


# HOW WAS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ABLE TO BORROW SO MUCH DURING THE PANDEMIC?

Ricardo Reis  
LSE



*21<sup>st</sup> of February 2023  
AEI book launch  
Washington DC (virtually)*

# The rise in public debt




- Old seesaw: gold standard and short-lived deficits made debt very safe
- Gone after 1960 because: (i) welfare state, (ii) great inflation, (iii) persistent deficits
- Steady rise of debt

# XXIst century debt dynamics



- Steady rise, no fall, stepping up a ladder
- Conditional on no shocks, no fall in the debt

# Public borrowing during the pandemic



- In 2020, good reasons for deficits: tax smoothing, stimulus, social insurance.
- Ability to borrow: those with more debt were able to borrow more. No signs of debt capacity.
- Appetite for it: excess savings (and the Fed)


# Moving forward, no limit to public borrowing

- Tempting to draw that conclusion. See it in Europe's response to energy crisis
- Laws of accounting:

$$\text{Increase Public Debt} = \text{Primary Deficit} + \text{Return Debt} + \text{Debt Revenue}$$

- Debt Revenue arises from return on public debt ( $r$ ) being below return on private investments ( $m$ ). United States always had it.
- **Debt revenue:** *The discount the government gets in borrowing rate relative to other borrowers in the economy. It saves future taxes to repay a debt that grows at a lower rate than market rate. Can be realized if make public loans at market rates. Can be implicit if fund a transfer, households can borrow less, they will have debt revenue left over after paying taxes to pay public debt in the future.*


# The gap in returns: the specialness of debt



- Government debt relative safety
- Government debt relative liquidity
- Government debt as good collateral
- Government debt as store of value for foreigners

# Debt revenue

**Figure 1:** The flow budget components as a ratio of GDP for the G-7 countries and the US




- We paid for rising debt by selling the services that debt provided.
- Across the world demand rose for safety, liquidity, convenience of US Treasuries
- But these have a limit

# First limit: inflation

Figure ES.3. Effect of Inflation Shock on the Debt Ratio, Selected Countries, 2022 versus 2020

(Percent of GDP)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.


## Price stability keeps debt sustainable

- Keeps main source of risk on debt returns low
- Long-run prediction: independent inflation-targeting central banks maximize debt revenue.
- Application: Gains of 2022 are done, now come losses from risk premium
- Trade-off: Delay raising rates in short run to keep  $m-r$  high in short run can erode long-in specialness



# Second limit: fiscal caution needed

**Figure 1.2. Fiscal Responses in Large Crises**  
(Estimated coefficients)



Source: IMF staff estimates (see Online Annex 1.1).

Note: The figure shows the average of time-varying coefficients by country income groups, based on panel regressions estimated on the sensitivity to GDP growth of the deficit-to-GDP ratio from 1980 to 2021. Typical recessions are defined as periods when individual countries' growth rates are below their own average levels over the previous three years.

- Can borrow while people think you are safe
  - US exorbitant privilege as the safe harbor
  - Justified to have more aggressive deficits, but also to pay debts faster once crisis over
- **Public debt crowds out and in private debt**
  - Financial development lowers debt revenue
  - Crowd out: Financial repression as coerced debt, raise debt revenue, present biases
  - Maximizing debt revenue is not maximizing social welfare

# Conclusions

- **Increase in public borrowing in 2020 was culmination of a long trend**
  - Debt had been rising for a long time, and appetite for it grew during pandemic
- **Able to do it because debt revenue had rises**
  - *m-r* gap from store of value, safety, collateral, liquidity had risen
- **Fiscal capacity should not be taken for granted and will be shrinking**
  - Reinforce commitment to price stability, have the fiscal rectitude of having surpluses in non-crises times