*RESEARCH PROPOSAL*
FOR M.PHIL/PH.D. UPGRADE

WARFARE, ADMINISTRATION AND STATE FORMATION IN SOMALILAND:

ASSESSING PROCESSES OF STATE & NATION BUILDING IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

DOMINIK HELLING

Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

London, May 2008

ABSTRACT *The proposition that state formation is a function of warfare, rather than 'peacefare', is presently hotly debated by academic scholars and the wider international community. While the debate has come to an impasse, fresh approaches are needed that contribute to our understanding of processes of state formation and the role warfare plays in its course. In this proposal, I argue that differences regarding the outcome of state formation projects can be explained by the elites' varying ability to implement central administration across a claimed territory. Central administration is key to state formation, as it sparks institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, processes that lie at the heart of state and nation building respectively. Warfare can play a constitutive and catalyzing role for state formation under the condition that it contributes to the establishment of institutional and socio-cognitive consistency within the state's borders. In order to solve the conundrum of state formation, its interdependence with central administration and warfare's potential contribution, this project combines the to date largely unconnected concepts of state building and nation building, and applies qualitative research framed in comparative case studies in order to test the advanced hypotheses.*

Word Count:
8,890

STUDENT DETAILS:

Status:	*Full-time*
LSE ID:	*200509833*
1st Supervisor:	*Prof. Dr. James Putzel(LSE)*
2nd Supervisor:	*Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel (INEF)*

An electronic version of this document can be found under the following URL:

http://personal.lse.ac.uk/helling/Research .htm

TABLE OF CONTENTS

"War is the greatest plague that can afflict humanity […], it destroys states"

– Martin Luther (1483-1546; Charlton 2002)

1. INTRODUCTION

Echoing Luther's view that war destroys states, international development agencies and an increasing number of scholars dealing with 'failed states' see (civil) wars in today's developing world as "tragic vicious circles" (World Bank 2008), amounting to "nothing less than doom" (Mohamoud 2006:15), and constituting 'development in reverse'[1]. Along this reasoning, Tilly's (1992:67) inspiring hypothesis that "war makes states, and vice versa" has been called into question by scholars like Kaldor (1999), Herbst (2000) and Leander (2004), arguing that the 'new wars' "do not make states, but rather unravel them" (Leander 2004:69) and that war and state failure "can only be stopped by outside intervention" (ibid.:78; Weinstein 2004:11).

Simultaneously, the literature on 'state failure' has lost sight of the dynamics of state formation. Countries emerging from war are frequently seen as a 'blank slate'[2] with an institutional *tabula rasa*, offering a "particularly suitable time for radical policy reform" (Collier/Pradhan 1994:133). However, this liberal perspective on violence "may only be sustained by a form of historical amnesia" (Cramer 2006:9), as, historically, war made states (Tilly 1992:67). Considering this impasse and the fact that political violence, in and of itself, is neither the prophet of order nor the daemon of decay, I advocate the need to disaggregate the 'black box' of warfare (Rasler/Thompson 1989; Kestnbaum/Skocpol 1993:667) and the need to understand *under what conditions* and *how what kinds of* warfare may be constitutive to state formation.

To address this conundrum, I draw mainly on literature on *state* and *nation* building. Since the assumed links between 'state-building', 'nation-building' and 'development' were broken in the 1980s (Eriksen 2006:1), there has, unfortunately, been an astonishing lack of exchange between these strands of literature. Approaches to state formation have generally been informed by models emphasizing institution building; however, "simply putting in place the formal rules is a recipe for disappointment, not to say disaster" (North 2005:161). 'Bringing the *Nation* Back In' and combining the knowledge of the two concepts of state and nation building promises to raise deeper insights into the phenomena of 'state failure' and state formation. I suggest that this can lead towards an improved understanding of the many states in the developing world that are still largely in a process of formation (Carothers 2002). Furthermore, the project draws on a third strand of literature, namely that concerning warfare. Overall, I will argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the determining role of *central administration*, which links state building, nation building and warfare.

---

[1] cf. Cramer (2006:9), criticising the liberal position on war
[2] cf. Cramer (2006:255), referring to the dominant liberal viewpoint

The project's main proposition is that state formation is principally a process of *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization*. *Institutional standardization* underlies state building and can be understood as a process whereby a single set of 'rules of the game' gains dominance within a given territory – a condition in which all major role relationships are regularized and their hierarchical organization is dominated by a preponderant organization. *Socio-cognitive standardization*, on the other hand, underlies nation building and is defined as a process whereby one common, standardized set of socio-cognitive elements, such as language or mental maps, becomes dominant within a society in a given territory.

Another proposition is that these processes of *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization* are driven by *central administration*. Thus, a fundamental hypothesis advanced here is that outcomes of state building are largely determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build central administrative structures. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that warfare can foster and catalyze processes of state formation, if it promotes central administration and enhances institutional and socio-cognitive standardization across a specific territory. This research project suggests that warfare and associated state collapse do not produce 'blank slates' and the dead-ends commonly suggested by the international community, but argues for their potential to pave the way for new processes of state formation. By means of a comparative case study I will map divergent processes of state formation and trace the differences that account for the observed variation in state formation outcomes.

Somalia and Somaliland lend themselves to investigate the issues at stake for several reasons.[3] Once perceived as constituting the only real African nation-state (Lata 2004; Reno 2003; Touval 1963; Sheik-Abdi 1977; Adam 1999; Laitin/Samatar 1987:xiv), Somalia became known as a "full-blown case of state collapse" (Milliken/Krause 2002:754; Adam/Ford 1997:106; Rotberg 2002:86; Mohamoud 2006:16; Foreign Policy 2007; Schneckener 2007). While Southern Somalia is after 17 years and 14 peace-building attempts still in search of political stability, the northern break-away region of Somaliland has brought forth viable structures of governance (Reno 2003:2; Zierau 2003:58; Doornbos 2002:808; Bradbury 1997:27; Mubarak 1996:150; Jirdeh 2004). It has undertaken remarkable self-directed reconstruction (Bradbury 2008:4; Omaar 1994; Economist 1999:35; Klein 2002; Mehler 2002:78; Jhazbhay 2003:80; Gabush 2004:320; Kulessa/Heinrich 2004; Höhne 2006:404; Forrest 2007:233) and developed into "one of the most stable polities in the Horn" (Bradbury 2008:1; ICG 2003:10; World Bank 2005:19). This astonishing development, particularly when compared with Somalia, constitutes the empirical puzzle the project will address.

This proposal is structured as follows: section two briefly outlines the topicality, significance and objective of the research. The next section presents the research question, before outlining the analytical framework in section four. Section five discusses the conceptual framework that is to be applied. The proposed methodology is introduced in section six before section seven concludes.

---

[3] see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 for a more detailed discussion

"Indeed, the importance of warfare […] cannot be underestimated."

– Kalvvas 2005:89

2. RESEARCH TOPICALITY, SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVE

Research Topicality

'State failure' and violent conflicts are today among the international community's main concerns. 'The South' suffers from widespread state fragility, while 'the North' increasingly fears the violence emanating from 'failed states' (Economist 2002:51;[4] see Bradbury 2003:8). The post-Cold War and particularly post-September 11, 2001 era has witnessed an "increased willingness by the international community to intervene in the domestic affairs of states, especially with the aim of ending conflict and rebuilding institutions in post-conflict societies" (Zaum 2007:1).

This political topicality is reflected in recent academic debates. Subsequent to the Washington Consensus and an overly optimistic emphasis on the market (Milliken/Krause 2002:753; Berger 2008:1; Robinson 2007:11f.), the need for "Bringing the State Back In" (Evans et al. 1985) has increasingly been realized. Research on issues of governance, state fragility and formation is flourishing, not least because "[f]rom a historical perspective, much of the developing world today is characterised by states in the process of formation" (CSRC 2005:2).

Research Significance

State failure and warfare are among the most serious challenges affecting humanity. In 2007, one tenth of the world's states was considered being in a process of 'failing' (Foreign Policy 2007), while their accompanying violent conflicts demanded an uncountable number of lives and resulted in the displacement of some 25 million people (IDMC 2008). Although these crude statistics only scratch the problem's surface, they exemplify its magnitude and underscore the significance of research in this field. As our knowledge regarding post-conflict reconstruction experiences and processes of state formation[5] still remains fragmented and incomplete (Cramer 2006:276), much more work is needed to understand how viable states can be built.

Research Objective

This research aims to contribute to developing a better *theoretical* understanding of state building,[6] nation building[7] and the role of warfare in these processes. The project's primary objective is to identify the key *variables* and *dynamics* that inform processes of state and nation building. Starting from Tilly's (1992:67) "war makes states" proposition, the research pays particular attention to the role of

---

[4] referring to the US National Security Strategy of 2002

[5] *State formation* circumscribes any efforts undertaken by diverse actors in order to build a viable state, consisting of a sound institutional set-up (i.e. *state building*) and socio-cognitive framework (i.e. *nation building*).

[6] *State building* refers to the establishment of institutions of government.

[7] *Nation building* implies the creation of a nation, addressing issues of identity rather than government.

warfare in and for state formation and aims to understand *under what conditions*, *why* and *how* warfare may be beneficial for such processes.

Secondly, the project aims to expand our still limited *empirical* knowledge on state formation in general and 'autonomous state formation' (Weinstein 2005) more particularly, by investigating state dynamics in the Horn of Africa by means of qualitative research.

While contributing to academia's theoretical and empirical knowledge, the project seeks to dismantle some arguments that have lately risen to popularity, but which are believed to be misleading. Firstly, the research challenges the 'new wars'-theorists who postulate that war was a "political retrovirus […] about nothing at all" (Enzensberger 1995, as in Cramer 2006:77; Kaplan 1994; Schlichte 2003:27) and could not possibly have beneficial effects on state formation (Holsti 1996; Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001). Similarly, the project questions the argument of the 'war makes states'-sceptics, who suggest that warfare no longer exercised a state developmental role (Desch 1996; Herbst 2000; Clapham 2001; Leander 2004). Contrarily, the project proposes a more specific differentiation while emphasizing the continuities of potential benefits of past and present wars.

Secondly, as valuable as conceptualizations of war as rational economic strategy are (Keen 1994; Reno 1997; Duffield 2001), they tell us little about the forms of social transformation during conflict (Bakonyi/Stuvoy 2005:363). This research takes a broader, societal view and argues that warfare not only renders (financial) benefits to individuals, but may also be conducive to overall social progress.

Thirdly, this research will subject to critical scrutiny the propositions that state formation is no longer on Africa's agenda and that "[…] the chances of success for state-building in the early 21st century are […] constrained, if not completely obsolete" (Berger/Weber 2008:198). I suggest that despite superficial symptoms of decline, processes of state formation have not vanished from the African continent and that "[state] collapse is likely to inaugurate fresh or renewed processes of state formation" (Doornbos 2002:798; Eisenstadt 1988).

Fourthly and lastly, the research confronts analyses put forward by theorists of globalisation (Griffin/Khan 1992; Perraton/Goldblatt 1997; Jenkins 2004) who argue that room for national action is dwarfed in face of the powers of globalisation. While acknowledging that the politico-economic environment undoubtedly "affect, in a multitude of ways, the evolution of all these patterns across the economic and political terrains" (CSRC 2005:7; see also Krause 1998:130; CSRC 2001; Moore 2004:309; Migdal/Schlichte 2005:10/33) and additionally increase "political and economic expectations" (Khan 2002:4), partially even leading to the "overburdening of the political, administrative and, in part, also military capacities" (Debiel 2002:5) of states, the project explores the proposition that even the most vulnerable political entities do not merely float in the currents of globalization, but still have 'room for manoeuvre' (Clay/Schaffer 1984; Duffield 2001).

Si vis pacem para bellum (lat.: if you want peace, prepare for war)

– cf. Simmel 1964:13

3. RESEARCH QUESTION

Having outlined the general framework, topicality, significance and objective of the research, I now return to the theoretical issues by introducing my primary research question (Q):

Q: *Why* and *how* has Somaliland – in contrast to Somalia – succeeded in undertaking a process of state formation, *what* are the main processes involved, and *under what conditions* can warfare exercise a constitutive role for state and nation building?

"States are not simple war machines and warfare does not automatically lead to a strengthening or weakening of the state."

– Schlichte 2003:38

4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Before entering theoretical conceptualizations, I briefly outline the analytical framework that is to be applied to this study, in order to clarify the underlying construct of ideas.

4.1 Defining Analytical Tools

4.1.1 The State

Much has been theorized about the state. It has been attributed an "extensive role in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities" (Sen 1999:5), but was conceptually declared a "messy concept" (Mann 1988:4). The Weberian (1919) state concept is valuable, but has trouble dealing with cases where the lines between state and society, or formal and informal are blurred (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:2). Marxist and functional approaches that interpret the state as the necessary fulfilment of certain ends (Marx 1848; Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2004), on the other hand, fail "to anticipate the new and diverse forms of state institutionalization" (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3; Khan 2002:14). Lastly, the new institutional economics (Coase 1960; North 1990) picturing the state as a set of institutions that sanction the creation, enforcement and change in property rights, ignores in its narrowness the factors that allow the state to achieve these stated goals. Thus, in an attempt to combine the virtues of Marxist, Weberian and institutional concepts, I understand the state as

a hierarchically organized and centrally administered matrix of organisations and institutions, which has the authority and capacity to dominate the 'rules of the game' that regulate political, economic and socio-cognitive interactions across a claimed territory.

The state has frequently been called into question as an appropriate analytical tool (Foucault 2000:123), particularly for sub-Saharan Africa (Linklater 1995:178ff.; Heyer 1997:11; Migdal/

Schlichte 2005:3). Nevertheless, this project employs it as a central analytical concept, partly because the process under investigation is *state* formation, at the basis of which lies, by definition, the state.[8] Secondly, the state is far from being political 'scrap-iron', but remains the foremost political actor in today's world (Howard 2002:103; Tilly 1992:4). Even in the 'stateless state' of Somalia, "the coup of 1991 was more of an attack on a regime's inequitable policies than a repudiation of the modern state" (Little 2003:168). Lastly, "[s]tate-making was essentially an internal undertaking" (Holsti 1996:44), further justifying a national focus.

4.1.2   The Nation

If the state is considered a 'messy concept', "[t]he concept of the nation is one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" (Tilly 1975:6) and "one of the [most] difficult areas of social science" (Bereketeab 2000:15). There is a plurality of nation definitions, reaching from emphasizing their "distinct ethnic identity and history" (Mann 1993:215) to characterizing them as 'imagined political communities' (Anderson 1983:6).[9] In my understanding of the nation, I join those who postulate that "nations and nationalism have primarily developed in response to the development of the modern state" (Mann 1986:44; Tilly 1992:116; Breuilly 2006:xxv; Chasteen 2003:xx) and define it as

> *an imagined, yet politically organised community that is characterized by a shared and state-related socio-cognitive framework.*

The application of such an ambiguous concept as the nation is justified firstly by the argument that nation building constituted an important part of state formation, making the usage of this concept imperative. Furthermore, "the 'end of the era of nationalism', so long prophesised, is not remotely in sight", but nation-ness still represents "the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time" (Anderson 1983:3). Finally, there is widespread understanding that the European experience of state and nation building was diffused to non-European societies through colonialism (cf. Bereketeab 2000:40; Tilly 1975; Smith 1983; Mazuri 1983; Diamond et. al. 1988; First 1983; Young 1994).

---

[8] The 'state', referring to the framework and instruments of political power, is to be distinguished from a 'regime', which denotes the way in which these instruments are used.
[9] Traditions of national thinking include premordialists (e.g. Geertz 1965; van den Berghe 1981), perennialists (e.g. Seton-Watson 1965; Connor 1994), ethno-symbolists (e.g. Hutchinson 1994, Smith 1983), as well as modernists (e.g. Giddens 1985; Mann 1986, 1993; Tilly 1992; Anderson 1983).

4.2   Institutional Framework

In order to analyse dynamics of state and nation building, I apply an institutional framework. General consensus has been established that "institutions matter" (Bardhan 2000:245) and that they "are critical to all levels of human interaction" (Wunsch 2000:489). Thereby, institutions are generally understood as the 'rules of the game' that "reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life" (North 1990:3). While building on North's (1995) understanding, I follow the conceptual modifications of Harriss (2002) and Putzel (1999), who argue that institutions are not merely "*constraints* that structure human interaction" (North 1995:23; my emphasis), but can also play an *enabling* role. Consequently, I understand institutions as

> *(a) mechanisms of social order and cooperation and (b) systems of rights and obligations based on recognized and enforceable rules that govern the behaviour of two or more individuals by creating regularised role relationships.*

An institutional perspective is chosen, mainly because such a framework allows capturing the processes of state formation better than classic definitions of the state would allow, partly because the latter depart from an *already existing* state.

A final note is to be attributed to the concept of 'institutional multiplicity'[10] – describing a situation in which "individuals and organisations appear to operate often simultaneously in multiple institutional systems, governed by very different sets of incentives" (CSRC 2005:8) – which promises to be instructive for this study. This analytical prism is not only useful in capturing the situation in many 'fragile states', but is particularly apt to conceive of situations prior to the establishment of the state. Both of the questions of *why* the organisation of the state comes into existence and *how* it evolves are fundamentally influenced by the (pre-)existing institutional framework (North 1990:5). While agreeing that institutional diversity[11] is desirable (North 2005:42), this research argues that state formation can only come about through a process of (institutional and socio-cognitive) *standardization*, which replaces (institutional and socio-cognitive) *multiplicity* by their respective *consistency*. This argument can be traced throughout this proposal.

---

[10] A term and concept introduced and coined by the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC), LSE
[11] Understood as a complex institutional matrix, which does not suffer from the dependence on one single set of institutions

"To see how administrative units could, over time, come to be conceived as fatherlands […]
one has to look at the ways in which administrative organizations create meaning."

– Anderson 1983:53

5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – CONCEPTUALIZING STATE FORMATION

In order to theoretically conceptualize processes of state (de)formation, I will firstly revisit past accounts of state formation and scrutinize the proposition that "war makes states" (Tilly 1992:67). Secondly, I introduce an alternative approach, which seeks to improve our understanding of state formation and advance our knowledge regarding the question of *what kind of* warfare may be constitutive for it. While the *terms* of 'state building' and 'nation building' frequently have been used interchangeably (Zaum 2007:1), their *concepts* usually have been treated as distinct. Combining these frameworks and emphasizing their common basis of *central administration*, I argue that it is *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization* within a claimed territory that ultimately drives state formation.

5.1   Past Accounts of State Formation

5.1.1   Classic Accounts of State Building…

Theorizing about state formation has a long history and valuable insights can be taken from classical accounts. Social contract theory, as developed by Hobbes (1651), Locke (1694), and Rousseau (1763), describes a situation in which a given society experiences a situation of *homo homini lupii*. The philosophers hypothesise that this situation, in which competition among equals causes anarchy, can only be overcome, if the competing players cooperate rather than defect, and delegate some of their powers to a supreme *primus inter pares*, the *Leviathan*. Being endowed with the means to exercise coercion, this hegemon enforces certain 'rules of the game' that regulate role relationships and contribute to an overall more peaceful coexistence.

The same principle logic is applied by pragmatist-realist informed approaches to state building. Macchiavelli (1513) postulates that state building was a power-driven process and resulted less from diverse players' cooperation than defection in a situation of unequal access to power, in which a new, self-proclaimed *Il Principe* executes 'coerced state building' through the application of (immoral) force. Although starting from different origins, both accounts share the argument that state formation is a competitive process resulting in a situation in which some actors (through negotiation or enforcement) succeed in establishing a preponderant power position.

5.1.2   … and their Current Political-Economic Interpretations

These classic accounts are mirrored in recent works. Already in his state definition, Weber (1919) placed as central the 'monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'. This

is taken up by scholars who apply a political-economy interpretation to the classic accounts. Olson (1965), supported by the collective action literature, postulates that state formation takes place, if 'roving' bandits turn into 'stationary' ones, thereby starting to employ their coercive capacity in socially productive ways. Similarly, the accounts of Huntington (1968), Cohen et al. (1981), McNeill (1983), Tilly (1985), Mann (1986), Rasler/Thompson (1989) and Colley (1992) argue that state formation was a violent process of diverse elites' competition for the means to concentrate capital and coercion. In "a highly suggestive analysis of European state formation" (Pereira 2003:387) these scholars show that states formed due to warfare, that war was possible thanks to the concentration of capital and coercion, and that military power was gradually 'caged' by civilian institutions.

5.1.3   Warfare – An Independent Variable?

What these historic accounts share is their emphasis on the crucial contribution of threat, violence and war for state formation. Against conventional assumptions it is postulated that "violence […] is an integral part of the processes of accumulation of power by the national state" (Cohen et al. 1981:901; Bradbury 2003:10). Tilly's (1992:67) statement that "war makes states and states make war" is infamous in this context. In summary of these historically informed political-economy accounts, Clapham (2001:1) states that "the experience of warfare has played a central and indeed essential role in the processes of state and nation formation in Europe" (Tilly 1992; Colley 1992; McNeill 1983; van Creveld 1991/1999).

The argument that 'war makes states' has not remained undisputed. In the shadow of the 'new wars' literature (Kaldor 1999/2007; Duffield 2001; Jung 2003), scholars such as Leander (2004) and Herbst (2000) cast doubt on the hypothesis that warfare really held as the independent variable for state formation. While the two academic blocks continue to defend their respective views, a third position has established itself around the inconclusive argument that "[t]he effects of contemporary wars on statehood are ambivalent" and that there was "no single unambiguous causal relation between states and wars" (Schlichte 2003:38; Clapham 2001:8; Cohen et al. 1981:902).

As this 'war (un)makes states'-debate stands, it faces the unresolved challenge that its very object, warfare, remains dubious and ill-defined. This partly results form the fact that the discourse spans considerably in time and space. Given this impasse, I argue along the lines of Cramer (2006) for the necessity of disaggregating the 'black box' of warfare, in the belief that "[not] all types of violent conflict are equivalent in their historical significance" (ibid.:48). As political violence, in and of itself, is neither the prophet of order nor the daemon of decay, Tilly's (1992) analysis would gain much by a greater differentiation regarding *which* wars make states (Rasler/Thompson 1989; Kestnbaum/ Skocpol 1993:667). Before analyzing *under what conditions* and *how* warfare may be constitutive for state formation, an alternative approach to state formation is introduced.

5.2   Institutional Interpretation of State Formation

As mentioned previously, this project conceives of state formation in broader terms, as a combination of state *and* nation building. Thus, these concepts will be discussed separately, while showing that they are connected by the common denominator of *central administration*, which forms the basis for institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

5.2.1   State Building

In light of institutionalism, modern political thought on state formation reveals aspects hidden from the political-economy interpretation. Applying an institutional perspective, the Hobbesian 'actor anarchy' turns into an 'institution anarchy', in which diverse institutional set-ups compete with one another.[12] The situation preceding state formation can be pictured as an 'anarchy' among institutional 'pre-state frameworks', which is resolved by introducing a preponderant organisation – either in that form of a (negotiated) *Leviathan*, or an (enforced) *Principe* – that takes control over and regulates role relationships within the 'institution anarchy' across a given territory. Thus, resolution is found and (institutional) order brought about by creating a *hierarchically organized matrix of organisations and institutions* which is dominated by a *Leviathan* that *centrally administers the 'rules of the game', which regulate political, economic and socio-cognitive interactions across a claimed territory.*

This project pictures the institutional framework of the state as a *hierarchical* matrix, not only because sociological phenomena generally show a "hierarchy of relationships" (Simmel 1964:25), but also because hierarchies are nothing but the logical extension of institutions – both provide a means to 'regularize role relationships' and "structure human interaction" (North 1995:23). And as "institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient", but "are created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to create new rules" (North 1990:260f.), it is in the interest of the *Leviathan/Principe* to uphold a state's hierarchical, institutional structure.

Naturally, the creation of such a hierarchically organised 'state-matrix' is a political and contested issue, as diverse players claim the position of the *Leviathan/Principe*. Therefore, the struggle for the hierarchy's apex might not be resolved through negotiation, but requires (violent) power struggles. Thus, Tilly (1992) and his academic followers have a point by postulating that 'war makes states'. However, this may be only half the story. Firstly, from the observation that a hierarchically organised 'state-matrix' is created through warfare cannot be inferred that war *per se* led to state formation. Secondly, the *establishment* of a 'state-matrix' is not to be equalled with its *maintenance* – state formation is not a 'once and for all'-issue, but a dynamic process that needs to be sustained.

---

[12] Following the conceptualization of the CSRC, such a situation could be depicted as 'institutional multiplicity'

5.2.2   Nation Building

The school of nation building has also, albeit quite differently, contributed to ideas on state formation (see e.g. Anderson 1983; Gellner 2006; Smith 1998). Thereby, scholars have shown how socio-cognitive elements, such as a common language, script and education, hopes, fears and idea(l)s, national holidays, mental maps and ideology have contributed to the formation of the 'nation-state' – a term that did not come about without reason.

Analogous to the state, the nation is not born into a *tabula rasa*. Prior to the emergence of national state identities exist other identities with shared socio-cognitive frameworks, such as cultural or religious ones. Just as is the case for an ethnic group or church, a state needs to develop and maintain a shared socio-cognitive framework, namely "a means of reducing the divergent mental models that people in a society possess and constitute the means for […] unifying perceptions" (North 2005:27). This socio-cognitive framework of the nation is generally territorially bound to the state and provides the population with an additional, overarching identity. It can be said that the idea of the nation is born into a situation of *socio-cognitive multiplicity* and that nation building ultimately strives for 'reducing the divergent mental models' and creating *socio-cognitive consistency*. Just as "[t]he powerful influence of myths, superstitions, and religions in shaping early societies came form their role in establishing order and *conformity*", so is also nationalism to this day "a major force in reducing the costs of maintaining order" (North 2005:42; my emphasis).

My argument that nation building is a process of *socio-cognitive standardization* derives from the nationalism literature. With the example of language, Anderson (1983) shows that while multiple vernaculars – reaching e.g. from 'holy' Latin to 'barbarian' Bavarian – anticipated an 'imagined community', their sacrifice for *standardized* German enabled nationalism to evolve. Such *social* standardization is mirrored by *cognitive* standardization, e.g. by nation-wide newspapers evoking common fears, or by centralised schools conveying the same imagination of the state's territory. This is what Connor (1994:92) tries to capture by defining a nation as a "social group that shares […] a sense of homogeneity". Therefore, whether brought about by industrialization (Gellner 2006), warfare (Mann 1986; Tilly 1992; Breuilly 2006) or imagination (Anderson 1983), *socio-cognitive standardization* is the basic red line that runs though all of these explanations of nationalism.

5.3   Central Administration – The Independent Variable

All social groups and forms of (complex) interaction are underpinned by role-regulating institutional frameworks. This applies to pre-modern hunter-gatherer communities as well as to modern nation-states, to civil society as well as to the army. A main difference, however, lays in the presence or absence of dominating players or organizations that (re)structure these frameworks. The

(hierarchical) character in which the 'rules of the game' are organised, enforced and standardized, i.e. the way in which they are administered, is a key differentiator between social groups.

In the following section I argue that it is *central administration* across a claimed territory and its population that lies at the heart of state and nation building – or *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization* respectively. Furthermore, *central administration* is also suggested being the decisive differentiator for warfare. As all three phenomena are rooted in *central administration*, I postulate that this factor is eventually superior to warfare as an independent variable for explaining state formation.

5.3.1   Central Administration Impacting State Building…

That administration, i.e. the "management of public affairs" (OED 1989), is central to state building, is an obvious and well-established argument (Tilly 1992; Herbst 2000; Reinhard 1996). Previous sections introduced state building as a process in which a 'hierarchically organized matrix of institutions' 'regulates political, economic and socio-cognitive interactions across a claimed territory'. In order to manage such a complex institutional matrix, *central administration* is necessary.

Central administration is a major means and ends for accomplishing *institutional standardization* and, thus, replacing *institutional multiplicity* with *institutional conformity*. In fact, central administration aims at harmonizing existing and eventually competing 'rules of the game'. This process is driven by *Il Principe* who has an inherent interest in *institutional conformity* as this facilitates his (central) management of the complex institutional 'state-matrix'. *Central administration* – understood broadly as state-society communication that includes the exchange of services and exercise of power – thus lies at the basis of *institutional standardization* and thereby the creation and maintenance of *a hierarchically organized and centrally administered matrix of organisations and institutions*, i.e. the state.

Central administration benefits state formation partly by enhancing the (institutional and territorial) reach of *Il Principe*. Furthermore, it allows *Il Principe* to penetrate the territory and society under his control deeper, more efficient and effective. Lastly, it enables *Il Principe* to delegate parts of his monopoly over power and institutions to other players and organizations in a controlled manner. Thus, the higher the degree of *central administration*, the higher the level of *institutional standardization*, and therefore the more effective and efficient the *hierarchically organized 'state-matrix'*.

5.3.2   … Nation Building …

Administration provokes also *socio-cognitive* standardization and conformity. The argument that the formation of group identities depends notably on administrative structures is not new and has already been made in other contexts. Barth (1969), e.g., argues that the sharing of a common culture is less the definitional characteristic of an ethnicity, but rather an 'implication of result' of its *organisation*.

In the context of nationalism, Anderson (1983:53) postulates that "administrative organizations create meaning" and that centralised bureaucracy and political penetration have been instrumental in

forming nations. The way a regime interacts and communicates with society, or, said differently, the form of administration exercised, profoundly influences society's feeling of belonging and identity, i.e. nationalism. Administration is attributed such a significance that Giddens (1985:116) includes "unitary administration" in his definition of a nation and it has convincingly been argued that state administration have been a primary source of nationalism (Jenkins/Plowden 2006:1; Mann 1986:44; Tilly 1992:116; Breuilly 2006:xxv; Jacquin-Berdal 2002:35). One reason for the importance of social organisation on identity-creation is that administration is much firmer than the rather fluid borders of language, history or culture.

In Africa, as elsewhere, *socio-cognitive consistency* in the form of nationalism has generally been a legacy of colonialism. Mayall (2006:553) states that it was the bureaucratic, colonial state in Africa that "pulverised traditional society and laid the foundations for an imagined modern community" (see also Smith 1983:56). Analogous arguments are made for Latin America, where "[t]he wars of independence broke the colonial viceroyalties apart, […] *always along existing administrative lines*, into fragments that had been, themselves, units of colonial governance" (Chasteen 2003:xx; my emphasis). Concluding, Smith (1991:59) states that "activities of taxation, conscription and administration endowed the population within its jurisdiction with a sense of their corporate identity and civic loyalty" (as in Bereketeab 2000:38f.).

5.3.3   … and Warfare

Tilly (1992) argues that state formation is brought about by warfare and that the latter depended on the ruler's ability to concentrate the means of coercion and capital. These tasks as well as the control of territory and its population by enforcing certain 'rules of the game', raise the need for central administration. Only by means of *central administration* can *Il Principe* recruit soldiers, extract resources, direct armies and organise the hierarchical institutional matrix at his command effectively. But despite the fact that central administration is key in determining the nature of warfare, it has received only little attention in the warfare literature. This is unfortunate, because the criterion of central administration is the link that connects warfare with state formation.[13]

5.3.4   Sketching the Lack of Central Administration

Central administration across a claimed territory, its means to carry through *standardization* and its ends to create *institutional and socio-cognitive conformity*, are vital for state formation. It is these parts that form the pillars for the sustainable formation of a *hierarchically organized matrix of organizations and institutions*.

If central administration is not carried through (sufficiently), thereby failing to initiate institutional and socio-cognitive standardization within the 'state-matrix', competing institutional sub-matrixes

---

[13] see section 5.4

with their own socio-cognitive frameworks will emerge along alternative (historical) lines of authority, hence challenging the state's institutional set-up. Thus, a state's failure to eliminate and/or accommodate competing frameworks and ensure an effective central administration results in institutional and socio-cognitive multiplicity inimical to state formation. Concretely, such 'state failure' leads to the evolution of alternative structures of organisation (such as ethnic or religious groups), which are more effective in the 'management of public affairs'.

This argument can be inferred from Migdal (1988) who postulates that states that are unable to provide central services will be challenged by alternative forces within society that are capable to do so. In this light, Englebert (2000:67), supported by Holsti (1996), Azam (2001:430) and Khan/Gray (2006), rightly states that "[e]thnicity provides a level of institutional identification to fall back on in times of contestation of the state." From a political science perspective, the organization, or say administration, of political entities is key to overcoming fragmentation. Thereby, "[t]he more complex and heterogeneous the society, the more the achievement and maintenance of political stability becomes dependent upon the working of political organization" (Huntington 1968:9).

This reasoning allows two conclusions. Firstly, political units weak in central administration are likely to be challenged by competing sub-units that are more effective in issuing institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Secondly, it is exactly these sub-units that bring about 'state failure', which ensure the 'post-state' regularization of the 'rules of the game' (cf. Brons 2001:3).

5.4 Warfare – An Antecedent Condition

In order to assess the role of warfare in the process of state formation, we need to investigate *under what conditions* and *how* warfare can contribute to *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization*. That it is not the presence or magnitude of war, but rather its *structure* and *form* which is decisive for its impact on state formation has been stated by Bates et al. (2002:599), Kalyvas (2005:92) and Cramer (2006:45). While Pandora's Box has not yet been disclosed, *central administration* promises to be a decisive key. Thus, I hypothesize that warfare is constitutive to state formation under the condition that it enhances *central administration* across a claimed territory and population.

5.4.1 War(fare)'s[14] Role for Institutional Standardization…

In Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, "the first step towards reconstituting (or constituting) the state was a military victory" (Ottaway 2002:1013). More generally, one of the most robust findings of the war termination literature is that military triumphs result in more sustainable peace (Weinstein 2004:5; Licklider 1993; Toft 2003; Fortuna 2003). Recalling that state formation is about the transformation

---

[14] It is deemed useful to analytically distinguish between 'war', i.e. the hostile contention by means of armed forces, and 'warfare', i.e. the 'art', or more profoundly, the 'way' of organising war.

of a situation of *institutional* and *socio-cognitive multiplicity* into one characterized by *institutional* and *socio-cognitive consistency* and *hierarchy*, I firstly argue that *war* can contribute to this end by *eliminating* or *accommodating* competing *Principes* and their respective frameworks of organizations and institutions.

Elimination of competing institutional and socio-cognitive frameworks as a *Principe*'s means to secure his preponderant position vis-à-vis his rivals is plain. Principally, war removes competitors that are deemed too risky, challenging or incapable to be incorporated into the existing framework. Of course, and for several reasons, does not every war end in the complete annihilation of the competitive society and/or its institutional framework – *accommodation* of competing organizations and institutions is an alternative. War, understood as "an act of force to compel our adversary to our will…" (Ropp 1959:13; cf. Nathan/Lamb 2000:9) can thereby facilitate the process of (institutional and socio-cognitive) *accommodation*, which entails a procedure of institutional standardization, in order to bring the 'new' institutions into line with the already existing 'state-matrix'.

Secondly, *warfare* also impacts institutional standardization within the 'state-matrix', because it leads to "the formation of an organ of the strictest efficiency" (Simmel 1964:87f.). In this 'organ', namely a society's military structure, everything is intensified: the institutional matrix's hierarchy, institutional standardization and socio-cognitive homogeneity. This institutional standardization within a 'state-matrix' taking place during warfare is further summarized by Simmel (1964): "A state of conflict […] pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such a *uniform impulse* that they either must completely get along with, or completely repel, one another" (ibid.:92; my emphasis). With wars' end, its impact on the institutional structures does not vanish immediately, which is why post-conflict societies are generally marked by structures of violence (Debiel 2002).

Thus, war(fare) can have positive impacts on institutional matrixes and their standardization, which is why "[h]istorically, improvements in state administrative capacity are associated with warfare" (Goldsmith 2007:34).

5.4.2   …Socio-Cognitive Standardization…

"Nationalists themselves are divided about the role of war" (Smith 1998:78) – while 'liberal' nationalists hope for its elimination, 'historicist' nationalists have established that warfare and "military factors are vital in shaping the emergence and course of modern nationalism" (Mann 1986; as in Smith 1998:80). Consequently, scholars like Renan (1882), Howard (1979), Turton/Fuki (1979), Ferguson (1984), and Holsti (1996) argue that it was "very difficult to create national self-consciousness without war" (Howard 1979:108) and "[s]cholars of colonialism suggest that the most important factor in the formation of national consciousness in colonised societies is the resistance to foreign domination" (Bereketeab 2000:181; Hodgkin 1956; Emerson 1960; Leonard 1982; Smith 1983; Anderson 1983). I argue that warfare can contribute to nation formation under the condition

that it enhances *socio-cognitive standardization* across the institutions and organisations that are accommodated within a state's territory.

The previously exposed argument that socio-cognitive standardization chiefly results from central administration, applies even the more to groups at war, in which the 'state-matrix's' characteristics are intensified. Not least, this can be taken from a simple comparison between an army and civil society, in which the distinct hierarchically organised and centrally administered army (generally) trumps the much looser structured civil society in terms of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.

Warfare's contribution to socio-cognitive standardization expresses itself also otherwise. Starting with the army's consistent uniforms that turn every individual into a uniform soldier and ending with the sheer unitary play-back of ideologies among military personnel, warfare can significantly contribute to the standardization of an ('imagined') community. Accordingly, Jacquin-Berdal (2002:41) states that "[…] the role that war plays in spreading national identity among individuals who until then had only a vague understanding of the meaning and implications of their national belonging, cannot be overlooked." Instead, it can by highlighted that "the armed forces do much more than make war" (Pereira 2003:394; Davis 2003:18) and that army and warfare are probably the greatest manufacturer of standardization.

5.4.3   … and State Formation

Warfare is "paradoxical in that it can both facilitate the creation of states […] and also bring about their demise" (Ropp 1959:13). The question of *under what condition* "war generates stable […] institutional arrangements" (Weinstein 2005:9) can tentatively be answered as follows: warfare positively influences state formation under the condition that it enhances *institutional* as well as *socio-cognitive standardization* across a claimed territory.

In conclusion and by means of returning to the question, if war was an adequate independent variable for state formation, the presented material suggests seeing warfare in the sense of Clausewitz (1780-1831), namely as "the continuation of politics by other means" – war(fare) is a catalyst that can foster institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, but, *per se*, does not cause state formation. I close by positing that warfare is conceptually to be treated as an *antecedent condition*, i.e. "a phenomenon whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a […] hypothesis" (van Evera 1997:10).

> *"It is rather to the strength of bureaucratic control and territorial definition,*
> *as well as educational impact, that we need to look"*
>
> – Smith 1983:58

6. METHODOLOGY

6.1   Comparative Case Study Research Design

I plan to undertake qualitative research framed as a "structured, focused comparison" (George/ Bennett 2005) of a manageable number of case studies for three reasons. First, the study focuses on *processes* and *patterns*, rather than variables, making such an approach appropriate (Ragin 1987; Cramer 2006:136). Secondly, many of the potentially decisive variables identified above are hard to grasp without a detailed investigation, which rules out statistical methods in favour of a small-N comparative analysis (cf. Acemoglu et al. 2003:84). Finally, van Evera (1997:30) argues that "[m]ost theories of war are best tested by case-study methods."

The research is comparative in three aspects: (A) *in time*, comparing past and present processes of state formation; (B) *intra-case*, comparing processes of state formation within different parts of former Somalia (national comparative study); and (C) *inter-cases*, i.e. comparing processes of state formation in Somalia and Somaliland with Eritrea and South Sudan (international comparative study). The division of the case of Somalia into 'sub-cases' or 'subunits' along chronological and geographical lines, allows increasing the number of observations, "making many observations from few" (King et al. 1994:217ff.; Lijphart 1971), and confronting the problem of underdeterminancy of research design.

6.1.1   Selection of Case Studies

According to orthodox procedure, the "fundamental problem of inference" (King et al. 1994:91) should be counteracted by ensuring variation in the independent variable (ibid.:140f.). Such a 'controlled comparison', however, is largely incompatible with social science research, which is why case-selection on the dependent variable is a legitimate alternative as long as sufficient variation in the values of the dependent variable is ensured (Ragin 2004:7; King et al. 1994:129; van Evera 1997:52; Geddes 2003:116; George/Bennett 2005).

Somaliland has been chosen as the focus, which will be compared primarily with other 'sub-units' of former Somalia.[15] Consequently, the following cases are to be investigated in depth: (1) Somaliland (1991-2008), (2) Somalia (1960-1977; 1978-1991), and (3) Ex-Somalia (1991-2008). The *across-case comparison* will allow identifying those variables that strongly influence the outcome of the dependent variable and, undertaking a *longitudinal study* ensures limited variation of background conditions. In a

---

[15] Note on terminology: *Somalia* refers to the Republic of Somalia, which was established in 1960 through a union of the British Protectorate of Somaliland and the Italian Colony of Somalia; *Ex-Somalia* refers to today's political unit on the territory of the former Italian Colony, including Puntland; *Somaliland* denotes the in 1991 self-declared independent state within the borders of the former British Protectorate.

second step, the findings are to be subjected to a comparison, based on secondary literature, with processes of state formation in Eritrea (1991-2008) and South Sudan (1983-2008).

6.1.2   Justification of Case Study Selection

One selection criteria was sufficient variation on the dependent variable (King et al. 1994:140), which the selected cases ensure. Secondly, these cases fulfil the demands of a 'most similar research design' (Przeworski/Teune 1970:32f.; Berg-Schlosser/Siegler 1990:156; Klugmann et al. 1999:11) and facilitate the identification of causal mechanisms, as the values of the dependent variable are very high. Besides, the time span in each case is similar (roughly 20 years each). Fourthly, all cases lend themselves to the study of the relationship between war(fare) and state formation, which in the Horn has been "far more intensive, and of much longer duration, than elsewhere [in Africa] and where this relationship can correspondingly be tested far more effectively" (Clapham 2001:2). Lastly, the case studies are interesting in their own right, but have received very little academic attention to date.

The works of Lewis (1982, 1993, 2002) have greatly improved our knowledge of Somali society and scholars Laitin (1987), S. Samatar (1991), A. Samatar (1992), Gilkes (1994), Drysdale (2001), Bakonyi (2001), and Bradbury (2003), have contributed to our understanding of 'state failure' in Somalia. Furthermore, there is an abundant literature on international intervention in Somalia (Keen 1994; Lyons 1995; Prunier 1997; Drysdale 2001). At the same time, our knowledge of post-war reconstruction in Somaliland is mainly restricted to the works of Brons (2001) and the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) (1999, 2005) as well as some articles (Prunier 1994, 1998; Adam 1994; Ahmed/ Green 1999; Mohamed 2002; Bekalo et al. 2003; Zierau 2003; Höhne 2006).

Unsurprisingly, this scarce literature exhibits certain gaps. One unanswered question is why Somalia's nation building project of the early and mid-1970s crumbled. The traditionalists (Lewis 1994; S. Samatar 1991; Simons 1995) argue that it was "the continuity of clan politics [that] has destroyed the state" (Mohmoud 2006:20). Correct as this is, this answer does not get to the heart of state (de)formation dynamics, partly because it puts the clan instead of the state at centrepoint. I suggest that Somalia's state failure was a consequence of inadequate central administration and institutional standardization, or, more generally, "political artificiality" (Drysdale 2000:114).

Another puzzle that remains insufficiently explored is why the outcomes in state formation dynamics since 1991 have been so different within Somalia. Answers are offered that emphasize the differing colonial legacies (Lewis 1980; Shultz 1995; Reno 2003; Bradbury 2003) and/or the (dis)functioning traditional structures (Brons 1994; Prunier 1998; WSP 1999). Although pointing in the right direction, I suggest that this is again only half the story. I argue that the different state formation outcomes are ultimately determined by the ability or inability of elites to establish *central administration* introducing *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardisation* across a specific territory.

A third gap I address regards the role of warfare in state formation. Preliminary work on nation building and its influence through warfare was undertaken by Jacquin-Berdal (2002). However, her work needs to be amended by investigating the impact of warfare on state building. As suggested above, the 'black box' of warfare needs to be opened through an examination of administration.

6.2   Research Strategy

In order to identify the causal chains and mechanisms between administration and different state formation results the method of *process-tracing* is applied, as it is "an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory development" and "particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for deviant cases" (George/Bennett 2005:207). Using the method of *structured focused comparison*, the project standardises the data requirements, asking general questions for each case (George/Bennett 2005:67).

Researching the project can be broken down in several ways. To clarify my research strategy, I subsequently elaborate on (1) a *thematic* classification, expose (2) a *chronological* division, which entails a crude *methodological* partition, and close by presenting (3) the project's timeframe.

6.2.1   Thematic Allocation

Administration and its centrality can be observed in numerous sectors and ways. Yet, this research will concentrate on long-established key aspects of state and nation building, namely security, taxation and (legal) communication. As war(fare) has theoretically been established as an antecedent condition, the change and development of these indicators will be scrutinised particularly in periods of conflict.

Security

A state's *raison d'être* is the containment of violence within its territory (Brons 2001:27). Tilly (1992) and other scholars argue that historically the struggle over territory has crucially contributed to outcomes of state building. Although the importance of the territorial aspect has been called into question,[16] the provision of security across a claimed territory appears to remain central for state building (Milliken/Krause 2002:756; Seton-Watson 1977; Tilly 1975; Smith 1983). Particularly, the Horn of Africa disposes of a relationship between warfare, territory and state formation that has been "far more intensive, and of much longer duration, than elsewhere [in Africa]" (Clapham 2001:2).

A state's ability to provide security across its claimed territory is a central component of its viability. Thus, the existence and degree of central administration shows, amongst others, in the elite's ability to monopolise and hierarchically structure the means of violence and apply them throughout the territory. Analyzing a state's *de jure* and *de facto* organisation and utilization of the security sector is

---

[16] Talk has been about the "end of territoriality" (Badie 1995; Ruggie 1993), "the rise of the virtual state" (Rosecrance 1999), and the "debordering the world of states" (Albert/Brock 2000), particularly for sub-Saharan Africa, where states have generally not penetrated their territories (Herbst 2000; Ottaway 2002; Zaum 2007).

critical to learn about the central character of state administration and security provision. Key questions for investigating the central character of security for each case include:

- Which player/organization is in charge of the security apparatus within the claimed territory and to what degree does he/it dominate *de facto* security provision and rule enforcement?

- Does the security sector act in tune with the rules and regulations commanded by the political actors in exercising its duties and are the latter implemented uniformly across the territory?

- How can the prevailing security system be characterized, what are the (pre-)colonial legacies, where are its roots (polities, clans, ethnicities, etc.), and to what extent is it centralized?

Taxation

The importance of taxation for state formation has long been realized and resurfaces (Tilly 1992; Herbst 2000:130; Moore 2004:299; Hesselbein et al. 2006; Bräutigam et al. 2008), after it had been "missing from the new scholarship on state-building" (Bräutigam 2008:2; cf. Chesterman et al. 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Levy/Kpundeh 2004). Taxation informs *state* building, as "[m]uch of the institutional apparatus of modern government and economic management has its origins in this compulsion to finance wars" (Cramer 2006:178; Moore 2004). Additionally, it also benefits *nation* building, partly because "[t]he experience of being taxed engages citizens in the political process" (Moore 2008:35). As taxation is contested between state and society and thus demands quite elaborate state capacity in terms of (central) administration and enforcement mechanisms, "[t]here is no better measure of a state's reach than its ability to collect taxes" (Herbst 2000:113). Consequently, the nature of a tax regime and, thus, its ability to contribute to *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization*, is a valuable indicator for a state's administrative capacity.

Based on the different characters of tax regimes[17] I will focus on (1) income tax, (2) taxes on property, and (3) taxes on international trade and transactions. This choice is partially based on the fact that (1) and (2) require enhanced administrative capacity in terms of monitoring and enforcement (Lieberman 2002:99), whereas (3) generally yields high profits and can easily be captured. Key questions include:

- How did the taxation regime develop, what changes did it experience, and has there been significant extension or diminution of the tax system across a certain territory?

- Who levies taxes and for what reasons, is the system uniform across the claimed territory, and does the tax collecting organization dispose of the means of surveillance and enforcement?

- Does the weakness or outright absence of a taxation system within a polity's claimed territory correlate with 'regional fragility' and the emergence of *institutional* and *socio-cognitive multiplicity*?

(Legal) Communication

A third condition for state formation and indicator for a state's administrative outreach and potential to foster institutional and socio-cognitive standardization is its ability to (literally) 'broadcast'

---

[17] Differing e.g. in their inclusiveness, outreach, required surveillance and enforcement mechanisms

its power. Regarding the process of nation building, the importance of "communicat[ing] with one another on *matters of common interest*" (Touval 1963:25; my emphasis) has frequently been stressed. Thus, of importance is not only *linguistic* standardization (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1977; Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983; Gellner 2006; Abdi 1998), but also *topical* standardization, as it is important for a community's 'imaginability' to share issues of common concern, fear and joy and to have a common pool of information. Furthermore, "it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one of the many communications, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism" (Gellner 2006:121f.).

A state's ability to communicate matters of common interest and legal concerns as well as the population's (volunteer) absorption of such information via (state-owned) media provides important clues on the state's administrative reach and its potential to manipulate and administer its population's hearts and minds. For matters of state formation it is thus of interest, how a regime communicates with its population and if it has enough (credible) voice to spread the same topics and similar emotions across the territory. Main questions asked across cases include:

- What news do people share predominantly, where do they get those news from, how inclusive/exclusive is this source of information, and who dominates the respective media?
- Is the population kept informed about *Il Principe*'s activities and aspirations, how does this communication look like, and does it dispose of a one-way or reciprocal character?
- How did 'nodes of communication' develop in phases of war(fare) and regime-changes and within which territory are people concerned with and accept laws issued by the regime?

6.2.2   Chronological/Methodological Allocation

In chronological terms I will firstly explore Somalia's (failed) state formation projects (1960-1977, 1978-1991 and 1991-2008), secondly Somaliland's experience of state formation (1991-2008), and thirdly compare the respective findings to processes in Eritrea (1991-2008) and South Sudan (1983-2008). This translates roughly into a tripartite methodological division: two phases mainly marked by archival work with possibly brief field trips to Somalia, Eritrea and South Sudan (security/resources permitting), and one expanded phase of field research in Somaliland.[18]

Phase I: State Formation (Failure) in Somalia

Researching Somalia's state formation project (1960-1977) and its failures (1978-1991 and 1991-2008) clearly has to be historically informed. Concentrating on the above outlined indicators, I will reconsider existing literature[19] and archived documents.[20] Additionally, I will interview key actors.[21]

---

[18] See section 6.2.3 „Envisaged Time Table" for further detail and elaboration

[19] Literature of the academic sort as well as the respective grey literature, spanning from documents of the donor community to media resources

[20] Key resources will be the National Archives of the Public Records Office London, London's diverse libraries, and worldwide accessible online archives

The relatively long time period that is to be analyzed will be sequenced and research will concentrate on key crisis moments (episodic analysis), which will be studied in depth. For Somalia, these key moments are (1) the colonial to post-colonial transition around 1960; (2) the political transition from civil to military government around 1969, (3) the Ogaden-war against Ethiopia of 1977/78, (4) the Somali civil war of 1988-1991, and (5) the establishment of the TNG[22] in 2000 and TFG[23] in 2004. While analysing these key periods in Somalia's (failed) state formation history, I will concentrate on how systems of security, taxation and communication changed and what role war(fare) might have played in these dynamics.

Phase II: State Formation in Somaliland

Researching Somaliland's process of state formation will be based primarily on field work. A first field visit is planned for October 2008,[24] while a prolonged research period is scheduled for the time from February to June 2009. The field visits are to amend knowledge previously gained through the study of secondary resources and will provide me with the ability to collect primary data.

In order to assess the *security* sector I will seek interviews in the ministries of defence[25] and interior,[26] aiming to find out about the history, coherence, and (central) administration of the security forces. Furthermore, interviews with UNDP[27] and other key actors that have helped build Somaliland's police forces are to be conducted in order to shed further light on the organization of the security sector. Additionally, the research envisions trips to Borama (Awdal-region), Berbera (Sahil-region), Burao (Togdheer-region), and Erigavo (Sanaag-region), which will provide me with the opportunity to observe the functioning and structure of the security sector and its connection to the centre. Interviews with ex-members of the SNM[28] will allow me to trace whether and how the organization of the security sector was a product of war(fare).

To investigate the *taxation* system and its effects on administration and state and nation building, I plan to interview personnel of the ministry of finance[29] and commerce and industry.[30] Reviewing the government's accumulated material on taxation[31] and visiting the aforementioned regions and their

---

[21] Including members of Somalia's diaspora in London and (former) aid agency workers; initial contacts have already been established with UNHCR, UNDP, and the scholarly community in the United Kingdom and Germany
[22] Transitional National Government
[23] Transitional Federal Government
[24] This not only allows conducting first field research, but comes at a time, when local elections will be held
[25] Mr. Adan Mire Mohamed
[26] Mr. Abdilahi Ismail Ali
[27] United Nations Development Programme
[28] Somali National Movement
[29] Mr. Huseen Ali Duale
[30] Mr. Ossam Qasim Qodax
[31] Including e.g. special taxation laws and statistics

administrations[32] will inform me about the nature of the prevailing taxation system and e.g. the degree to which Law No. 12 of the Unified Tariffs for Local Government – which centralises all revenue collection – is implemented. Again, interviews with key informants are to provide me with insight about the roots of the taxation system (in warfare) and its current character.

In order to assess *communication* I will seek to interview officials in the ministries of information,[33] justice,[34] and post and telecommunication.[35] I will aspire to trace the (nature of) exchange of information between the centre and periphery and analyse the value attached to it. The degree to which e.g. the Regions and District Law[36] is realized by respective regional councils and, in fact, the latters' mere presence and recognition of the Somaliland government "provides a means of judging the territorial reach of the state" (Bradbury 2008:232).

The role of war(fare) and its impact on the development of the organization of security, taxation, and communication – and ultimately (central) administration – will in parts be traced through interviews with former members of the SNM.[37] Further informants are possibly members of the *guurti* (council of elders) and the Supreme Court.

In order to facilitate my field research activities in Somaliland, I will seek affiliation with the *Academy for Peace and Development*, Hargeisa, as a research fellow.[38] Existing contacts of the *Institute of Development and Peace* (INEF) at the University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany), where my second PhD-supervisor is based, will be of further help.

Phase III: State Formation in Eritrea and South Sudan

In a final step, the findings resulting from the comparative study of Somalia and Somaliland are to be compared to Eritrea and South Sudan, in order to investigate in how far the underlying state formation processes are similar. Additionally, this phase will investigate whether or not administration holds as the main explanatory variable and warfare as antecedent condition for explaining state formation outside Somaliland in the wider Horn of Africa. Information are sought primarily through secondary resources, but may also include brief field visits to Asmara (Eritrea) and Juba (South Sudan) in order to gain first hand information and conduct interviews with key informants.

---

[32] Including district and local government bodies as well as the administration of the port of Berbera, which is the "government's main source of revenue" that provided an income of an estimated US$10-15 million per year (Bradbury 2008:111)
[33] Mr. Ahmed Haji Dahir Elmi
[34] Mr. Ahmed Hasan Ali
[35] Mr Liban Ducaleh "Casyr"
[36] Law No. 23/2002, which formalised the division of Somaliland into six administrative regions
[37] E.g. with Abdi Yusuf Duale (former SNM member and now Programme Coordinator of the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Hargeisa) or Abdulaziz Mohamed Samale (First Deputy Speaker of the Somaliland Parliament, to whom a first contact has already been established)
[38] I have been in contact with the Academy's director, Mr. Mohamed Said Gees, and received positive feedback regarding this inquiry

6.2.3   Envisaged Time Frame

Timeframe	Action to be taken
Oct 07 – Jan 08	Literature review phase 1: Familiarization with diverse analytical and theoretical frameworks; Formulation of research questions and first hypothesis; Presentation (and eventual readjustment) of research project.
Feb 08 – Apr 08	Literature review phase 2: Establishment of firm theoretical framework; Definition of hypothesis and development of methodological approaches; Submission of research proposal to the DESTIN upgrading committee.
May 08	Upgrading panel; Exams in diverse (methodology) courses at the LSE (Mi451, Mi453, Mi454) as well as Arabic language course.
Jun 08 – Dec 08	Literature review phase 3: In depth study of (failed) state formation project of Somalia; Besides historical review and archival work, interviews with key informants of the Somali diaspora and donor community are to be conducted. Draft composition of chapters 1 (theoretical framework) and 2 (failed state formation project of Somalia).
Jul 08	Intensive language course (Arabic) at the LSI (Bochum, Germany) for three weeks.
Oct 08	Field work phase 1: Somaliland; Establishment of personal contacts, conduction of first interviews and observation of the local elections.
Jan 09 – May 09	Field work phase 2: Somaliland Stopover in Nairobi (Kenya), UN Country Office: First contacts have already been established in order to facilitate and accelerate field research; Interviews will contribute to my insights into the (failed) state formation project in Somalia and Somaliland; Eventually brief field visit to Somalia.
Jun 09 – Sep 09	Data analysis and draft composition of chapter 3 (state formation in Somaliland).
Oct 09 – Feb 10	Literature review phase 4 and possible field work phase 3: State formation projects in Eritrea and South Sudan
Mar 10 – May 10	Draft composition of chapter 4 (state formation in the Horn of Africa).
June 10 – Oct 10	Comparative analysis of case studies, completion and submission of PhD dissertation project.

"War was a great stimulus to state building, and it continues to be,
if not a great stimulus, then at least a major factor."

– Rasler/Thompson 1989:2

7. CONCLUSION

The project's relevance lies in it scrutinizing current explanations of state formation and advancing an alternative approach, which combines valuable insights from the literature on state building, nation building and warfare and addresses some of the literatures' key gaps. Its originality is grounded in the proposition that it is *central administration* that lies at the heart of state formation, as it sparks processes of *institutional* and *socio-cognitive standardization* across a certain territory, thereby stabilizing a society's *hierarchically organized matrix of organisations and institutions*. Under the condition that warfare contains dynamics catalyzing these standardizations, it is constitutive for state formation. The research will also contribute to developing a deeper understanding of why the Somalia state building project collapsed and what lies behind the seemingly successful process of state formation in Somaliland – both terribly under researched to date.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdi, A. (1998): Education in Somalia: History, Destruction, and Calls for Reconstruction; In: Comparative Education, 34(3): 327-340.

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, et al. (2003): An African Success Story: Botswana; In: Rodrik, D. (ed.) (2003): In Search of Prosperity – Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth; Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford: 80-119.

Adam, H. (1994): Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea; In: Review of African Political Economy, 21(59): 21-38.

Adam, H. (1999): Somalia: Problems and Prospects for Democratization; In: Menkhaus, K. and Daddieh, C. (eds.) (1999): State Building and Democratization in Africa – Faith, Hope and Realities; Praeger: London: 261-277.

Adam, H. and Ford, R. (ed.) (1997): Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century; Red Sea Press: Lawrencville, N.J.

Ahmed, I. and Green, H. (1999): The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction; In: Third World Quarterly, 20(1): 113-127.

Albert, M. and Brock, L. (2000): Debordering the World of States: New Spaces in International Relations; In: Albert, M., Brock, L. and Wolf, K.D. (eds.) (2000): Civilizing World Politics – Society and Community Beyond the State; Rowman and Littlefield: Boston.

Anderson, B. (1983): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism; Verso: London.

Azam, J.-P. (2001): The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa; In: Journal of Peace Research, 38(4): 429-444.

Badie, B. (1995): La Fin des Territoires; Hachette: Paris.

Bakonyi, J. (2001): Instabile Staatlichkeit – Zur Transformation politischer Herrschaft in Somalia (Instable Statehood – About the Transformation of Political Governance in Somalia); Universität Hamburg Arbeitspapier 3/2001.

Bakonyi, J. and Stuvoy, K. (2005): Violence and Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola; In: Review of African Political Economy, 32(104): 359-382.

Bardhan, P (2000): Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics from the Point of View of Poor Countries; In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 156(1): 216-35.

Barth, F. (1969): Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference; Allen and Unwin: London.

Bates, R. (1981): Markets and States in Tropical Africa; University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles: 119-132.

Bates, G., Harper, P. and Jones, A. (eds.) (2002): Huntington's Disease; Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Bekalo, S., Brophy, M. and Welford, A. (2003): The Development of Education in Post-Conflict 'Somaliland'; In: International Journal of Educational Development, 23: 459-475.

Bereketeab, R. (2000): Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890-1991; Uppsala University: Uppsala.

Berger, M. (2008): From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order; In: Berger, M. (ed.) (2008): From Nation-Building to State-Building; Routledge: London: 1-22.

Berger, M. and Weber, H. (2008): Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-State System in the 21st Century; In: Berger, M. (ed.) (2008): From Nation-Building to State-Building; Routledge: London: 197-204.

Berg-Schlosser, D. and Siegler, R. (1990): Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder.

Bradbury, M. (1997): Somaliland Country Report, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR).

Bradbury, M. (2003): Living with Statelessness: The Somali Road to Development; In: Conflict, Security and Development, 3: 7-25.

Bradbury, M. (2008): Becoming Somaliland; Progressio: London.

Bräutigam, D., Fjeldstad, O.-D. and Moore, M. (eds.) (2008): Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries – Capacity and Consent; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Breuilly, J. (2006): Introduction; In: Gellner, E. (2006): Nations and Nationalism, 2nd Edition; Blackwell Publishing: Oxford: xx-liii.

Brons, M. (1994): Somaliland Zwei Jahre nach der Unabhängikeitserklärung (Somalia Two Years after the Declaration of Independence); Institut für Afrikakunde: Hamburg.

Brons, M. (2001): Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia – From Statelessness to Statelessness; International Books: Utrecht.

Carothers, T. (2002): The End of the Transition Paradigm; In: Journal of Democracy, 13 (1): 5-21.

Charlton, J. (ed.) (2002): The Military Quotation Book; St. Martin's Press: New York.

Chasteen, J. (2003): Beyond Imagined Communities; In: Castro-Klarén, S. and Chastee, J. (eds.) (2003): Beyond Imagined Communities – Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America; Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London: ix-xxv.

Chesterman, S., Ignatieff, M. and Thakur, R. (eds.) (2005): Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance; United Nations University Press: Tokyo and New York.

Clapham, C. (2001): War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea; Failed States Conference, Florence, 10-14- April 2001.

Clay, E. and Schaffer, B. (1984): Room for Manoeuvre: The Premise of Public Policy; In: Clay, E. and Schaffer, B. (eds.) (1984): Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy in Agriculture and Rural Development; Heinemann Educational: London: 1–12.

Coase, R. (1960): The Problem of Social Cost; In: Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1): 1-44.

Cohen, Y., Brown, B. and Organski, A. (1981): The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order; In: The American Political Science Review, 75(4): 901-910.

Colley, L. (1992): Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837; Yale University Press: Yale.

Collier, D. (1993): The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change; In: Finifter, A. (ed.) (1993): Political Science: The State of the Discipline; American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.: 8-11; 110-112.

Collier, P. Pradhan, D. (1994): Economic Consequences of the Ugandan Transition to Peace; In: Bevan, Azam and Collier (eds): Some Economic Consequences of the Transition form Civil War to Peace, Policy Research WP 1392; World Bank: Washington D.C.

Connor, W. (1994): Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.

Coyne, C. (2006): Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy; In: Foreign Policy Analysis 2: 343-360.

Cramer, Ch. (2006): Civil War is not a Stupid Thing – Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries; Hurst & Company: London.

Creveld, M. van (1991): On Future War; Brassey's: London.

Creveld, M. van (1999): The Rise and Decline of the State; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) (2001): Concepts and Research Agenda, CSRC Working Paper No. 1, April 2001.

Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) (2005): War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: Phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme; CSRC Working Paper No. 1, September 2005.

Davis, D. (2003): Contemporary Challenges and Historical Reflections on the Study of Militaries, States, and Politics; In: Davis, D. and Pereira, A. (eds.) (2003): Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 3-34.

Debiel, T. (2002): Do Crisis Regions Have a Chance of Lasting Peace? In: Debiel, T. and Klein, A. (eds.) (2002): The Difficult Transformation form Structures of Violence: Fragile Peace – State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions; Zed Books: New York: 1-30.

Desch, M. (1996): War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States? In: International Organization, 50(2): 237-268.

Diamond, L., Linz, J. et al. (eds.) (1988): Democracy in Developing Countries; Lynne Rienner: London.

Doornbos, M. (2002): Somalia: Alternative Scenarios for Political Reconstruction; In: African Affairs, 101: 93-107.

Drysdale, J. (2000): Stoics without Pillows: A Way forward for the Somalilands; Haan Associates: London.

Drysdale, J. (2001): Whatever happened to Somalia? Haan: London.

Duffield, M. (2001): Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security; Zed Books: New York.

Economist (1999): Somaliland: Should the World Now Accept Somaliland as an Independent State; The Economist, 7-13 August 1999; The Economist Newspaper Limited: London: 35

Economist (2002): Unprecedented Power, Colliding Ambitions; The Economist, 26 September 2002; The Economist Newspaper Limited: London.

Eisenstadt, S. (1988): Beyond Collapse; In: Yoffee, N. and Cowgill, G. (eds.) (1988): The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilisations; University of Arizona Press: Tucson, AZ.

Emerson, R (1960): From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.

Englebert, P. (2000): State Legitimacy and Development in Africa; Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.

Enzensberger, H. (1994): Civil War; translated by Piers Spence; Penguin and Granta: London.

Eriksen, S. (2006): The Theory of Failure and the Failure of Theory: "State Failure" in Theory and Practice; Accessed through URL: http://www.prio.no/files/file48992_stein_sundstol_eriksen_sip_wg_nov30_des1.pdf; 09.04.2008.

Evans, P., Rueschmeyer, D., et al. (1985): Bringing the State Back In; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Ferguson, R. (1984). Warfare, Culture, and Environment; Academic Press: New York.

First, R. (1983): Colonialism and the Formation of African States; In: Held, David (ed.): States and Society.

Foreign Policy (2007): Failed States Index 2007; July/August 2007: 54-63.

Forrest, J. (2007): Subnationalism and Post-Conflict Governance: Lessons from Africa; In: Brinkerhoff, D. (ed.) (2007): Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – Rebuilding Fragile States; Routledge: London and New York: 226-240.

Fortuna, V. (2003): Forever Hold Your Peace? An Assessment of Peacekeeping in Civil Wars; Manuscript: Columbia University.

Foucault, M. (2000): Truth and Power; In: Fearon, D. (ed.) (2000): Power; New York: The New Press.

Fukui, K., Turton, D. et al. (1979). Warfare Among East African Herders: Papers Presented at the First International Symposium, National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, September 1977; National Museum of Ethnology: Osaka.

Fukuyama, F. (2004): State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century; Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY.

Gabush, J. (2004): Islamization and Democratization of Somaliland Politics; In: Ford, R., Adam, H. and Ismail, E. (eds.) (2004): War Destroys: Peace Nurtures – Somali Reconciliation and Development; The Red Sea Press: Asmara, Inc.: 315-324.

Geddes, B. (2003): Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics; University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.

Gellner, E. (2006): Nations and Nationalism; Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY.

George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005): Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences; MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.

Giddens, A. (1985): The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 2; Polity: London.

Gilkes, P. (1994): Descent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991-December 1992; In: Gurdon, C. (ed.) (1994): The Horn of Africa; University College London: 47-60.

Goldsmith, A. (2007): Does Nation Building Work? Reviewing the Record; In: Brinkerhoff, D. (ed.) (2007): Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – Rebuilding Fragile States; Routledge: London and New York: 25-44.

Goldstone, J. (1991): Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World; University of California Press: Berkeley.

Griffin, K. and Khan, A. (1992): Globalization and the Developing World Geneva: UNRISD; Accessed through URL: http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/ocational_papers/oc2a.htm, 02.04.2008.

Hall, P. (2000): Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., September 2000.

Harriss, J. (2002): Institutions, Politics and Culture: A Case for 'Old' Institutionalim in the Study of Historical Change; Destin Working Paper 34; accessed through URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP34.pdf.

Herbst, J. (2000): States and Power in Africa – Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control; Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Hesselbein, G., Golooba-Mutebi, F. and Putzel, J. (2006): Economic and Political Foundations of State-Making in Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction; Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Heyer, S. (1997): Staatsentstehung und Staatszerfall in Somalia: Dezentralisierungsmodelle jenseits des Staates? (State Formation and State Failure in Somalia: Models of Decentralization beyond the State?); In: Working Papers on African Societies, Nr. 23.

Hobbes of Malmesbury, T. (1651): Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil; Printed for Andrew Crooke at the Green Dragon in St. Pauls Churchyard: London.

Hobsbawm, E. (1977): The Age of Revolution: 1789-1846.

Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Hodgkin, T. (1956): Nationalism in Colonial Africa; Muller: London.

Höhne, M. (2006): Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia; In: Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3): 397-414.

Holsti, K. (1996): The State, War, and the State of War; Cambridge University Press: New York.

Howard, M. (1979): War and the Nation State; Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Howard, M. (2002): Thmahawks and Kalashnikovs; In: Howard, M. (ed.) (2002): The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War; Profile: London: 91-114.

Huntington, S. and Harvard University Center for International Affairs (1968): Political Order in Changing Societies; Yale University Press: New Haven and London.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2008): IDP Global Statistics; Accessed through URL: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpPages)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?OpenDocument&count=1000; 20.04.2008.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2003): Somaliland: Democratization and Its Discontent; ICG Africa Report no. 66; ICG: Nairobi and Brussels.

Jacquin-Berdal, D. (2002): Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa: A Critique of the Ethnic Interpretation; Edwin Mellen Press: Lewiston, N.Y..

Jenkins, R. (2004): Globalization, Production, Employment, and Poverty: Debates and Evidence; In: Journal of International Development, 16(1): 1-12.

Jenkins, K. and Plowden, W. (2006): Governance and Nationbuilding: The Failure of International Intervention; Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.

Jhazbhay, I. (2003): Somaliland – Africa's Best Kept Secret: A Challenge to the International Community? In: African Security Review, 12(4): 77-82.

Jirdeh, A. (2004): Analysis of Election Procedures; In: Ford, R., Adam, H. and Ismail, E. (eds.) (2004): War Destroys: Peace Nurtures – Somali Reconciliation and Development; The Read Sea Press, Inc.: Asmara: 91-97.

Jung, D. (2003): A Political Economy of Intra-State War: Confronting a Paradox; In: Jung, D. (ed.) (2003): Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars – A Political Economy of Intra-State War; London.

Kaldor, M. (1999): New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era; Polity Press: Cambridge.

Kaldor, M. (2007): New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era; Stanford University Press: Stanford, Cal.

Kalyvas, S. (2005): Warfare in Civil Wars: In: Duyvesteyn, I. and Angstrom, J. (eds.) (2005): Rethinking the Nature of War; London and New York: 88-108.

Kaplan, R. (1994): Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History; Papermac: London.

Keen, D. (1994): Famine, needs-assessment and survival strategies in Africa; Oxfam Publications: Oxford.

Kestnbaum, M. and T. Skocpol (1993): War and the Development of Modern National States; In: Sociological Forum, 8(4): 661-674.

Khan, M. (2000): Rent-Seeking As Process; In: Khan, M. and Sundaram, J. (eds.) (2000): Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development – Theory and Evidence in Asia; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 70-144.

Khan, M. (2002): State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform; Draft of paper for Oslo Conference, 24-26 June 2002.

Khan, M. and Gray, H. (2006): State Weakness in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform – Operational Implications for Anti-Corruption Policy and a Case-Study of Tanzania.

King, G.; Keohane, R.; Verba, S. (1994): Designing Social Inquiry; Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Klein, A. (2002): The Horn of Turbulence: Political Regimes in Transition; In: Debiel, R. and Klein, A. (eds.) (2002): Fragile Peace – State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions; Zed Books: New York: 156-170.

Klugman, J., Neyapti, B., et al. (1999): Conflict and Growth in Africa – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Krause, K. (1998): Theorizing Security, State Formation and the 'Third World' in the post-Cold War Era.

Kulessa, M. and Heinrich, W. (2004): Dekonstruktion von Staaten als Chance für neue Staatlichkeit? Das Beispiel Somalia und Somaliland (Deconstruction of states as chance for new statehood? The example of Somalia and Somaliland); In: Hippler, J. (ed.) (2004): Ethnizität und Nation-Building (Ethnicity and Nation-Building); Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF).

Laitin, D. (2002): Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline; In: Milner, H. and Katznelson, I. (eds.) (2002): Political Science: The State of the Discipline; Norton: New York.

Laitin, D. and Samatar, S. (1987): Somalia: Nation in Search of a State; Westview: Boulder and London.

Lata, L. (2004): The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland – The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization. Wilfrid Laurier University Press: Ontario.

Leander, A. (2004): Wars and the Un-making of States; In: Guzzini, Stefano and Jung, Dietrich (eds.) (2004): Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research; Routledge: London and New York; pp. 69-80.

Leonard, R. (1982): European Colonization and the Socio-Economic Integration of Eritrea; In: The Eritrean Case.

Levy, B. and Kpundeh, S. (eds.) (2004): Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons; World Bank: Washington, DC.

Lewis, I. (1980): A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa; Longman: London.

Lewis, I. (1982): Nationalism Turned Inside Out; MERIP Reports (106): 16-21.

Lewis, I. (1993): Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History and Social Institutions; Haan Associates: London.

Lewis, I. (1994): Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society; Red Sea Press: Lawrenceville.

Lewis, I. (2002): A modern History of the Somali: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa; James Currey: Oxford.

Licklider, R. (1993): The consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993; In: American Political Science Review, No. 89 (September), pp. 681-690.

Lieberman, E. (2002): Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research; In: Studies in Comparative International Development, 36(4): 89-115.

Lijphart, A. (1971): Comparative politics and the comparative method; In: The American Political Science Review 65(3): 682-693.

Linklater, A. (1995): Community; In: Danchev, A. (ed.) (1995): Fin de Siècle – The Meaning of the Twentieth Century; Tauris Academic Studies: London.

Little, P. (2003): Somalia: Economy Without State.

Locke, J. (1694): Two Treatises of Government; Churchill: London.

Lyons, T. (1995): Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction; The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.

Macchiavelli, N. (1513): Il Principe; Wetstein: Amsterdam.

Mamdani, M. (1996): Citizen and Subject - Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism; James Currey: London.

Mann, M. (1986): Sources of Social Power; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Mann, M. (1988): States, War and Capitalism; Studies in Political Sociology; Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Mann, M. (1993): The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Marx, K. (1848): Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (Manifest of the Communist Party); Dietz: Berlin and London.

Mayall, J. (2006): Dominique Jacquin-Berdal Memorial Lecture: Nationalism and Self-Determination in Africa; In: Nations and Natinoalism 12(4): 549-557.

Mazuri, A. (1983): Francophone Nations and English-Speaking States: Imperial Ethnicity and African Political Formation; In: Rothchild and Olorunsola (eds.) (1983): State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemma.

McNeill, W. (1983): The pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and society since A.D. 1000; University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Mehler, A. (2002): Decentralization, Division of Power and Crisis Prevention: A Theoretical Exploration with Reference to Africa; In: Debiel, T. and Klein, A. (eds.) (2002): Fragile Peace - State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions; Zed Books: New York: 72-85.

Migdal, J. (1988): Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World; Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Migdal, J. and Schlichte, K. (2005): Rethinking the State; In: Schlichte, Klaus (ed.) (2005): The Dynamics of States – The Formation of Crises of State Domination; Ashgate, 1-40.

Milliken, J. and Krause, K. (2002): State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies; In: Development and Change, 33(5): 753-774.

Mohamed, J. (2002): Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954-1960; In: English Historical Review (474): 1177-1203.

Mohamoud, A. (2006): State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960-2001); Purdue University Press West: Lafayette, Ind.

Moore, M. (2004): Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries; In: International Political Science Review, 25(3): 97-319.

Moore, M. (2008): Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on Taxation and Governance; In: Bräutigam, D.; Fjeldstad, O.-H.; Moore, M. (eds.) (2008): Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries – Capacity and Consent; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 34-63.

Mubarak, J. (1996): From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia – How an Economy Fell Apart; Praeger: Westport and London.

Nathan, L. and Lamb, G. (2000). A Literature Review on the Current Relationship Between War and Economic Agendas in Africa. Cape Town, Centre for Conflict Resolution.

North, D. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

North, D. (1993): Economic Performance Through Time; Prize Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1993; Accessed through URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html; 03.01.2008.

North, D. (1995): The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development; In: Harriss, J., Hunter, J. and Lewis, C. (eds.) (1995): The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development; Routledge: London and New York:17-26.

North, D. (2005): Understanding the Process of Economic Change; Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Omaar, R. (1994): Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Time; In: Current History – A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, May 1994: 232-236.

Ottaway, M. (2002): Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States; In: Development and Change, 33(5): 1001-1023.

Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1989): Second Edition; Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Pereira, A. (2003): Armed Forces, Coercive Monopolies, and Changing Patterns of State Formation and Violence; In: Davis, D. and Pereira, A. (eds.) (2003): Irragular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 387-408.

Perraton, J., Goldblatt, D., Held, D. and McGrew, A. (1997): The Globalization of Economic Activity; In: New Political Economy 2(2): 257-277.

Prunier, G. (1994): Somaliland: Birth of a New Country? In: Gurdon, Charles (ed.) (1994): The Horn of Africa; University College London Press: London, pp. 61-75.

Prunier, G. (1997): Somaliland: A Forgotten Country; Le Monde Diplomatique (English Edition).

Prunier, G. (1998): The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide; Hurst: London.

Przeworski, A. (1991): Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America; Cambridge University Press.: Cambridge.

Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. (1970): The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry; Wiley-Interscience: New York.

Putzel, J. (1999): Survival of an Imperfect Democracy in the Philippines; In: Democratization 6(1): 198-223.

Ragin, C. (1987): The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Methods; University of California Press.

Ragin, C. (2004): Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-Oriented Research; In: Brady, H. and Collier, D. (eds.): Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards; Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham.

Rasler, K. and Thompson, W. (1989): War and State Making: The Shaping of Global Powers; Boston: Unwin and Hyman.

Reinhard, W. (1996): Introduction: Power Elites, State Servants, Ruling Classes, and the Growth of State Power; In: Reinhard, W. (ed.) (1996): Power Elites and State Building; Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Renan, E. (1882): Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation? Calmann-Lévy: Paris.

Reno, W. (1997): Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Reno, W. (2003): Somalia And Survival In the Shadow of the Global Economy; In: Queen Elisabeth House Working Paper Series (QEHWPS No. 100).

Robinson, N. (2007): State-Building and International Politics: The Emergence of a 'New' Problem and Agenda; Hehir, A. and Robinson, N. (eds.) (2007): State-Building - Theory and Practice; Routledge: London: 1-28.

Ropp, T. (1959): War in the Modern World; Duke University Press: Durham.

Rosecrance, R. (1999): The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century; Basic: New York.

Rotberg, R. (2002): The New Nature of Nation-State Failure; In: The Washington Quarterly 25(3): 85-96.

Rotberg, R. (2004): The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair; In: Rotberg, R. (ed.) (2004): When States Fail: Causes and Consequences: Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1763): Du Contrat Social: Ou, Principes du Droit Politique; Chez M. M. Rey: Amsterdam.

Ruggie, J. (1993): Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations; In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 139-174.

Samatar, A. (1995): Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction; The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.

Samatar, S. (1991): Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil; Minority Rights Group: London.

Schlichte, K. (2003): State Formation and the Economy of Intra-State Wars; In: Jung, D. (ed.) (2003): Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars - A Political Economy of Intra-State War; London.

Schneckener, U. (2007): Rankings und Indizes: Welche Staaten gelten als fragil? (Rankings and Indexes: Which States are Supposedly Fragile?); Diskussionspapier Forschungsgruppe Globale Fragen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (8/2007).

Sen, A. (1999): Development as Freedom; Knopf: New York

Seton-Watson, H. (1977): Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism; Methuen: London.

Sheik-Abdi, A. (1977): Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future; In: The Journal of Modern African Studies 15(4): 657-665.

Shultz, R. (1995): State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis; In: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541: 75-88.

Simmel, G. (1964): Conflict; In: Simmel, G. (1964): Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations; Free Press: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore: 13-123.

Simons, A. (1995): Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone; Westview Press: Boulder, CO.

Smith, A. (1991): National Identity; Penguin Books: London.

Smith, A. (1983): State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism; Wheatsheaf: Brighton.

Smith, A. (1998): Nationalism and Modernism: A critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism.; Routledge: New York.

Tilly, Ch. (1975): The Formation of National States in Western Europe; Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Tilly, Ch. (1985): War Making and State Making as Organized Crime; In: Evans, P. and Rueschemeyer, D. (eds.) (1985): Bringing the State Back In.

Tilly, Ch. (1992): Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD990-1992; Blackwell: Oxford.

Tilly, Ch. (1997): Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology; In: Comparative Social Research, Vol. 16, pp. 43-53.

Toft, M. (2003): Peace Through Victory? The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars; Manuscript; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.

Touval, S. and Harvard University, Center for International Affairs (1963): Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.

Turton, D. (1979): War, Peace and Mursi Identity; In: Fukui, K. and Turton, D. (eds.) (1979): Warfare Among East African Herders; National Museum of Ethnology: Osaka.

van Creveld, M. (1991): On Future War; Brasey's: London.

Van den Berghe, P. (1981): The Ethnic Phenomenon; Elsevier: New York.

vanEvera, S. (1997): Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science; Cornell University Press: Ithaca.

War-torn Societies Project (WSP) (2005): International Somali Programme: Rebuilding Somaliland – Issues and Possibilities; The Red Sea Press, Inc.: Asmara.

Weber, M. (1919): Politics as a Vocation.

Weber, M. (1948): From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology; Translated, Edited and with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills; Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.

Weinstein, J. (2004): Which Path to Peace? Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective; A Background Memo Prepared for "The Bottom Billion", Oxford University June 27-29.

Weinstein, J. (2005): Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment; In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 69(4): 598-624.

World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics; World Bank: Washington, D.C.

World Bank (2008): Information taken from the Homepage of the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit; accessed through URL: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVE LOPMENT/EXTCPR/0,,menuPK:407746~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSite PK:407740,00.html; access date: 13.04.2008.

Wunsch, J. (2000): Refounding the African State and Local Self-Governance: The Neglected Foundation; In: The Journal of Modern African Studies 38(3): 487-509.

Young, C. (1994): The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective; Yale University Press: New Haven, Ct.

Zartman, I. (ed.) (1995): Collapsed States; Lynne Rienner: London.

Zaum, D. (2007): The Sovereignty Paradox - The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding; Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Zierau, T. (2003): State Building without Sovereignty: The Somaliland Republic; In: Mondes en Developpement 31(123): 57-62.