I am a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at LSE.
My research addresses questions about practical reason, metaethics, and decision theory.
My PhD Thesis concerns the role of normative uncertainty in models of rational choice. I defend a set of claims about the ways in which our choices under normative uncertainty depend on the nature of normative judgements themselves.
I am a co-organiser of LSE's Choice Group.
Here is a recent copy of my CV.
"Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-cognitivists." Forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
"Preference and Commitment Under Moral Uncertainty." Under review, Draft available on request.
"The Possibility of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons Under Uncertainty About Population Axiology." Under review. Draft available on request.
"The Relevance of Belief." In preparation.
"The Balance and Weight of Reasons." In preparation.