

**Union Decline, Alternative Forms of Representation,
and Workplace Authority Relations in the United States**

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We draw on a telephone survey of 1000 American workers to explore whether alternative, non-union forms of representation appear to be filling the gap left by union decline, whether this matters to authority relations at work, and whether it may help to explain union decline. We find that non-union associations do not appear to be filling the gap, but that management-established, non-union representation systems are one-and-a-half times as widespread as is union representation and are evaluated as favourably by workers. We also find that unions and management-established systems have positive implications for authority relations at work before controlling for management practices, but these are substantially weakened once these practices -- especially "bureaucratic" practices -- are entered. We argue that, in the case of unions, this likely reflects their implications for the adoption of these practices. But management-established systems are more likely to be set up in conjunction with these practices and hence not to have similar implications. Finally, our results suggest that management-established systems are often in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the Wagner Act. But they bear no association with the propensity to vote for a union. Instead, it is bureaucratic practices that matter.

Labor unions have long been argued to be the primary institutions of workers in the United States, providing not only improved wages and benefits, but also rights and protections related to the exercise of authority and ultimately to the realization of democratic values at work (Sinyai 2006; Chamberlain and Kuhn 1965). Their decline might therefore be seen, in this respect, to represent a diminishment of American democracy (Kochan 2005). Yet the extent to which this may actually be the case is not clear. Not only has there been a paucity of multivariate research into the actual implications of union representation for authority relations at work, it is possible that alternative forms of representation, coupled with employment law and management practice, have been filling any void left by union density decline. Particularly interesting is the possibility that employees have been joining identity-based associations (Helfgott 2000; Scully and Segal 2003; Kochan 2005; 169-71; Piore and Safford 2006), but there is also some likelihood that employers have been quietly establishing alternative, non-union systems of representation that substitute for unions. This may skirt or even violate the law, but it represents a real possibility in view of widespread worker support for such systems (Freeman and Rogers

1999), widespread support for changes to this law (e.g., the 1995 "TEAM" Act), and the limited resources and enforcement powers of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

The extent to which these possibilities hold true has important implications not only for understanding the current state of representation and authority relations in American workplaces, but also for debates over labor law reform. First, to the extent that unions can still be shown to democratize authority relations at work, the case for labor law reforms is strengthened. Second, to the extent that management-established systems appear to serve as effective alternatives to union representation, the case for repealing legal prohibitions against these systems may also be strengthened. This may be especially so if it can be shown that these systems do not serve as impediments to union organizing, which remains the sole means to the attainment of legally protected and independent collective representation rights in the United States.

This paper draws on a random telephone survey of 1000 employed Americans to address these questions. We explore the extent to which workers in our sample are represented by a union, a management-established system, or an independent non-union association, and how they evaluate each of these forms of representation where established. We also explore how each of these systems is associated with the exercise of authority at work, as perceived by workers. Finally, we explore whether non-union systems are associated with a lower propensity for non-union workers to vote for a union should a ballot be held and hence whether any growth in the prevalence of these systems may help to explain union decline.

Research Questions

In the United States, labor unions have been widely viewed as the primary means by which workers can collectively achieve democratic rights and protections within the employment relation, whether in the form of "concrete freedom on the job" (Perlman 1928), industrial

jurisprudence (Slichter 1941; Chamberlain and Kuhn 1965), or collective voice in the determination of the terms and conditions of their employment (Freeman and Medoff 1984). These rights and protections may be considered of value in and of themselves. But they are also commonly associated with a variety of positive outcomes, particularly enhanced personal security, dignity, fairness, and justice. These "democratization effects," as they may be referred to, have long provided a major impetus for laws supporting the right to union representation and collective bargaining (see Derber 1970) and for international human rights declarations in favour of this right (see Human Rights Watch 2000). Unions may not alter the basic structure of the employment relation, but they in theory substantially alter the conditions under which management authority is to be exercised, and in this sense may be argued to bring an element of democracy into the workplace (Lieserson 1973), with potential implications not just for the quality of the employment experience, but also for the quality of the democracy within which this experience occurs.

It is this democratic function, perhaps as much or more than their economic one, that has served as an essential justification for unions throughout the past century (see Derber 1970). To quote Walter Reuther:

"Our economic gains...are important; but most important is the fact that we have won a measure of industrial democracy within our industries. We have won recognition of workers' rights. A worker is no longer a mere clock-card number; he is now a person - a human being, who can hold his head high and demand the respect and consideration to which he is entitled. We have in truth given substance to the old phrase "dignity of labor" (Reuther 1951, as cited in Derber 1970: 463).

Yet, not only has the effectiveness of unions in serving this function sometimes been questioned, there may also be alternative means of doing so, thereby filling (or even explaining) any void left by union decline (Kaufman 2005).

First, it is possible that alternative forms of representation have come to serve as effective substitutes for unions. Particularly noteworthy have been American-style works councils, referred to traditionally as "company unions," but referred to in this paper as "management-established representation systems" (or just "management-established systems"). These systems have been widely criticized as unacceptable substitutes for unions (e.g., Gitelman 1988, Brody 1994, Kelly 1996) and in the United States they are illegal under section 8(a)(2) of the Wagner Act if established by the employer and if they operate as "labor organizations," as defined under Section 2(5) of the Act (Gely, 1998). But according to some authors, they provided effective representation for workers in the early decades of the twentieth century (Fairris 1995, Kaufman 1999) and may continue to do so where established (Kaufman 2000, 2005).

These systems can take a variety of forms and serve a variety of functions (see Taras and Kaufman, 2006), many of which may fall within the definition of an illegal labor organization under the Wagner Act.¹ However, there is evidence of widespread worker support for *some* form of workplace representation, including management-established systems (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 146-47). Moreover, legal restrictions on these systems are ambiguous and their legitimacy has been widely questioned (Patmore 2010). Their enforcement may also be lax. In practice, a union has to bring a charge to the NLRB, which may serve little purpose unless the workplace is/has been an organizing target. Even then, the NLRB is unlikely to deal with such a charge in a timely fashion, and the available sanctions are limited and largely regarded as ineffective (Patmore 2010: 93). Thus, it is quite possible that management-established representation

¹ In the *Electromation* and *DuPont* decisions, the NLRB essentially ruled that this restriction applies not only to traditional company unions but also to high performance or involvement work systems if they include representative committees (see Patmore 2010: 91). Although controversial, attempts to amend the Act so as to allow for such committees failed (i.e., the 1995 "TEAM" Act).

systems in some form are not only becoming widespread, but also that they do indeed serve as effective substitutes for unions.

Second, it is possible that democratic rights associated with labor unions have been rendered superfluous by the growth in substantive regulation, as embodied in statutes, administrative rulings, and court decisions over the past half-century (Piore and Safford 2006: 301). According to Piore and Safford (2006: 301-302), these began to develop in the early 1960s, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed. Since then, protections against discriminatory practices have been extended to a variety of groups and minorities. There has also been legislation mandating family leave and advance notice of layoffs, limits imposed on the doctrine of employment-at-will, and a proliferation of employment legislation at the state and local levels (e.g., living wage laws). In response, employers have generated standard personnel policies and practices and developed a new strategy centred on private arbitration procedures.

To the extent that the democratization effects of unions are attributable to their implications for employer policies and practices, the spread of "standard personnel practices" in non-union workplaces may have lessened the implications of union decline and even effectively rendered unions redundant. But it is also possible that unions have become supplanted by alternative "identity" based groups and associations. These groups have not only helped to promote government regulation, they have also, according to Piore and Safford, become active at the workplace level. Although Piore and Safford do not explicitly state that they serve as substitutes for unions, it is possible that they help to ensure that various rights and protections within the 'new employment rights regime' are established and enforced and that they serve as an alternative means of representation in this regard.

These possibilities give rise to five research questions:

- 1) Have management-established representation systems and more independent, identity-based associations become widespread?
- 2) Do workers perceive these systems/associations to be as effective as they do unions?
- 3) Does union representation have observable democratization effects and, if so, to what extent are these attributable to policies and practices associated with unions but which may also be widespread in non-union workplaces rather than to union representation per se?
- 4) Do alternative systems of representation (i.e., non-union, management-established systems and associations) have democratization effects comparable to those of unions?
- 5) Do alternative systems of representation lower the propensity of workers to join a union?

To date, there would appear to have been little US research directly addressing questions one and two. Research by Freeman and Rogers (1999: 92-93) revealed that, as of the early 1990s, 37 percent of workers in the USA had "committees of employees that discuss problems with management on a regular basis" in their workplaces, and that 29 percent of workers with these committees judged them to be "very effective." In comparison, 30 percent of union employees reported their union to be "very effective." But these findings may now be dated, and it is not in any case clear that the question asked referred to representation systems or simply, for example, problem solving groups (also known as quality circles). In contrast, the 1996 Lipset and Meltz survey of American and Canadian workers specifically asked respondents if they had a formal non-union employee representation system and whether representatives in this system discussed compensation and benefits with management. Fifteen percent of non-union employees in the USA sample reported that they had such a system, and seven in ten of these employees reported the latter to be the case (Lipset and Meltz 2000: 226). This survey did not, however, address the effectiveness of these systems, and it is possible that its findings are also dated.

There appears to have been no research directly addressing question three (the workplace democratization effects of unions, as defined in this paper). There has, however, been research into the implications of unions for job satisfaction. Measures of job satisfaction may be too blunt to pick up the democratization effects of unions, but this research can shed some light on these effects and how to address them. In essence, the overall results have tended to be uneven, with only one study finding positive effects (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1990), and others finding neutral or even negative ones (see Bryson et al 2004). This could in part reflect a tendency for job satisfaction to reflect negative union effects on attitudes (e.g., a higher consciousness of conflict), offsetting the implications of their positive "objective" effects. But it is also possible that union workers are more likely to possess values or beliefs that render them more likely both to be in a union job and to evaluate their jobs negatively. A further possibility is that there are unobserved differences in union and non-union workplaces, particularly as they pertain to job quality, and that this is reflected in lower job satisfaction (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1990). The research tends to support these latter two possibilities, finding that observed negative effects disappear once possible selection biases and job content are entered for (see Bryson et al. 2004).

We might expect similar results for the democratization effects of unions, especially because workers are more likely to seek union representation if they have union values or are subject to arbitrary, disrespectful, unfair, or unjust treatment.² It is also likely, however, that it is not just the presence of a union that matters, but also the practices associated with one. The former should mean a change in authority relations, because workers now have a system of legal

² Research into union voting propensity supports this possibility. In addition to consistent findings that less satisfied workers are more likely to desire a union, a recent Canadian study (Godard 2011) found poor job quality to bear a strong positive association with voting propensity. The job quality measure in the latter study was comprised of a number of variables that unions can be expected to affect positively, including perceived rights at work. Thus, research into the democratization effects of unions may be subject to specification issues similar to those in the job satisfaction research.

representation. However, it also been found to substantially alter management practices (Verma 2005). Employers are required to negotiate a grievance system enabling employees to seek justice if treated unfairly or subject to discipline. This is reinforced by various work and seniority rules negotiated into collective agreements to ensure fair and just treatment and to provide security to workers. Thus, unions can be expected to have indirect as well as direct effects.

Question four raises the possibility that the democratization effects often attributed to unions may also be achieved by non-union representation systems. Not only is this possibility important in itself, it also suggests that research into the democratization (and job satisfaction) effects of unions will be biased if the implications of these systems are not accounted for. To date, there has been no multivariate research specifically doing so. There have been a number qualitative studies of the implications of non-union representation (question 4), especially of management-established non-union systems (see Helfgott 2000; Kaufman 2003; Gollan 2006). But although these studies offer rich insights into how these systems operate and what they *can* do, they have generally yielded mixed results as to what these systems *actually* do. They have also not specifically addressed workplace democratization effects (as defined in this paper).³

In addition, there has again been little consideration as to whether it is these systems per se or rather policies and practices that tend to be adopted in conjunction with them that matter. This may include so-called "best" practices designed to shape employee values and expectations and which tend to be associated with non-union workplaces (Godard 2009). It may also include bureaucratic practices, as discussed above, especially if these enhance perceptions of fairness and justice. If so, it is possible that any effects initially observed for management-established representation systems are in considerable measure attributable to these practices. Yet, because

³ They have also often explored company representation programs in the first half of the twentieth century (e.g., Jacoby 1997; Kaufman 1999), which may be of limited contemporary relevance in view of the changes since then.

these systems are established on management's terms and do not normally engage in formal, Wagner-style bargaining, various practices are likely to be adopted in conjunction with, rather than negotiated by, these systems. Hence, it would be mistaken to infer indirect effects similar to those inferred for unions.

Turning to question five, there has been considerable debate over the extent to which alternative systems of representation, and management-established systems in particular, are implemented in whole or in part to avoid unionization. There may be a number of ways in which they can achieve this outcome, including an improved ability to detect and head off an organizing drive. However, one that is often identified is a lowering of the general propensity of workers to vote for a union by providing rights and protections that mimic those of a union workplace. Although a few studies have found that the opposite can actually occur (Taras and Copping 1998), the research to date has again been largely qualitative in nature and has, overall, yielded mixed results (Kaufman and Taras 2010: 277; Timur, Taras, and Ponak 2010).

Overall, therefore, there has been little research addressing the five questions identified above, and the research that has been conducted has tended to be limited in important ways. Below, we seek to address this void in the literature.

Data and Methods

Our data set is drawn from a 2009 nation-wide survey of 1000 employed Americans over 17 years of age and working more than 15 hours per week for the same employer for six months or more.⁴ The survey averaged about 23 minutes in duration. It was conducted by a professional polling firm, Eastern Research Services, using random digit dialing and computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) with up to three call-backs per household. Those working less

⁴ Economic conditions at the time of the survey may have had implications for the data collected; although we delayed the survey in part due to these conditions, we could not delay further without threat of losing our grant.

than 15 hours per week or less than six months with their current employer were excluded in order to ensure that respondents were in "real" jobs and would be sufficiently familiar with employer practices and workplace conditions (including representation) to be able to respond in a meaningful and informed way to the questions in our survey.

Our sample is not perfectly representative of the US labor force because of the sampling strategy. But to ensure that it was reasonably so, we used quota sampling on the basis of gender, race, and US census region. Thus, women comprised 50 percent of the sample and whites 82 percent, both of which roughly match BLS estimates for the general labor force. Respondents from the Northeast comprised 20 percent of the sample, from the West 20 percent, from the South 30 percent, and from the Midwest 30 percent (2006 census estimates were 18, 24, 36, and 22 percent, respectively). In turn, although sectoral designations are always subject to some classification error, 20 percent of our sample reported some form of industrial work, which compares to 17 percent for the general labor force. However, 46 percent reported that they were in what we refer to as "public services" (government, education, health and social services), compared to 35 percent for the general labor force. This likely reflects both classification error and sampling strategy (i.e. workers in these sectors are more likely to be in "real" jobs). Exploratory analysis in any case revealed that it made no meaningful difference to the results, except possibly for union coverage. Seventeen percent of respondents reported being represented by a union, compared to the 2009 BLS estimate of 13.6 for the general labor force. However, this would also appear to be attributable to our sampling strategy.⁵

⁵ Workers in their first 6 months of employment are more likely to be in temporary jobs and hence less likely to be represented by a union (they may even be excluded under the NLRA). BLS data reveal that 1 in 5 workers has less than a year of tenure (data on those with 6 mos. or less are not available); if we infer that 1 in 10 has less than six months and that these are non-union workers in most or all cases, this could account for as much as 2.0 percentage points of the difference. In addition, an analysis of 2010 BLS data reveals that those working less than 15 hours per week are about half as likely to be represented by a union, potentially accounting for about another .06 percentage points of the difference. (We thank Barry Hirsch for this analysis.). Only an additional percentage point may be

Our survey was designed as part of a broader comparative study of work, happiness, and citizenship in the USA and Germany, and therefore addressed an array of broader issues of economy and society beyond those addressed in the present analysis, including the implications of work and employment for general health and happiness, for civic virtue, and for political and social engagement. In order to do so, we had to sacrifice "fidelity" for "band width" by restricting the number of questions we could ask for each of the constructs reported in the present analysis. This is common in national surveys of this nature, with the result that authors often rely on single item measures (e.g., for job satisfaction: see Helliwell and Huang 2010). Although especially prevalent in the economics literature, it has also come to be accepted in organizational research (Wanous and Hudy: 2001). We do not believe that it has appreciably affected the results in this paper. Nonetheless, it may mean that some of our measures are weaker than would be the case for a narrower study with a more singular focus.

Questions 1 and 2: How Widespread Are Alternative Forms of Representation and How Do Workers View Them?

Respondents were asked about three general categories of representation: union representation, management-established representation systems, and representation by an identity group or association. As in any broad-based survey of this nature, we could not probe as thoroughly as might be ideal to establish the exact form of representation workers were receiving within each category. This was especially so with regard to management-established systems and identity associations, both of which can vary extensively in nomenclature, form, and function. However, in this study we are interested only in the overall prevalence and average effects of these categories of representation at the time of our survey, not with their morphologies. Thus,

explained by the over-representation of public service workers, who are more highly unionized (26 percent in our sample reported union coverage). Although not mutually exclusive, these factors may therefore in combination account for a sizeable portion of the 3.7 percentage point difference between union coverage in our sample and BLS estimates.

although we did ask selected follow-up questions as to the functioning of each, more fine-grained questions would have contributed little. In view of the variation in non-union systems and identity associations and the terminology around them, they would also likely have been of little value.⁶

The three main questions were: (1) "Are you covered by a union agreement?", (2) "Is there a non-union, management-established system where worker representatives meet with management?", and (3) "Are you a member of another type of association to assist with work related matters? This association may be based on your occupation, race, gender, or some other characteristic you identify with." These questions were designed to be as direct and precise as possible given the purposes of this study. To ensure clarity, they were included in a section that began with the following lead in: "Now, I would like to ask you about representation in your workplace." The question asking about a management-established system explicitly asked if there was a "system" to avoid confusion with the existence of a more "micro" committee (e.g., for health and safety). If the respondent indicated that a system was in place, one of the follow-ups also asked if representatives actively consulted with management over wages and benefits (see below), enabling us to establish if the system appeared to meet the general definition of a management-established representation system advanced by Taras and Kaufman (2006) and Gollan (2006) and if it appeared to violate the prohibition on company unionism under the Wagner Act (Patmore 2010: 91).

Because the management-established, non-union representation question was designed to address alternatives to union representation, and because we wanted to avoid respondent fatigue, this question and the follow-ups to it were asked only if the respondent was not covered by a collective agreement. However, in view of the tendency for identity groups and associations to

⁶ As Gollan (2010: 213) notes, "variations in terminology do not equate to differences in form or function."

form within unions as well as within non-union workplaces, the association question was asked of both union and non-union workers. Where the respondent reported membership in an association, he/she was further asked to indicate "the main characteristic that unites members of this organization", followed by a prompt stating "this could be occupation, race, or some similar characteristic," to be read if the respondent appeared not to understand the question.⁷

Question 1: How Prevalent Are Alternative Forms of Representation? Table 1 reports the descriptive findings for various forms of representation, both for the total sample and for a subsample excluding public service workers. There are a few differences between the total and sub samples (except with regard to union representation, which is as expected).

In general, it would appear that management-established systems may indeed be replacing unions to a significant extent, but that independent associations may not be. Although 17 percent of respondents in the total sample reported union representation, 34 percent of non-union respondents, or 28 percent of the total sample, reported a non-union, management-established system. Fifteen percent of the total sample reported that they were a member of another type of association. The answer to the latter differed only slightly by union status, with 14 percent of non-union and 18 percent of union respondents reporting membership in an association. Of those with neither a union nor management-established system, 11 percent, representing 6 percent of the total sample, reported membership in an association. These results may not be perfectly representative of the US labor force, especially in view of the over-representation of public service workers. Yet as revealed in column 3 reveals, there is little difference between the results for the total sample and those for the reduced sample excluding these workers (with the exception of union representation, which is as expected).

⁷ This was simply intended to reinforce the clarification that followed the original question. We did not include sexual orientation in either because we were concerned that this would be viewed as too intrusive, especially in our German sample. We did, however, include this as a response option, to be read out only if needed.

Although it would not appear that associations are substituting for unions except perhaps for a very small percentage of the labor force, the characteristics of these associations may be of interest if they are based on identity groups. But as also reported in table 1, 74 percent in the total sample are reported to be based on occupation. Only 7 percent are reported to be based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. Seventeen percent are reported as "other," and it is possible that some portion of these respondents chose this option because the sexual orientation option was too sensitive to answer. Nonetheless, it would appear that non-conventional associations, based on "identity groups," do not at present play much role in the US labor market and are not filling the gap left by union decline. A similar conclusion can be reached for even occupational associations. Subsequent analysis revealed that 78 percent of those reporting an occupational association also identified themselves as a member of a profession, suggesting that these are conventional professional associations and not new forms of representation.

Question 2: How Do Workers Evaluate Different Forms of Representation? The table 2 results address research question two. For each of the three representation questions, respondents who answered affirmatively were also asked a series of questions about the nature of the representation they were receiving. These questions differed by form of representation; because these forms differ, we had somewhat different questions we wished to explore for each. However, for all three forms, respondents were asked about the extent to which representatives "can be counted on to stand up for members, even if this means a disagreement with management" and the extent to which they "actively consult with workers about their ideas and concerns." As noted above, we also asked workers with a management-established system whether their representatives "actively consult with management over wages and benefits," because we wanted to get some additional indication of whether, indeed, these systems appear to

be functioning as "labor organizations" and hence as potentially in contravention of section 8(a)(2).

As revealed in table 2, 54 percent of workers with management-established representation systems rate their representation highly when it comes to consultation with members, compared to 41 percent of those with union representation. Fifty-one percent rate their representation highly when it comes to standing up for members, which compares to 54 percent for unions. Those reporting association membership rate their association about the same as for unions when it comes to consultation with members (44 percent), but less favourably with respect to standing up for members (38 percent). Of those reporting association membership but no other form of representation, the statistics are 41 percent and 27 percent, respectively. The latter statistic suggests that, when it comes to standing up for workers, associations are more effective where some other form of representation is in place and hence more likely to serve as complements rather than alternatives to these other forms of representation.

These results should be treated with caution, not just because our sample may not be perfectly representative, but also because different forms of representation may give rise to different expectations and hence perceptions. This may be especially true of management-established systems, in which employers may be able to frame both expectations and the information available to workers as to their effectiveness. Thus, these systems may be less (or more) effective than unions, yet evaluated as favourably. Nonetheless, the findings for management-established representation systems are particularly noteworthy. They suggest that these systems are not only filling the gap left by union decline (as per table 1), they may also be as or more effective than unions -- at least from the point of view of respondents. Associations

may also be filling some of the gap, but much less so than is the case for management-established systems.

The results in table 3 also suggest that management-established non-union systems may indeed be effectively replacing unions. As revealed in the bottom row of this table, 42 percent of respondents reporting these systems also report that their representatives consult with management over these issues "to some extent" and 37 percent report that they do so "to a considerable extent." This suggests that eight out of ten management-established representation systems perform at least some substitution function when it comes to wage and benefit determination. It also suggests that violation of section 8(a)(2) is widespread.

It is also possible, however, that these systems operate as part of high performance work systems and hence serve a "mutual gains" function, one that has little to do with the traditional union role. This question has been at the heart of debates over whether section 8(a)(2) should be amended or repealed, and were central to arguments in favour of the TEAM Act. Our survey contained a number of questions about these systems, and so we explored the association between management-established representation systems and an index of high performance practices.⁸ The correlation was .25, suggesting some association (the correlation with union representation was only .04). But we also explored whether there is an association between consultation on wages and benefits and high performance practices where a management-established system was reported. The correlation was only 0.07. There was also a relatively weak association between the presence of management-established system and a measure of team work ($r=.16$). It does not appear, therefore, that the mutual gains explanation bears much support.

⁸ This was an additive index consisting of items d, g, h, i, j, and k from *Best practices*, as reported in table 3 (below). Cronbach's alpha=.75.

Questions 3, 4, and 5: Does Union Decline Really Matter to Relations at Work?

Overall, the findings to this point suggest that management-established systems of non-union representation may be replacing unions. Not only have these become widespread, covering more than a third of the non-union respondents in our sample, they are evaluated as favourably as or more favourably than unions, and they are typically consulted in the determination of wages and benefits. Although they may bear some association with high performance practices, it is not likely that the facilitation of these practices is their only or even main purpose. The important question, however, is whether the apparent spread of these systems is actually filling the 'gap' left by union decline as it pertains to authority relations at work, and whether, indeed, unions even matter any longer to these relations in view of the increases in these systems and in individual worker rights and protections under the law. In particular, do unions have democratization effects at the present point in time (question 3) and, if so, do management-established systems have democratization effects that are comparable (question 4)? The latter question also applies for non-union associations. Although there is little evidence to this point that these associations are displacing unions or filling the gap left by union decline, and although they largely involve conventional occupational associations, they also tend to be evaluated favourably and, where established, may also have democratization effects.

Our data set contains a wide array of measures that can be used to address the non-economic implications of union representation. For present purposes, however, we limit our analysis to the implications of unions for four constructs that, we believe, are most relevant to the question of whether unions alter relations of authority in the workplace and whether alternative forms of representation are as or more effective in doing so. These include: *security*, *dignity*, *fairness*, and *justice*. The items comprising each, along with (where relevant) their inter-item

reliability scores (Cronbach's alpha) appear in Table 3. (See Appendix A for descriptive statistics and inter-correlations.)

Security is a single item measure, based on a five point agree/disagree Likert scale, worded generally in an attempt to address not just perceived security from layoff, but also how secure the respondent feels *in* his or her actual *job* and hence how much he or she might fear being demoted or dismissed. This is, we believe, more reflective of authority relations of work.

Dignity is a three item (Likert) additive scale. Despite some literature addressing the determinants of dignity at work (see in particular Hodson 2001), we were unable to find any precedents for how to measure this construct. However, the concept of dignity has to do ultimately with whether management treats employees as if they are equals, including willingness to consult with them, whether they treat them with respect, and whether they allow employees to question decisions. The items included in this measure address each of these three questions.

Fairness consists of four (Likert type) items addressing perceived fairness in the exercise of authority. In turn, we believe that justice refers more to perceptions of rights at work and, in particular, whether "something could be done to make things right" in the event that these rights are violated. Accordingly, *justice* is comprised of four items that address this question, as adapted from Godard (2011). If a respondent was unclear about the meaning of "something could be done", he was told "This could involve going to a government body, a union rep, a manager, or some other channel." If the respondent answered that the violation would not happen where she worked, she was then asked "Well, what if it did?"

Also identified in table 3 are a series of control variables intended to address possible specification biases. In addition to standard "objective" controls, we also include perceptions of

employer finances (*finances*). Doing so should be especially useful for exploring for the implications of unions, helping to partial out insecurity attributable to employer health and any association this may have with union coverage. We also include two variables measuring job content, *job autonomy* and *job complexity*, thereby addressing the possibility that unions are more to become organized likely (or non-union systems less likely to be established) in jobs associated with lower autonomy and fulfillment. The items comprising *job complexity* are adapted from the Oldham and Hackman job diagnostic index (1980). We also include seven "subjective" variables, measuring values and beliefs that may be both more characteristic of union workers and associated with the dependent variables in this analysis. Including these two additional sets of controls thus addresses the main explanations discussed earlier for why unions often appear to have negative or at best benign implications for job satisfaction. (The subjective items did not correlate sufficiently to justify creating a composite index or factor and so are entered separately.)

We also include two indices to address workplace and management practices. The first, *Best practices*, is an additive index of 9 items associated with "new" work and HRM practices in the literature. The second, *Bur practices*, is an additive index of 4 items associated with the bureaucratic/internal labor market practices emergent in the post world-war two era, and which is largely consistent with the arguments of Piore and Safford as to the rationalization of the personnel function. The items used for these measures, and the measures themselves, again appear in table 3. They are derived from earlier research into the implications of employer practices for worker outcomes (Godard 2009, 2010). Because we are concerned primarily with the implications of bureaucratic practices, and because this prior research has both theorized and found these practices to have different effects on workers than new work and HRM practices

(Godard 2010), we created two separate, conceptually rather than empirically (e.g., from factor analysis) derived measures (also see Godard 2009: 177-178, 2010).⁹ However, the number of items for each measure was reduced in an attempt to avoid respondent fatigue. Items were deleted largely on the basis of their relative contributions to scale reliability (Cronbach's alpha if item deleted) in this earlier research, and sensitivity analyses addressing whether their deletion made a difference to the observed associations in that research. The items for each measure, and their inter-item reliability scores, appear in table 3. (See Appendix A for descriptive statistics and correlations.)

One question that follows from the job satisfaction literature is whether and how the observed implications of unions and of alternative representation systems are sensitive to specification. The current data set is especially useful for addressing this question, as it contains an array of control variables often not found in other data sets. Accordingly, we ran hierarchical ordinary least squares regressions¹⁰ for each dependent variable in order to explore whether and how the observed effects of unions, management-established systems, and associations, are altered as different sets of control variables are introduced. We also begin with union representation as the sole independent variable, before entering the other two representation measures, in order to explore whether failure to include the latter may matter to the observed implications of the former (as suggested earlier). Finally, in introducing the controls, we begin with standard "objective context" controls, and then enter sets of controls that are less common in the literature, beginning with job content, then subjective values and beliefs, then each of the

⁹ In the previous research, work practices and new HRM practices were included in separate indices. Because potentially separate effects of these practices are not of interest in the present analysis, we combined them for the sake of parsimony.

¹⁰ Even though *security* is based on a single, five point item, ordinary least squares is a valid statistical approach (Schwab 2005: 99-100) and is more readily interpretable than ordered probit; it also facilitates comparisons with the results for the other dependent variables.

two management practice measures, then a measure of trust (as discussed below). The results are in table 4. Because the effects of management practices are relevant to our research questions, we report the coefficients for the management practice measures as well as those as for the representation measures.

Question 3: Do Unions Have Democratization Effects? As revealed in column 2 of table 4, the bivariate regressions reveal union representation to have a statistically insignificant association with *security*, a statistically significant negative association with *dignity*, a statistically insignificant association with *fairness*, and a statistically significant positive association with *justice*. However, the results suggest substantially stronger and more positive effects once alternative forms of representation (column 3), then objective controls (column 4), then job content controls (column 5), then subjective controls (column 6) are entered. Prior to the introduction of the management practice measures (columns 7 and 8), the coefficient for *union* is positive and significant in the regressions for *security*, *fairness*, and *justice*. The significant negative association with *dignity* also disappears.

These results are generally consistent with the union-job satisfaction literature, suggesting that a failure to find positive effects for unions may reflect inadequate controls, including for alternative forms of representation. However, they change substantially once the two management practice measures (columns 7 and 8) are entered. This is especially true with regard to the introduction of *Bur practices*. Once this variable is introduced, the coefficients for *union* are statistically significant in only the regressions for *dignity* and *justice*, and in these regressions, their signs are actually negative. Moreover, the coefficients for this variable (column eight) reveal strong positive associations with all four dependent variables, which suggests that it is these practices, rather than union representation per se, that matters most.

One possibility discussed earlier is that unions are associated with more adversarial, lower trust relations, in reflection of US institutional norms. If so, union coefficients in column eight may reflect negative affect attributable to this distrust rather than the actual treatment afforded workers. To explore this latter possibility, we reran the column eight regressions, but adding a single item measuring trust in management (see table 3) on a 5 point disagree/agree Likert scale. As revealed in column nine of table 4, the negative coefficients for *union* in the *dignity* and *fairness* regressions decline substantially and become statistically insignificant, while the positive coefficients in the *security* and *justice* regressions increase in size, with the latter becoming statistically significant.¹¹ It would thus appear that the column eight regressions are indeed picking up negative affect as well as the actual treatment afforded workers.

For reasons identified earlier, these results likely also reflect the tendency for unions to have indirect effects, through their implications for bureaucratic practices. Accordingly, we computed the direct, indirect, and total effects of unions based on estimates obtained from structural equation modelling (also see Appendix B). As revealed in table 5, the estimated indirect effects of unions, through *Bur practices*, are roughly equivalent to its direct effects in the case of *security* and *justice*, but substantially larger in the case of *dignity* and *fairness*. However, the direct effect for *union* is statistically significant only in the regression for *justice* (consistent with table 4), suggesting that it is indeed management practices that may matter most and that the role of unions is largely indirect, though their implications for these practices. In turn, when their implications for *trust in mgmt* are accounted for (see row 2), their estimated total effects decline.

¹¹ However, controlling for *trust in mgmt* made little difference to the union coefficient in the column 3 to 6 regressions. Subsequent analysis (with *trust in mgmt* as the dependent variable) revealed that this is likely because unions bear little association with trust until *Bur practices* is entered. Thus, it would appear that unions have indirect positive implications for trust through their implications for management practices, but negative direct implications.

In answer to question three, therefore, these results suggest that unions do little to alter the dignity with which workers are treated, at least as measured in this study. They also suggest that it is not union representation per se, but rather bureaucratic practices, that matter most. Unions bear direct positive associations only with perceptions of justice at work. However, they appear to have positive indirect associations with perceptions of security, fairness, and justice, at least to the extent that they can be seen as casually prior to bureaucratic practices. These positive associations may be offset by a higher tendency of union workers to distrust management and hence by negative affect. But unions appear to bear stronger positive associations with the *actual* treatment afforded workers.

Question 4: Do Non-union Forms of Representation Have Equivalent Effects? In contrast to the findings for *union*, the coefficients for *mgmt-established system* are positive and statistically significant in the table 4, column 3 regressions for all four dependent variables, while the coefficients for *association* are consistently positive and significant in all but the regression for *security*. But again in contrast to the findings for *union*, the coefficients for both of these forms of representation steadily decline in magnitude as controls are introduced. In the case of *association*, they become statistically insignificant across all four dependent variables once subjectivity controls have been introduced (column 6) and remain insignificant thereafter. In the case of *mgmt-established system*, however, they are all still positive statistically significant until *Best practices* is entered (column 7), at which point they become statistically insignificant in the regressions for *security* and *fairness*. Once *Bur practices* is entered, they become statistically insignificant in the regressions for *dignity* and *justice* as well. This trend is partly reversed with the introduction of *trust in mgmt* (column 9). *Mgmt-established system* becomes statistically

significant (and positive) in the regressions for *dignity* and *justice*, although the coefficients are relatively small and are significant only at the .10 level.¹²

The finding that alternative forms of representation have initially positive results but that these decline as controls are entered suggests that, in contrast to the results for union representation, a failure to introduce a full array of controls results in upward estimation biases. Once all controls are entered, only *mgmt-established system* would appear to have any implications for the dependent variables in this study, and these would appear to be marginal.

As is the case for union representation, it would appear that it is management practices rather than non-union representation per se that matters most, because *mgmt-established system* also becomes insignificant once the management practice measures are entered. It is possible that this is because it has indirect positive effects similar to those for unions. Yet, as discussed earlier, management-established systems are voluntarily introduced by employers rather than legally imposed on them and not entail Wagner-style bargaining, as is almost always the case for union representation. It is thus more likely that this form of representation is introduced as part of a strategy that includes best and bureaucratic practices (or a combination thereof) and hence that these practices are not a consequence of this form of representation (contrary to the case for union representation) but rather implemented in conjunction with it.¹³

In answer to question four, therefore, associations do not appear to matter to authority relations. Management-established, management-established systems do appear to have relatively strong democratization effects, but only prior to the introduction of management

¹² In regressions with *trust in mgmt* as the dependent variable (also see fn. 10), the coefficient for *nonunion representation* is positive until *Bur practices* is introduced, at which point it becomes negative. Although it is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, this likely explains why the inclusion of *trust in mgmt* yields only small increases the magnitude of the coefficients for *nonunion representation* in the table 4 regressions.

¹³ **For this reason, we do not report estimated direct and indirect effects for this variable. However, these may be computed using the estimates in Appendix B.**

practice variables, reflecting the tendency for these systems to be implemented as part of a broader management strategy. Thus, we interpret these findings as suggesting that workers may *on average* be only slightly (if at all) worse off in workplaces with management-established representation systems than they are in union workplaces, but this is likely because of the bundle of practices that they tend to be associated with, not because of these systems per se.

Question 5: Do Non-Union Systems Lower the Propensity to Vote for a Union?

The final question to be addressed (question five) is whether non-union forms of representation may not only be taking the place of unions, but also may help to explain their decline through their implications for union voting propensities. To address this possibility, we ran a series of specifications as in table 4, but on the non-union sample only and with *union voting propensity* as the dependent variable (see table 3).¹⁴ Because this is a binary variable, we use logistic regression analysis.

As revealed in table 6, there is little evidence that non-union systems matter to voting propensity. Neither *mgmt-established system* nor *association* is significant in any of the specifications. The coefficients are especially small for the former. This could be because much depends on the extent to which representatives address wage and benefit issues, rather than whether some form of system is in place per se. However, the results did not change when we replaced *mgmt-established system* with a composite measure allowing us to address this possibility. Finally, consistent with recent research (Godard 2009), *Bur practices* bears a statistically significant negative association with *propensity*.

¹⁴ Twenty-two percent of non-union respondents stated that they would vote for a union, while 68 percent stated that they would not (10 percent were uncertain). This is lower than prior national-level estimates, which have ranged from roughly 30 to 50 percent. However, the developments of 2008-2010 appear to have substantially lowered general support for unions (Jones 2011); they also likely lowered the perceived effectiveness of unions. Both have been consistently found to bear strong associations with voting propensity (Godard 2008)

Conclusions

Our findings should be treated with caution, because they are largely based on employee perceptions, which are not always be entirely accurate. Nonetheless, they suggest that union decline has likely resulted in a "de-democratization" of authority relations at work despite arguments that non-union representation and the strengthening of employment law in the United States have effectively rendered it unimportant. It would appear that unions continue to have positive implications for perceptions of security, fairness, and justice at work once a full set of objective, job content, and subjective controls has been entered. These associations diminish once management practices, especially "bureaucratic" practices, are entered, with the result that unions appear to have implications only for justice at work. This suggests that it is not unions per se, but bureaucratic practices that matter most. However, these are practices that unions have traditionally fought for. To the extent that unions may be viewed as causally prior to them, they may still be seen to have important democratization effects, albeit in large part indirectly, through these practices. We also find the effects of unions to be strengthened once worker trust in management is entered, likely reflecting the tendency for union workers to be more conscious than otherwise of underlying conflicts and suggesting that the effects of unions on actual authority relations are stronger than on perceptions of these relations.

Management-established representation systems may, however, have been taking the place of unions. Although our sample may not be perfectly representative of the US labor force, our results suggest that workers are substantially (1.5 times) more likely to be subject to such a system than they are to be represented by a union and that these systems are typically involved in the determination of wages and benefits. Moreover, where established, workers evaluate them as favourably as union workers do their unions. In addition, these systems are associated with

heightened perceptions of security, dignity, fairness, and justice, suggesting strong democratization effects. With the exception of perceptions of dignity, however, these associations are weaker than for unions once the full set of objective, job content, and subjective controls has been introduced. They also diminish once management practices (especially bureaucratic) are entered. It is possible that this reflects indirect effects, as for unions. Yet because these systems are established voluntarily by management, it is more likely that this finding reflects a tendency for them to be adopted in conjunction with various management practices and hence to be coterminous rather than causally prior to these practices. In other words, in contrast to unions, management-established representation systems do not have democratization effects so much as they tend to be part of broader "regimes" that do. It is these regimes, not management-established representation systems per se, that substitute for unions.

In contrast, it would not appear that non-union associations, especially identity based ones, have not been taking the place of unions. Only a small portion of our sample is a member of an independent non-union association, and where they are, it is typically based on their occupation. Although evaluated relatively favourably by their members, these associations also do not appear to bear any relationship with workplace authority relations once objective, job content, and subjective controls are entered.

Finally, neither non-union associations nor management-established representation systems appear to affect the propensity of workers to vote for a union. However, bureaucratic practices, which tend to be associated with the latter, do appear to have significant negative implications, a finding consistent with recent Canadian research (Godard 2009), and with our argument that unions matter to the adoption of these practices, so that where these practices are already established, workers believe there to be less need for a union.

Overall, it would thus appear that, although both unions and management-established representation systems have positive democratization effects (on perceived justice and dignity, respectively) exclusive of their associations with employer practices, it is the latter, and especially more traditional bureaucratic practices, that are most important to the democratization of authority relations at work. Unions typically play an important role in the adoption of these practices, and so they may be argued to have important indirect effects, effects that non-union systems of representation do not likely have. Because of this, these practices and not management-established systems also appear to serve a union substitution function where a union is not established, as reflected in lower union voting propensities.

Our finding that unions still appear to matter to worker perceptions of workplace authority relations (even if largely through their implications for employer practices) can be seen to provide support for stronger labor laws, while our finding that union voting propensities are not affected by management-established representation systems can be seen to provide support for the repeal of section 8(a)(2) of the Wagner Act. Yet the latter conclusion must be qualified. Management-established systems may be used to forestall unions in a number of ways other than lowering voting propensities (e.g., to detect and quash increases in support for a union). Thus, our findings provide only limited support for repeal of section 8(a)(2). In addition, management-established systems do not appear to have implications for workplace authority relations comparable to those of unions, and even though practices associated with them do, both exist at management's behest and on management's terms. As such, any apparent diffusion of these systems and practices should not be viewed as weakening the case for stronger labour laws.

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Table 1

	Full sample n=1000	Excluding public services workers ¹ n=543
Percent covered by a collective agreement	17	10
Percent covered by "a non-union, management established system, where worker representatives meet with management" (non-union respondents only)	34	31
Percent covered by "a non-union, management established system, where worker representatives meet with management" but no union (all respondents)	28	27
Percent who are "a member of another type of association to assist you with work-related matters. This association may be based on your occupation, race, gender, or some other characteristic you identify with."	15	12
Percent covered by a collective agreement and who are members of an association	18	9
Percent not covered by a collective agreement and who are members of an association.	14	12
Percent not covered by either a collective agreement or a management-established non-union representation system but who are members of an association.	11	10
Percent of total sample represented only by an association	6	6
Percent of association members reporting that "main characteristic that unites members of this association" is:		
occupation	74	65
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation	7	11
religion	1	2
other	17	22

Prevalence of Alternative Forms of Representation

1 = includes workers in government, education, health, and the social services.

Table 2
Evaluations of Alternative Forms of Representation

	Very little if at all	To some extent	To a great extent
Evaluations of unions: all respondents covered by collective agreements:			
Union representatives can be counted on to stand up for workers, even if this means a disagreement with management.	16	30	54
Union representatives actively consult with workers about their ideas or concerns	23	36	41
Evaluations of management-established, non-union representation systems: all respondents covered by a non-union system:			
Non-union representatives can be counted on to stand up for workers, even if this means a disagreement with management.	17	33	51
Non-union representatives actively consult with workers about their ideas or concerns	11	35	54
Evaluations of employee associations: all respondents reporting membership:			
This association or organization can be counted on to stand up for workers, even if this means a disagreement with management.	32	30	38
This association or organization actively consults with workers about their ideas or concerns	13	43	44
Percent of workers with a management-established non-union representation system reporting that their representatives actively consult with management over wages and benefits.	20	42	37

Table 3
Variables

Dependent Variables

Security (single item): You feel that your job is secure (1=disagree strongly to =agree strongly)

Dignity (3 item scale, divided by 3, $\alpha=.79$): a) Management consults workers or their representatives on major work-related decisions (if R unclear, say "... for example, if work is to be reorganized). b) You feel free to openly question a manager's decision if you disagree with it. c) The person for whom you work treats you with respect (if more than one, ask about the main person to whom R reports) (1=disagree strongly to 4=agree strongly; unsure=2.5).

Fairness (4 item scale, divided by 4, $\alpha=.81$): a) The way in which work is assigned is fair. b) The way in which pay levels are decided is fair. c) The way in which promotions are decided is fair. d) Employees are treated fairly when they do something wrong. (1=disagree strongly to 4=agree strongly; unsure=2.5).

Justice (4 item scale, divided by 4, $\alpha=.77$): a) If a co-worker was unjustly dismissed, it is likely that something could be done to make things right. b) If a female co-worker was denied a promotion due to her gender, it is likely that something could be done to make things right. c) If a co-worker was bullied by a manager, it is likely that something could be done to make things right. d) If a co-worker was denied pay or bonus money to which she was entitled, it is likely that something could be done to make things right. (1=disagree strongly to 5=agree strongly). (For each item, if R needs clarification, state "This could involve going to a government body, a union rep, a manager, or some other channel" If for any item, R states "would not happen," respond with "Well, what if it did?")

Union voting propensity (single item): If an actual ballot was held today, would you be likely to vote for a union? (1=no, 2=yes).

Independent Variables

Union (single item): Are you covered by a union agreement? (1=yes, 2=no)

Mgmt-established system (single item): Is there a non-union, management established system, where worker representatives meet with management? (1=yes, 2=no).

Association (single item): Are you a member of another type of association to assist you with work related matters? This may be based on your occupation, race, gender, or some other characteristic you identify with. (1=yes, 2=no).

Objective Controls (mixed response formats) a) average hours worked per week, b) number of employees at workplace (1=under 25, 4=over 500), c) employer's current financial situation (1=very good to 5= very bad); d) age; e) if male, f) average hourly pay; g) education, h) 4 occupational dummies, j) if public services.

Job Content Controls: Fulfill (3 item additive scale, divided by 3, $\alpha=.73$) a) There is a lot of variety in what you do in your job. b) Your job makes you keep learning new things. c) Your job is fulfilling. **Autonomy** (2 item additive scale, divided by 2, $\alpha=.56$), a) You are free to choose how you do your work. b) You are free to alter the times at which you work. (1=disagree strongly to 4=agree strongly; unsure=2.5).

Subjective Controls: a) Thinking politically and socially, where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is very liberal and 10 is very conservative? b) You have always, by your nature, tended to be a happy person. c) You have always, by your nature, tended to worry about issues of fairness and justice. d) You have always, by your nature, tended to view working as central to who you are? e) You have always, by your nature, tended to believe employees should always follow management instructions, without questioning them? f) You have always, by your nature, tended to think unions are needed to look out for workers? g) You have always, by your nature, tended to get involved in things, such as political, cultural, or religious activities. h) You have always, by your nature, tended to trust others (item a: 1=very conservative, 10=very liberal; items b to h: 1 = strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree; unsure=2.5).

/continued over

Table 3 continued

Best practices (9 item additive index, divided by 9, all items standardized, $\alpha=.70$). a) When you were first hired by your current employer, were you asked to participate in any team building, communication, or similar exercises? b) Before you were hired, were you given a test asking about your attitudes, preferences, or general personality? c) Over the past twelve months, how many days have you spent in employer sponsored training or development sessions? d) Are you and your co-workers subject to a system for measuring your performance? e) How often do managers hold formal meetings with you and your co-workers with the primary purpose of keeping you informed about things? Such meetings might be held on a team, departmental, workplace, or even company-wide basis. f) To what extent does management encourage employees to engage in continuous learning or long term development? g) To what extent are you and your co-workers subject to a continuous quality improvement system? h) How about a group or team based system, in which people do their work as members of formally designated teams? i) To what extent are these teams self-managed, with no direct supervision? j) To what extent does your pay depend on incentives or bonuses? (mixed response formats)

Bur practices (4 item additive index, divided by 4, all items standardized $\alpha=.67$). a) When a job opens up, current employees are given priority over external applicants. b) When a job opens up, employees with the most seniority are given priority, provided they are qualified. c) Job security policies or protections make it unlikely that permanent employees will ever be laid off. d) Workers who believe they have been unfairly treated are able to get a formal hearing, with some form of representation. (1= strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree).

Trust in Mgmt. (single item) You can trust management (1=strongly disagree to 4= strongly agree; unsure=2.5).

Note: For the Likert-type items, low numbers of respondents typically answered "neither agree nor disagree," which was initially scored as 3. These items were thus coded to range from 1 to 4, with the neither response scored 2.5.

Table 4
Representation and Authority Relations at Work
Hierarchical Regressions (OLS)

	(2) Union coverage only	(3) Alternative forms of rep entered	(4) Objective controls entered	(5) Job content controls entered	(6) Subjective controls entered	(7) <i>Best</i> <i>practices</i> entered	(8) <i>Bur</i> <i>practices</i> entered	(9) <i>Trust in</i> <i>mgmt.</i> entered
Security Regressions								
<i>Union</i>	.006	.038	.067**	.087***	.090***	.087***	.011	.044
<i>Mgm- estab. system</i>		.106***	.087***	.053*	.055*	.048	.014	.021
<i>Association</i>		.050	.034	-.006	-.008	-.011	-.013	-.026
<i>Best practices</i>						.038	-.013	-.038
<i>Bur practices</i>							.325***	.218***
Rsqr.	.000	.014	.095	.183	.199	.200	.278	.331
Dignity Regressions								
<i>Union</i>	-.083***	-.037	-.003	.030	.030	.018	-.064**	-.016
<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>		.157***	.149***	.094***	.096***	.068**	.030	.040*
<i>Association</i>		.111***	.102***	.038	.033	.021	.019	.001
<i>Best practices</i>						.156***	.102***	.066***
<i>Bur practices</i>							.350***	.200***
Rsqr.	.007	.045	.116	.346	.370	.388	.479	.584
Fairness Regressions								
<i>Union</i>	-.032	.000	.030	.057***	.071**	.064**	-.056**	-.014
<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>		.109***	.100***	.050*	.051*	.033	-.021	-.012
<i>Association</i>		.095***	.084***	.025	.016	.009	.005	-.011
<i>Best practices</i>						.097***	.018	-.014
<i>Bur practices</i>							.509***	.379***
Rsqr.	.001	.023	.082	.274	.306	.313	.504	.584
Justice Regressions								
<i>Union</i>	.089***	.133***	.132***	.148***	.153***	.146***	.045	.074**
<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>		.152***	.138***	.102***	.105***	.091***	.044	.050*
<i>Association</i>		.111***	.099***	.055*	.047	.041	.038	.027
<i>Best practices</i>						.079**	.011	-.011
<i>Bur practices</i>							.438***	.348***
Rsqr.	.008	.044	.078	.178	.212	.207	.349	.388

*=significant at .10 level, **=significant at the .05 level, ***=significant at the .01 level (two tailed).

Hierarchical analysis with standardized coefficients; each column adds additional controls to the specification in the preceding column. See table 3 for each set of controls.

Table 5

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Total objective union effect (cols. 4+5)	Total objective + subjective (cols 4+5+6)	Direct union effect	Indirect, through <i>Bur practices</i>	Indirect, through <i>trust in mgmt</i>
<i>Security</i>	.095	.067	.045	.050+	-.028+
<i>Dignity</i>	.038	-.004	-.011	.049+	-.042+
<i>Fairness</i>	.081	.044	-.011	.092+	-.037+
<i>Justice</i>	.152	.128	.076***	.076+	-.024+

Decomposition of Direct and Indirect Effects of Union Coverage

(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Objective	Job content	Subjective	<i>Best</i>	<i>Bur</i>

All estimates are computed with the same variables as in columns 8 and 9 of table 3, but using structural equation modelling (see appendix B). The estimated total effects differ somewhat from their equivalent estimates in table 3 due to computational differences (SEM relies on generalized least squares) and corrections for measurement error.

*** = significant at the .01 level or better

+ = both coefficients used to compute an indirect effect are significant at the .10 level or better.

Table 6
Non-union Representation and the Propensity to Vote for a Union
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis

(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Objective controls entered	Job content controls entered	Subjective controls entered	<i>Best practices</i> entered	<i>Bur practices</i> entered

<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	-.048	.100	.121	.072	.134
<i>Association</i>	-.419	-.276	-.162	-.175	-.141
<i>Bur practices</i>					.374**
Rsq.	.066	.111	.307	.308	.312

*=significant at .10 level, **=significant at the .05 level, ***=significant at the .01 level (two tailed). Hierarchical analysis with unstandardized coefficients; each column adds further controls to the specification from the preceding column..

Appendix A
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: Key Variables

	Range	mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. <i>secure</i>	1 to 4	3.2	.98									
2. <i>dignity</i>	1 to 4	3.2	.78	.41								
3. <i>fairness</i>	1 to 4	3.1	.75	.45	.64							
4. <i>justice</i>	1 to 4	3.1	.75	.32	.51	.55						
5. <i>union</i>	0 to 1	.17	.39	.01	-.08	-.03	.09					
6. <i>mgmt estab. system</i>	0 to 1	.28	.44	.10	.18	.12	.12	-.32				
7. <i>association</i>	0 to 1	.18	.36	.07	.13	.12	.13	.04	.08			
8. <i>best practices</i>	-1.2 to 1.3	.00	.51	.16	.25	.21	.21	.04	.23	.17		
9. <i>bur practices</i>	-1.9 to 1.0	.00	.71	.44	.52	.62	.53	.15	.12	.10	.27	
10. <i>trust</i>	1 to 4	.31	1.01	.50	.69	.66	.48	-.12	.14	.14	.22	.50

Note: If a correlation is greater than .06, $p=.05$ or less

Appendix B
Structural Equation Modelling Estimates
(Standardized Regression Weights)

			Estimates	P
<i>Bur practices</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	.208	.001
<i>Bur practices</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	.186	.001
<i>Bur practices</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	.075	.012
<i>Best practices</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	.121	.001
<i>Best practices</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	.248	.001
<i>Best practices</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	.145	.001
<i>trust in mgmt</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	-.084	.001
<i>trust in mgmt</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	.116	.001
<i>trust in mgmt</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	.037	.001
<i>Security</i>	←	<i>Bur practices</i>	.238	.001
<i>Security</i>	←	<i>Best practices</i>	-.034	.241
<i>Security</i>	←	<i>Trust in mgmt</i>	.339	.001
<i>Security</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	.045	.112
<i>Security</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	.023	.435
<i>Security</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	-.026	.348
<i>Dignity</i>	←	<i>Bur practices</i>	.235	.001
<i>Dignity</i>	←	<i>Best practices</i>	.087	.001
<i>Dignity</i>	←	<i>Trust in mgmt</i>	.500	.001
<i>Dignity</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	-.011	.663
<i>Dignity</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	.049	.056
<i>Dignity</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	.008	.736
<i>Fairness</i>	←	<i>Bur practices</i>	.443	.001
<i>Fairness</i>	←	<i>Best practices</i>	-.004	.868
<i>Fairness</i>	←	<i>Trust in mgmt</i>	.435	.001
<i>Fairness</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	-.011	.651
<i>Fairness</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	-.015	.559
<i>Fairness</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	-.001	.961
<i>Justice</i>	←	<i>Bur practices</i>	.367	.001
<i>Justice</i>	←	<i>Best practices</i>	.000	1.000
<i>Justice</i>	←	<i>Trust in mgmt</i>	.280	.001
<i>Justice</i>	←	<i>Union</i>	.076	.005
<i>Justice</i>	←	<i>Mgmt-estab. system</i>	.052	.063
<i>Justice</i>	←	<i>Association</i>	.035	.187

NOTE TO REFEREES: This table includes estimates for *mgmt-established system* and *association*, and for *Best practices*. We think it best to drop these because they are not hypothesized in the paper.

This will also save space. However, we have included them at this point for the purview of the referees.