papers on labour contracts

authority in employment contracts: a bilateral bargaining approach

or (if you can afford it) access through sciencedirect

why does my (and many others) employment contract say that i have to do what my employer says? this paper argues that employers impose such clauses as a 'divide and rule' strategy to strengthen their hand in wage bargaining. and workers are happy to accept these clauses as they will not be used in equilibrium

imperfect labour markets, the stock market and the inefficiency of capitalism

argues that, because the discount rate of workers is below that of employers, there is a generic bias in the organization of firms towards inefficient arrangements that strengthen the bargaining power of employers

an asymmetric information approach to the comparative analysis of participatory and capitalist firms.

something about comparing the distirbution of information in different types of firms. more than a little speculative

the profitability of private information in unionised capitalist enterprises

argues that employers have an information to restrict information distribution in an attempt to get informational rents.

inefficiency and inequality in a model of occupational choice with private information (with b.lockwood).

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can't remember what this was about but i'm sure it seemed terribly important at the time

implicit contracts

a survey of what was then regarded as very exciting.