

# Reading Group Topics 2011-12

## Dynamic Wars (Francesco)

1. Shubik, Dollar Game, 1971.
2. Hörner and Sahuguet, A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels, JET 2011.
3. Abreu and Gul, Bargaining and Reputations, EMA 1998.
4. Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky, Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition, Mimeo 2006.
5. Jarque, Ponsatí and Sákovics, Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication, Journal of Mathematical Economics 2003.
6. Ponsatí and Sákovics, The war of Attrition with Incomplete Information, Mathematical Social Sciences 1995.

## Behavioural Economics (Matt – Kristof)

1. Camerer et al, Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games, EMA 1999.
2. Fudenberg and Levine, Self-confirming Equilibrium, EMA 1993.
3. Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio, Adaptive Behavior and Coordination Failure, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1997.
4. Nageeb Ali, Learning Self-Control, QJE 2011.
5. Erev & Roth, Reinforcement Learning, AER 1998.
6. Crawford & Iriberri, Level-k in private value auctions, EMA 2007.
7. Eyster & Rabin, Cursed Equilibrium, EMA 2005 (if students don't already know it).
8. Dekel, Fudenberg & Levine, Learning to Play Bayesian Games.
9. Fudenberg & Levine survey on learning.
10. Jehiel & Koessler, Revisiting Analogy based Expectations Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information.

## Common Learning (Jason)

1. Monderer, and Samet, Stochastic Common Learning, GEB 1995;
2. Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson, Common Learning, 2008;
3. Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz, Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World, 2007;
4. Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz, Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement under Bayesian Learning, 2009.