

Economic Theory Reading Group 2010-11

Suggested Reading List

Please feel free to make suggestions about the papers and topics.

Topic I: "Designing Group Decision Making Processes" (Ronny)

Recent papers suggest a "mechanism design approach" to group decision making (in contrast to modelling existing institutions of decision making and communication). This seems important especially today with more and more group decision applications on the internet (Etherpad, Google wave and many more), political campaigns and online town meetings (Obama) and the research interest in modelling practices on the internet (eg auctions for advertisement). A possible application to pursue being: "How to design a discussion with many participants on the internet?".

1. Jackson & Sonnenschein, Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions, *Econometrica*, 75 (2007), 241–257.
2. Rubinstein and Glazer:
 - (a) On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with J. Glazer, *Econometrica*, 72 (2004), 1715-1736.
 - (b) A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with K. Glazer, *Theoretical Economics*, 1 (2006).
 - (c) Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with J. Glazer, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 36 (2001), 158-173.
3. Casella, Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments, <http://www.columbia.edu/c186/>, Mimeo Columbia.
4. Levy & Razin, <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/levyg1/simple.pdf>, Mimeo LSE. A simple paper to introduce the question: "Should we auction off the right to speak/vote?".
5. Szentes & Gershkov, Optimal Voting Scheme with Costly Information Acquisition, June 2004, Forthcoming *Journal of Economic Theory*.

Topic II: "Repeated Interactions with Local Monitoring" (Francesco)

1. Wolitzky, Repeated Public Good Provision, <http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5321>, Mimeo MIT (2010).
2. Takahashi, Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 145:1 (2010), 42-62.
3. Haag & Lagunoff, On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 135 (2007), 68 – 89.

4. Mailath & Morris, Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 102 (2002), 189–228.
5. Ben-Porath & Kahneman, Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring, *Journal of Economic Theory* 70 (1996), 281–297.
6. Illtae Ahn, Imperfect Information Repeated Games with a Single Perfect Observer, <http://www.princeton.edu/~smorris/pdfs/PhD/Ahn.pdf>, Mimeo UPenn (2002).
7. Francesco may present his new research (joint with Michele) on the topic.

Topic III: "TBA"