not the distribution itself
- Proof uses DAG techniques to show that under G -separability, the only aspects of ω that determine how s_i varies with θ are associated with a **time-invariant** belief
- **Application:** Causal inference via **IV** where the identifying assumption is that instrument is independent of confounder

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- Hypothesis on the structure of the distribution, not the distribution itself
- Proof uses DAG techniques to show that under G -separability, the only aspects of ω that determine how s_i varies with θ are associated with a **time-invariant** belief
- **Application:** Causal inference via **IV** where the identifying assumption is that instrument is independent of confounder

RESULT III: STABLE BELIEFS

DEFINITION

A belief $\mu^* \in \Delta(\Omega)$ is **stable** given ω^* if $\Pr(\mu(\cdot|h^t) \xrightarrow{w^*} \mu^*|\omega^*) > 0$.

PROPOSITION

If μ^* is stable given ω^* and Θ^R is continuous at μ^* , then $\mu^*(O) = 1$ for any open O s.t.

$$O \supset \operatorname{argmin}_{\omega} D_{\text{KL}}\left(P(s|\omega^*, \theta \in \Theta^R(\mu^*)) \parallel P(s|\omega, \theta^*)\right)$$

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RESULT III: STABLE BELIEFS

if μ^* stable then it rules out parameters that do not minimize

$$D_{\text{KL}}\left(\underbrace{P(s|\omega^*, \theta \in \Theta^R(\mu^*))}_{\text{Actual distribution of } s} \parallel \underbrace{P(s|\omega, \theta^*)}_{\text{Predicted distribution of } s \text{ given } \omega \text{ \& } \theta^*}\right)$$

- Here, KL divergence is a result not assumption
- Distinct divergence than for plausibility
- Self-referential equation / equilibrium condition
- Related to Berk-Nash equilibrium (Esponda-Pouzo 2016)
- Stable belief biased in most generalizations of our examples

WRAP-UP

In paper:

- Possibility of multiple stable beliefs
- Stable beliefs far from truth even with small K
- Extensions
 - ▶ Choosing between structural assumptions / setting the value of a fixed parameter; learning by “calibration”
 - ▶ Choosing between research-design and structural assumptions; “natural experiment” vs. “Heckman correction” identification strategies for selective samples

Wishlist:

- Choosing between a strong assumption (to answer an ambitious question) and a weak assumption (to answer a modest question)
- Hierarchy of identifying assumptions