# THE FOUR R-STARS: FROM INTEREST RATES TO INFLATION, AND BACK

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# Where are interest rate going?

Important question to answer, even if very hard:

- for monetary policy in 2025: when will central bank stop easing?
- for fiscal policy: will r < g keep sustaining high public debt?
- for <u>macroeconomists</u>: has the savings-investment balance changed?
- for intertemporal tradeoffs in economics: how is future being discounted?

# Current approach and its difficulties

(1) <u>Steady-state</u> or long-run value component of realized returns. Measured with long time series, separating trends from cycles.

<u>Counterfactual</u> interest rate where investment equals savings Measured using models of capital markets and investment.

(3) <u>Benchmark for policy rate, if above (below) it, the inflation will fall (rise)</u> Measured using models and data on expectations, financial conditions, inflation

(4) <u>Risk-free rate</u> in  $r_i = r^* + premium_i$ , Measured as return on safest, most liquid, short-term asset... (policy rate!?)

Four approaches because not really the same object, or the same use...





- The econometrician chasing four hares
- While thinking there is only one, and so missing
- This talk: Identify four separate R-stars, conceptually show they are different, look at data of the past, guess where they are going

# CONCEPTS AND TRENDS FROM 1995-2019

# The four r-stars... (1) investment, m



- Expected return on productive investment
- Matches models of savings and investment
- Ramsey-Solow
- Wicksell







- Real yield on government bonds
- Matches finance models of safe returns
- Diamond's unproductive storage







# The four r-stars... (3) realized return $\rho$



- Realized return on government bonds
- Relevant for debt sustainability and fiscal policy
- Time-series average of returns over long samples

![](_page_9_Figure_6.jpeg)

# The four r-stars... (4) policy rate, i

![](_page_10_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_10_Picture_2.jpeg)

- Policy rate
- Captures role of monetary policy
- Connection to inflation

# Conclusions for 1995-2019 The four r\*

- y: Real yield on government bonds declined throughout The r\* that matches finance models of safe returns
- i: Policy rate fell even faster until 2010-15, but then rose The r\* that captures role of monetary policy in inflation

• m: Expected return on productive investment was roughly stable throughout. The r\* that matches long-run macro models of savings and investment

•  $\rho$ : Realized return on government bonds mirror yields until 2010-15, then up The r\* that captures time-series role of unexpected inflation in business cycle

![](_page_11_Picture_10.jpeg)

#### Other indicators

![](_page_12_Figure_1.jpeg)

(c)  $x/x^p$ : output relative to potential

![](_page_12_Figure_3.jpeg)

#### **(b)** *b*/*k*: ratio of unproductive to productive assets

![](_page_12_Figure_5.jpeg)

# **AN EXTENDED I-S FRAMEWORK**

![](_page_13_Picture_3.jpeg)

#### I. Productive savings and investment

![](_page_14_Picture_1.jpeg)

- *m* marginal product of capital
- Productive investment is lower the higher is the return it gives, diminishing returns
- Shifts left-down when:
  - TFP falls, depreciation rises
  - Price of capital goods falls
  - Less competition, more regulation, higher taxes
  - Public investment falls

![](_page_14_Figure_11.jpeg)

### I. Productive savings and investment

![](_page_15_Figure_1.jpeg)

- In Ramsey model, supply of savings it horizontal at the discount rate.
- Upward sloping with incomplete markets.
- Unpack it...

![](_page_15_Picture_7.jpeg)

# 2. Productive versus storage savings

![](_page_16_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Productive capital stock vs storage (gov debt + housing + rents)
- Not 45 degree line because differ in their non-return features
- Shifts right-down when:
  - Productive investments are perceived as riskier or less liquid
  - Financial frictions preventing productive investment

![](_page_16_Picture_9.jpeg)

# 2. Productive versus storage savings

![](_page_17_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Average return on savings = discount rate plus growth (times inverse IES).
- Average of returns on the two forms of savings: downward sloping between the two returns.
- Shifts left-down:
  - Growth falls
  - Inequality rises
  - Demography so discount less

 ${m}$ 

![](_page_17_Picture_10.jpeg)

# 2. Equilibrium

![](_page_18_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_18_Figure_4.jpeg)

#### K

- More investment in productive assets (k) shifts P-A right-down, raises *m*, Savings upward slope
- Savings shifts left-up if: (i) lower growth, (ii) aging, (iii) more financial frictions

![](_page_18_Figure_9.jpeg)

# l and 2. Equilibrium

![](_page_19_Figure_1.jpeg)

20

# 3. Realized returns, potential and actual output

![](_page_20_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $x^{p'}$  $x^p$ 

- Given productive capital,
  output x equals potential x<sup>p</sup>
- Variable inputs require ex post return through a norm.
- Inflation below norm, then  $\rho$  is high, inputs are less used, output is below potential  $\mathbf{x}^{p}$
- Kink where  $\rho = y$
- Shifts left-down if less capital

![](_page_20_Picture_10.jpeg)

# 4. Policy target: fiscal and monetary policy

![](_page_21_Picture_1.jpeg)

- Aggregate demand management by fiscal and monetary policy
- Policy targets: trade-off costs of inflation versus costs of underemployment.
- Shift right-down when
  - y falls
  - Target higher potential or higher inflation above norm

 $\mathcal{X}$ 

![](_page_21_Figure_8.jpeg)

### 4. Equilibrium realized returns and output

![](_page_22_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Goal: intersect at the kink
- Policy: target inflation equals inflation norm and target output equals potential output.
- If overdo it, intersect below kink, high inflation, realized returns lower.
- By Rational expectations, then inflation norm rises, shift *PT* left-up towards kink

 $\mathbf{X}$ 

![](_page_22_Picture_8.jpeg)

# 5. Policy rate and unexpected inflation

![](_page_23_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Lower policy interest rate (i)raises aggregate demand by consumers, pushes inflation high from sticky prices by firms
- Neutral/Wickselian rate: y/t
- Shifts left-down if:
  - Yield y falls
  - Term premia (t) rises
  - Expected inflation  $(\pi^e)$  falls

 $\pi$ 

![](_page_23_Figure_9.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_10.jpeg)

# 5. Policy rate and unexpected inflation

![](_page_24_Figure_1.jpeg)

2%

- Taylor rule for policy rate: higher inflation leads to higher policy rate, as usual.
- Shifts right /down when higher target inflation rate
- Policymaker targets the neutral rate, and if gets it right, then inflation is equal to target, as intersects the PC-IS at this level

er ner

# All together: four r\*'s

(a) Productive investment and savings

(b) Unproductive or productive savings

![](_page_25_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Figure_5.jpeg)

(c) Realized returns and policy choices

![](_page_25_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Figure_8.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Figure_9.jpeg)

ı	$\mathbf{m}$
iou	

Taylor rule

![](_page_25_Picture_13.jpeg)

- Structural determinants: growth, demographics, productivity, competition, financial frictions
- Norms, expectations: compensation, expected inflation, term premium
- Policy goals / targets: potential output, inflation target, neutral rate pursued

 $\pi$ 

![](_page_25_Figure_18.jpeg)

# USING THE FRAMEWORK TO ACCOUNT FOR THE 1995-2019 TRENDS

#### Fundamentals from literature on investment

![](_page_27_Figure_1.jpeg)

Investment curve left-down

- Rachel Smith (17), Rachel (23). (1) Fall in relative price of capital (2) Lower economy and population growth rate. (3) Decline in public investment
- I would add: (4) Higher depreciation (5) Higher markups

![](_page_27_Figure_7.jpeg)

# But data says m constant or barely fell

![](_page_28_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Therefore Savings curve must have shifted left-up
- Consistent with data on depressed investment
- To see why S may have shifted left and what about **y** turn to the next plot...

 $\mathbf{k}$ 

![](_page_28_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_28_Figure_8.jpeg)

#### Fundamentals from the literature on savings

![](_page_29_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $\mathcal{M}$ 

- Rachel Smith (17), Rachel (23).
- (1) Demographics: ageing RE left-down
- (2) Productivity and population RE left-down
- (3) Rising inequality RE left-down
- But would lead to *m* falling as much (or more) than y.

![](_page_29_Figure_10.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Figure_11.jpeg)

### P-A to the right-down is consistent with m-y

![](_page_30_Figure_1.jpeg)

 ${\mathcal m}$ 

#### Portfolio-Arbitrage right-up:

(1) Global imbalances

SE Asia reserve accumulation desire liquidity. State-controlled foreign investors prefer safety.

(2) Global financial crisis Risk aversion and regulation rise. Decrease in private supply of storage.

![](_page_30_Picture_8.jpeg)

![](_page_30_Picture_9.jpeg)

# Policy challenge from high m-y world

![](_page_31_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $x^{p'} x^p$ 

- AS shifted left-down
  - (1) less investment means less productive capacity
  - (2) higher markups
  - (3) higher depreciation rate
  - Vertical kink is lower
  - (1) as y' is lower

Underemployment with unchanged policy: <u>2008-12</u>

![](_page_31_Picture_10.jpeg)

# Policy challenge of low r, high m world

![](_page_32_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $x^{p'} x^p$ 

- Policy challenge: shift **PT** rightdown from B towards B"
  - Fiscal policy large deficits
  - Monetary policy kept rates at zero.
  - Also, norms adjusted: persistently lower returns, lower inflation norm (less union power, Chinese "'deflation' forces)
  - 2012-19

 $\mathbf{X}$ 

![](_page_32_Picture_9.jpeg)

### Inflation and the ZLB problem

![](_page_33_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $\pi$ 

- With a lower y, the PC-IS shifted left-down
- Policy had to adjust policy to a lower interest rate, but with ZLB, low-inflation trap, point **B**.
- The low inflation delivers the realized returns that led to under-employment, and ZLB explains why PT curve not shift enough, need for fiscal

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![](_page_33_Figure_7.jpeg)

### The term premium to the rescue

![](_page_34_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Unconventional monetary policy (QE and others) lowered term premium to get out of ZLB and raise inflation.
- Get back to A by lowering t'
- In EZ, not quite all the way, but towards there.

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#### THE PRESENT

# What are the data showing? US, 3 years

![](_page_36_Figure_1.jpeg)

y: much higher, with *i* lagging

# If last few years persist: why higher y?

![](_page_37_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $k^{''}$  $k^{'}$ 

- Shift left-up in **P-A**:
- (I) Government bonds no longer perceived as safe and liquid
- (2) Global imbalances reversal
- (3) Elections and fiscal/monetary mix going forward
- *R-E* shift up-right for *m* stable: (4) Consumption spree post pandemic,
- (5) Optimism about Al

 $\mathbf{k}$ 

### If last few years persist: m

![](_page_38_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Shift down/right of **S**avings line from previous slide, brings down *m* and *K*
- Shift up/right in Investment keeps *m* high, as a result of: (i) Al optimism (ii) rise in public investment
- These are small for now, but if keep on picking up, rise in investment and gradually drive down of **m**

 $\mathbf{m}$ 

![](_page_38_Figure_8.jpeg)

![](_page_38_Figure_9.jpeg)

![](_page_38_Picture_10.jpeg)

# What happened in last few years: inflation

![](_page_39_Figure_1.jpeg)

- With persistently higher y, then vertical kink becomes higher.
- With unchanged policy: **B** higher inflation, low returns for bondholders
- Why tolerated in 2021-22? (i) to avoid under-employment (ii) pressure to inflate debt.
- Eventually adjust, **PT** shifts upleft, towards point C, 2023-24

![](_page_39_Figure_9.jpeg)

![](_page_39_Figure_10.jpeg)

![](_page_39_Figure_11.jpeg)

![](_page_40_Figure_0.jpeg)

2%

- Higher y meant that PC-IS shifted up/right.
- Economy moved to point C
- Keeping inflation on target would have required raising "ineutral rate" in the Taylor rule, shifting it up,
- Deliver same inflation through significant higher rates, vertically above point **B**

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![](_page_40_Picture_9.jpeg)

#### THE FUTURE

#### Scenario I. Benevolent benchmark

- **TR**: back to inflation target 2% requires higher *i* forever to match *y*.

![](_page_42_Figure_3.jpeg)

• **PT**: back to kink,  $\rho = y$ , higher primary surpluses to pay for interest on debt

![](_page_42_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_42_Figure_10.jpeg)

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### Scenario I. Benevolent benchmark

- Challenge (i): bumpy road, hard to calibrate
- Challenge (ii): higher **y** or lower **m**?
- Challenge (iii): higher interest burden on public debt, pressure on policy

![](_page_43_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_43_Figure_8.jpeg)

# Scenario 2. Forever-higher inflation

![](_page_44_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Give in to fiscal pressure, want to "run economy hot"
- Move **PT** right-down, point **D'**.
- Forever high inflation, lower returns to bondholders.
- But, norms adjust, **PT** goes up-left, policy keeps pushing right-down
- Forever higher inflation, shuffling between **D** and **D**'

![](_page_44_Figure_10.jpeg)

![](_page_44_Figure_11.jpeg)

![](_page_44_Picture_12.jpeg)

# Scenario 2. Forever-higher inflation

![](_page_45_Figure_1.jpeg)

- This is achieved by too low policy rates, Taylor rule to the right-down
- First get point **D**'.
- But then **PC-IS** shifts right-up as expected inflation rises,
- Economy moves to D", inflation higher, and so on, both forever shifting right.
- Friedman '68 and the 70s.

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![](_page_45_Figure_9.jpeg)

![](_page_45_Picture_10.jpeg)

#### Scenario 3.A double trap

![](_page_46_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_46_Picture_3.jpeg)

- Say term premium (t) rises: (i) higher inflation risk premia after recent inflation disaster, (ii) financial repression coming (iii) unwinding QE
- PC-IS left down, low inflation. Policy responds by forward guidance, but ZLB hits, end up at D'
- The higher term premium offsets the higher long-term interest rate to leave policy rate near zero.

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![](_page_46_Figure_8.jpeg)

![](_page_46_Figure_9.jpeg)

# Scenario 3. A double trap

![](_page_47_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Monetary policy cannot move **PT** to the right, since constrained by the ZLB.
- Fiscal policy can neither, constrained by fiscal capacity, fear of default.
- Tight AD policy means **PT** upleft, economy at D', recession
- A stagnation trap.

![](_page_47_Figure_9.jpeg)

![](_page_47_Figure_10.jpeg)

![](_page_47_Figure_11.jpeg)

![](_page_48_Picture_0.jpeg)

#### CONCLUSION

# Where is r\* going?

- Forecasting may be hard, but ignoring the question is foolish
- trends, looked into the future.
- investment, AI optimism, (demography and inequality?)
- Three scenarios for  $\rho$  and i via  $\pi$

• This talk: distinguished four *r*\*'s, proposed a framework, calibrated it with past

• Scenario where y rises a lot, m falls some: loss of safety, global imbalances, public

• Accept higher policy rates forever, inflation back on target, primary surpluses • Persistent higher inflation, low-then-high policy rates, low-then-normal returns • Persistent low inflation, stagnation with under-employment, high returns

![](_page_49_Picture_13.jpeg)