INTRODUCTION
-
what
is to follow in these two lectures
-
who
is who etc
-
themes
covered today
i. General: EU and Greek
economic policy
ii. The impact of EU membership
on Greek economic policy
iii. The impact of EU membership
on the Greek economy
-
themes
covered next week
i. The impact of EMU on Greek
economic policy and performance
ii. The impact of EU on domestic
structural reforms
iii. The prospects / conduct of
Greek policy in relation to Lisbon 2000
IMPACT ON MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY
General
-
What
do we mean with “economic policy”?
-
What
do we mean by “EU”?
-
Which
areas of policy are covered?
Agricultural policy |
Monetary and finance
policies |
Regional and cohesion
policies |
Fiscal policies |
Industrial and competition
policies |
Trade and investment
policies |
Privatisation |
Labour market and social
security policies |
-
What
are the main episodes of the EU (that could influence policy)?
Membership (1981) |
SMP / Maastricht (1985/92) |
EMU-1 (1999) |
SEA (1986) |
CSF-II (1993) |
CSF-III / Lisbon (2000) |
CSF-I (1988) |
EMS-2 (1994/98) |
EMU-2 (2001) |
EMS-1 (1990) |
GSP / Luxemburg (1997) |
Rome (2004) ? |
-
We
need to separate between EU-effects (e.g., cohesion, integration) and EMU-effects
(GSP-related)
Four ‘periods’ / regimes of the EU – Greek policy
relationship
Period
|
Circa
|
Policy expectation |
Policy & economy |
Early membership
|
1974-1983 |
Remove
barriers to trade Modernise economy
Harmonise
policy environment |
Stabilisation
policies Inflation
and instability |
European
integration |
1984-1993 |
Liberalise
markets Achieve
real convergence Harmonise
policies |
Expansionary
policies Stagnation
with inflation |
EMU
preparation |
1994-2003 |
Integrate
economy Achieve
nominal convergence Harmonise
fiscal environment |
Disinflation
policies Growth
and convergence |
Beyond
EMU (Lisbon
strategy) |
2004-??? |
Move
to a really single market Achieve
structural reforms Harmonise
institutions (pensions, LM,
privatisation) |
Stabilisation
policies ??? Unemployment? |
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
Economic performance circa
1981-1993
-
the
effects of EU membership on economic performance are difficult to measure /
quantify
-
important
to look at overall economic performance and try to see whether / how much
membership coincided with
i. improvements in outcomes
(direct ‘effects’)
ii. changes in policy and policy
conduct that can be related to improvements in outcomes (indirect ‘effects’)
-
economic
performance in the 1980s and the early-1990s has been poor at best
(stagflation)
i. exploding public debt and
deficit
ii. reduced growth rates and
investment
iii. increasing unemployment and
prices
-
pre-1981
convergence with EU-9 was halted: divergence throughout the 1980s
-
…but
the EU was hardly responsible for the deterioration in economic performance
i. structural problems of the
Greek economy
ii. PASOK’s statist economic
programme / policies
iii. the international business
cycle (e.g., oil shocks)
iv. as well as pressures from
increased exposure to international competition and subsiding protectionism
|
1986-90 |
1991-95 |
|
1986-90 |
1991-95 |
Total domestic demand |
2,2 |
1,3 |
GDP pc (PPS, EU-15=100) |
60,1 |
63,3 |
Exports of goods and services |
3,8 |
4,4 |
GDP growth rate |
1,3 |
1,3 |
Imports of goods and services |
8,4 |
3,6 |
Unemployment
|
6,6 |
8,3 |
Public consumption expenditure |
-0,1 |
0,5 |
Output gaps (% deviations from potential GDP) |
-1,5 |
-2,1 |
Private consumption expenditure |
3,2 |
1,8 |
Relative unit labour costs (1995=100) |
94,6 |
94,5 |
Cur. account deficit (%GDP) |
1,4 |
0,5 |
Inflation (GDP deflator) |
17,2 |
14,0 |
Private GFCF (non-residential) |
2,9 |
2,2 |
Total GFCF |
1,5 |
-0,4 |
Private GFCF (residential) |
3,6 |
-7,0 |
Government deficit (%GDP) |
12,0 |
11,6 |
Short-term interest rate (1yr) |
17,8 |
22,1 |
Gross public debt (%GDP) |
61,7 |
99,4 |
Real effective exchange rate (1991=100) |
98,8 |
103,6 |
Net inflows from EU (%GDP) |
3,0 |
4,3 |
Sources: European Economy; OECD, Economic Outlook; Bank
of Greece, Annual Report
Agricultural / CAP
-
CAP
has been a significant source of financial transfers into Greece
i. more than 50% of total EU
funding came through the Agriculture Guarantee Section
ii. governments fought hard to
protect against CAP reform / accession of competitors (e.g., Spain)
-
Agricultural
policies favoured protectionist-like support of existing businesses
i. initial response was
negative due to fears of bias towards large (foreign) producers
ii. fears not unsubstantiated –
but challenge not taken
-
Little
effective effort on restructuring
i. the state of agriculture
1.
small
/ segmented unproductive farms
2.
low
capital ratios and technological content
3.
casual
/ seasonal employment and low skills
ii. effort to contain
unemployment and urbanisation
iii. under farmers’ pressure
production diversification has been incomplete / unsuccessful
-
Conclusion:
CAP / EU used as a source of public transfers – not of restructuring /
modernisation – not dissimilar to, e.g., France
Regional & cohesion
-
The
CSFs have been a significant source of financial transfers into Greece
i. averaging around 4% of GDP
per year
ii. almost €40bn in 2000-2006
-
Greek
RDPs targeted sustainable development through
i. Improving infrastructure
ii. Supporting fixed capital
formation
iii. Increasing competitiveness
iv. Improving education /
training provision
v. Modernising the public
sector
vi. Fostering regional
development
-
The
impact of the CSF funds is noticeable but limited
i. Due to concentration of
spending (horizontal)
ii. Lack of focus / strategy /
coordination
iii. Mainly short-lived
demand-type effects – not supply-side (cumulative) spillovers
iv. Relative neglect of
‘dynamic’ areas (R&D, education, skills, networks, etc)
-
The
uncertain future of CSFs post-2006 poses extreme challenges for Greek policy
and economic well-being
i. Reduced / phased-out funding
ii. Increased competition
Regional policy and reform have been little affected by EU support
-
History
of concentration / centralisation
i. Limited funding: only almost
a third of all EU funding goes to regional development (outside Athens /
non-horizontal policies)
ii. Centralised administration:
responsibility for regional allocations and budgets lies with the MNE and the
central government
iii. Lack of autonomy of local
institutions
a.
regional
and sub-regional authorities were centrally appointed and thus did not
challenge the central planning
b.
this
reproduced the culture of clientelism and dependence
-
Restructuring
of local governance / devolution was particularly slow due to political /
partisan considerations
i. ‘need’ for state /
centralised control
ii. lack of local ‘actors’ and
initiatives to contest the central decision-making processes
iii. PASOK’s early programme
cancelled by New Democracy governments (1990-1993) - eventually administrative
decentralisation (but partial) post-1994
iv. History of concentration /
centralisation
-
More
recent RDPs (PEPs) have been more targeted and successful
i. Higher local autonomy
ii. Greater involvement from
local actors
iii. More coordinated programmes
(esp. on infrastructure)
Industrial and competition
-
Greece’s
modernisation of policies was slow
i. partly because of its weak
administrative and institutional structures (esp. at the sub-national / local levels)
ii. partly because of political
barriers and short-run considerations
iii. partly because of the need
to support industries of national interest / importance
-
Little
effort on modernisation / competition / competitiveness
i. PASOK’s programme of
nationalisation
ii. Reliance of old/traditional
industry
iii. State aid and
nationalisation versus deregulation and openness / competition
-
Greece
continued to support many ‘traditional’ policies, including export promotion and
(in)direct subsidies often in exception from or in violation of EU directives
-
Industrial
policy largely failed to enhance the dynamism of aspects like networks /
clusters / etc which are increasingly important – but one has to acknowledge
that the entrepreneurial / etc base was also lacking
-
Post-1993
change: e.g., the 1994 White Paper on Growth, Competition and Employment
emphasised the modernisation of industrial policies
Privatisation
-
The
privatisation process was similarly slow because
i. public companies were not
very attractive / profitable
ii. there were significant
reactions by the public and key actors (unions, etc)
iii. there was attention to
securing continuing control over key sectors of national interest
iv. the financial sector (ASE)
was not fully developed
-
Nevertheless,
EU momentum towards flexibility / deregulation reinforced domestic shift
towards privatisation – EMU criteria gave further stimulus
i. New Democracy adopted a
Thatcherite programme since mid-1980s
ii. PASOK was slow to adapt:
selected privatisation, mainly of ailing companies
iii. Privatisation more targeted
/ linked to modernisation post-1996
iv. Programme helped achieve
nominal convergence and shrink public sector
-
However
state companies still have large deficits – absorbing significant EU funding
for support
-
Greek
state is still largely protectionist and seeks control over public and state
enterprises
-
reforms
started in late 1980s but became more concrete / rigorous in the pre-EMU period
-
the
actual impact of EU membership as such was rather minimal – mainly regime
change
-
financial
sector easier to regulate – lower political costs (a win-win situation)
-
Trade
liberalisation (removal of tariffs & quotas; reduction of export promotion
/ subsidies) was de facto required and proceeded relatively fast – but not
without problems
-
Removal
of non-tariff barriers (border controls; regulations on procurements &
standards; VAT & excise) was slower, more controversial, and more
challenging
i. conflict with domestic
‘culture’ of protectionism and statism
ii. Greek economy not ready for
extreme openness
iii. Established interest groups
/ clientelism
-
Openness
to investment / deregulation, especially of services, was notably slow
i. slow removal of protected
monopolies
ii. financial sector not too
developed to accommodate financial flows
iii. economic conditions not
favourable for FDI
Labour market and social
security
-
Reforms
have been slow owning to strong labour movement and sentiment in the public:
(i) not binding EU pressures; (ii) reforms mainly dictated by economic
conditions; (iii) deregulation only post-1993 - more under Lisbon strategy
section (next week)
SUMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summary
-
Defining
areas of economic policy and identifying relevant episodes in the development
of the EU
-
Identifying
policy regimes and economic periods
-
The
performance of the Greek economy since the 1970s
i. Lost its earlier dynamism
ii. Encounter significant
structural problems
iii. Fiscal and budgetary
aggregates deteriorated significantly
-
EU
developments and the conduct of Greek economic policy
i. Areas of economic policy
ii. Largely little response to
both challenges and requirements of EU membership and integration (deepening /
enlargements)
iii. Progress only in a limited
number of areas
iv. Policy divergence not
unrelated to economic divergence
Discussion
-
What
other areas of policy (not covered here) have been affected by EU membership?
-
What
is the relation between the political and economic cycles in the conduct of
economic policy and the prevailing economic performance?
-
Has
EU membership influenced political aspirations / partisan strategies?
-
Why
was Greece slow in adopting EU-inspired policies / adapting to the new
international / competition environment?
END.-