The internal resolution of serious ethnic and national conflicts almost inevitably involves some form of power sharing and/or power division (autonomy and federation). While power sharing is often invoked in normative and comparative accounts of conflict resolution, it is less frequently systematically examined. Conflict and Institutional Design (CID) is a comparative analysis of the making, maintenance and too often breaking of power sharing agreements. When and how are peace agreements negotiated? What type of power-sharing and federal designs are available? Under what conditions is power sharing likely to help contain conflict, and when does it fail? The course will pay particular attention to what happens after a power-sharing agreement is reached. The institutional focus will include analysis of electoral system design for divided societies, the dynamics of electoral and party competition within ethnic segmentation and consociational governance (power-sharing executives, legislatures and federations). While not neglecting theory and concepts, whenever possible the course will examine the quantitative and qualitative evidence on the successes and failures of power sharing.

Place:
U203 (Tower 1), 11am-2pm.

Availability:
MSc Politics and Government in the European Union
MSc in Comparative Politics (within which priority will be given to the ‘Conflict Studies’ and ‘Democratization’ Streams).
MSc in Global Politics

Formative work:
One briefing paper on pre-selected key concepts/cases and one research design plan for the assessed essay.
About the Style and Organization of this Course

This is a research course in several senses:

(a) Everyone is required to do independent reading, thinking and research.

(b) I do not have fixed opinions on the subject matter we will be covering. It is rare for there to be a ‘correct answer’ that I can reveal to you (or you to me). Even so, some answers are better than others, so I encourage informed disagreements with your peers and with me. The course is topical and important and you all bring different knowledge and backgrounds, so I expect to improve my thinking on these matters as well. And I’ll be disappointed if I don’t!

(c) The ‘end product’ of the course is not just what you have learned along the way, but a tangible piece of your own research (free from the distraction of an exam!).

Each week we have a 3 hour time slot to provide sufficient space for a seminar, lecture, debates and Q and A. With the exception of Week 1 most of the other weeks on this course will be structured roughly as follows:

(a) **Seminar**: We will begin each week with a seminar (for 60-75mins). Each week the reading lists are very long (but could be even longer!) – these are intended as a research resource rather than a mandatory labour sentence. To give extra coherence to our discussions – everyone must read the 2 or 3 items listed in the ‘required reading’ sections. It is unlikely that you will get to the ‘additional readings’ sections unless it is a week when you are presenting, or a topic of special interest to you.

(a.1) **Student Presentations**: Each week 2 or 3 students will make a presentation. These will be selected at the first class from the research questions listed and/or other questions agreed with me. You should make a power point presentation (rather than read out a full text essay – which is too boring). Your presentation should be uploaded to the ‘Assignment Forum’ section of the GV4E8 Moodle site by 5pm on the day BEFORE class (instructions on how to do so will be provided on the Moodle site). On the day of class expect to make a 10-15 min maximum oral presentation explaining your slides. [Hint: remember to face the class and not the whiteboard all the time as you talk!].

(b) **Coffee break** (15mins).

(c) **Lecture** (for 60-80mins). Feel free to stop me for clarification of points. Note that the seminars lag the lectures by one week. In other words we end each session with a lecture because the lecture introduces next weeks topic. Copies of all lecture slides will be uploaded to the course Moodle site.

(d) **Q and A** (10mins)
Arrangements for Week 1

Preparation you can do in advance!

1. Read this course guide carefully!

2. In particular you will be asked to ‘volunteer’ for 2 presentations – so think about what questions you might like to answer from those listed in this guide. It is best to rank order 3 or 4 choices since I can’t guarantee that you will get both of your first two choices (depending on which topics are most popular!). I’ll try to ensure that everybody gets at least one of their first two choices.

3. Read something on the invasion of Iraq and/or political solutions to the problem.

4. And begin to think about what your research paper will be about . . .

On the Day:

1. Course introduction and selection of presentation topics.

2. Prologue Lecture: Case Study of Iraq and Kurdistan

3. Followed by discussion of Iraq. The more general context for thinking about Iraq are the discussions questions:

   *Can* democracy be engineered in divided places?
   *Should* democracy be engineered in divided places?

Coffee Break

There will then be a shorter second lecture briefly introducing next week’s topic.

L2. Peace Agreements and the Spoiler Problem

(A full lecture and seminar programme follows below)
Assessment

A 5000 word essay/project (100% of Assessment)

The research essay will be on a topic of your choice. Having said that the topic will be discussed between each of you and myself and I must approve the topic.

The research paper should ideally examine a research question using relevant concepts and theories, and must have an empirical dimension that is relevant to the themes of the course. 'Empirical' is understood in the broadest sense: your material could be a case study set in an appropriate theoretical framework, it could examine a theme with comparative case studies, it could be quantitative or qualitative. Whatever is deemed appropriate to the research question at hand. Bear in mind though that broad surveys are generally not a good idea. After all 5000 words is about half the standard size of a journal article. Much more advice about the essay will be given as the course progresses both collectively and in individual meetings with each of you.

One of the aims in asking participants to write a paper is to help you to think about research questions and appropriate research design. Thus we are aiming at more than a traditional essay (which largely summarizes what significant others have said), and to begin to make the transition towards ‘postgraduate research’ in which you help develop new insights and/or new empirical knowledge. This should also help you when approaching the planning and writing of your MSc dissertation.

Since you will be working on something that really interests you I hope that this will be an enjoyable experience. Of course it will also be challenging; but there will be an understanding that there is only so much you can do in the limited time available. As such you will not be asked to write any un-assessed essays.

Instead, during the term, you will be asked to work on the first two parts of your research essay, which I will read, and discuss with you. This should give you a chance to revise your paper and to achieve a better plan by the end of the term. Here is how the work will be organised:

1. By 6 February 12pm (end of week 4 – e-mail directly to me), you should hand in the first part of your research essay, which should consist of a provisional title, brief statement of research topic and ‘state of the art’ (very short literature review), and possible research question. This should be 2-3 pages since the aim is to advise on the appropriateness and viability of your proposed research essay.

2. By 6 March 12pm (end of week 8 – e-mail directly to me), you should have handed in a revised version of your work. As well as any revisions to your provisional title, statement of research topic and ‘state of the art’ (slightly expanded literature review if appropriate), research question, this should now included a more concrete statement of your ‘point of departure’ (i.e what you are actually planning to do), and early identification of any difficulties that may arise, be they methodological or data related. This should be about 5-8 pages.

3. Your final research essay will be due by 27 April 12pm (first day of the summer term). Note: for the final paper please return directly to the main Government office and get a receipt proving submission AND send me an electronic copy. Please note that all papers that count towards grades are electronically scanned with up to date plagiarism software. In addition to revisions to the two parts above you will now discuss your findings, and draw some conclusions. The 5000 word limit will be enforced, and is about 15-18 pages of A4 double spaced. The number of words used must be clearly stated on the cover page (the total includes main text, footnotes / endnotes and tables (but not appendices).
### Seminar / Lecture Outline  (U203 (Tower 1), 11am-2pm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seminars</th>
<th>Lectures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction and set-up</td>
<td>L2.  Peace Agreements and the Spoiler Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L4b. ‘The perils of power sharing’ according to Roeder and Rothchild</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Power-Sharing: The Critics</td>
<td>L5. Territorial Approaches to Conflict Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executives and Legislatures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ‘External’ Support and ‘Complex’ Consociations</td>
<td>What Explains Success and Failure?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most Relevant Journals (in no particular order)

Journal of Conflict Resolution
Electoral Studies
International Organization
Party Politics
Journal of Peace research
World Politics
British Journal of Political Science
International Security
Democratization
Journal of Democracy
Conflict Management and Peace Science

On-Line Resources

IDEA: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://www.idea.int/).
International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm)
The United Nations: (http://www.un.org/english/)
Penn Program on Ethnic Conflict (http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/ppec/index.html)
Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1)
Polity IV: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2004 (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/)
Chatham House (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/)
Reading List
(continually under development! If you read items that are especially good either on relevant
themes or cases – please tell me.)

While there is no single text or need for purchase, several books are referred to repeatedly.

Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. [the collected writings of Lijphart].

Press. (Chpt 15).
University Press.

** Roeder, Philip and Donald Rothchild (2005). Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy
After Civil Wars. Cornell UP.
University Press. JC423F93 (has chpts on the theory of power-sharing and federalism,
on Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, South Africa,
Afghanistan, Cyprus, and the EU).
Management and Democracy. Oxford UP.

1. Democracy and Institutional Engineering

‘This book’s message to the political leaders of plural societies is to encourage them to engage
in a form of political engineering: if they wish to establish or strengthen democratic institutions
in their countries, they must become consociational engineers’ (Lijphart, 1977, 233).

‘The “consociational democracy” thesis can be seen as part of the movement among political
scientists in recent years towards a reassertion of politics as the “master science” in reaction to
the socio-economic reductionism implicit in the explanatory claims of political sociology’
(Barry, 1975a, 494).

‘Is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in the plural society manageable in a
democratic framework? We think not’ (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972).

1a. Can democracy be engineered in divided places?
1b. Should democracy be engineered in divided places?

Required Readings

*For Items to Accompany Prologue lecture on Iraq see Appendix.

**Additional Readings**


Noel, Sid (2005, ed), *From Power Sharing to Democracy*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. JC423F93 (has chpts on the theory of power-sharing and federalism, on Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Cyprus, and the EU).


Linz, Juan and Arturo Valenzuela (1994, eds). *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*. Johns Hopkins UP.


Note: we will return to many of the themes addressed in the above readings in week 10.

2. Peace Agreements

‘Agreements are not merely scraps of paper, their content affects whether peace lasts or war resumes’ (Page Fortna, 2003, 365).

‘This book has argued that the greatest problem opponents encounter in trying to resolve a civil war is not that of reaching an agreement, as so many have assumed, but that of writing an enforceable contract under conditions of extreme risk. Combatants decide to pursue peace settlements in part because a third party is willing to verify or enforce demobilization, and because their role in the first postwar government can be safeguarded. These guarantees are necessary for the combatants to credibly commit to treaties that create enormous opportunities for post-treaty exploitation’ (Walter, 2002, 160).

‘It seemed to me that Walter’s analysis asked implementers to take on faith that warring parties were solely motivated by insecurity and fears of future vulnerability. Such a depiction seriously underrepresented a basic recurrent problem in civil war negotiations: strategic deception by parties who sought to use an agreement and its implementation as a source of advantage to winning the war’ (Stedman, 2002, 12)

2a. Under what conditions can a peace agreement be reached?
2b. Under what conditions can a peace agreement be successfully implemented?
2c. What are spoiler problems and how may they be managed?

Required Readings


Additional Readings


3. Power-Sharing: The Theory

‘Overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute for cross-cutting affiliations at the mass level’ (Lijphart, 1977)

‘Consociationalists generally claim that they have a better and more inclusive model of democracy than majoritarians. In a consociation, many more of the people than a plurality or majority may influence or control the executive. Many more than a majority get effective “voice”. Consociation does not eliminate democratic opposition within communities, but it does enable such divisions and oppositions as exist to flourish in conditions of generalized security’ (O’Leary 2005, 11).

3a. What makes a set of governing arrangements ‘consociational’?

3b. Evaluate consociational theory from a logical and normative point of view. [move to wk4].

3c. Evaluate the empirical record of consociational experiments in one of the following cases. Was it actually implemented? Did it help regulate conflict and maintain some democratic stability? If it failed, why did it fail and what might have worked better?

1. Lebanon (1943-75; 1991-)
2. Northern Ireland (1998-)
3. South Africa (1993-)
4. India (1947-)
5. Belgium (1970-)
6. Switzerland

Required Readings

Pretty much anything by Lijphart on consociational theory!

For example:


**Additional Readings**


Noel, Sid (2005, ed), *From Power Sharing to Democracy*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. JC423F93 (has chpts on the theory of power-sharing and federalism, on Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Cyprus, and the EU)


Lijphart, Arend (1968), ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, *Comparative Political Studies* 1:1, 3-44.

4. Power-Sharing: The Critics

‘I do think that someone who does not read the small print may go away with the impression that in order to turn a conflict-ridden democracy into a harmonious one all that is required is an effort of will by political leaders. Insufficient attention may be paid to the fact that, if the country is a democracy, the leaders can continue to be leaders only so long as they have followers’ (Barry 1975b, 395-6).

This evidence points to a dilemma: power-sharing institutions frequently facilitate a transition from civil war; but they thwart the consolidation of peace and democracy (Rothchild and Roeder 2005, 12).

In ethnically divided countries, the logic of power-dividing requires identifying alternative, crosscutting divisions in society that do not replicate the ethnic divide . . . in this sense the strategy begins from the constructivist view that politicized ethnic identities are often endogenous to the political process. (Roeder 2005, 63)

4a. What are the main criticisms of consociation? Evaluate the criticisms.

4b. Outline and evaluate the key difference between Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s approaches to conflict regulating (avoiding for now a focus on electoral systems).

4c. Evaluate the Roeder-Rothchild prescription of ‘power-division’.

Required Readings

Donald Horowitz, ‘Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes’ and Arend Lijphart

‘The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy’ (Horowitz and Lijphart go ‘head –to –head),

Additional Readings


Noel, Sid (2005, ed), From Power Sharing to Democracy. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. JC423F93 (has chpts on the theory of power-sharing and federalism, on Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Cyprus, and the EU).


5. Power-Division: Ethno-Federalism and Autonomy

The fact of the matter is that early, generous devolution is far more likely to avert than to abet ethnic separatism. Where a territorially based ethnic minority is politically out of step with other groups, uncompromising centralism in the guise of democratic majoritarianism will inevitably suppress that minority and provoke a reaction. (Horowitz, 1991, 224).

5a. ‘Different ethnonational groups need to be integrated not divided in institutionalised power-sharing arrangements.’ Discuss.

5b. How useful is federalism as a conflict regulating device in divided places?

**Required Readings**


**Additional Readings**


6 Electoral Systems for Divided Societies

The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post. (Lewis 1965, 71).

The fallacy of electoralism has increasingly been recognised – at least in the scholarly community – as a problem which aptly denotes the mistake of confusing the holding of elections with the advent and development of democratic regimes. (Elklit 1999, 28).

Table 1.1: Categories of electoral system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad category</th>
<th>Specific types</th>
<th>Country examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-member constituency systems</td>
<td>Single-member plurality (SMP)</td>
<td>Chapters 4–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative vote (AV)</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, France, India, UK, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two-round system (2RS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed systems</td>
<td>Mixed compensatory</td>
<td>Chapters 10–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed parallel</td>
<td>Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed list systems</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Chapters 16–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel, South Africa, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferential list systems</td>
<td>Open list</td>
<td>Chapters 19–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexible list</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-STV</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Chapter 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005

6a. Evaluate some of the main types of electoral systems from the perspective of their appropriateness for divided and/or democratising societies.

6b. Why does Lijphart so strongly advocate closed-list PR over all other forms of electoral systems?

6c. Imagine that you were recommending an electoral system for two of the following places – which systems might you pick? Pick two of (1) South Africa, (2) Iraq, (3) Papa New Guinea, (4) Fiji, (5) Northern Ireland, (6) Russia.
Required Readings


Additional Readings


7. Preferential Voting and Centripetal Politics

The approach I have advocated is to adopt an electoral system that will make moderation rewarding by making politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own. The dependence is only marginal, of course, but it will sometimes be the margin of victory. Since the parties must pool votes rather than merely pool seats, they must find ways before the election to communicate their ethnically and racially conciliatory intentions to the voters. After the election they must deliver on those commitments or risk electoral retribution. (Horowitz 1991, 196)
7a. Argue the case for Horowitz’s vote-pooling strategy for stabilising divided societies.
7b. Argue the case against Horowitz’s vote-pooling strategy for stabilising divided societies.
7c. Evaluate the empirical evidence concerning vote-pooling.

Required Readings


Additional Readings


8. Ethnic Party Systems: is collapse inevitable?

Moderation on the ethnic issue is a viable strategy only if ethnicity is not salient. Once ethnicity becomes salient and, as a consequence, all issues are interpreted in ethnic terms, the rhetoric of cooperation and mutual trust sounds painfully weak. More importantly, it is strategically vulnerable to flame fanning and the politics of outbidding. Ceylon and Ulster provide recent examples of the vulnerability of moderates . . . In Ulster, Protestant extremists, led by the Reverend Ian Paisley, have held the governing Unionist party in check, rendering moderation impossible’ (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 86).

8a. How do ethnic party systems develop and what is different about the nature of party competition in such systems? What are the likely effects on conflict regulation?

8b. Is all competition centrifugal in ethnic party systems?

Required Readings

Additional Readings


Special Issue of the journal Party Politics (July 2005) on Political Parties and Democratization in Africa.

9. CONSENSIOAL GOVERNANCE: EXECUTIVES, LEGISLATURES AND MULTI-NATIONAL FEDERATIONS

9a Evaluate what is different about executives and legislatures under consociation rules.
9b. Does the ‘opposition’ disappear in consociational systems? If so, is there meaningful competition?
9c. In what ways can legislatures be organised so that power is shared?

**Required Readings**


**Additional Readings**


Linz, Juan and Arturo Valenzuela (1994, eds). The Failure of Presidential Democracy.

Johns Hopkins UP.


10. ‘External’ Support and ‘Complex’ Consociations

Conclusions: What Explains Power Sharing Successes and Failures?

‘Another part of the logic behind consociationalism as a recommendation for deeply divided societies is that all of the potential alternative proposals – integration, partition, Horowitz’s alternative-vote plan, and the Roeder-Rothchild power-dividing proposal – have serious drawbacks and cannot be regarded as realistic options. Consociationalism is therefore the only realistic possibility’ (Lijphart 2008, 279).

‘Viable consociations that address ethno-national disputes may have to be the de facto or de jure protectorates of external powers.’ (O’Leary 2005, xxxi).

10a. What is a complex consociation and can it work?
10b. To what extent does the nature of peacemaking in South Africa or Northern Ireland provide a model for the resolution of other conflicts?

Required Readings

Roeder, Philip and Donald Rothchild (2005), ‘Conclusion: Nation-State Stewardship and the Alternatives to Power-Sharing’, pp.319-46 in Roeder, Philip and Donald Rothchild Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars. Cornell UP.

Additional Readings

Noel, Sid (2005, ed), From Power Sharing to Democracy. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. JC423F93 (has chpts on the theory of power-sharing and federalism, on Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Cyprus, and the EU).


APPENDIX: HANDBOOKS and CASES

HANDBOOKS


Belgium


From this issue, for example –


Bosnia – Herzegovina


Cyprus


East Timor


India


Iraq and Kurdistan


Full text of the Constitution of Iraq: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html


Brendan O’Leary (2005), ‘Multi-national Federalism, Power-Sharing and the Kurds of Iraq’, can be downloaded from O’Leary’s website at [http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/faculty/bios/O'leary.htm](http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/faculty/bios/O'leary.htm)

Brendan O’Leary (2005), ‘It is Past Time to Reframe Constitutional Thinking on Iraq’, [http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/faculty/bios/O'leary.htm](http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/faculty/bios/O'leary.htm)


**Kashmir**


**Lebanon**


Northern Ireland

For the background and full text of the Belfast Agreement go to: http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreement.htm


Spain and the Basque Country

South Africa


Sri Lanka


Switzerland


