

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY: THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH

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“Insiders and Outsiders in the domain of knowledge unite. You have nothing to lose but your claims. You have a world of understanding to gain.”

Robert K. Merton

The fundamental questions of what scientific knowledge is, how knowledge is created in the social sciences, and how social science disciplines develop, are rarely being discussed in the academic disciplines themselves. Since disciplinary epistemology was pushed out of mainstream research in the beginning of last century and created independent sub-disciplines (sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, history of science, or philosophy of science) we hardly find any direct exchange between them and the subject of their inquiries.² Except, it seems, in times of crisis when academics acknowledge the need to rediscover their disciplinary identities and reflect upon their metaphysical and methodological foundations.

The industrial relations field is a good example in this respect and provides us with a useful case study. There is no doubt that industrial relations (IR) as an academic field faces an increasing crisis since the high days of the 1970s, which expresses itself, among other things, in declining numbers of students, university departments, publications,

1. Rutgers and LSE. I wish to thank Stephen Bronner, Matt Finkin, John Godard, Sanford Jacoby, John Kelly, and David Marsden for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2. L. Shaskolsky, *The Development of Sociological Theory in America—A Sociology of Knowledge Interpretation*, in *THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY* 6, 6 (L.T. Reynolds & J.M. Reynolds eds., 1970).

and author affiliations.³ The increasing awareness of the academic crisis provoked a small, rather eclectic discussion on the constitution and future of the field in recent years.⁴ Besides structural circumstances such as the worldwide decline of unions and collective bargaining being a traditional core topic of interest for IR scholars, most scholars highlight methodological and theoretical deficiencies of IR research. The criticisms refer to outdated ideological foundations (e.g., pluralism) of IR, the heavy reliance on labor economics and the subsequent narrowing of topics, and the atheoretical, empirical nature of IR research.

In more detail, Marsden argues that IR was a-theoretical from its very beginning in the early twentieth century and trapped within the confines of empiricist epistemology since then.⁵ Thus, what Dunlop described in 1958, that the field consisted of little more than a "mountain of facts" and seemed to be at a virtual dead end, has not changed much since then. Capelli finds that deductive nomological theory is not appropriate for the study of many IR phenomena, primarily because it requires individual-level analysis, and advocates more group-level, inductive, and qualitative research.⁶ Similarly, Godard argues that mainstream IR scholars have failed to generate much by way of deductive theory, with most of their research remaining atheoretical and that they have been preoccupied with

3. P. Jarley, T.D. Chandler & L. Faulk, *Maintaining a Scholarly Community: Casual Authorship and the State of IR Research*, 40 INDUS. REL. 338 (2001); B. KAUFMAN, *THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS* (1993).

4. R. Adams, *All Aspects of People at Work: Unity and Division in the Study of Labor and Management*, in *INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THEORY: ITS NATURE, SCOPE AND PEDAGOGY* 119 (R. Adams & N. Meltz eds., 1993); P. Capelli, *Theory Construction in IR and Some Implications for Research*, 24 INDUS. REL. 90 (1985); J. Godard, *Beyond Empiricism: Alternative Philosophies of Science and the Study of Industrial Relations*, QUEEN'S PAPERS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Working Paper, 1989) [hereinafter Godard, *Alternative Philosophies*]; J. Godard, *Beyond Empiricism: Towards a Reconstruction of IR Theory and Research*, 6 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Godard, *Towards a Reconstruction*]; J. Godard & J. Delaney, *Reflections on the "High Performance" Paradigm's Implications for Industrial Relations as a Field*, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 482 (2000); S.M. Jacoby, *The New Institutionalism: What Can It Learn from the Old?*, 29 INDUS. REL. 316 (1990); KAUFMAN, *supra* note 3; B. Kaufman, *Paradigms and Strategic Choices for Industrial Relations: The Importance of Getting Commons Right*, Industrial Relations Department, Working Paper Presented at guest speaker seminar (2001); T.A. Kochan, *On the Paradigm Guiding Industrial Relations Theory and Research: Comment on John Godard and John T. Delaney, "Reflections on the 'High Performance' Paradigm's Implications for Industrial Relations as a Field"*, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 704 (2000); G. Strauss, *Industrial Relations as a Field: What Went Wrong With It?*, in *THEORIES AND CONCEPTS IN COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS* (J. Barbash & K. Barbash eds., 1989); K. Whitfield & G. Strauss, *Methods Matter: Changes in Industrial Relations Research and Their Implications*, 38 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 141 (2000).

5. R. Marsden, *Industrial Relations: A Critique of Empiricism*, 16 SOCIOLOGY 235 (1982).

6. Capelli, *supra* note 4.

empirical phenomena, while failing to address more fundamental debates and problems in IR.⁷ He criticizes that empiricist research is ultimately conservative with its general acceptance of the status quo and its general assumption that a primary purpose of IR research should be to resolve policy issues.⁸ Moreover, he insists that the mainstream orthodox pluralistic perspective on IR (with its focus on collective bargaining) has failed. He argues that the pluralist conception of organizations and the belief that unions enable workers to confront management as equals ignores the limited role and scope of collective bargaining and the legally authoritarian nature of work organizations as systems of super ordination and subordination. Hyman⁹ highlights that the few discordant voices among IR scholars which provide innovative approaches, such as Giles and Murray's¹⁰ emphasis on IR as critical political economy or Kelly's¹¹ mobilization theory, only have a limited impact on Anglo-Saxon IR orthodoxy and in the main, alternative concepts of the world of work have been developed outside the boundaries of IR. Finally, Mitchell complains that a standard IR journal article is highly likely to be a statistical exercise, often within the labor economics paradigm, which creates a tendency for IR research to become ingrown.¹² As a consequence, IR research is more uniform than it once was and is less interesting to non-specialists, and IR articles are not likely to make for "gripping bedtime reading."

This paper takes a comparative perspective and argues that many of the proposed deficiencies are not IR specific but symptomatic for Anglo-Saxon and in particular U.S. social sciences and are not necessarily found in continental European research. This is underlined by Hyman's observation that "IR research in continental Europe commonly displays a more critical or radical analytical thrust, with a strong emphasis on the dynamics of conflict in IR and an explicit rejection of the economic framework of analysis traditional in Anglo-Saxon approaches. This approach created a growing, diverse

7. Godard, *Alternative Philosophies*, *supra* note 4, at 2.

8. *Id.* at 29.

9. R. HYMAN, *THEORISING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: ANGLO-SAXON INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL*, (London School of Economics, Working Paper, 2001).

10. A. Giles & G. Murray, *Industrial Relations Theory and Critical Political Economy: Why There Is No "State of the Art"* (paper presented to IIRA Study Group on Industrial Relations Theory, Brussels).

11. J. KELLY, *RETHINKING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS* (1998).

12. D. Mitchell, *IR Journal and Conference Literature from the 1960s to the 1990s: What Can HR Learn From It? Where Is It Headed?*, 11 *HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV.* 387 (2001).

and innovative research community in Europe in recent years when at the same time IR research in Anglo-Saxon countries declined.”¹³

The paper discusses different national patterns of IR research in the United States and Germany and reveals the considerable cross-country variation in the organizational, methodological, theoretical, and ideational traditions of IR research. It highlights that, despite the increasing convergence of research topics throughout the advanced industrialized world, and despite the increasing international communication and interaction among the research communities, the national patterns of social science research seem astonishingly resistant to change.

Moreover, the paper points to two major explanations of the cross-country variation: differences in the subject matter (different national industrial relations institutions and regulations) and its historical legacies (national labor movement histories) and differences in the national knowledge production in the social sciences. A core aim is to show that IR research is not just determined by the subject matter but is socially constructed and continuously reinvented by strategic actors and structural conditions. It reveals that social science disciplines are not god-given nor made by an invisible scientific law, but manmade and this challenges the supposed naturalness of scientific development in IR research. The paper concludes by pleading for a stronger awareness of the national cognitive frames of knowledge production and advocates a more international, pluralistic, less instrumental approach that allows “insiders” and “outsiders” of the U.S. model to participate more equally in the pursuit of knowledge.

I. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Most discussions on the problems of the IR discipline are implicitly United States-focused and if comparative analyses are used at all they are usually restricted to the Anglo-Saxon hemisphere, in other words United States vs. Britain.¹⁴ It seems to make more sense, however, to compare the United States with a continental European

13. R. Hyman, *Industrial Relations in Europe: Theory and Practice*, 1 EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 30 (1995).

14. Capelli, *supra* note 4; Godard, *Alternative Philosophies*, *supra* note 4.

country such as Germany¹⁵ to make the different characteristics of their knowledge fields even more evident.

In order to compare IR research in the United States and Germany, four categories are used: research subject, research assumptions, epistemology (theories), and methodology. The analysis is based on a content analysis of articles published in the German journal of industrial relations, "Industrielle Beziehungen," in the first five years since its creation in 1994.¹⁶ I restrict myself to German authors discussing German or European topics, which account for the majority of articles (55 articles).¹⁷ Since the limited space does not permit a real comparison between these publications and those of U.S. journals, I contrast my findings with common characterizations of current U.S. research as revealed in earlier assessments.¹⁸

The discussed subjects of the articles comprise four main areas: (i) reorganization of work (lean management, rationalization, organizational change) and works councils/codetermination (22 articles); (ii) transformation of industrial relations at the sectoral level (collective bargaining; employers' associations) (7 articles); (iii) east German transformation (6 articles); and, (iv) Europeanization (6 articles). The emphasis is clearly on the workplace level, and particularly on the reorganization of work and work councils' reactions. In contrast, in the highly deregulated Anglo-Saxon setting, IR research tends to focus more on union-management bargaining relations or union strategies, non-unionized workplace relations and

15. Germany was chosen because of its centrality in developing a strong research tradition that can be seen as the antipode to the Anglo-Saxon/United States approach in social science. G. DELANTY, *SOCIAL SCIENCE: BEYOND CONSTRUCTIVISM AND REALISM* (1997); W. LEPENIES, *GESCHICHTE DER SOZIOLOGIE, BAND 1*, xxvi (1981).

16. There are a few other publications that deal with industrial relations but have a broader agenda. For example, "WSI-Mitteilungen" (founded in 1947 as the journal of the union confederation (DGB)'s socio-economic research institute). It has a broad interest in macro economic analysis, wage and income distribution politics, and social politics. Industrial relations is only one among many topics. "SOFI-Mitteilungen" publishes working papers of the SOFI Institute, a prestigious institute of industrial sociological research in Germany, founded in 1970. And finally, "Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte" and "Mitbestimmung" are DGB-sponsored journals for a wider intellectual and unionist audience.

Another criticism of my decision to focus on "Industrielle Beziehungen" could be that German IR researchers prefer to publish either in books or in discipline-specific journals that count more for career promotion than IR journals. However, most observers will agree that there is not much difference between articles and books in terms of the criteria used here and are likely to be similar in Anglo-Saxon countries. See Mitchell, *supra* note 12.

17. An overview table of all articles that outlines title of the article, year, author's affiliation, content of article, methodology, and empirical data is available from the author.

18. Capelli, *supra* note 4; Mitchell, *supra* note 12.

human resource management (compensation/pay systems, training), and multinational firms.¹⁹

Second, in terms of the definition of industrial relations and the research paradigms there are two main findings. First of all, the articles have a tendency to describe changes within IR as wider societal changes and thus seem to interpret IR phenomena as socio-political processes rather than as outcomes of imbalances in the labor market, as is more typical in current U.S. research.²⁰ This matches Hyman's diagnosis that "continental European research interprets IR as part of more general socio-economic relations and not just as a Dunlopian societal sub-system where broader macro-issues can be described as external and be left out as is the tradition in the US."²¹ Similarly, Mitchell suggests that if one wants to find IR literature dealing with larger societal issues today, it is more likely to be found abroad than in the United States.²²

In more detail, there is the widespread belief in German research that you can only understand workplace phenomena if you link them to the wider system of society and ideology.²³ Thus, many articles dealing with the reorganization of work link the occurrences at shop floors to the wider situation of workers in society (e.g., in terms of democratic participation rights). A typical example is Heidenreich and Töpsch²⁴ who discuss workplace relations implications of the arising "knowledge society," or Bogumil and Kißler²⁵ who analyze the impact of organizational modernization on employees and their participation as a political process at workplace level.

Reorganization of work, or as the Germans call it "rationalization"²⁶ seems to be evaluated not just as the technical liberation of workers, but as part of their economic and political/social liberation as well. As Schneider puts it, liberation from work and

19. Mitchell, *supra* note 12.

20. H.W. Hetzler, *25 Jahre Deutsche Sektion der International Industrial Relations Association—Erinnerungen, Erfahrungen und Erwartungen*, 2 *INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN* 312 (1995).

21. Hyman, *supra* note 13, at 39.

22. Mitchell, *supra* note 12, at 384.

23. H.P. Bahrtdt, *Die Industriosozologie—eine "Spezielle Soziologie"?*, 34 *KÖLNER ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE* 14 (1982).

24. M. Heidenreich & K. Töpsch, *Die Organisation der Arbeit in der Wissensgesellschaft*, 5 *INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN* 13 (1998).

25. J. Bogumil & L. Kißler, *Die Beschäftigten im Modernisierungsprozeß—Akteure oder Agierende?*, 5 *INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN* 298 (1998).

26. The term is meant in a Weberian sense as the spread of formal rationality in an organization.

within work should be the dual aim of rationalization.²⁷ This critical understanding is typical for much of the German industrial sociology work on rationalization in the last few decades. It indicates the clear influence of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School under Horkheimer.²⁸ In contrast, U.S. research on “rationalization” seems to emphasize more the reconciliation between the social and technical systems at the workplace level and focuses on behaviorist, human relations consequences rather than on the societal consequences of the production process.²⁹ I have for example not come across any U.S. publication on high involvement work systems that links developments at shop-floor level to broader socio-political issues.

The second major characteristic of the research assumptions is the underlying understanding of German scholars of “social partnership” as the ideal form of IR versus a pluralistic or unitarist model in the American context. This becomes especially clear in articles discussing the current challenges and changes of the IR system (globalization, decentralization) and emphasizing the continuing stability of the cooperative union management relations.³⁰ “Social partnership” is defined as a concept that requires strong legal rights for workers and their interest representatives (e.g., codetermination), and thus should not be confused with the voluntary “partnership” agreements between management and workers currently *en vogue* in Anglo-Saxon research.³¹ Its emphasis among researchers is not surprising since the German model of industrial relations explicitly promotes and practices social partnership at national, sectoral, and workplace level.

Third, with regard to epistemological assumptions (theories) there are two main findings. First, the articles can be characterized in

27. R. Schneider, *Gesellschaft im Übergang: Beiträge zu einer anderen Standortdebatte*, 5 WSI-MITTEILUNGEN 334, 334 (1995).

28. L. v. Freideburg, *Kooperation und Konkurrenz*, SOFI-MITTEILUNGEN, Jul. 25, 1997, at 25, 28.

29. H.J. Braczyk, J. von dem Knesebeck & G. Schmidt, *Nach einer Renaissance: Zur gegenwärtigen Situation von Industriosozologie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 34 KÖLNER ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 16, 48 (1982); W.A. Glaser, *Cross National Comparison of the Factory*, 3 J. COMP. ADMIN. 83 (1971).

30. H. Kotthoff, *Mitbestimmung in Zeiten interessenpolitischer Rückschritte*, 5 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 76 (1998); W. Müller-Jentsch & B. Seitz, *Betriebsräte gewinnen Konturen. Ergebnisse einer Betriebsräteumfrage im Maschinenbau*, 5 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 361 (1998).

31. See P. Ackers & J. Payne, *British Trade Unions and Social Partnership: Rhetoric, Reality and Strategy*, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 529 (1998); S. RUBINSTEIN & T. KOCHAN, *LEARNING FROM SATURN: POSSIBILITIES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS* (2001).

terms of their theoretical approaches. It is difficult to classify each article into a specific theory since most are not explicit about their underlying assumptions, but two broad tendencies can be outlined: institutional/structural and action-theoretical approaches.³² An example of an institutional/structural approach is Kädtler and Kottwitz on the East German transformation, who discuss the institutional transfer of German industrial relations institutions and regulations rather than the actual practice in east German workplaces.³³ An example for the action theoretical approach is Schirmer who locates the introduction of lean management in terms of political negotiations processes between middle managers.³⁴

The institutional/structural approach became particularly prominent in the literature on corporatism and private interest government that had its high days in the 70s/80s.³⁵ From the mid-80s onwards, German research has increasingly focused on Weberian action-theoretical approaches,³⁶ especially the "labor politics" approach (Arbeitspolitik),³⁷ "workplace social constitution" (betriebliche Sozialverfassung),³⁸ or "micro politics."³⁹ Their common idea is that the workplace and its regulations are seen as a permanent political process where different collective actors try to influence the structures of communication and regulations. Thus, they emphasize the political processes within an organization that result out of the unspecified employment contract and the ongoing "power games" of

32. H. Lengfeld, *Kollektive Interessen, Politik und symbolische Interaktion im Betrieb. Zur Kritik der Theorie innerbetrieblicher Verhandlungsbeziehungen*, 5 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 438 (1998).

33. J. Kädtler & G. Kottwitz, *Industrielle Beziehungen in Ostdeutschland: Durch Kooperation zum Gegensatz von Kapital und Arbeit?*, 1 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 12 (1994).

34. F. Schirmer, *Management contra "Neue Managementkonzepte"? Gleichzeitig Anmerkungen zur betriebspolitisch marginalisierten Bedeutung von Sprecherausschüssen in Reorganisationsprozessen*, 1 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 62 (1994).

35. See, e.g., TRENDS TOWARDS CORPORATIST INTERMEDIATION (P.C. Schmitter & G. Lehmbruch eds., 1979); W. Streeck & P.C. Schmitter, *Community, Market, State—Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order*, in PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 1 (J. Barbash & K. Barbash eds., 1985).

36. See Lengfeld, *supra* note 32, at 438.

37. See ARBEITSPOLITIK (U. Jürgens & F. Naschold eds., 1984).

38. E. HILDEBRANDT & R. SELTZ, WANDEL BETRIEBLICHER SOZIALVERFASSUNG DURCH SYSTEMATISCHE KONTROLLE? DIE EINFÜHRUNG COMPUTERGESTÜTZTER PRODUKTIONSPLANUNGS-UND-STEUERUNGSSYSTEME IM BUNDESDEUTSCHEN MASCHINENBLAU (1989).

39. T. Burns, *Micropolitics: Mechanism of Institutional Change*, 6 ADMIN. Q. 257 (1961); MIKROPOLITIK IM UNTERNEHMEN: ARBEITSBEZIEHUNGEN UND MACHTSTRUKTUREN IN INDUSTRIELLEN GROBBETRIEBEN DES 20 JAHRHUNDERTS (K. Lauschke & T. Welskopp eds., 1994).

the strategic actors.⁴⁰ The political process translates the class interest conflict of a capitalist employment relationship into a specific case study.⁴¹ A major example is Kotthoff who describes the dynamics of workplace relations between management and works councils over time by focusing on the norms and political motives of the actions of collective actors.⁴² Both the structural-institutional approach and the action-theoretical approach can be contrasted with the longstanding emphasis in U.S. research on individualistic theories such as rational choice theories or behaviorist socio-psychological approaches.⁴³

Finally, my impression is that German researchers are more inclined to place their research into a wider theoretical framework than their U.S. counterparts. Thus, there seems to be a stronger attempt to affiliate oneself with the “grand social science theories” (e.g., as a Weberian or a system theorist) and this “home address” serves as a theoretical basis for the research. It is also no coincidence that a recent annual conference (1999) of German IR Association (GIRA) was devoted to “theories of industrial relations.” Hyman makes a similar statement that continental European research is more rooted in broad theories of the economy and society and incorporates a larger variety of micro-, meso-, and macro-research perspectives.⁴⁴ U.S. research, on the contrary, is largely applied research and, thus, there is more emphasis on testing mid-range hypotheses.⁴⁵

A second epistemological characteristic is that there is a strong tendency among the articles to speculate about future developments, offer policy recommendations, and/or treat the scientific process as an inherently political process.⁴⁶ As an example, Kädtler and Kottwitz describe the institutional transfer of Western industrial relations institutions to east Germany, arguing that the new institutions are inadequate to deal with the problems in east Germany, and recommending a reform of industrial relations in west and east alike (the introduction of regional industrial policies).⁴⁷ Zagelmeyer

40. W. Müller-Jentsch, *Theorien Industrielle Beziehungen*, 3 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 36, 50 (1996).

41. Lengfeld, *supra* note 32, at 442.

42. H. KOTTHOFF, *BETRIEBSRÄTE UND BETRIEBLICHE HERRSCHAFT* (1981) [hereinafter KOTTHOFF, *BETRIEBSTRÄTE UND BETRIEBLICHE*]; H. KOTTHOFF, *BETRIEBSRÄTE UND BÜRGERSTATUS* (1994) [hereinafter KOTTHOFF, *BETRIEBSRÄTE UND BÜRGERSTATUS*].

43. Godard, *Towards a Reconstruction*, *supra* note 4.

44. Hyman, *supra* note 13.

45. Mitchell, *supra* note 12, at 382.

46. D. Gerst & M. Kuhlmann, *Industriesoziologen im Feld—aus dem Alltag empirisches Sozialforschung*, SOFI-MITTEILUNGEN, July 5, 1997, at 33, 34.

47. Kädtler & Kottwitz, *supra* note 33.

discusses different collective bargaining policies in the Euro zone and speculates on what is necessary to develop European level bargaining.⁴⁸

Viewing research as a political process can be traced back to the traditions of German (industrial) sociology. In contrast to the early Frankfurt School, which had mainly a theoretical focus, "critical industrial sociology" (and subsequently IR research) has had the explicit aim of being more than a pure "critique of ideology." While being skeptical about the revolutionary potential of the working class, it wants to go further and explore practical possibilities of societal change.⁴⁹ In other words, empirical research in German industrial sociology is traditionally understood as an attempt to create greater social rationality in the organization of work. Scientists, it is felt, should help to influence (participate in) the societal rationalization process on the basis of a scientific diagnosis. The researchers, it is claimed, have a moral and political role in social sciences, not a neutral one. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon social science is traditionally more influenced by the positivist notion of neutrality and objectivity of researchers.⁵⁰ A political definition of research should not be confused, however, with public policy research that, of course, was highly popular in U.S. IR research, especially before the 70s⁵¹ and still is, but in recent years has declined.⁵²

Finally, there are two main methodological characteristics: First, there are indications that the preferred methodology derives from the hermeneutical tradition (neo-Kantianism and the German Historical School), and in particular from Max Weber's interpretative sociology, which stand in opposition to the positivist Anglo-Saxon traditions.⁵³ According to Weber, the purpose of social science is to interpret a social phenomenon in all its aspects, thus to fully understand ("verstehen") its meaning and to explain the underlying motivations leading to action. Weber also believed that the social world of meaning is too complex to be directly observed. In opposition to positivist approaches, he favored the use of "ideal types" to simplify

48. St. Zagelmeyer, *Zur Zukunft von Kollektivverhandlungen in Euroland (The Future of Collective Bargaining in the Eurozone)*, 6 *INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN* 427 (1999).

49. H. KERN & M. SCHUMANN, *INDUSTRIEARBEIT UND ARBEITERBEWUSSTSEIN* (1970).

50. DELANTY, *supra* note 15.

51. See Kaufman, *supra* note 4.

52. K. Whitfield & G. Strauss, *supra* note 4, at 145.

53. DELANTY, *supra* note 15, ch. 2; M. GANGL, *POLITISCHE OKONOMIE UND KRITISCHE THEORIE: EIN BEITRAG ZUR THEORETISCHEN ENTWICKLUNG DER FRANKFURTER SCHULE* 96 (1987).

reality in order to aid the construction of theories. Contemporary German IR research is rich in such typologies. For example, Liebig⁵⁴ suggests various types of organizational cultures, while Faust, Jauch, and Deutschmann classify diverse management types and their reactions to job insecurity.⁵⁵ Recent books on German industrial relations deal with the development of different types of works councils and work climates.⁵⁶ And Michael Schumann, one of the most prominent contemporary German industrial sociologists, explicitly states that his aim is not to offer positivistic hypotheses, but to obtain in-depth, detailed identification and categorical specification of rationalization tendencies.

It comes as no surprise that virtually all research published in "Industrielle Beziehungen" is descriptive (44 articles) rather than hypothesis-building (inductive) or testing (deductive). One rarely sees the empirical testing of hypotheses. Moreover, in terms of empirical data, only eight of 55 articles use some form of statistical analysis (five use data collected by the author, four use public data), 32 are qualitative (case studies, elite interviews with institutional actors), and 15 are theoretical and/or think-pieces. More than half of the qualitative studies lack an explicit section on methodology and data collection. The typical pattern is a simple mention that the data derive out of a larger research project sponsored by some honorable funding institution under the supervision of a well-known professor. Although the quantitative studies are more explicit about their data collection, they too often do not fulfill U.S. journal standards. Half of them limit themselves to descriptive statistics.

In contrast, Whitfield and Strauss's analysis of recent trends in Anglo-Saxon industrial relations research finds that Anglo-Saxon industrial relations journals are increasingly empirical, deductive, and quantitative (with multivariate statistics).⁵⁷ In 1997, they found in the "Industrial and Labor Relations Review" (ILRR) 30 articles, all of which were empirical and 26 used deductive methods. Another survey by Mitchell compares the ILRR and "Industrial Relations"

54. S. Liebig, *Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen und Unternehmenskultur: Befunde zu den Bedingungen von Gerechtigkeitsbeurteilungen in Unternehmen*, 2 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 345 (1995).

55. M. Faust, P. Jauch & C. Deutschmann, *Mittlere und untere Vorgesetzte in der Industrie: Opfer der "Schlanken Produktion"?*, 1 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 107 (1994).

56. 1 A. BOSCH ET AL., *BETRIEBLICHES INTERESSENHANDELN* (1999); 2 A. BOSCH ET AL., *BETRIEBLICHES INTERESSENHANDELN* (1999); KOTTHOFF, *BETRIEBSTRÄTE UND BETRIEBLICHE*, *supra* note 42; KOTTHOFF, *BETRIEBSRÄTE UND BÜRGERSTATUS*, *supra* note 42.

57. Whitfield & Strauss, *supra* note 4.

journals in 1962 and 1963 with 1997 and 1998: Only 5.6% of articles in 1962/63 and 1.9% in 1997/98 dealt with "theory" whereas 40% in 1962/63 and 89.6% in 1997/98 were empirical studies.⁵⁸ (With regard to U.S. book publications, a similar picture emerges: only 3% in 1997/98 dealt with theoretical issues).

In conclusion, Table 1 provides a summary of the main ideal typical (simplified) differences between current German and U.S. IR research. The epistemological, ontological, and methodological characteristics resemble the general typologies of mainstream German and U.S. social sciences: U.S. social sciences as pragmatic/instrumental, empirical/quantitative, deductive, atheoretical, individualistic vs. German social sciences as holistic/hermeneutic, qualitative, theoretical, and inductive.⁵⁹

58. Mitchell, *supra* note 12.

59. P. MANICAS, A HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1987); D. ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991).

Table 1
Trajectories of German and U.S. Industrial Relations Knowledge Fields

	Germany	United States
<u>Institutional</u>		
academic organization	different social science departments (especially industrial sociology)	industrial relations/HR departments, business schools
<u>Research Subject</u>		
main topic of research	emphasis on institutions at sectoral level, codetermination, and rationalization at workplace level	emphasis on management practices (HRM, high involvement), collective bargaining and union/worker responses at shop floor level (organizing. . .)
<u>Research Assumptions</u>		
definition of industrial relations	industrial relations as a socio-political process	industrial relations as a labor market outcome
paradigm(ideology)	social partnership/industrial democracy	collective bargaining of economic interests
<u>Epistemology</u>		
theories	institutional, action theoretical approaches	economic (rational choice) theories, sociopsychological/behaviorist theories
aim of research	research as a political process, and to find "truth"	research to solve social problems, policy-orientation, hypothesis-testing
<u>Methodology</u>		
methodology	hermeneutic/descriptive ("verstehen")/ideal types	positivist/deductive
empirical data	qualitative, case studies	empiricist quantitative, surveys

II. EXPLAINING CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION OF KNOWLEDGE FIELDS

As Wagner and Wittrock point out, it is a common observation among social sciences that national intellectual traditions exist.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, it is astonishing that these traditions persist despite the growing convergence of IR topics and the growing international communication between national research communities. They seem remarkably resistant to processes of universalization or modernization. However, apart from general reflections about intellectual cultures in different countries, not many attempts have been made hitherto to systematically and comparatively explain specificities of national discourses.⁶¹ In particular, we do not have a satisfactory theory of knowledge formation that would allow us to account simultaneously for the social structures and institutions of knowledge production and for the latter's intrinsic, substantive ideational nature.⁶² Ideally, we would need a comparative history of IR and its ideas in United States and Germany, a history of influential academics in the field, a social history (students and their background), a history of knowledge production and a history of the relations between IR and related disciplines. We would also need a theory to interconnect these external (structural) and internal (cognitive, ideational) determinants and the scientific community.⁶³ The following presents a very first, sketchy start by discussing two major determinants of the cross-country variation of knowledge fields: the IR subject and its history and the national styles of knowledge production (explained by academic disciplines, historical socio-economic conditions and the intellectual history) (Picture 1).


60. P. Wagner & B. Wittrock, *States, Institutions, and Discourses: A Comparative Perspective on the Structuration of the Social Sciences*, in DISCOURSES ON SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES 341 (P. Wagner, B. Wittrock & B. Whitley eds., 1991).

61. *Id.*

62. M. Fourcade-Gourinchas, *Politics, Institutional Structures, and the Rise of Economics: A Comparative Study*, 30 THEORY & SOC'Y 397, 398 (2001).

63. P. WEINGART, WISSENPRODUKTION UND SOZIALE STRUKTUR (1976).

Picture 1
Determinants of Knowledge Fields



A. IR subject and its history

The current subject field and its national variations has an important impact on its academic treatment. This is in stark contrast to the traditional positivist position that argues that scientific inquiry is external to the phenomenon observed but is widely acknowledged among social scientists today.⁶⁴ Schmitter,⁶⁵ for example, speaks of the evolution of political science as isomorphic with the evolution of its subject matter, and Braczyk, von dem Knesebeck, and Schmidt state that “as all empirical analytical disciplines, industrial sociology did not develop in a coherent manner but was influenced by specific national socio-economic developments, power relations and political cultures.”⁶⁶ With regard to IR, Hyman points out that the different

64. DELANTY, *supra* note 15.

65. P.C. Schmitter, *Seven (Disputable) Theses Concerning the Future of “Transatlanticized” or “Globalized” Political Science* (manuscript of presentation at the IPSA 50th Anniversary conference).

66. Braczyk, von dem Knesebeck, & Schmidt, *supra* note 29, at 48.

national IR systems provoke different research topics: for example, an emphasis of Anglo-Saxon research on collective bargaining and in Germany on social partnership and codetermination.⁶⁷ Also, the strong presence of the state in German IR lead to a juridification of the academic field. In other words, IR is a problem-oriented discipline and is shaped by the real world of IR, which differs from country to country. Moreover, as Capelli rightly argues, shifts in research topics easily occur as a reaction to shifts in government, union, or employer policies.⁶⁸ Clearly, the growing interest of European IR researchers in the recently introduced mandatory European works councils is a good example.

Related, a hypothesis that needs to be investigated further is that the traditional close link between IR as a practice-oriented discipline and the professional field of IR (unions, HR managers, state legislators, etc.) makes the IR discipline open for influences of the "national administrative culture" or policy-making style of these bodies. According to Jann the general "policy-making" style of political and civic institutions in the United States can be characterized as more fragmented and short-term oriented than in Germany where legal correctness, procedure, and the right to act are at least as important as effectiveness and efficiency and where, simply put, institutions are more important than persons.⁶⁹ In short, policy making in the United States seems to be more market-like, relying more on personal performance and short-term success. Thus, a profession of IR experts arguing economically and quantitatively maybe well suited to the American "business" culture of unions, employers, and government.

Furthermore, IR departments, especially if they are incorporated into business schools as is increasingly the case in the United States, and their students seem closely connected to the values inherent in pluralism, incrementalism, and the "free market system." European observers may ask themselves whether this normative bias is not too narrow and whether or not the dominating consensus of the scholars leaves too little room for critical reflection on IR governance. In continental Europe, the more political orientation of unions, its

67. HYMAN, *supra* note 9.

68. Capelli, *supra* note 4.

69. W. Jann, *From Policy Analysis to Political Management? An Outside Look at Public-Policy Training in the U.S.*, in SOCIAL SCIENCES AND MODERN STATES: NATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEORETICAL CROSSROADS 110 (P. Wagner, C. Hirschon Weiss, B. Wittrock & H. Wollman eds., 1991).

traditional exchange with intellectuals and its emphasis on long-term strategic planning, seem to create a climate that more easily induces theoretical and speculative discourses and ideological disputes.

Finally, the historical development of the research subject has an impact on the knowledge fields. As I explain in more detail elsewhere, Germany and the Anglo-Saxon countries experienced a radically different labor movement history.⁷⁰ It is widely agreed that the labor movement emerged in nineteenth century Germany as a stronger political movement than in United States or Britain, where unions were seen as more pragmatic economic actors, German unions were more political and state-focused.⁷¹ Moreover, because the German labor movement was more socialist than its Anglo-Saxon counterparts, it preferred using the political arena to advance its goals. It did not rely on economic means in the labor market, as the Anglo-Saxons preferred. The longstanding interaction between the state and labor and the development of early corporatist features since the early Weimar state clearly influenced the perception of German scholars on IR as a socio-political phenomenon and unions as social movements rather than as labor market actors as in the United States. Also, the strong interference of the German state in social policy and labor issues and the increasing juridification of IR during the Weimar Republic and after World War II establishes the concept of social partnership as the juridical expression of class compromise. On the other side, the liberal U.S. IR model fosters the notion of free interrelations between the actors (i.e. collective bargaining) as the solution to class conflict. These historical legacies have also meant that German sociologists and political scientists took a prime interest in trade unions and other related IR topics whereas in the U.S. labor economists were and are more strongly affiliated with the subject.

B. National Styles of Social Science Knowledge Production

My thesis is that although the history and current status of the research subject explain the choice of different research topics in different countries, and also have an influence on the theories, the knowledge production, and how current actors and academic

70. C.M. Frege, *Comparing Research Traditions in Industrial Relations: Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon Countries*, in *INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE: COMPARING ITS ACADEMIC TRADITIONS* (P. Ackers & A. Wilkinson eds., forthcoming).

71. W. KENDALL, *THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN EUROPE* (1975); K. Tenfelde, *Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung: Ein Sonderweg*, in *DER AQUADUKT 1763-1988. EIN ALMANACH AUS DEM VERLAG C.H. BECK IM 225 JAHR SEINES BESTEHENS* 469 (1988).

institutions keep them alive are crucial for our understanding of the cross-country variation in scientific discourse. Thus, knowledge production is socially constructed and has a certain ideational independence of its subject matter and although the subject matter clearly influences the way it is researched it does not completely determine it. As Wagner and Wittrock argue, the knowledge production of the social sciences varies considerably across nations: "There is no reason to assume that these varieties are deviations from a standard, or delays in reaching that standard. Instead, long-term analyses reveal that national profiles have their roots in the specific intellectual, institutional, and political constellations under which 'social scientists' have tried to develop discursive understandings of their societies."⁷² In the following I will explore the national forms of knowledge production by discussing historical developments in the early twentieth century that helped shape U.S. social sciences into a pragmatic tool for the improvement of society.

1. History of Knowledge Production in the United States: Instrumentalizing Social Sciences

Three interrelated factors of the historical development of knowledge production in the United States are highlighted: two structural conditions (academic disciplines and socio-economic conditions) and the intellectual history of the American social sciences.

The academic disciplines are not the outcome of an automatic progress of science, nor are they natural, god-given categories. On contrary, the content and borders of the disciplines that resulted in the beginning of the twentieth century were as much the product of national cultures, local circumstances, and accidental opportunities as intellectual logic.⁷³ In her historical analysis of the creation of social sciences in the United States, Ross⁷⁴ argues further that the disciplines were linked to professional careers, because university appointments were not a traditional "profession" nor one that carried civic status and thus professional career lines and expertise were more important concerns than in Europe. Moreover, the different structures of the

72. P. Wagner & B. Wittrock, *Analysing Social Science: On the Possibility of a Sociology of the Social Sciences*, in DISCOURSES ON SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES 3, 6 (P. Wagner, B. Wittrock & R. Whitley eds., 1991).

73. D. ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (2001).

74. *Id.* at 6.

university systems in the United States and Europe had a major impact on the disciplinary formation. Beginning in the 1870s Americans created a decentralized system of private and state colleges and universities. With no traditional European-style faculty bodies standing between professors and the university president, the new universities moved to departmental organization, solidifying disciplinary distinctions. In contrast, in continental Europe, and in particular in Germany, the traditional "Lehrstuhl" (chair) continued to be the major unit within the university system. As a consequence, social scientists thus disposed of state-endowed rank by their very position as chair holders in state universities whereas their American counterparts had to create a professional identity in terms of their access to specific knowledge and by developing universities into non-state locations of knowledge production.⁷⁵ Another result is that social science disciplines often needed to legitimize its existence in a competitive university environment and thus increasingly relied on sophisticated statistics imitating the leading natural sciences.⁷⁶

Moreover, social sciences developed less quickly in Europe, struggling for recognition against the traditional faculty bodies of humanities and natural sciences. Wagner and Wittrock show that, for example, the notion of sociology has been rather detested by German scholars in the beginning of last century as being "scientific, positivistic and deterministic."⁷⁷ As such it was seen as incompatible with the humanistic and historical heritage of the German tradition of true scholarship.⁷⁸ Only in the 1960s and 1970s did Germany, and other continental European countries, see the emergence of social sciences as a fully legitimate academic activity whereas in the United States, the position of social sciences within the university system was already prevalent throughout the late nineteenth century.⁷⁹ Given these circumstances, it makes sense that it was easier in the United States to establish an independent IR discipline than in Germany where various social science disciplines could study different aspects of IR and where there was less of a possibility to establish an independent academic field.

75. *Id.* at 7.

76. C. Camic & N. Gross, *The New Sociology of Ideas*, in *THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIOLOGY* (forthcoming).

77. Wagner & Wittrock, *supra* note 60, at 336.

78. In the nineteenth century, German universities played a leading role in institutionalizing human sciences, into which social sciences were subsumed. See DELANTY, *supra* note 15, at 44.

79. Wagner & Wittrock, *supra* note 60, at 336.

As an outcome, a stronger institutional base developed for the social sciences in the United States throughout the 20th century, but also stronger disciplinary bodies whereas Europe had less in disciplinary stability but sometimes gained, according to Ross, in richer intellectual milieu.⁸⁰ She explains the latter by describing how strong disciplinary bodies became something of a subculture in their own right and like a professional guild, provided recruits with norms of behavior, patterns of preferment, and hierarchically ordered career tracks that somewhat insulated members not only from outside judgment but also from outside inspiration. Also, one should note that the importance of disciplines and disciplinary professions to stabilize academic positions in the U.S. system lead frequently to an ontological purification of disciplinary discourses by excluding outside factors to strengthen disciplinary identification whereas in Europe disciplines were less inhibited to use concepts from other disciplines. This, for example, helps to explain our earlier observation that IR in the United States is focused on more narrowly defined IR topics and is less likely to take wider socio-political processes and insights from other disciplines into account.

The various socio-economic and political conditions of the United States at the end of the nineteenth century also helped shaping the role of social science. In particular, the explosive capitalist development at that time created devastating social problems for the new society (immigration, urbanization, industrialization) and social sciences were soon perceived as tools to combat these societal deficiencies. This became even more dominant after World War II, where social sciences were supposed to produce experts to help with creating functional stable democracies. Furthermore, the weak state, federalism, the lack of a significant state bureaucracy, and a middle-class, which deemphasized politics, had an impact on the development of universities that were frequently established by capitalists rather than by the state (the Cornells, the Stanfords. . .). The new breed of educational managers reconstituted higher education and emphasized its societal usefulness in providing expert knowledge for the improvement (performance) and stability of the new society and thus fulfilling a role as a "guide on the path to modernity."⁸¹ Finally, one should not forget the legendary "class-less" culture of American society. Salomon describes America as the only place where sociology

80. See ROSS, *supra* note 73.

81. *Id.* at 11.

is practiced without socialism.⁸² Smith notes that the founding fathers of American Sociology rejected Socialism, Marxism, and Anarchism—the intellectual and political traditions established in Europe—and instead became ideological protagonists for corporate capitalism.

Finally, the intellectual history of the United States and its particular adaptation of European thought serves as another explanation for the pragmatic bias of U.S. social science. It is well-known how influential German science was in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nine thousand Americans studied at German universities during the turn of the century, including the key figures in the development of all social science disciplines.⁸³ However, the distinctively German historical and holistic conception of society that these scholars brought back could not take root in America. The early struggle between these “Germanic” scholars and their U.S. counterparts can be witnessed in all social sciences and also in the humanities.⁸⁴ There were the above mentioned institutional and political pressures (e.g., competitive academic enterprises in America with businessmen as executives of the new universities) against it and competing ideas from the British individualistic heritage that had profound effects on early American thinking and which ultimately lead to an “Americanization” of social science.⁸⁵

A most dominating difference between continental European and early U.S. thinking was the intense belief in the United States in both the inevitability and the value of progress. In particular, Darwin’s theories were believed to be most apt for the vibrant and developing society that was America at the end of the nineteenth century.⁸⁶ U.S. social science became quickly characterized by psychological realism/individualism, thus the assumption that the structure of all social groups is the consequence of the aggregate of its separate, component individuals and that social phenomena ultimately derive

82. A. SALOMON, *THE TYRANNY OF PROGRESS* 22 (1955).

83. MANICAS, *supra* note 59, ch. 11; ROSS, *supra* note 73, at 5.

84. See R. Solow, *How Did Economics Get that Way and What Way Did it Get?*, in *AMERICAN ACADEMIC CULTURE IN TRANSFORMATION: FIFTY YEARS, FOUR DISCIPLINES* 57 (T. Bender & C.E. Schorske eds., 1997) (for economics); Shaskolsky, *supra* note 2 (for sociology); K. DANZINGER, *CONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH* (1990) (for psychology); C.E. Lindblom, *Political Science in the 1940s and 1950s*, in *AMERICAN ACADEMIC CULTURE IN TRANSFORMATION: FIFTY YEARS, FOUR DISCIPLINES* 243 (T. Bender & C.E. Schorske eds., 1997) (for political science); H. Putnam, *A Half Century of Philosophy, Viewed From Within*, in *AMERICAN ACADEMIC CULTURE IN TRANSFORMATION: FIFTY YEARS, FOUR DISCIPLINES* 193 (T. Bender & C.E. Schorske eds., 1997).

85. MANICAS, *supra* note 59, at 214.

86. Shaskolsky, *supra* note 2, at 10.

from the motivations of these individuals.⁸⁷ This contrasts with the core concepts, "society" and "history" in continental European science.

Another tradition that quickly developed dominance in the United States was the anti-metaphysical empiricist philosophy of science⁸⁸ evolving from the expansion of natural sciences at the turn of the twentieth century.⁸⁹ In particular, the problem of classical theorizing, the relation between society and individual, was circumvented methodologically by emphasizing statistical, quantitative methods and objectivist natural science types reasoning. In the theoretically more ambitious approaches, this latter reasoning was couched in structural functionalist, structuralist, or rational-individualist terms.⁹⁰ It should be noted that the most well-known American IR theorist, the economist Dunlop, based his work on Parsons' functionalist theory, which has been characterized as ultimately conservative and methodologically individualistic.⁹¹

Wagner and Wittrock conclude that this theoretical orientation went along well with an expansion of empirical social and economic research often devoid of any explicit theoretical interest at all.⁹² Merton confirms this by postulating that U.S. sociology seeks scientific truth whereas European sociology seeks existential truth.⁹³ He also notes that "in American sociology reliability has been won by surrendering theoretical relevance."⁹⁴ In a similar vein, Veblen refers to U.S. social science as "a 'science' of complaisant interpretations, apologies, and projected remedies. The putative leaders of science put aside questions of causes in favor of questions of use, on what ought to be done to improve conditions and to conserve those usages and conventions that have by habit become imbedded in the received scheme of use and wont, and so have been found to be good and right."⁹⁵ And that meant providing positivist and ahistorical social sciences that adopted an unabashed technocratic stance.

87. K.H. Wolff, *The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory*, in *THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY* 31, 46 (L.T. Reynolds & J.M. Reynolds eds., 1970).

88. E. MACH, *THE ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS* (1883).

89. P. Manicas, *The Social Science Disciplines: The American Model*, in *DISCOURSES ON SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES* 45, 50 (P. Wagner, B. Wittrock & R. Whitley eds., 1991).

90. Wagner & Wittrock, *supra* note 60, at 351.

91. C.W. MILLS, *THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION* 49 (1959).

92. Wagner & Wittrock, *supra* note 60, at 351.

93. R. MERTON, *SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE* 449 (1957).

94. *Id.*

95. T. VEBLLEN, *THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA: A MEMORANDUM ON THE CONDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN* 136 (1957)

The special case of IR exemplifies these developments well. Historically IR was founded in the United States by institutional economists (Wisconsin School) who derived from the German historical approaches to political economy and were pushed out of the increasingly neoclassical economics departments in the beginning of the twentieth century and found in IR a niche to pursue pragmatic, behaviorist, public-policy oriented research.⁹⁶ Today IR, despite its potential interdisciplinary character, is still much dominated by labor economic paradigms, probably now even more than in the 1950s–1970s.⁹⁷ However, as mainstream economics moved toward a sharply focused analytical discipline with a strong methodological consensus (not to say orthodoxy) centering on model-building and on the statistical-empirical verification on largely mathematical theoretical hypotheses, this also had, unsurprisingly, an impact on labor economics and IR and ended up marginalizing the institutionalists even further.⁹⁸ Thus, IR developed from a more institutional focus toward increasingly neoclassical (rational choice) paradigms.

In sum, by the 1930s American social sciences had achieved both academic respectability as an independent discipline (earlier than in Europe) and public approval as a study devoted to correcting the imperfections of society.⁹⁹ It had shorn itself of the last vestiges of ideological involvement that was so much part of European social sciences. It was a study very much related to society, but presenting no challenge to society. The idea of practicality, of not being utopian, of finding politically neutral solutions to practical problems, operated, in conjunction with other factors, as a polemic against the “philosophy of history” brought into American social sciences by scholars trained in Germany. This also implemented a drive to lower (micro-) levels of abstraction. As Wilhelm suggests, “a view of isolated and immediate problems as the ‘real’ problems may well be characteristic of a society rapidly growing, as America was in the nineteenth century, and ideologically in the early twentieth century.”¹⁰⁰

After the catastrophe of World War I, it seemed clear to everyone that this was a right choice. The experience of World War I made historical progress uncertain and strengthened a sense of

96. Jacoby, *supra* note 4.

97. Mitchell, *supra* note 12, at 375.

98. Solow, *supra* note 84.

99. S. Wilhelm, *Elites, Scholars, and Sociologists*, in *THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY* 114, 131 (L.T. Reynolds & J.M. Reynolds eds., 1970).

100. *Id.*

historical discontinuity and American exceptionalism.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the defeat of Hitler Germany also represented the final defeat of “metaphysical,” “statist,” historical, and holistic German social science. Long suspicious of it in any case, the war proved to them that older British (and French) empirical philosophies, continuously represented in the “old” political economy and in British utilitarian theories of government, had been right all along.¹⁰² Thenceforth, Americans would set the style in social science. As well-known social science debates in Europe after World War II were strongly influenced by the American model,¹⁰³ but as Manicas points out, the Bolshevik Revolution, the rise of fascism, and World War II persistently aborted, but never annihilated, alternative discourses, especially those nurtured on or in response to the possibilities of a Marxist social science.¹⁰⁴

To conclude the discussion on knowledge production, the outlined structural and intellectual conditions provoked an instrumentalization of mainstream U.S. social sciences (exceptions of course exist). In the words of Ross, “the aim of social intervention places social scientists in a more active role, and in a culture that especially valued useful knowledge and invented pragmatism, practical intervention had been central to the professional and disciplinary aims of American social science from its inception.”¹⁰⁵

However, the particular development and institutionalization of social sciences in the United States and its subsequent worldwide success was and is not inevitable.¹⁰⁶ Social sciences are social constructions. The description of the cross-cultural variations of IR research as well as the overview on the structural and ideational explanations of the knowledge fields, give testimony of that. Social science and thus IR was constituted by specific, often nameable, persons operating in concrete situations with specific resources at hand. As I have shown above, the political and economic conditions of late-nineteenth century America structured possibilities for institutional changes in higher education, which were exploited by educational managers and then by academics.¹⁰⁷ These legacies still

101. ROSS, *supra* note 59.

102. Manicas, *supra* note 89, at 51.

103. J. WEYER, WESTDEUTSCHE SOZIOLOGIE 1945-1960. DEUTSCHE KONTINUITÄTEN UND NORDAMERIKANISCHER EINFLUSS (1984).

104. MANICAS, *supra* note 59, at 216.

105. ROSS, *supra* note 73, at 11.

106. Manicas, *supra* note 89, at 51.

107. *Id.* at 67.

shape today's knowledge production. This brings us to the last topic I briefly want to touch upon: the reproduction of knowledge fields.

III. DISCUSSION: THE REPRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE FIELDS IN IR AND ITS FUTURE

Due to limited space, I restrict myself to illustrate the reproduction mechanism of knowledge fields in IR with a few examples from the United States: First, the continuing labor economic bias is evident to anyone reading the recent issues of the major U.S. IR journals (Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Industrial Relations). It is interesting to note that virtually all editors of both journals are labor economists by training. "Industrial and Labor Relations Review" consists of five editors, four of whom are labor economists (plus except the chief editor all are male). And both (male) editors of the "Industrial Relations" are also labor economists. As a comparison, the leading European/British IR journal, BJIR consists of six editors (two females), only one is a labor economist (three IR scholars, one sociologist, one lawyer). Another indicator of the strong relationship between the two fields might be the fact that the American IR Research Association's annual conference is held together with the American Association of Economists (although, admittedly, there have been discussions to rotate it with other social science annual congresses).

Second, there is a potential bias against foreign submissions in U.S. journals. Mitchell finds that during 1997 and 1998, out of 309 authors of the ILRR and IR issues just under a fifth were foreign (2% in 1962/63).¹⁰⁸ My own survey of the ILRR and IR between 1995–2001 reveals a slightly higher share: around 13.9% foreign authored articles in the ILRR and 11.1% in IR.¹⁰⁹ However, most of the authors are from Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand), and if we just count non Anglo-Saxon authors, the share shrinks to around 2% for both journals. Around 80% of the foreign authors were economists by affiliation (might be more by training) and virtually all articles used quantitative, statistical methods.

108. Mitchell, *supra* note 12, at 383.

109. I counted 30 articles in the ILRR and 24 articles in the IR with foreign authors (meaning all authors of a paper have foreign affiliation) during the six years. I found that each issue has roughly nine articles, which makes 216 articles per journal in six years.

Related to this, the nearly total absence of comparative international studies in research and in the curriculums of U.S. IR programs underpins the potential U.S. centrism. It comes as no surprise that virtually all IR comparativists in the U.S. are political scientists by training and frequently also by affiliation, and prefer to publish in political science journals or in books. Another example is that in most IR programs "comparative/international IR" courses are optional (if they are taught at all) whereas in most British IR programs, for example, they are obligatory.

Finally, texts of European or international origin are rarely quoted in U.S. publications, nor are they included in most course syllabi (if at all they are restricted to the British classics such as Webbs, Flanders, or Fox, but hardly include current foreign authors). Frequently, foreign and particularly continental European texts are excluded because they are not "clear" and do not contain "arguments" or "evidence." As one young (and rather "leftish") colleague and friend of mine recently declared with regard to a well-known French social theorist, it was "radical continental waffling." Unfortunately, the Anglo-Saxon "obsession" with the Tractarian doctrine that whatever can be said at all can be said clearly, necessarily restricts what one can talk about and read.

What is worrying about this situation is not only, from a political perspective, that the U.S. IR academic world might actually contribute to U.S. centrism through its teaching, policymaking, and research, but more crucially that IR research might lose out on the newer developments in social science research.

Since the 1970s, social sciences have seen the emergence of various new post-empiricist discourses such as feminist epistemology, post-modernist, and cultural studies, and specific innovative theories such as Bourdieu's "structuralist constructivism," Luhmann's "auto poetic constructivism," or the critical realism of Bhaskar.¹¹⁰ These developed as a critique to the classical theorizing, namely the relationship of society and the individual and, in particular, for neglecting the specificity and complexity of human action.¹¹¹ Thus, human beings were either seen as responding via social norms to

110. DELANTY, *supra* note 15, at 111; *see also* V.R. MCKIM & S.P. TURNER, CAUSALITY IN CRISIS?: STATISTICAL METHODS AND THE SEARCH FOR CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1997) (the increasing critique on causal and regression analysis by analytical philosophers and statisticians).

111. A. TOURAINE, RETURN OF THE ACTOR: SOCIAL THEORY IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1988).

functional needs of social systems or as isolated individuals making rational calculations in following their pre-existing preference orderings. According to Wagner and Wittrock, “the degree of formality and formalization, regarded as a virtue of scientificity, is increasingly seen as a barrier to the understanding of social processes. As a reaction, a return to emphasizing the specificities of historical and cultural constellations has been proposed, as has a renewal of social theorizing overcoming the limits of the grand reductionist approach.”¹¹² In other words, these approaches attempt to find new answers by explicitly rejecting positivism and empiricism as simplistic and by recognizing that social scientific knowledge is a reflexive knowledge that constitutes its object. Clearly, the object, social reality, exists independently of what social scientists do, but there is a sense in which social science itself plays an active role in the shaping of knowledge.¹¹³ Thus, rather than supporting the claim that social science can provide answers to social problems, these approaches foster the critical and hermeneutic character of social science. As Habermas reminds us, social science involves a critical engagement with its subject matter.¹¹⁴

These alternative approaches, many of them originating in Europe, are slowly absorbed in U.S. sociology or political science and other social science disciplines, despite ongoing resistance of the mainstream scholars. And there is a renewed interest in neo-institutionalism even in economics.¹¹⁵ In political science for example, there is a growing critical group, Perestroika, explicitly rejecting the quantitative, empiricist, atheoretical bias of the A.P.S.A. (American Political Science Association) and demanding a more equal treatment for qualitative, cultural studies (including a quota for qualitative papers at the association’s journal). Nothing, however, happens in the field of IR. Its conservatism is not really surprising and a longstanding feature: The IRRA is probably the only social science association in the United States, which never had a Marxist subgroup (even the economists do!), there was not even ever a conference panel on “class” (the first one got realized in 2001 with the title: “Does class matter?”). Part of the explanation for its outspoken conservatism might lie in the discipline’s close connection to the U.S. labor

112. Wagner & Wittrock, *supra* note 60, at 352.

113. DELANTY, *supra* note 15, at 114.

114. J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (2d ed. 1978).

115. Jacoby, *supra* note 4.

movement, which cannot be described as ever having been a radical, intellectual, or political actor.

IR is still at a dead end as Dunlop already diagnosed 45 years ago. But this time the diagnosis is more consequential. Forty-five years ago, unions were still influential institutions and justified a discipline devoted to its broader subject. Today, this legitimation has become more difficult.

If we are convinced, however, that IR should not merge into the new field of Human Resource Management (HR), as some people argue, or completely dissolve into labor economics, but that it should stay an independent field of study, it urgently needs to broaden its perspective conceptually and methodologically.¹¹⁶ Its major institutional actors (such as journal editors) need to be convinced that American IR research deserves to become more international (in its true meaning), more diverse, more pluralistic and a more fertile ground for theories and also utopias. It needs to acknowledge the benefits of divergent ideologies, assumptions, and methodologies in IR research such as the example of the German research traditions highlighted. As, for example, Godard suggests, Anglo-Saxon IR research should be reconstructed along the lines of a political economy paradigm that draws more extensively from the relevant sociology and political economy literature and focuses upon issues of economy and society as they apply to industrial relations.¹¹⁷

Moreover, rather than proposing a stronger emphasis on applied, public policy research removed from ideological preconceptions, as Mitchell has done, I advocate a move toward more abstraction and less instrumentalization.¹¹⁸ As Karl Mannheim alerted us years ago, "the disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing."¹¹⁹ Who if not IR scholars are called upon to challenge the increasing instrumentalization and economicism of labor-management relations, social policy making or the welfare state?

The United States learned from European social sciences in the beginning of the twentieth century when it built its academic institutions and disciplines. The following decades were increasingly dominated by American social sciences and, in turn, frequently admired and copied in post-war Europe. It might be time once again,

116. See, e.g., B. Kaufman, *supra* note 4.

117. Godard, *Towards a Reconstruction*, *supra* note 4, at 3.

118. Mitchell, *supra* note 12.

119. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 231 (1955).

at the beginning of the new millennium, for Americans to return to Europe for new ideas and to rediscover forgotten research traditions.

