
JUMP-STARTING THE EURO AREA RECOVERY: WOULD A RISE IN CORE FISCAL SPENDING HELP THE PERIPHERY? BLANCHARD, ERCEG, AND LINDÉ

Ricardo Reis LSE and Columbia University

> NBER Macroeconomics Annual Cambridge, April 16th, 2016

THE CASE FOR EZ FISCAL SPENDING

- The situation in 2010-12:
 - Eurozone as a closed economy
 - Application to GIIPS and others
 - **Figure 1. Germany: Growth Outlook** Jermany The German économy remains on ar



Domestic demand regained momentum at 2

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
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THE CASE FOR EZ FISCAL SPENDING

- The situation in 2016
 - Euro area expected to grow by 1.7%
 - Germany expected to grow by 1.7%
 - Some growth in G already from refugee crisis



THIS PAPER: SPILLOVERS

- Take as given that Germany is in a ZLB stagnation. Would periphery benefit as well?
- BE&L simple model:

$$y_{Dt} - y_{Dt}^* = g_y(1 - \omega_g - \omega_g^*)(g_t - g_t^*) + \epsilon \tau_t + c_y(1 - \omega_c - \omega_c^*)(c_t - c_t^*).$$

$$r_{Lt} - r_{Lt}^* = \mathcal{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (r_{t+j} - r_{t+j}^*) = -\mathcal{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\pi_{Dt+j} - \pi_{Dt+j}^*),$$

• 3 effects: imported g, depreciation, inflation.


FACTORS IT DEPENDS ON

- I. Expected duration of liquidity trap
 - In the liquidity trap for 3 years.
 - Hike in government spending for 2.5 years.
- 2. Responsiveness of inflation to stimulus, or slope of Philips curve
 - Flat in their case, price stickiness: 3.5 years.
- 3. Import content of government spending in core
 - Import/GDP share, and trade price elasticity 1.1.
- 4. Potentially large welfare benefits for periphery
 - If in output, rather than consumption.

FACTORS THEY LEAVE OUT

• Trade with a third part current accounts continue to strengthen while external are Relative to their peaks, seven imbatances within the euro area have widened.

• Nominal wage rigidity



What do fiscal expansions and multipliers stand for?

$$\Delta Y = \Delta G \left(\frac{\partial Y}{\partial G} \right) \Big|_{(B,\vec{\tau},T,x,\dots)_{t,t+1,t+2,\dots,I_t,I_{t+1},I_{t+2}}}$$

HOW SPENDING IS FINANCED

- Deficits, slowly paid by lump-sum taxes (simple model) or labor income taxes (larger model).
- Consumption taxes, capital income taxes, labor income taxes all have different distortions.
- Time profile of taxes, before and after the ZLB.
- Uncertainty on future taxes.

AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS

- I. Complementarities between private and public consumption in core and periphery.
 - Effect on marginal utility of consumption is key in a ZLB scenario.
- 2. Countervailing effect of expansion based on purchases on spending in other social programs.
 - Redistribution and targeting matters.

SPENDING IS NOT PURCHASES


I. Most of 2007-09 fiscal expansion was transfers

Country	Percentage	Fraction of	Fraction of	Growth in
	change in total	increased spending	increased spending	transfers in excess
	spending	due to transfers	due to consumption	of GDP and trend
			plus investment	spending growth
United States	14.2%	75%	27%	25.4%
Ireland	2.5%	232%	-206%	37.9%
Italy	1.0%	147%	32%	6.9%
Luxembourg	4.3%	145%	-60%	12.6%
Portugal	7.4%	101%	4%	12.8%
Japan	5.3%	86%	9%	-9.3%
Sweden	6.5%	69%	52%	20.0%
Greece	17.2%	75%	22%	24.2%
France	6.0%	74%	46%	9.5%
Slovakia	20.7%	64%	34%	37.6%
Netherlands	15.9%	63%	41%	23.9%
Belgium	13.3%	60%	42%	15.4%
Germany	9.2%	59%	44%	11.2%
UK	17.3%	52%	47%	24.4%
Spain	11.1%	47%	50%	17.1%
Finland	11%	43%	56%	25.6%
Poland	30.2%	40%	52%	21.9%
Denmark	14.2%	36%	56%	19.7%
Austria	5.4%	35%	65%	6.8%
Czech Republic	10.3%	34%	68%	3.7%
Canada	11.1%	31%	76%	4.2%
(Hungary)	-4.3%	78%	44%	-9.9%

Source: Oh and Reis, 2012

SPENDING IS NOT PURCHASES


2. In the United States ARRA, most of extra spending was given to states, only some spent it.



Source: Cogan and Taylor, 2010

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INFLATION AND THE ECB

2. New Keynesian effect works through expected inflation. Using the authors' shocks as regressors:

	Dependen	Dependent variable: $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
$\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t$	0.806***	0.889***	0.889***	
	(0.094)	(0.126)	(0.138)	
e_t^{gov}	0.049	0.035	0.029	
·	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.054)	
e_{t-1}^{gov}		0.003	-0.003	
ιı		(0.056)	(0.058)	
e_{t-2}^{gov}		0.029	0.042	
<i>t</i> -2		(0.052)	(0.055)	
e_{t-3}^{gov}			0.043 (0.053)	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Observatio} \\ \text{R}^2 \end{array}$

38

0.716

37

0.722

36

0.718


Bringing in modern views of the crisis




INTEREST RATE SPREADS

- What does increase in core government spending do to risk premia in periphery government bonds?
- I. Fall in foreign risk-free rate.
- 2. Boost exports.
- 3. Incentives to repay.

Figure 4. Ten-Year Interest Rates on Government Bonds in Portugal and Its Main Trading Partners, 1993–2013



Two features of slump pre crisis are the growth of non-tradable and fall in average productivity.



Fonte: FMI (2013)

Two features of slump pre crisis are the growth of non-tradable and fall in average productivity.

		Change, 2000–06 (percentage points)		
Indicator and sector	Portugal, 2006	Portugal	Euro areaª	Main trading partners ^a
Share in employment				
Manufacturing	17.74	-2.72	-1.94	-2.14
Construction	10.22	-1.33	0.16	0.53
Real estate	6.38	0.96	1.40	1.39
Community and other services	24.06	1.12	1.07	0.94
Wholesale and retail trade	17.42	1.95	-0.14	-0.28

Table 4. Changes in Sector Composition in Portugal and Its Trading Partners, 2000–06

Source: Reis, 2014

Two features of slump pre crisis are the growth of non-tradable and fall in average productivity.

Indicator and sector	Portugal	Euro areaª	Main trading partnersª
Total factor productivity	Annualized growth rate, 2000–05 (percen		
All industries	-1.85	0.07	-0.21
Manufacturing	-0.81	0.92	0.63
Construction	-2.46	-0.60	-0.74
Real estate	-4.44	-0.76	-0.92
Community and other services	-1.77	-0.19	-0.48
Wholesale and retail trade	-2.96	0.34	-0.16
	Aver	age annual change	, 2000–06
Markups ^b	(percentage poin	nts)	
All industries	0.00	0.39	0.84
Manufacturing	-0.58	0.31	0.35
Construction	-0.93	1.16	1.42
Real estate	-0.49	-1.02	0.10
Community and other services	0.58	0.11	0.29
Wholesale and retail trade	-1.42	0.01	0.13

Table 5. Changes in Productivity and in Markups in Portugal and Its Trading

 Partners, by Sector

Sources: See appendix A.

a. In the top panel, "euro area" includes only Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. In the bottom panel, "euro area" refers to the same 12 countries as in table 1.

b. The markup for each sector is defined as the negative of the log of the labor share.

Source: Reis, 2014

Two features of slump pre crisis are the growth of non-tradable and fall in average productivity.

1.005 1.19 1.000 1.14 ······ 0.995 1.09 0.990 1.04 0.985 p90 10 tfpr empl rel98 •••••• TFP based on WLP estimation (median manufacturing firm relative to 1998) -sd tfpr empl rel98 0.99 Solow Residual (median manufacturing firm relative to 1998) 0.980 •••• p75 25 tfpr empl rel98 Labor productivity, VA/L (median manufacturing firm relative to 1998) 0.94 0.975 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Figure 3: Median Firm Productivity in Spain: 1998-2007 (a) TFPR (L) Source: Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, Villegas-Sanchez (2013)

Figure 4: Dispersion of TFPR within four digit NACE for Spain

Source: Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, Villegas-Sanchez (2013)

BANKS AND SAFE ASSETS

- I. Scarcity of safe assets
 - Create more government bonds in the core.
 - More safe assets for banks to hold?

- 2. Bonds held by households, not banks.
 - Higher bond supply affects credit

CONCLUSION

- The paper contributes:
 - Relevant and important question today.
 - Isolate three first-order things that matter.
 - All countries may be better off.
- I added:
 - There are more first-order factors to take into account
 - Where does extra spending go, how it is financed?
 - What happens to interest rates, misallocation, banks?
- On welfare and conflicts: left for another day