

**End of Award Report  
ESRC Project L219252105**

**Devolution and Party Adaptation:  
The UK in Comparative Perspective**

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- **Background**

This project has as its starting point a critique of the existing literature on decentralization and territorial politics. Much previous research on the ‘territorial question’ in contemporary European states has tended to focus on the formal changes to the administration structure of the state inherent in decentralization reforms, and/or the political movements demanding greater self-government or independence for historically or culturally distinctive territories within European national states. We found this literature lacking in two respects. First, analysis of the formal institutional dimension of decentralization reform often pays little attention to the political dynamics involved in governing a decentralized state, and in particular, ignores or understates the decisive role of political parties. Second, to the extent that political parties have been a focus of studies of territorial politics, researchers have often privileged analysis of small nationalist or regionalist parties demanding decentralization, and scarce attention has been paid to the major statewide political parties which, almost everywhere in the advanced world, dominate representative institutions at both state and sub-state level.

We therefore proposed to place statewide political parties at the centre of our analysis of decentralization processes in Western Europe. By doing so, as well as filling a clear lacuna in the existing state of knowledge of territorial politics, we also hoped to address two broad debates. First, the study of party politics has recently been dominated by concerns that parties are no longer organizationally capable of fulfilling their traditional role as a ‘transmission belt’ of social demands into the institutions of government. We set out to assess how this trend towards party organizational decline affected, and was affected by, processes political decentralization. Second, discussion of decentralization in Western Europe, particularly in the UK and Spain, has often revolved around the impact of institutional reforms on the unity of the state. By focusing on the role of state-wide parties explicitly committed to maintaining the unity of the state, we hoped to shed new light on the political future of plurinational states in Europe. These concerns emerged from the comparative research on political parties previously carried out, particularly by Hopkin and van Biezen who had already made significant contributions to debates on organizational change in political parties in the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain.

- **Objectives**

The broad objective of this research was to assess the impact of decentralization on patterns of party politics in Western European democracies in general, and the United

Kingdom in particular. Underlying this broad area of enquiry was a more direct question: does decentralization accentuate or mitigate centrifugal pressures in plurinational states? In other words, by analyzing the British experience of devolution in a comparative perspective, we wished to gauge the implications of devolution for the unity and cohesion of the British state. We worked on the assumption that the role of political parties, particularly those with a state-wide presence, would be a crucial intervening variable.

More specifically, the objectives of this research divided into three areas.

First, we proposed to provide a quantitative measure of the degree to which party politics reflected a 'nationalized' political system, with voters tended to vote in similar proportions for the different political parties in different territories of the state. This data would be used to assess the quantitative evidence for a relationship between the degree of political decentralization of a state and the extent to which centrifugal or centripetal dynamics dominate in electoral politics.

This proved the most problematic aspect of the project, principally because in the process of collecting and analyzing the electoral data, Daniele Caramani (then at the University of Mannheim) published a book including a similar analysis to the one we proposed<sup>1</sup>. This naturally pre-empted our own analysis and meant that much of our data-gathering work had been simply duplicating work already done by Caramani.

Second, we proposed a reconceptualization of the theoretical 'toolkit' of the field of party politics to accommodate the territorial dimension of many contemporary political systems. By introducing an explicit reference to territoriality in our use of the existing theories of party systems and party organization we hoped to facilitate our empirical analysis of the relationship between decentralization and party politics.

This work was carried out successfully, producing a framework of analysis for the study of party politics in conditions of decentralization. This work has resulted in one journal article specifically relating to territoriality and party theory<sup>2</sup>, and underpinned several further publications of a more empirical orientation. This framework has also been taken up by other scholars working in the field and suggests a significant impact of the project on the way in which decentralization and party politics are studied.

Third, we proposed a comparative analysis of the relationship between decentralization and reforms and party politics in four Western European democracies: the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain. This part of the research looked at the major state-wide parties in each country and assessed how decentralization had affected their organization and activity at different levels of government within the state. It also looked at how decentralization affected inter-party relations, since parties could find themselves in very different relationships – sometimes competitive, sometimes cooperative – at different levels of government. In the UK case, this part of the research had the aim of assessing how devolution might, through its impact on party politics, affect the set of established constitutional arrangements known commonly in the literature as the 'Westminster model'.

This work has produced the bulk of our findings and can be regarded as having been successfully completed, with some qualifications. The major problem facing us has been the effective loss of one of our cases, France, from the comparative analysis, due to the departure of the relevant project member from academic life mid-way through the project. However, this lacuna does not, in our opinion, undermine our findings, since France at a prima facie glance is an example

of a relatively modest decentralization reform taking place within a relatively homogeneous state, and which appears to confirm the null hypothesis, ie that decentralization has little impact on the party system. We have responded by bulking up our analysis of the remaining cases, which provide sufficient traction for interesting comparative work. On the whole, our research has produced a comparative analysis of three key cases with useful findings, some of which have been published and are already being cited in relevant work by colleagues working on territorial politics.

- **Methods**

This project has been based on the standard methods of contemporary comparative politics research. Both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis have been deployed. On the quantitative side, electoral data measuring the territorial dispersion of voting behaviour in European states has been analyzed to produce a variety of measures of the degree to which voters in different regions vote in similar ways: this include indices of similarity, standard deviations and Gini coefficients. Most of the research, however, relied on largely qualitative methods. Electoral strategies, political discourse, and patterns of intra-party organization have been studied on the basis of elite and expert interviews, press reports and party documentation. The project members interpreted the information derived from this research according to the precautionary principle that findings were more reliable when corroborated by more than one source, although this is naturally not always possible. This qualitative analysis also relied heavily on the project members' in-depth knowledge of the countries studied. The research team is perhaps unique in the UK for bringing together academics with expert knowledge on four of the five largest European Union states, along with the relevant language skills. Finally, the comparative analysis of party change under decentralization reform drew on the insights of Charles Ragin<sup>3</sup> and informally deployed the principles of his technique of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) based on Boolean logic. Although the 'too many variables, too few cases' problem remains a serious issue in this kind of three/four country study, QCA did provide a basis on which to test the validity of some of the comparative inferences drawn here.

- **Results**

The results of our research can be assessed in terms of the three broad headings outlined in 'Objectives' above. This three headings also allow us to delineate where we have made a theoretical, or empirical, contribution to knowledge in this area. Finally, we presented a general overview of our response to the 'big' question presented in the introduction – what is the impact of devolution on the unity of plurinational states?

- 1) Quantifying the 'Denationalization' of Electoral Politics.

Here, we proposed to provide a measure of the degree to which party politics reflected a 'nationalized' political system, in which territory in and of itself has limited impact on voter choices. Our findings – inevitably - duplicated some of those of Caramani. However, there is a difference of emphasis which is worth highlighting.

Caramani's main objective in analyzing the territorial dispersion of the vote in European democracies since their first democratic elections was to demonstrate empirically the tendency of electoral politics in these states to become 'nationalized', in other words, for voter behaviour to be driven by a state-wide political logic leading to fairly similar vote shares for the major political parties in all parts of a national state. Our aim was rather different: to assess the extent to which this highly 'nationalized' picture of European electoral politics, characteristic of the period of stable, 'frozen' party systems in the immediate post-war period<sup>4</sup>, underwent significant changes after the 1960s when a range of pressures undermined the apparent predictability of party competition in the established democracies.

Our reading of the data suggests that Caramani downplays the emergence of centrifugal pressures in the most plurinational Western European states. First of all, even using the measures Caramani reports, there is significant evidence of 'denationalization' –increasing territorial disparities in voting behaviour – in some European democracies over the past three decades. The countries where such 'denationalization' has taken place are precisely those displaying long-standing political tensions of a territorial nature, tensions easily identifiable independently of the evidence of distinctive electoral behaviour: Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. In all these cases, linguistic/cultural divides have been present from the state's inception, and their integration has frequently been identified as a source of political controversy. An analysis based on the electoral performance of explicitly non-statewide political parties (NSWs)<sup>5</sup>, in those states where such parties have won parliamentary representation, reveals further evidence of 'denationalization' which reliance on simple measures of dispersion can overlook<sup>6</sup>. In the UK, Italy and Spain NSWs have won significant and increasing vote shares in recent decades: the Scottish and Welsh nationalists from the early 1970s, in Italy the Northern League since the late 1980s, and in Spain Catalan and Basque nationalists, plus NSWs representing other lesser known regions, in a linear pattern since the first democratic elections in 1977.

In short, although the picture over a century or so of electoral politics in Western Europe confirms Caramani's nationalization hypothesis, the bulk of this homogenizing process was complete by the Second World War, and in some cases has been – albeit only partially – reversed since the 1970s. We draw two implications from this observation. First, the by now indisputable evidence of increasing instability in Western European electoral behaviour over the last three decades coincides with the process of denationalization in specific cases. This suggests that support for NSWs in plurinational states is at least to an extent explicable in terms of the broad social, economic and cultural changes which have driven increasing vote shares for a variety of 'non-traditional' political movements since the 1960s. In other words, denationalization is empirically difficult to distinguish from the broad 'party change' and 'party decline' phenomenon which has preoccupied observers of electoral politics in recent years.

Second, there is a clear – if hardly counter-intuitive - empirical relationship between denationalization in the electoral arena, and with a variable lag, institutional reforms decentralizing power to the 'meso' level. In the UK, devolution reforms were first mooted in the 1970s, and finally adopted in the late 1990s. In Italy, the powers of regional government were extended in 2001, and a further devolution proposed, not but finalized, in 2005. In Spain, the open-ended nature of the constitutional settlement has allowed a progressive decentralization of a range of functions over the democratic quarter century, culminating in a wholesale redefinition of the powers of the

Autonomous Communities in 2005-6. In short, the European experience suggests that the denationalization of the vote begets decentralizing reforms. However these reforms are mostly too recent to allow any conclusions to be drawn on the opposite causal link – ie, the effects of decentralization on the territorial dispersion of the vote. The limited data points available suggest a mixed picture, with NSWs enjoying continued growth in Spain after decentralization, but stagnation in the UK and Italy. The quantitative evidence alone cannot tell us much about the relationship between institutional reform and the cohesion of plurinational states.

## 2) Theorizing ‘Denationalized’ Party Politics

The classic literature on party organizations and party systems – which continues to underpin much contemporary parties research – for the most part assumed a homogeneous national state in which political competition was driven by the various manifestations of the left-right dimension. However, as is clear from Stein Rokkan’s pathbreaking but often ignored research on the roots of Western European electoral politics<sup>7</sup>, territory is a crucial category in many democratic states, and territorial identities rarely fit comfortably into the one-dimensional view of politics as a battle between left and right. Our research has sought to move beyond this literature in the following ways.

First, our analysis of organizational change in political parties faced with decentralizing reforms (see also 3] below) is based on a framework for analysis which takes the existing party organizational literature and adapts it explicitly for research into the internal territorial dynamics of political parties<sup>8</sup>. It identifies three main areas susceptible to change as a result of decentralizing reforms. First, elite recruitment, and particularly the selection of candidates for election to sub-central representative institutions, is a key flashpoint in intra-party relations when decentralizing reforms take place. Second, the political discourses and programmatic commitments made by parties at the different levels of government reveal a great deal of information about intra-party changes in multi-level electoral contexts. Third, the behaviour of political parties in public office is another key arena: in particular, we focus on the importance of coalitional strategies in representative institutions at different levels. Here, decentralization creates the potential for different levels of the party organization to have different, even contradictory, relationship with rival parties. This framework reveals much of the ‘action’ in the party politics of decentralizing states, and has proved valuable in steering our empirical analysis of party adaptation to decentralization in the European countries studied in 3).

Second, we were curious to gauge the implications of decentralization for party system dynamics, still usually analyzed through the prism of the classic work of Duverger and Sartori. Territorial politics introduces a serious difficulty for the application of the spatial and linear reasoning implicit in these analyses. Competition, and coalitional bargaining, between parties whose relationship is determined by their relative positions on a left-right dimension, can be effectively analyzed using this approach. It works less well in cases where ethnic, cultural and linguistic identifications drive party behaviour. We therefore propose analyzing our party system cases in terms of two dimensions – left-right, and centralization-decentralization, along similar lines to the approach adopted by Hix<sup>9</sup> and others in research on party politics at the European level. This approach allows us to take

account of how both ‘denationalized’ and ‘nationalized’ voting behaviour coexists in the same political system, and often in the same coalitions.

A third, and largely unanticipated, theoretical contribution is the innovative use of historical institutionalism, an approach developed in North American comparative political economy<sup>10</sup>, to study party organization. Historical institutionalism is usefully distinguished from rational choice institutionalism<sup>11</sup>, which analyzes the incentives generated by the state’s institutional arrangements and deduces likely political behaviour from these incentives. Rational choice institutionalism implies that decentralization will create incentives for sub-central party elites to seize greater power within their party organizations, leading parties to adopt formally a structure which mirrors that of the broader political system<sup>12</sup>. We argue that this ‘power-seeking’ approach, by rejecting the notion of the party organization as a political arena in its own right, cannot hope to capture the complexity of institutional reforms and their impact on party politics<sup>13</sup>. Our analysis of this party organizational arena, driven by the analytical framework mentioned earlier in this section, has also benefited from the insights of historical institutionalism, which interprets actor behaviour as rational and strategic, but also influenced by institutional inertias, as well as relatively unpredictable dynamics of sequence and framing. Not only is this approach increasingly dominant in other fields of comparative politics, such as comparative public policy and welfare state studies, but it also provides an indispensable tool for understanding some of the perhaps counter-intuitive impacts of decentralization on party politics (see 3] below).

### 3) Comparative analysis of party adaptation to decentralization reforms in the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain.

The bulk of the empirical research we carried out related to this part of the project. On one level, our findings were perhaps less than spectacular: we observed a range of usually undramatic changes to party organizations in the wake of decentralization reforms, suggesting a remarkable ability of parties to adapt their behaviour and structures to new institutional environments without trauma. However, in the context of the bigger theoretical issues posed by our project, our findings appear rather more powerful. First, rational choice institutionalist predictions of party change receive only qualified empirical support. Parties are pushed to respond organizationally to changes in the territorial distribution of power within the state, but this is unsurprising: the null hypothesis – that parties remain exactly the same after such changes – would be almost nonsensical. In fact most of what is interesting about party adaptation to these reforms are best captured by a party-centred approach which takes seriously parties’ own organizational inertias and quirks. Second, our findings (in conjunction with our arguments presented in 1] above) suggest little support for the notion that decentralization reforms will accelerate centrifugal pressures and lead to the disintegration of plurinational states. On the contrary, institutional reforms are clearly a response to centrifugal pressures, and the organizational continuities in state-wide political parties act as a shock absorber, safely channelling such pressures through the institutions of the state.

The French case, dropped from the analysis for personnel reasons, appears on the surface to confirm these findings. The Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom cases, studied here in much greater depth, point in the same direction. We shall take these cases in turn, and then draw comparative conclusions. The Italian and Spanish cases

both offer a rather longer data period than available in the UK, with the regional or 'meso' governments created in 1970 in Italy (with an extension of their powers in 2001), and in 1979-80 in Spain (with further decentralization throughout the democratic period). Our analysis of these cases helped generate the theoretical tools for the analysis of the British case, as well as suggesting a set of empirical expectations – a kind of benchmark – for analyzing UK devolution.

In Italy, regional reform was not a response to any radical ethnoregionalist demand (except perhaps in the Alto-Adige province bordering Austria), but did lead to a substantial administration decentralization of key policy areas such as health and education, with important budgetary consequences. Italy therefore provides a test of the 'power-seeking' hypothesis, which would predict that regional elites would seize on their greater policy responsibility to redistribute power downwards within the party organizations. There is little evidence, however, that this indeed took place. The Christian Democrat party, the most important party of government for a long period spanning the regional reform, already had a highly factionalized internal structure before 1970. Factions were articulated on a territorial basis, with national-level party leaders building local power bases by distributing state resources and patronage. The decentralization reform did not substantially change this factional dynamic, although the availability of largesse through the regional structure did introduce a new tier to the flows of resources which kept the party machine running. In short, an already decentralized party adapted its clientelistic practices almost seamlessly to the new situation. A slightly different picture emerges from an analysis of the opposition Communist Party (PCI, later DS). The PCI seized upon the regional reform to establish its credentials as a competent party of government in its own electoral strongholds. However, this took place within the context of a high degree of internal centralization, with the PCI's regional elites contributing to a national strategy of preparing the party to enter the political mainstream. In short, the consequences of the 1970 reform point to incremental change in the main statewide party organizations.

In Spain, decentralization was a far more politically charged issue, with intense demand for self-government from two territories with distinctive traditions (Catalonia and Euskadi). Non-statewide parties won substantial support in these territories, and governed their decentralized institutions. Yet the picture at the statewide level suggests incremental change. The Socialist Party, despite a formally federal structure which would imply decentralized decision-making, in fact became relatively centralized under a charismatic national leader - Felipe González -, and only became less so after his retirement. In the subsequent decade, the regional leaders of the party have come to the fore, but acting as a kind of collegiate national leadership. Recent developments in the Catalan branch of the party<sup>14</sup> have destabilized this arrangement, but on the whole incrementalism has dominated. The conservative Popular Party, with its long-standing attachment to the highly unitary vision of Spain characteristic of Francoism, has maintained a comparatively centralized structure, centred around the authority of the national party leader. Interviews in Madrid and Barcelona confirmed the expectation that in cases of centre-periphery tensions, the national party leadership's writ would hold, even in territories where demands for self-government are highest. The comparison of the two major Spanish parties confirms the picture emerging from the Italian case of party organizational and ideological traditions proving extremely 'sticky', and acting as a filter to attenuate the potentially centrifugal impact of decentralizing reforms.

Our analysis of the British case – more tentative, given the shorter history of the UK's devolved institutions – was informed by these findings, and our expectation

was to observe a similar pattern of incremental change mediated by internal party dynamics<sup>15</sup>. Despite a few high-profile disputes over candidate selection for the first devolved elections, and some leadership instability in the first term of the devolved institutions (1999-2003), the picture presented by the major British parties at the end of the project (2006) resembled the findings of the Italian and Spanish case studies to a perhaps surprising extent. In short, the approach adopted by party managers, after an initial flurry of what some journalists have called ‘control freakery’, has been incrementalist, seeking to adapt and recalibrate the party organizations in order to manage intraparty relations in the new multi-level context. Party managers have ‘muddled through’ within the existing party structures, rather than reorganizing the party’s formal structures and decision-making bodies. This pattern has been most visible in the Labour party, which as the sole governing party in Westminster and (post-2003) Wales, and senior partner in coalitions in the devolved institutions, bore the brunt of most of the unsettling impact of devolution on party organizations. In the first devolved elections, high profile attempts to impose candidates favoured by the party’s London elite backfired spectacularly (most visibly in London). However the party’s response was to simply concede greater margin of manoeuvre to the sub-central elites and avoid open confrontation, rather than reconfiguring the party’s internal power map. This adaptive strategy seems to have proved successful, since the potential for policy differentiation between the devolved and Westminster arenas to create tensions inside the Labour party has been largely defused, allowing Labour to develop a ‘stratarchic’ model of party management in which different centres of power are able to coexist on the understanding that they do not encroach too much on each others’ domains.

A word of caution is necessarily in interpreting these findings for the UK case. First, the data period is extremely short, not even spanning two terms of the new devolved institutions. At the very least it is premature to draw definitive conclusions on the impact of devolution on party behaviour. Secondly, British politicians and voters have obstinately refused to provide us with optimal laboratory conditions for the comparative analysis. Only one party has governed in Westminster, and the same coalition, with only slightly variant levels of parliamentary representation, has governed in Scotland. In Wales, slight variations in coalitional dynamics and seat shares have barely affected the continuous domination of the Assembly by Welsh Labour. In short, UK devolution has yet to face more than a very narrow range of feasible political scenarios, which in the future are likely to include government turnover in Westminster and (although less likely) in Scotland and Wales, and in particular, the possibility of rival parties governing Westminster and the devolved governments (the almost certain consequence of a Conservative revival in general elections). These scenarios have the potential to disrupt the parties’ incrementalist adaptation to multi-level electoral politics, but there is little point in speculating on the consequences here. One point that is worth making, however, is that the ‘Westminster model’ – which rests on single-party government at the statewide level allowing for high concentrations of executive power – is not easily reconcilable with the logic of devolution. Up to now, the tension between majoritarian dynamics at Westminster and consensus dynamics imposed by multiple tiers of government has been managed from within the Labour party. However, a change in government at the UK level rather obviously has the potential to lay this tension bare<sup>16</sup>.

As a comparative conclusion, we have found in three rather different Western European cases a very similar response to decentralization reforms. Parties have adapted to such reforms by recalibrating their internal distribution of power on an

informal basis, rather than by wholesale restructuring of the party's formal organization<sup>17</sup>. We found very interesting comparative conclusions were suggested by analysis of the importance of timing of organizational change in relation to institutional reform: we discovered that the stage of organizational development at which a party finds itself during decentralization processes can explain a good deal of variation in party behaviour<sup>18</sup>. We argue this lends powerful support to the 'historical institutionalist' approach to analyzing party adaptation. It also suggests that apocalyptic predictions that decentralization would undermine the unity of the state are wide of the mark, in large part because they fail to take account of the organizational continuities and inertias of the statewide political parties that govern West European democracies.

Redistribution?

- **Activities**

Lead researcher Hopkin has been involved in variety of activities, regularly attending and contributing to Programme events and presenting research at conferences. Outputs from this project were presented at the American Political Science Association annual meetings of 2003 and 2004; and the European Consortium of Political Research Joint Sessions, the Conference of Europeanists and the PSA Territorial Politics group conference, all in 2004; and the Workshop on Territorial Party Politics held at the University of Edinburgh in 2005. Hopkin also organized two small one-day seminars involving Programme participants and other international experts: a seminar on Devolution and Party Politics, in Birmingham in 2004, and a seminar on Devolution and Redistribution in London in 2005. He has also been working closely with Catalan colleagues at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, and with Italian specialists on decentralization through the Italian Political Science Association Territorial Politics group.

- **Outputs**

Already published outputs include one article in *European Urban and Regional Studies*, a leading European journal on territorial issues, and *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, the leading journal on territorial politics in the U.S. Hopkin also wrote a conference paper on the Italian case due to be published in an ECPR series edited volume, another on the Italian case for a collective project due to be included in a further edited volume, and a further comparative paper with Programme colleagues Laffin and Shaw. This latter paper has been submitted along with four other refereed piece as a special issue of Party Politics, for which Hopkin is guest editor. Another special issue is planned for the papers presented at the LSE 'Devolution and Redistribution' meeting. Finally, Hopkin is working on a paper with Alex Cooley of Barnard College employing incomplete contracting theory to analyze the Spanish decentralization process, which when complete will be submitted to a major international journal. The final part of our dissemination strategy remains to be finalized, although there is probably sufficient material for a research monograph.

- **Impacts**

The work done on this project has undoubtedly made an academic impact, and some findings have been disseminated in the course of the research with users in relevant political parties in the countries studied. Its broader impact will depend on the extent to which the academic results recently published can be publicized effectively in the relevant circles.

## • Future Research Priorities

This research project, along with other related projects with which we have worked closely, has played a key role in ensuring that research on decentralization takes full account of the importance of party politics. However, such a broad study covering three-four countries could not exhaust the potential for greater empirical understanding of how decentralization processes play out within political parties. Moreover, important and perhaps unexpected themes have emerged from this work, particularly the theoretical innovations deployed which suggest a new approach to understanding internal party dynamics, and the importance of redistributive politics for the cohesion of large statewide political parties in plurinational and multi-level contexts. This avenue of research could be fruitfully pursued by a range of empirical and theoretical projects.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Caramani, D. (2004). *The Nationalization of Electoral Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>2</sup> Hopkin, J. (2003) 'Political Decentralization, Electoral Change and Party Organizational Adaptation: A Framework for Analysis', *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10 (3): 227-37.

<sup>3</sup> Ragin, C. (1987). *The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

<sup>4</sup> Lipset, S.M. and S. Rokkan (eds.) (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press.

<sup>5</sup> Non-statewide parties is an accepted, non-controversial nomenclature for what are often known as regionalist, nationalist, or ethnoregionalist parties.

<sup>6</sup> See for instance the analysis of Spain in Hopkin, J. (2005). 'Spain: Proportional Representation with Majoritarian Outcomes', in M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.375-94.

<sup>7</sup> Rokkan, S. (1970). *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

<sup>8</sup> Hopkin (2003).

<sup>9</sup> Hix, S. (2005). *The Political System of the European Union*. London: Palgrave.

<sup>10</sup> Thelen, K. and Steinmo, S. (1992). 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. (eds.), *Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chap.1.

<sup>11</sup> See Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996). 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms'. *Political Studies* 34: 936-57.

<sup>12</sup> Kollman, K. and P. Chhibber. 2004. *The formation of national party systems. Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>13</sup> See Hopkin, J. and J. Bradbury (2006). 'British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 36: 1, pp.135-52.

<sup>14</sup> Reported in van Biezen, I and J. Hopkin (2006). 'Party Organization in Multi-level Contexts', in Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery (eds.), *Devolution and Electoral Politics: A Comparative Exploration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp.14-36.

<sup>15</sup> See Hopkin and Bradbury 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Hopkin, J. (2004). 'Devolution and UK Party Democracy', ESRC Devolution meeting, Cardiff, June.

<sup>17</sup> As suggested by Kollman and Chhibber 2004.

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<sup>18</sup> See Hopkin, J., M. Laffin and E. Shaw (2005). 'Devolution and Organizational Change in Political Parties: The UK Labour Party and the Spanish Socialist Party Compared', presented at workshop on Territorial Party Politics, University of Edinburgh, 28-9 October 2005.