Why Do People Stay Poor?

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Introduction
Global poor are those whose income falls below the global poverty line, the famous “Dollar A Day” line

nowadays $1.90
The share of people living in absolute poverty has been dropping steadily in the last 200 years.
Poverty has been decreasing but is still high in SSA and SA
But numbers are stable in the poorest regions
Inequality and Intergenerational Persistence

Figure 6. The Great Gatsby Curve: More Inequality Is Associated with Less Mobility across the Generations

FIGURE 0.11  Higher relative IGM in income is associated with lower income inequality

Correlation = 0.56

Source: Equalchances 2018, compiled from multiple studies; GDIM 2018 (World Bank); World Development Indicators for income inequality.
Note: Higher intergenerational income elasticity indicates lower relative intergenerational mobility (IGM).

Source: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28428
Need to address the “stubborn poverty” problem: a lot of poor people are left behind even as countries grow.

We need to understand why people stay poor in order to design policies that lift the poorest out of poverty.

75% of extreme poor rural and of these majority work in agriculture (World Bank 2013)
Labor is the sole endowment of the poor → we need to understand what determines earnings

Earnings = wage × hours worked

This comes down to the choice of jobs
Laborers represents a large part of the workforce

- Nearly a third of workers in India and a fifth of workers in Bangladesh and Pakistan are itinerant wage labourers (World Bank 2011)

- 67% of landless rural workers report casual employment as their primary source of earnings (Kaur 2017)

- 98% of agricultural wage employment in India is through casual employment typified by spot markets (Kaur 2017)
Informal/Casual jobs

- Offered on a daily/hourly basis with no guarantee of further employment
- Very common: 98% of agricultural wage employment in India is through casual employment (Kaur 2017)
- Wage is low & elasticity to production shocks is high (Jayachandran 05)
- Demand during the lean season is very low (Khandker and Mahmud, 2012; Bryan et al, 2014; Fink et al, 2017)
  - Hides a lot of underemployment
Two standard views – convergence vs poverty trap

**Equal** access to opportunity, **different** fundamentals

- People have different fundamentals (productivity, preferences) which determine their occupational choices and earnings
- In the long run people converge to a steady state determined by fundamentals

**Unequal** access to opportunity, **similar** fundamentals

- People have different access to opportunity which determine their occupational choices and earnings
- People with the same fundamentals may converge to different steady states, depending on initial endowments
Make precise the assumptions underpinning the two views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equal access to opportunity, different fundamentals</th>
<th>Unequal access to opportunity, similar fundamentals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• People have different fundamentals which determine their occupational choices and earnings</td>
<td>• People have different access to opportunity which determine their occupational choices and earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Convergence to unique steady state occurs if either</td>
<td>• Multiple steady states may exist if</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DRS to factors that can be accumulated Or</td>
<td>• IRS to factors that can be accumulated And</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perfect credit markets</td>
<td>• Imperfect credit markets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Ghatak (2015)
If opportunities do not depend on initial wealth, you need differences in innate traits (A, s) to explain poverty.
If opportunities depend on initial wealth, individuals with identical innate traits \((A, s)\) can end up poor or non-poor.
View 1: A hill anyone can climb

Animation credit: Oriana Bandiera!
The economics behind the hill

- A person is born with an asset – say a shop – that generates income.
- She decides how much to consume and how much to save and reinvest in the shop.
- You get a “hill” if it is easier to grow a small shop than a large one, because, for instance, the same level of investment is more valuable when there are many unexploited growth opportunities.
A steep mountain face

Animation credit: Oriana!
The economics behind the mountain

- A person is born with an asset – say a shop - that generates income.
- She decides how much to consume and how much to save and reinvest in the shop.
- You get a “mountain face” if it is easier to grow a large shop than a small one, for instance because required investments are chunky.
- This, combined with little access to credit can generate “poverty traps” → people with the talent to run a business, study for a degree etc end up not doing so.
Poverty traps are both unfair and inefficient

- Unfair because two people with the same potential end up with different standards of living because of accidents at birth → poorer person faces higher barrier

- Inefficient because productive people who are born poor will not be able to exploit their productive potential and will be replaced by a less productive, richer, person

- Unutilized assets – institutional frictions prevent surplus creation (credit markets, long term labour contracts)

- Not just wealth: gender, race, caste can all cause barriers
Can the poor do better jobs when given the chance?

- Study by Bandiera, Burgess et al QJE 2017
- Sample over 21k households in 13009 villages in rural Bangladesh
- 6% are defined as ultra-poor (does not even qualify for microcredit)
- The poorest women in randomly chosen villages receive a large asset (a cow) with some training
- Over 4000 beneficiaries engaged solely in casual labor at baseline
- Asset transfer of approximately $560 in PPP in 2007
- Near doubling of baseline wealth for the ultra-poor
- Surveyed again in 2009, 2011, and 2014
Study site: Bangladesh

Lack of demand for casual wage labor, higher grain prices, extreme poverty and food insecurity
TUP targets the poorest women (but most are poor)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Ultra-Poor</th>
<th>(2) Near-Poor</th>
<th>(3) Middle Class</th>
<th>(4) Upper Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of population in this wealth class</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary female is illiterate</td>
<td>.929</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household is below the $1.25 a day poverty line</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Expenditure (per adult equivalent)</td>
<td>627.8</td>
<td>645.1</td>
<td>759.5</td>
<td>1234.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Assets [USD]</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>279.9</td>
<td>1663.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household savings [USD]</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>481.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household receives loans</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>.498</td>
<td>.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household gives loans</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business assets (excl. livestock and land) [USD]</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>286.1</td>
<td>1569.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The poorest women have fewer productive assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(2) Near-Poor</th>
<th>(3) Middle Class</th>
<th>(4) Upper Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value of cows [USD]</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>120.2</td>
<td>633.8</td>
<td>1559.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of goats [USD]</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household rents cows for rearing</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household rents goats for rearing</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household owns land</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.487</td>
<td>.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of land owned [USD]</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>491.2</td>
<td>6789.6</td>
<td>40125.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household rents land for cultivation</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>.168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The poor do casual labor, the rich only livestock rearing
Casual labor pays less per hour and is available on fewer days

### Village Level Statistics, Measured Pre-Intervention

Means, standard deviation in parentheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Casual Wage Labor</th>
<th>Self Employment</th>
<th>(4) t-test</th>
<th>(5) t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Agriculture</td>
<td>(2) Domestic Maid</td>
<td>(3) Livestock Rearing [Cows, Goats]</td>
<td>[Col 1 = Col 3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days per year</td>
<td>127 (65.9)</td>
<td>167 (89.5)</td>
<td>334 (41.2)</td>
<td>[.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per day</td>
<td>7.62 (1.15)</td>
<td>7.04 (1.74)</td>
<td>1.83 (.771)</td>
<td>[.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hourly earnings [USD]</td>
<td>.344 (.102)</td>
<td>.268 (.109)</td>
<td>.719 (.779)</td>
<td>[.000]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** All statistics are constructed at the village level, using baseline data from both treatment and control villages. The number of villages is 1309. In Column 3, livestock comprises cows and/or goats. To reduce sensitivity to outliers, the hours per day and hourly earnings variables are computed by first taking the median value for each activity in a village, and then averaging these across all villages. Columns 4 and 5 report p-values on a t-test of the equality of some of these outcomes between the two forms of casual wage labor (agriculture and domestic maid work) and livestock rearing. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
The poor have fewer assets and don’t accumulate over time.
Composition of assets at baseline by decile – ultra poor

Log productive assets in 2007

- Livestock
- Poultry
- Business assets
- Land
Wage earnings are flat, livestock earnings increasing
Wage labor is uncertain, seasonal and pays less per hour

Occupation correlated with ownership of productive assets (k): livestock, business assets (rickshaws, boats, sheds, agricultural machinery etc.) and land

Asset holdings stable through time
Can the poor do better jobs when given the chance?

- four years later after the asset transfer programme...
Ultrapoor women change jobs and work more hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIVESTOCK HOURS</th>
<th>AG LABOR HOURS</th>
<th>MAID HOURS</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
<th>TOTAL DAYS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
They earn more and consume more

- earnings: 21
- pce: 11
- durables: 57
and they save more and accumulate more assets
Both training and asset transfers transform the occupational choices of the beneficiaries

Leading to more employment and earnings → more investment → sustainable poverty reduction
Using our estimates of earnings the rate of return is 22%.

But the program is expensive: $560 -- GDP pc $541.

Cost more than one year worth of consumption and cannot be bought in pieces → poor talented people cannot afford them.

Large transfer allows them to escape the trap.

But for some it is not enough & they fall back.

What determines this - initial endowment level?

Subject of current exercise.
Preliminary evidence: some beneficiaries go back
Heterogeneity in asset accumulation behavior

What explains that?

In a poverty trap world, initial endowment should play a key role
1. Use theory to illustrate how response to exogenous shock to endowments can be used to test between the two views of poverty

2. Implement test using RCT in Bangladesh (Bandiera et al., QJE 2017) tracking 21k HHs across wealth distribution over 7 years

3. Inform the design of policies for poverty reduction
Theoretical Framework
Each person $i$ is born with one unit of time, wealth endowment $E_i$ and talent $A_i$ for self-employment

- 1 is wage labor, pays $w$
- 2 is livestock rearing, requires capital $K$ and yields $A_i f(K)$

Assume occupational choice is discrete

Can allow for mixing
Perfect credit markets + DRS $\rightarrow$ equal opportunities
In a model with savings, individuals can save their way out of poverty as small investments at low $K$ have high returns.

That is, as long as $f(.)$ is concave, credit market imperfections cannot generate a trap.
IRS at low K increase the minimum viable scale

\[ y = \max\{w, A f(k)\} \]

\[ y = w \]
We now have two groups of people for given talent $A$:

- those for whom $E_i > K(A_i^*)$ \(\rightarrow\) choose optimally
- those for whom $E_i < K(A_i^*)$ \(\rightarrow\) stuck in wage labor

\(\rightarrow\) endowments matter

\(\rightarrow\) some people observed in wage labor actually have $A > A^*$

\(\rightarrow\) misallocation

No credit markets + IRS \(\rightarrow\) poverty trap
Assume everyone has the same productivity $A$

Everyone has a given $k_0 \geq 0$

Everyone is given the same transfer $\Delta > 0$

Then the transition equation is

$$k_1 = sAf(k_0 + \Delta) + (1 - \delta)(k_0 + \Delta)$$

We are interested in

$$\Delta_1 \equiv k_1 - (k_0 + \Delta)$$
Let us define the function

\[ g(k_0) = sAf(k_0 + \Delta) - \delta(k_0 + \Delta) \]

We want to know

- If \( \Delta_1 \equiv g(k_0) \) is positive or negative
- If \( \Delta_1 \) is increasing or decreasing in \( k_0 \)
Convergence world

- $g(k_0)$ is strictly concave in $k_0$

- Depending on the size of $\Delta$ one of the following will hold regarding $g(k_0)$:
  - It will first increase, reach a maximum, and then decrease
  - Be decreasing

- It will reach the value 0 at $k_0 = k^*$ (the unique steady state) and after that will become negative
Let us take the S-shaped production function

\[ g(k_0) \] is strictly convex in \( k_0 \) for \( k_0 \leq \hat{k} \) and strictly concave for \( k_0 \geq \hat{k} \)

Also, \( g(k_0) < 0 \) for \( k_0 \leq \hat{k} \)

If the transfer \( \Delta \) is received for \( k_0 = \hat{k} - \Delta \) then the individual reaches the unstable steady state and stays there without further shocks

However for \( k_0 \geq \hat{k} \) the situation is similar to the case of convergence
Response to asset transfer in equal opportunity view

\[ k_{t+1} = k_t \]

\[ k_{t+1} = sA f(k_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t \]

\[ \Delta_1^A > 0 \]

\[ \Delta_1^B < 0 \]

Transfer (by design the same)

Change after Transfer (Varies depending on \( k_0 \))
How changes in $k$ depend on $k_0$
Changes in $k$ plotted against $k_0$ in Solow world

poorer people more likely to accumulate $k$
Response to asset transfer in unequal opportunity view

\[ k_{t+1} = k_t \]

\[ k_{t+1} = s Af(k_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t \]
$k_{t+1} = sAf(k_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t$
Changes in $k$ plotted against $k_0$ in Poverty Trap world

poorer people more likely to decumulate $k$
We test the joint $H_0$ that (i) there is a threshold and (ii) the program pushes some above and leaves others below

\[ k_{t+1} = sAf(k_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t \]

- Compare person A with person B
- Both receive transfer of size $\Delta$
- Transfer sends A below and B above $\hat{k}$
- A reverts back towards low steady state, $k^L$
- B escapes poverty and ends up at high steady state, $k^H$
Role of Training? Shifts the threshold down & high s.s. up

\[ k_{t+1} = sAf(k_t, h') + (1 - \delta)k_t \]

\[ k_{t+1} = sAf(k_t, h'') + (1 - \delta)k_t \]
Empirical Analysis
K shock: Asset transfer worth 1 year of PCE
4k HHs received the program at the same time
By design all get a package of similar value
But they start with different assets at baseline
Preliminary evidence: some beneficiaries go back
Identifying the threshold

- Level of $K$ such that those below fall back into poverty and those above escape

- This is identified by:
  - estimating the transition equation for $K$
  - finding the point, if any, where it crosses the 45 line from below

- Note: this estimates an average threshold
The transition equation

\[ k_{t+1} = sAf(k_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t \]

find this point
Non-parametric Identification of Transition Equation - Level

Local polynomial smooth, treated ultra poor

\[ \hat{k} = 2.34 \]

Sample includes treated ultra-poor households with baseline productive assets < 18,000 BDT.
Response to asset transfer in data – Change

Change in productive assets 2007-2011

Productive assets in 2007
Parametric identification

Polynomial of degree 3

\[ \hat{k} = 2.34 \]

\[ \hat{k} = 2.36 \]
Transition equation for control group
Productive assets in 2011

Placebo (red) vs Treatment (blue) - Levels

Baseline productive assets post-transfer (2007)
Placebo (red) vs Treatment (blue) - Levels

Control artificially “given” same transfer in both years
Suppose $\hat{k}$ is an unstable steady state

1. In equilibrium there should be no-one around it: people are either at the low or at the high SS

2. People brought by the program to the left of $\hat{k}$ should lose assets, those to the right should accumulate
At baseline the distribution of assets is bi-modal and density around the threshold is low.
After 2 years, some of the ultra-poor have crossed \( \hat{k} \)
After 4 years, more of the ultra-poor have crossed $\hat{k}$
Identification exploits differences in baseline assets

These could be correlated with traits – e.g. productivity - that determine the return to $k$
- the estimated $\hat{k}$ is an average of different thresholds
- no guarantee that people below it would be able to escape poverty had they been given enough

Shocks that drive capital accumulation

Is this really a poverty trap?
We consider some other explanations to assess whether the patterns we observe can be explained by differences in productivity correlated with baseline assets

1. Missing mass test

2. Sorting test
1. Missing Mass Test
Could Missing Mass be Driven by the A’s?

- One alternative explanation is that we are in the convergence world and A is correlated with baseline capital.
  - Individuals with low baseline capital have low A, and hence a low steady state, which they revert back to after the transfer.
  - Individuals with high baseline capital have high A, and hence a high steady state
  - They hadn’t fully converged to it before the transfer, but the transfer accelerates their convergence (and training shifts the unique steady state)
Could Missing Mass be Driven by the A’s?

- If this explanation was true, we would expect to see the change in assets to be increasing steadily in baseline assets, starting with negative change at low levels of baseline assets.

- Instead, we find the change to be decreasing in baseline assets below $\hat{k}$ and then there being a discontinuous jump.
Response to asset transfer in data, allowing for discontinuity

People below $\hat{k}$ lose assets at an increasing rate.

People above $\hat{k}$ accumulate more assets, at a decreasing rate.

Change in assets (2007-2011)

Productive assets ($k$) in 2007 + transfer
For this to happen in the alternative explanation above, the relationship between A and baseline capital would have to follow a similar pattern, which is unlikely.

Difficult to think of distribution of A that would produce the treatment pattern.
Consistent with no evidence for PT in panel data from China (Jalan and Ravallion, 2004), Hungary and Russia (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2004), or Pakistan and Ethiopia (Naschold, 2013).
Mean reversion - this is the pattern we would expect if individuals experience random shocks in each time period around some constant mean.

Had it not been for the programme, people above \( \hat{k} \) would have experienced a bigger loss due to mean reversion.
If individuals with higher baseline assets have higher A, hence high steady state level of capital, which they are still converging towards, this graph should be increasing.

For example, people with high baseline assets have experienced a positive asset shock just before baseline and are more likely to display lower asset level in the next survey round.

Rules out the conditional convergence explanation.
### Difference in difference estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>above $\hat{k}$</th>
<th>below $\hat{k}$</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>treatment</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>-.154</td>
<td>-.262***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.244***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.134***</td>
<td>.372***</td>
<td>-.507***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shows that hadn’t it been for the treatment pushing people above $\hat{k}$ to the new high SS, people with higher $k$ would have been more likely to lose assets (mean reversion to low SS)
Innate traits (A)

- Assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function:

\[ y = AK^{\beta_1}L^{\beta_2}H^{\beta_3} \]

- We want to test whether under this assumption the distribution of A can explain the observed bimodal distribution of productive assets.

- A is unobserved → estimate from panel of control HHs
- \( y_{i,t} \) is total income of the respondent, \( K_{i,t} \) is productive assets, \( L_{i,t} \) is total hours worked, \( H_{i,t} \) is respondent’s years of education, \( \gamma_i \) is an individual fixed effect, \( \delta_t \) is a time fixed effect, \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \) is an idiosyncratic error, and \( t \in \{2007, 2009, 2011\}. \)

- Regression equation:

\[
\ln(y_{i,t}) = \beta_1 \ln(K_{i,t}) + \beta_2 \ln(L_{i,t}) + \beta_3 \ln(H_{i,t}) + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]

- We interpret \( \exp(\hat{\gamma}_i) \), the individual fixed effect, as a measure of (unobserved) innate traits (A).
Could Missing Mass be Driven by the A’s? But A is unimodal
2. Sorting to Occupation Test
2 types of $k_0$: low and high

4 As in each type before transfer both types are in wage labor

after the transfer, only the brightest of low ($A_4$) but almost all of the high move to livestock

The average $A$ for switchers is \textit{decreasing} in $k_0$

The max $A$ for switchers is \textit{constant} in $k_0$

The min $A$ for switchers is \textit{decreasing} in $k_0$
Sorting when $A$ is correlated with $k_0$

2 types of $k_0$: low and high

Low has $A_{1-2}$, high has $A_{3-4}$

Before transfer both types are in wage labor

After the transfer, none of the low but all of the high types move to livestock

The average $A$ for switchers is increasing in $k_0$

The max $A$ for switchers is increasing in $k_0$

The min $A$ for switchers is increasing in $k_0$
Implications of $\text{cov}(k_0, A) = 0$ (vs $\text{cov}(k_0, A) > 0$)

1. The average $A$ for switchers is **decreasing** in $k_0$ (increasing)
2. The max $A$ for switchers is **constant** in $k_0$ (increasing)
3. The min $A$ for switchers is **decreasing** in $k_0$ (increasing)
A is not correlated with $k_0$
1. Average productivity of switchers is decreasing
2. Max productivity of switchers is flat

Local polynomial smooth

90th percentile of productivity in livestock

Baseline assets (k0)

Kernel: normal, bandwidth: 1.28
3. Min productivity of switchers is decreasing

Local polynomial smooth

10th pctile of productivity in livestock vs. baseline assets (k0)
Implications of $\text{cov}(k_0,A)=0$ (vs $\text{cov}(k_0,A)>0$)

1. The average $A$ for switchers is $decreasing$ in $k_0$ (increasing) ✔

2. The max $A$ for switchers is $constant$ in $k_0$ (increasing) ✔

3. The min $A$ for switchers is decreasing in $k_0$ (increasing) ✔
Mechanisms behind the Discontinuity
Nutrition

Per-adult equivalent annual food expenditure

Calorie intake per day per capita

Sample restricted to 3390 treated ultra-poor
Threshold at 2.34.

Cost of calories low relative to income even of the poorest (Subramanian and Deaton 1997, Banerjee and Duflo 2011)
Human capital

Body Mass Index

Years of Education of Main Respondent

Sample restricted to 3340 treated ultra-poor
Threshold at 2.34.

Sample restricted to 3540 treated ultra-poor
Threshold at 2.34.
Temptation goods or limited attention lead the poor to make worse choices (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010; Shah et al., 2012).
Suppose you have won 200 taka in a game. You can get this 200 taka today or get 250 taka instead in one month. Which one would you prefer?

1) 200 taka today
2) 250 taka in one month
Behavioral 2: risk aversion

Which payoff would you prefer?
1) 100 for winning, 100 for losing
2) 200 for winning, 60 for losing
3) 300 for winning, 20 for losing
4) 400 for winning, 0 for losing
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Savings Rate</th>
<th>(2) Risk Aversion</th>
<th>(3) Discount Rate</th>
<th>(4) Body Mass Index</th>
<th>(5) years of schooling, main female respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline productive assets</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
<td>-1.434**</td>
<td>-0.0934</td>
<td>0.0678</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Baseline productive assets)^2</td>
<td>0.00196</td>
<td>0.212*</td>
<td>0.00862</td>
<td>-0.00769</td>
<td>0.0415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Threshold</td>
<td>-0.000724</td>
<td>-0.0313</td>
<td>-0.0199</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>0.0758</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.0188</td>
<td>4.774***</td>
<td>1.672***</td>
<td>18.33***</td>
<td>1.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,385</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>3,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of dependent variable</td>
<td>0.00299</td>
<td>2.532</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>18.37</td>
<td>0.575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Regression discontinuity around threshold of 2.34. Standard errors are clustered at the spot ID level. Risk aversion is measured on a scale of 1 to 4 with higher values corresponding to lower risk aversion. Discount Rate is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent prefers a payment of 250Tk in 1 month over 200Tk now.
Why can’t the poor get past $\hat{k}$ on their own?

**Indivisible investments:** Given a limited set of production technologies and borrowing constraints, individuals face a non-convex production function (e.g. Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997).

- Supporting evidence: Pastoralists in rural Ethiopia (Lybbert et al., 2004; Santos and Barret 2011) and Kenya (Barrett et al. 2006).

**Evidence for IRS**
- fixed factors/indivisibilities
Asset composition differs: fewer chickens

Sample restricted to 2007 treated ultra-poor
Threshold at 2.34.

20% DROP
More goats

Share of goats in total assets

Sample restricted to 2007 treated ultra-poor
Threshold at 2.34.
More business assets (esp rickshaw and boats)

Share of business assets in total assets

Sample restricted to 2007 treated ultra-poor
Threshold at 2.34.
Regressions: composition of capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value of homestead land owned</td>
<td>baseline share of poultry in total assets</td>
<td>baseline share of goats in total assets</td>
<td>baseline share of business assets in total assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline productive assets</td>
<td>13,375***</td>
<td>-0.390***</td>
<td>-0.0643***</td>
<td>-0.205***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2,715)</td>
<td>(0.0218)</td>
<td>(0.00785)</td>
<td>(0.0161)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Above Threshold</td>
<td>670.2</td>
<td>-0.323***</td>
<td>0.0970***</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(889.5)</td>
<td>(0.0264)</td>
<td>(0.0124)</td>
<td>(0.0249)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-25,407***</td>
<td>1.730***</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6,163)</td>
<td>(0.0542)</td>
<td>(0.0195)</td>
<td>(0.0420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td>2,007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean of dependent variable</td>
<td>8239</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.0859</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Regression discontinuity around threshold of 2.34. Standard errors are clustered at the spot ID level. Capital shares are calculated as a fraction of total baseline productive assets.
Evidence that rural poor are locked into low productivity occupations

Sufficiently large transfers of productive assets (and training) can allow households to change occupation sustainably.

Those households who are elevated above a poverty threshold save and invest year after year and diversify into other assets (e.g. land).

Alternative approach: Address households’ autarky by infrastructure investments to reduce marketization/trade costs and allow rural households/regions to trade.
Taking stock

- Beneficiaries who do not start with complementary inputs regress back to poverty despite the large transfers.
- Those who do are elevated above the threshold and set on a sustainable path out of poverty.
- They save and invest year after year.
- They diversify into assets (e.g. land) that were not transferred by the program.
Policy
Microfinance is cheap (even profitable) but ineffective at allowing access to more remunerative occupations (Meager 18, Banerjee et al 15)

Vocational training programs typically have low take up if not they are effective, but expensive (McKenzie 17, Alfonsi et al 18)

Large assets & cash grants are effective at promoting occupational change, but expensive (Banerjee et al 15, Blattman et al 14,16, Bandiera et al 17)
The existence of a poverty threshold implies that only transfers large enough to push beneficiaries past the threshold will reduce poverty in the long run.

Smaller transfers might increase consumption for a short period but will have no long lasting effects.

BRAC asset transfer worth $515 (1 year of PCE) was enough for 66% of beneficiaries.

Micro-loans are typically <$200, which might explain the disappointing effects of microfinance.

For average effects to be high, need large number of people to cross the hump.
A big problem requires a big solution

Percentage of HHs above $\hat{k}$ on transfer size

Household transfer value

(share of average annual per capita consumption)
A big problem requires a big solution

Percentage of HHs above $\hat{k}$ on transfer size

Alternative Policies:
- Microloan 100 $ PPP
- Microloan 200 $ PPP
- NREGA
- Peru*
- Pakistan*
- Ghana*
- India*
- BRAC
- Honduras*
- Blattman et al. (2014)

* Country names refer to study sites in Banerjee et al. (2015)
Next steps - extended model

- We are currently extending the preliminary framework to allow for:
  - Individuals to split time between livestock rearing and wage labour
  - Change in total hours worked as a result of the programme
- These are both observed in the data
- In this setup, we can take FOCs to the data to:
  - Solve for each individual’s productivity term $A_i$ in livestock rearing
  - Quantify the extent of misallocation at baseline
Conclusions

- Poor people are not unable to take on more productive employment activities – they just lack the needed capital.
- Program releases this constraint – those closer to the threshold cross it and move out of poverty, those further away sink back into poverty.
- Key policy conclusion – need big push policies to tackle persistent poverty.
- These policies need to focus on tapping into the abilities and talents of the poor rather than just propping up their consumption.
thank you