

How Do Central Banks Control Inflation? A Guide for the Perplexed[†]

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Central banks have a primary goal of price stability. They pursue it using tools that include the interest they pay on reserves, the size and the composition of their balance sheet, and the dividends they distribute to the fiscal authority. We describe the economic theories that justify the central bank's ability to control inflation and discuss their relative effectiveness in light of the historical record. We present alternative approaches as consistent with each other, as opposed to conflicting ideological camps. While interest-rate setting may often be superior, having both a monetarist pillar and fiscal support is essential, and at times pegging the exchange rate or monetizing the debt is inevitable. (JEL E31, E43, E52, E58, E62, F31, G21)

1. Introduction

How do central banks keep inflation on target? How do they prevent episodes of hyperinflation and their tragic consequences for welfare? Can a central bank control inflation if the economy goes through secular stagnation, a liquidity trap, or a fiscal crisis? Why was inflation so high in 2021–24 and will it ever settle down at 2 percent? These are crucial questions that have answers in current economic theory.

Yet, students coming out of a macroeconomics class are often flummoxed by this topic. Undergraduates mostly retain that central banks print money and more money means higher inflation. They are then thoroughly confused when they learn that most central bankers barely mention money in their speeches, that they do not actually choose how much currency to print, and that the US monetary base increased fivefold between 2008 and 2014 with no visible dent in inflation. Graduate students learn about the setting of interest rates and the Phillips curve, and perhaps even about the welfare costs of inflation and the links between monetary

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and fiscal policy. However, when asked to reconcile the Fisher relation (higher interest rates are associated with higher expected inflation one-to-one), the Taylor principle (increasing interest rates more than one-to-one in response to inflation keeps inflation constant), and the empirical evidence (exogenous positive shocks to interest rates lower inflation), they struggle with the apparent paradoxes. Discussions of equilibrium determinacy or active–passive regimes attract theoretically minded researchers as much as they put off those focused on empirical applications.

The goal of this article is to provide a unified treatment of the theory of how central banks control inflation. The hope is that researchers will have an accessible entry point to this literature so they can make sense of monetary policies and inflation outcomes. Our approach has three distinctive features.¹

The first is that we highlight the common features of different viewpoints by using a single model of prices *conditional on real outcomes*. We present alternative theories not as opposing views, but rather as actively relying on some economic mechanisms while other economic mechanisms play a passive role.

The second feature is that we put the central bank at the center of all of them. It is the central bank whose liabilities define the price level and which has a mandate to target a value for inflation. The central bank's policies are always the key determinant of inflation, whether they can be described as monetary, fiscal or, more accurately, as a mix of both.

The third feature is that we provide one interpretation of the history of inflation as a result of different strategies followed at different times. Our goal is not to defend it as either the only or the right explanation for inflation's movements, but rather to let the reader see the different theoretical concepts at work and their relative strengths. We conclude that by setting the interest rate on banks' deposits at the central bank (reserves) in an aggressive and transparent way, while having a monetary pillar to anchor expectations and fiscal support to prevent runs on its liabilities, the central bank can effectively control inflation. We discuss the circumstances when this is not possible, and how central banks can regain control of inflation by picking from a menu of unconventional policies.

This is not an article about the optimal way to conduct monetary policy or about how to trade off variability in inflation versus real activity. We take the target for inflation as given and study the central bank's ability to achieve it. A first step in doing so is for policy to deliver a unique price level, which is a question of how policy can ensure the *determinacy* of equilibrium. We take multiple or indeterminate equilibriums in a model as a sign of an incomplete policy framework. A second step is *effectiveness* in the sense of inflation being close to the target, which we evaluate in terms of the variables that the central bank has to track and how they fared across different actual monetary policy regimes in both advanced economies and emerging markets.

Section 2 sets up the general model of prices that we will use. The model provides an incomplete description of equilibrium by characterizing solely how inflation depends on real outcomes, stopping short of solving for both as a function of exogenous shocks. The gain of this approach is that the model is very general, nesting the neoclassical and new Keynesian general equilibrium frameworks as special cases. A limitation is that while the model points to some general restrictions on what central banks can achieve, there are further restrictions

¹Previous surveys, taking a different approach, are McCallum (1999) and Woodford (2003).

that we will ignore because they would be specific to the model jointly determining real and nominal outcomes.

A key result from the model is that the classical analysis of supply and demand does not pin down inflation. This is what makes this topic special. To discuss inflation, one must introduce a central bank, whose liabilities define what prices are in the first place. Section 3 lays out the tools at the central bank's disposal and sets up a passive strategy where they are not used, with the government only receiving dividends in the background. Inflation remains indeterminate. The sections that follow activate one tool at a time, together with different interactions with the fiscal authority. Each tool is associated with one economic force to pin down inflation.

In Section 4, we consider the economic force of arbitrage between savings in nominal or real investments. The central bank steers inflation by choosing the interest rate that remunerates reserves, but it must do so with a feedback from inflation to the interest rate. If that feedback is aggressive, if the central bank forms accurate estimates of the state of the economy, and if it communicates them transparently, then it can keep inflation close to its target. The inflation targeting regimes that dominated monetary policy in the 1990s and 2000s testify to the success of this approach, even though testing it econometrically is challenging. This section also shows the importance of having a pillar, in the sense of an escape clause, to stop self-fulfilling expectations from making inflation explode.

Section 5 continues with setting interest rates, but in the version that dominated the actions of the major central banks in the 2010s (and earlier in the case of Japan). We discuss why there may be bounds on interest rates that lead to unconventional times where the approach of the previous section cannot be used. Forward guidance, quantitative easing, or going long are strategies that focus on long-term interest rates, while subsidizing bank credit focuses on private bank rates. All of these put a great burden on the rationality of the economic agents interacting with the central bank, as their effectiveness relies on how farsighted they are in setting their expectations. The experience with these strategies has been mixed.

Section 6 considers the economic force that brings the market for banknotes into equilibrium. The key equation is the demand for currency, while the policy tool is the central bank's exclusive right to supply banknotes. We consider money growth rules, fiscal rules on the seignorage revenues from this activity, and pegs to either commodities, such as gold, or to foreign currencies. Determinacy is easy to ensure, but the theory suggests that this policy strategy is usually not effective. The experience using money growth rules in the early 1980s in the United Kingdom and United States and with the pegs of the Bretton Woods system after World War II confirms that the monetary approach often leads to volatile inflation. The experience in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s shows that it can even come hand in hand with hyperinflation.

In Section 7, the key equation is the intertemporal budget constraint of the central bank, and the economic force is the unwillingness of private agents to hold the liabilities of an insolvent institution. The policy tools are the central bank's expenses, the composition of its assets, and especially the dividends it pays to the fiscal authority, all of them affecting the net income shortfall of the central bank. In practice, this strategy is more often imposed on, rather than adopted by, central banks when they lose their financial independence. This section makes clear that ensuring fiscal support for the central bank is the way to avoid it and discusses how this can be done.

Section 8 concludes with a brief discussion of how central bank strategies to control inflation have evolved since Bretton Woods.

2. *The Challenge of Pinning Down Inflation*

Our starting point is a general description of an economy with many goods. Those goods have prices in dollars, euros, or some other unit of account. Our goal is to characterize how many fewer goods you can buy with one dollar today relative to a past date: this is inflation.

We achieve generality by strictly focusing on a very narrow question: What is inflation, while taking as given real outcomes? Usually, when economists talk of solving for a variable like inflation in a model, they mean solving for how some exogenous forces determine inflation. This is not what we do. That would involve solving for real outcomes and inflation at the same time, which in turn would require many more specific assumptions. When we take this next step, we will focus on two commonly-used models: a neoclassical one and a new Keynesian one.

2.1 *A General Model of Prices*

Consider many nondurable goods indexed by i from 0 to I , and also many possible assets indexed by j , and finally many dates denoted by t from 0 to infinity. Each good and each asset at each date is traded by many agents and has a price in the unit of account, say the dollar. The price of good i at time t is $P_t(i) \geq 0$, while the net return on asset j held for one period is $I_{t+1}(j)$, both in dollars. Because the world is uncertain, people must form beliefs: We use the $E_t(\cdot)$ operator to capture the expectation of future variables at date t . The agents forming these expectations may not have full information, but we assume that they are rational in the sense of being consistent with the other equilibrium equations of the model.²

2.1.1 *Building Blocks*

The first building block is a definition of the price level. This is an index function $\mathcal{P}(\cdot)$ over all goods' prices:

$$(1) \quad P_t = \mathcal{P}\left(\{P_t(i)\}_{i=0,\dots,I}\right).$$

When every price doubles, the price level doubles as well: The function $\mathcal{P}(\cdot)$ is linear homogeneous. This function may be the ideal measure of the cost of living in the economy, or it may be some other index that we choose to measure inflation over, like the consumer price index, the consumption deflator, or core versions of either of them.

The second building block is the consumption-optimality condition that households equate the relative price between two goods, say i and 0, to their marginal rate of substitution:

$$(2) \quad \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t(0)} = \mathbf{R}_t(i) \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, I.$$

The real variable $\mathbf{R}_t(i)$ captures how many units of good i the consumer would trade for one unit of good 0, which may change over time, reflecting shocks to consumer tastes.

²Section 5.7 will relax this assumption where it especially matters, when forming faraway expectations.

The third building block is the optimal saving decisions of households. They equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t versus $t + 1$ to their relative price. This intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is the variable $\mathbf{M}_{t+1} \geq 0$, which is sometimes also called the stochastic discount factor.

The return to holding a pure financial asset that is valued only for the income it provides is $P_t(1 + I_{t+1}(j))/P_{t+1}$. This is because the saver must forego P_t units of goods to buy the asset today, in order to earn the nominal return $1 + I_{t+1}(j)$ next period with which to buy goods at a price P_{t+1} . However, households may consider not just the financial return, but also some services from holding this asset. For instance, housing is an asset that provides shelter. Another example is government bonds that many financial institutions can use to satisfy regulations or as collateral in other financial transactions. This extra yield from holding an asset is the real variable $\mathbf{Q}_t(j)$.

Therefore, savers will equate the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to the intertemporal relative price, which is the (inverse of the) nominal asset return plus its convenience yield:

$$(3) \quad E_t \left[\mathbf{M}_{t+1} \left[\frac{P_t(1 + I_{t+1}(j))}{P_{t+1}} + \mathbf{Q}_t(j) \right] \right] = 1 \text{ for all } j.$$

The fourth block refers to firms setting prices to maximize the surplus of production under imperfect competition. Introduce two more real variables: $\mathbf{C}_t(i)$ is the real marginal cost of producing good i and $\mathbf{Z}_t(i)$ is the desired markup. Then, the price in dollars that the firm would like to charge, $\tilde{P}_t(i)$, is

$$(4) \quad \tilde{P}_t(i) = P_t \mathbf{Z}_t(i) \mathbf{C}_t(i).$$

These four blocks are common to most models written by economists. They define a general model of prices, where our goal in this paper is solely to study the inflation sequence $\{\Pi_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$, where $\Pi_t \equiv P_t/P_{t-1}$.³

DEFINITION 1: *Given a path for real outcomes, $\mathbf{N}_t = \{\mathbf{R}_t(i), \mathbf{Z}_t(i), \mathbf{C}_t(i), \mathbf{M}_{t+1}, \mathbf{Q}_t(j)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, a conditional equilibrium for prices is a path for $\{P_t, P_t(i), \tilde{P}_t(i), I_{t+1}(j)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ that satisfies equations (1)–(4).*

This is an unusual definition of equilibrium. It does not map shocks to outcomes. Rather, it maps real outcomes to prices denominated in dollars. In this sense, it is a form of partial equilibrium, but where what is being treated as exogenous are not other markets but instead the real outcomes. In this sense, it is quite general, and yet, as we will show, it already puts restrictions on equilibrium inflation and on what central banks can achieve. Moving to general equilibrium, as we will discuss in Section 2.2, puts further restrictions on how inflation co-moves with real outcomes.

³For convenience, we set $P_{-1} = 1$ so $\Pi_0 = P_0$.

2.1.2 Uncertainty

Before proceeding, we make two simplifications regarding the nature of uncertainty. We invite the interested reader to check the Supplemental Appendix for derivations without these simplifications.

First, we assume that all uncertainty regarding the path of real outcomes is resolved in period 1 and is captured by the state of the world, s . Therefore, for $t \geq 1$, $\mathbf{N}_t = \mathbf{N}(s)$. At date 0 agents do not know which s will be realized the following period. But once period 1 arrives, all exogenous variables become known, and for simplicity we take them to be constant.

Second, we assume that shocks are small in the sense that it is accurate to focus on a log-linearized version of this economy around a steady state where all the real outcomes are constant (for instance, where $\mathbf{M}_{t+1} = \beta$, a constant discount factor) and all prices grow over time at the constant rate $\bar{\Pi}$. For the rest of the paper, we denote steady-state values using this notation, that is, $\bar{\Pi}$ is the steady-state level of inflation. Letting lowercase prices p_t , $p_t(i)$ and $\tilde{p}_t(i)$ denote the difference of the log of the prices in capital letters from this constant growth path, the four log-linearized equations corresponding to equations (1)–(4) are:

$$(5) \quad p_t = \sum_{i=0}^I \omega_i p_t(i)$$

$$(6) \quad p_t(i) = p_t(0) + \rho_t(i)$$

$$(7) \quad \tilde{p}_t(i) = p_t + z_t(i) + c_t(i)$$

$$(8) \quad r_t = E_t(i_{t+1}(j) - \pi_{t+1}) + q_t(j).$$

The first equation is the price index, where ω_i is the elasticity of function $\mathcal{P}(\cdot)$ with respect to its i th argument evaluated at the steady state.

The second equation says that relative prices depend on the real marginal rate of substitution, where $\rho_t(i)$ is the log-linear deviation of $\mathbf{R}_t(i)$ from its steady state value.

The third equation says that firms want to set the log of their prices to the sum of the price level, the desired real markup, and the real marginal cost, where $z_t(i), c_t(i)$ are the log-linear deviations of $\mathbf{Z}_t(i), \mathbf{C}_t(i)$ from their steady state values, respectively.

Finally, the fourth equation has the return on an asset on the right-hand side: It is the sum of the log of the gross yield on an asset, $i_{t+1}(j)$, minus inflation plus the nonpecuniary benefits of the asset: $q_t(j) = \frac{\bar{Q}(j)}{1 - \bar{Q}(j)} \log(Q_t(j)/\bar{Q}(j))$ where $\bar{Q}(j)$ is the steady state value of $Q_t(j)$. On the left-hand side is a new variable, r_t , which is the log-linear approximation of $1 + R_t \equiv [E_t(\mathbf{M}_{t+1})]^{-1}$. The R_t is the return of a specific pure financial asset whose returns provide a useful benchmark for our analysis. This financial asset is a safe bond that pays the same real return at $t + 1$, no matter the state of the world, and that has no convenience yield. Likewise, a safe bond that pays the same nominal return at $t + 1$, no matter the state of the world and that has no convenience yield, has a return I_t .⁴

⁴These are two of the j assets, namely those such that: $I_{t+1}(nom) = I_t$ and $1 + I_{t+1}(real) = (1 + R_t)P_{t+1}/P_t$.

Focusing on these four equations, note again how general they are. Most economic models share these links from marginal rates of substitution, marginal costs, and desired markups to prices and nominal returns.

2.1.3 Price Level (In)determinacy

Does this model of the economy deliver a unique prediction for the endogenous level and rate change of prices? It will if it obeys the following conditions:

DEFINITION 2: *Inflation as a function of real outcomes $(P_0, \Pi_t(s))$ is unique or determinate in equilibrium conditional on real outcomes if*

- (i) *There is a unique scalar P_0 in equilibrium.*
- (ii) *If the functions $\Pi_t'(s)$ and $\Pi_t''(s)$ both satisfy equilibrium conditions, then $\Pi_t'(s) = \Pi_t''(s)$.*

An alternative way to define indeterminacy is to consider a “sunspot” random variable, call it \tilde{s} , that does not drive any of the real variables but may affect inflation at any date. Determinacy of the price level is then a statement that (P_0, Π_t) does not depend on \tilde{s} .⁵

For given real outcomes, $\mathbf{N}(s)$, and a path for the price level, $(P_0, \Pi_t(s))$, the $I + 1$ equations in (1) and (2) pin down the prices $P_t(i)$ for each of the $I + 1$ goods while each indexed version of equation (4) solves for each good, i 's, desired price $\tilde{P}_t(i)$. Given a path of real dividends (another real outcome) for each financial asset j , the corresponding version of equation (3) determines that asset's price and its return, $I_{t+1}(j)$.

But what pins down the price level in the first place? Nothing; there are no equations left.

Under the current framework, any level of inflation is consistent with the equilibrium conditions above. If the price level doubles at all dates, then actual and desired good prices will double as well and nominal returns will be the same. If instead the price level grows twice as fast, nominal returns will be twice as high, and actual and desired good prices will grow twice as fast.

This result is what makes the study of inflation so special and different from other variables in economics. Its importance and generality dates back to Hume (1752): Dollars are just a unit of account with which the prices of goods are determined. Nothing in classical economics, or in demand and supply, pins down the price level or inflation, in the same way that nothing determines whether measurements should be in inches or centimeters.

2.2 Prices and Quantities

For much of what follows in this paper, readers can skip to the next section. The only requirement is to take real outcomes as given, especially the real return, r_t . This will be enough to show some central limits on how central banks can overcome the indeterminacy of inflation.

There are further limits that come from how inflation will affect real outcomes. Exploring them requires a complete statement of equilibrium that endogenizes prices and quantities as a function of shocks. This, in turn, requires a whole host of assumptions that link those

⁵Analogous to all uncertainty being resolved at period 1, we also only consider sunspots that are realized by period 1. Again, this is not necessary for the thrust of the results, but simplifies the exposition.

quantities to the marginal rates of substitution and marginal costs in our general model. We lay out one set of those assumptions here using a canonical general equilibrium model that goes under the label of the new Keynesian model. It is covered in textbooks like Galí's (2015). This is not the place to review those assumptions and the reasoning behind them, so we just state them.

The link from $\mathbf{N}(s)$ to the quantities consumed (and produced) of each good $y_t(i)$ (and their total $y_t = \sum_i y_t(i)$), the quantities of each asset $b_t(j)$, and exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity a_t , desired markups z_t , and the service from assets $u_t(j)$ are

$$(9) \quad \omega(i) = 1/(I + 1)$$

$$(10) \quad \rho_t(i) = -\sigma(y_t(i) - y_t(0))$$

$$(11) \quad c_t(i) = y_t - a_t + \frac{y_t - a_t}{\varphi}$$

$$(12) \quad q_t(j) = -\frac{b_t(j) - p_t - y_t}{\eta^j} + u_t(j)$$

$$(13) \quad r_t = E_t(y_{t+1}) - y_t,$$

where σ, φ, η^j are nonnegative elasticities.⁶ The Supplemental Appendix lists the utility functions, production technologies, and markets that give rise to these links. Of note are the assumptions of diminishing returns in the definition of the elasticities, since the marginal rate of substitution for a good falls with the quantity of the good consumed, the convenience yield of an asset falls with the quantity of the asset held, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution falls with the growth rate of output.

A missing ingredient to complete the description of general equilibrium of quantities and prices is the link between desired prices, $\tilde{p}_t(i)$, and actual prices, $p_t(i)$. Two prominent models make different assumptions between them.

2.2.1 A Neoclassical Model

In the neoclassical model, $\tilde{p}_t(i) = p_t(i)$, actual and desired prices are the same. Then, combining equations (5)–(13) gives the following solution for real outcomes: $y_t^n = ((1 + \varphi^{-1})a_t - z_t)/(1 + \varphi^{-1})$ and $r_t^n = E_t(y_{t+1}^n) - y_t^n$, where we use the superscript n to denote the neoclassical, or natural, unique equilibrium.

In this model, real outcomes, and especially the real interest rate, are independent of nominal variables. This is commonly referred to as the classical dichotomy: Real trade-offs are unchanged regardless of the price level. That is, in a neoclassical world, \mathbf{N}_t is exogenous with respect to inflation.

Real variables are uniquely determined. Yet, the indeterminacy of inflation remains.

⁶Recall here $I + 1$ captures the total number of goods.

2.2.2 A Sticky-Price Model

Nominal rigidities drive a wedge between desired and actual prices. There are many models of nominal rigidities but we will describe, arguably, the most popular one. This is the Calvo price-setting model, which assumes that each firm producing a good at any given date is randomly allowed (or not) to choose a new price, otherwise keeping the old one.

Starting from our general model, which nests the Calvo model, begin by combining equation (8) for the nominal safe bond with no convenience yield with equation (13), and then subtract the solution for r_t^n in the neoclassical equilibrium above to write

$$(14) \quad \tilde{y}_t = E_t(\tilde{y}_{t+1}) - [i_t - E_t(\pi_{t+1}) - r_t^n],$$

where $\tilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^n$ is the output gap. This is sometimes referred to as the new Keynesian investment–savings (IS) curve.

The Calvo model combines the other three equations in (5)–(7) with the assumptions in equations (9)–(13) together with its assumption on how prices are infrequently set to write what is known as the new Keynesian Phillips curve:

$$(15) \quad \pi_t = \beta E_t(\pi_{t+1}) + \kappa \tilde{y}_t + z_t.$$

The parameter κ captures the inverse of the degree of nominal rigidities, so that when $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$ we are back at the neoclassical model. Again, interested readers can refer to Galí (2015) for the derivation of this equation. The only important feature for the purposes of this article is that changes in inflation now affect real outcomes, which in turn affect inflation as well.

The new Keynesian equilibrium features two equations, (14)–(15), but three unknowns: i_t , y_t and π_t . For a given π_t , the i_t is determined, just as before. But now, for a given π_t then y_t is also solved for and, from there, all other real variables follow. Nominal outcomes now feed back into real outcomes without a dichotomy between the two.

Crucially, there is still nothing in the economy to pin down inflation in the first place. Not only does the indeterminacy of inflation remain, it is now worse, as there is indeterminacy of output and all other real variables. Intuitively, for any given path for inflation, firms and workers produce whatever is demanded at these prices. In turn, demand dictates an amount of savings that determines the real interest rate.

Other models of nominal rigidities will have different mechanisms, but they share this joint nominal and real indeterminacy.⁷

3. Introducing a Central Bank

What is a central bank? In a modern digital economy, when an agent makes a payment to another, it uses a debit or credit card to communicate to the payer's bank that it should deduct an amount from its account, while telling the receiver's bank to add that same amount to its account. If the banks are not the same, there must be a settlement in a third institution where

⁷Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002) and Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) provide further discussion on sticky prices and real indeterminacy.

the two banks each have accounts where the amount gets added and subtracted. This institution is the central bank: the clearing house where payments between banks take place.

The amount in the accounts of banks at the central bank are called reserves. Because reserves are the ultimate form of payment, their unit is the unit of account of the economy. Since reserves in the United States are denominated in dollars, firms and people choose to denominate their prices in dollars as well. The price of a good is simply how many units of reserves must switch between accounts to obtain such good.

It is therefore perhaps not surprising that in the previous section we could not pin down what a dollar is worth in unit of goods. A dollar is defined in reference to a central bank, so no model of dollar inflation is complete without specifying what the central bank does. This section does so by introducing the central bank's tools and its goals.

3.1 *Central Bank Tools*

As with any other institution, a central bank has a balance sheet with liabilities and assets and faces a budget constraint describing the evolution of its net worth given net income. We lay them out, one by one.

3.1.1 *Liabilities: Reserves*

Reserves are deposits of banks at the central bank, so they are a liability of the central bank. Their total amount is V_t . As an asset of the bank, reserves earn an interest rate, $I_{t+1}(V) \equiv I_t^v$, which is credited in the form of additional reserves added to each account in the next period. Importantly, because each bank's reserves are just entries in a spreadsheet at the central bank, the central bank can perfectly control the total amount of reserves. The interest paid on reserves is a tool of the central bank: The central bank can choose it, as it has absolute control over the spreadsheet.

From the perspective of households, reserves are a safe nominal asset (held via banks). They are one particular j and the optimality condition in equation (3) (or (8)) gives the demand for reserves. The convenience yield of reserves has been approximately zero since the great financial crisis.⁸ Combining equation (3) for nominal safe bonds and reserves implies that $I_t = I_t^v$ in this case. Intuitively, any discrepancy between these returns would lead savers to want to borrow an infinite amount of the nominal safe bond to invest in an infinite amount in reserves or the other way around, and the markets for neither bonds nor reserves would clear.

Through the power of arbitrage, by choosing the nominal return on reserves, the central bank controls the nominal interest rate on safe bonds as a tool. The constraint is the infinitely elastic demand for reserves from equation (8):

$$(16) \quad r_t = i_t^v - E_t(\pi_{t+1}).$$

3.1.2 *Banknotes*

Central banks issue another means of payment: banknotes in the nominal amount $H_t \geq 0$.

⁸Reis (2016) provides evidence that this has been the case in the United States post-2008 and argues this is desirable. We will discuss the pre-2008 experience in Section 6.

Banknotes are distinct from reserves in a few ways. To start, banknotes pay no interest. Therefore, $I_{t+1}(H) = 0$ and the opportunity cost of using banknotes as opposed to digital means of payment is equal to the interest rate paid on reserves.

Moreover, banknotes can be freely held by anyone in the economy, not just banks, and they are anonymous, as people do not have to declare to the government how much currency they have or from whom they got it. Agents are willing to sacrifice returns when holding banknotes because some prefer not to use the banking system when making payments, some want anonymity in their transactions, and some prefer physical to digital payments. The convenience yield for banknotes in log-linearized terms is assumed to be (mirroring what we assumed for other assets in equation (12))

$$(17) \quad q_t(h) = -\frac{h_t - p_t - y_t}{\eta^h} + u_t(h).$$

As banknotes provide a convenience yield, but no financial return, they can be described as durable goods that the central bank produces and sells for its value $1/P_t$. The payoff from the sales of these durable banknotes is called seignorage, and is given by $K_{t+1} = (H_{t+1} - H_t)/P_{t+1}$. Because the central bank commits to exchange banknotes for reserves one for one at all times, they are a durable good with unlimited refunds. This has led to banknotes sometimes being described as liabilities of the central bank. Either way, the amount H_t is a central bank tool.

The constraint in setting that tool comes from the demand from banknotes, which follows from combining equation (17) with the optimality condition for holding banknotes in equation (8):

$$(18) \quad h_t - p_t - y_t = -\eta^h [r_t + E_t(\pi_{t+1})] + \eta^h u_t(h).$$

3.1.3 Assets, Net Worth, and Shortfalls

On the asset side, the central bank's balance sheet has a portfolio of some of the assets in the economy. Letting $A_t(j)$ be the real holdings of asset j , then the total real value is $A_t = \sum_j A_t(j)$. The central bank can choose the composition of these assets, which will earn a return.

The central bank earns real seignorage, K_{t+1} , from printing banknotes. It has real expenses net of the surcharges it may impose on banks, which we denote by E_t . Finally, it pays a real dividend to the government, D_t . Combining all of these sources and uses of funds, the real resource constraint of the central bank in period $t + 1$ is

$$(19) \quad K_{t+1} + \sum_j \left[\frac{1 + I_{t+1}(j)}{P_{t+1}} \right] P_t A_t(j) + \frac{V_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} = E_{t+1} + D_{t+1} + A_{t+1} + \frac{(1 + I_t^v) V_t}{P_{t+1}}.$$

The real net worth of the central bank is, by definition, the difference between the real value of assets and liabilities: $W_t = A_t - V_t/P_t$. We treat banknotes as a durable good here, rather than a liability, although this accounting convention is not material for any economic result. The evolution of the real net worth is governed by

$$(20) \quad W_{t+1} = ((1 + I_t^v) P_t / P_{t+1}) W_t - S_{t+1},$$

where S_{t+1} is the fall in net worth relative to the previous date, including interest payments. We refer to it as the net shortfall (or the negative of net income).

Log-linearizing this law of motion around a positive steady state for both net worth and net shortfall (and recalling that the safe real rate is $\beta^{-1} - 1$ in the steady state) gives

$$(21) \quad \beta w_{t+1} = i_t^v - \pi_{t+1} + w_t - (1 - \beta)s_{t+1},$$

where w_t and s_t are the log-linearized counterpart of W_t and S_t , respectively.

Combining the law of motion in levels, (20), with the real resource constraint of the central bank, (19), shows that the net shortfall is

$$(22) \quad S_{t+1} = E_{t+1} + D_{t+1} - \sum_j \left[\frac{I_{t+1}(j) - I_t^v}{P_{t+1}} \right] P_t A_t(j) - K_{t+1}.$$

The expenses, E_t , the dividends, D_t , and the portfolio of assets, $A_t(j)$, are all choices of the central bank. Their combined role is to determine the shortfall, S_t , which is a statistic that combines the impact of these three choices. This S_t is the final monetary policy tool.

This tool is set subject to a constraint. The central bank might be tempted to have very large net shortfalls (perhaps to pay high dividends to the Treasury), driving net worth to negative values. If this persists and explodes at a rate faster than how private agents discount future payoffs, then they would not want to participate in this Ponzi scheme. Their refusal to do so is captured by the condition⁹

$$(23) \quad \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} (\mathbf{M}(s)^T W_T) = 0.$$

3.2 *The Policy Target*

The central bank uses these tools to achieve an objective: to keep inflation ($P_0, \Pi_t(s)$) close to a target ($P_0^*, \Pi^*(s)$). The target depends on the real state of the economy, and it may be arbitrary or optimal given some objectives of policy.¹⁰ The key assumption is that, again, we solve for prices taking the target as given.

The information of the central bank is limited by imperfect real-time estimates of the state of the economy. While $E_t(r_{t+j})$ denoted the public's expectation at t of what the real interest rate will be at $t + j$, we use \hat{r}_{t+j} to denote the central bank's expectation at t , and these may not be the same.

3.3 *All Together: A Formal Definition of a Central Bank*

All combined, the central bank's problem to control inflation as follows.

⁹Perhaps banks allow the central bank to run a Ponzi scheme on them, compensated by themselves running a Ponzi scheme on another branch of the government, like the Treasury. We rule this out on account of the central bank being financially independent, but discuss what this means and what it implies in Section 7.

¹⁰Readers interested in the choice of P_t^* can see Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) or Woodford (2010).

DEFINITION 3: *The central bank uses its tools (I_t^v, H_t, S_t) to select an equilibrium price level path $(P_0, \Pi_t(s))$ that is in expectation equal to the target $(P_0^*, \Pi^*(s))$, given its perceptions of the real variables \hat{N} .*

Starting with the model in Section 2, by spelling out the central bank this section introduced three new equations: the demand for reserves in equation (16), the demand for banknotes in equation (18), and the law of motion for net worth in equation (21). Take then the following benchmark where the central bank *passively* sets its tools:

- (i) the interest rate on reserves to whatever level satisfies the demand in equation (16);
- (ii) the quantity of banknotes to whatever level satisfies the demand from equation (18);
- (iii) the income shortfalls to ensure net worth is constant in equation (21).

Under this passive regime, the three new equations in this section simply pin down the three central bank tools as endogenous variables. Inflation continues to be indeterminate. We have made no progress from the last section.¹¹

Yet, in exercising each of these three functions, the central bank can instead choose how to set each one of these tools, either to follow some exogenous targets or to satisfy some policy rules. This will lead to new equations that solve the indeterminacy. How to do so, and under which constraints, will reveal how the central bank controls inflation. Each of the following sections will separately relax one of (i) to (iii) while keeping the others unchanged, revealing an approach of the central bank to achieve the inflation target.

4. Steering Inflation Using the Interest Rate on Reserves

For many decades, most major central banks have conducted monetary policy by actively steering safe interest rates, more recently by setting the interest rate on reserves. We study this policy regime in this section, while keeping all other policies passive.

4.1 The Economic Force That Drives Inflation

Combining the saving optimality condition in equation (3) for the nominal and real safe bonds, and recalling that arbitrage steers nominal rates to be equal to the rate on reserves, gives the nonlinearized version of equation (16):

$$(24) \quad E_t \left[M_{t+1} \left(1 + R_t - \frac{1 + I_t^v}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right) \right] = 0.$$

This states that, once adjusted by the stochastic discount factor, savings in real safe bonds or in reserves at the central bank must yield the same expected return.

This is called the Fisher equation and it captures a central economic force driving inflation when central banks set interest rates. It works as follows: The private sector can choose to hold

¹¹A different use of the word active and passive is to describe which of two institutions, the central bank or the Treasury, is imposing its decisions on the other. If they are playing a game with each other, this will affect how the policy approach is chosen and set. Unfortunately, both definitions of active/passive are used in the literature, generating confusion.

reserves or real safe bonds. Suppose the price level today was below its equilibrium value, keeping fixed real outcomes. All else equal, then expected inflation would be too high given the future equilibrium price level. Therefore, the return on reserves would be lower than the return on real safe bonds. In other words, by holding reserves at the central bank, the private sector gets fewer goods in return than if they had invested them privately.

Agents would want to hold zero reserves and invest all of their resources in real terms. This would not be an equilibrium, given a positive supply of reserves.

Rather, as they demand fewer reserves, their value falls. Because reserves are the unit of account, their real value is $1/P_t$, so the price level rises back into equilibrium. A higher price level means that expected inflation is lower and the real return on reserves is higher, rising until the point where agents are back to being indifferent between real safe bonds and reserves.¹²

By itself, this force does not determine inflation. The argument above kept fixed the price level next period to pin down the price level today. But when combined with a particular way of choosing interest rates, it will lead to determinacy, as we will see in the remainder of this section. Importantly, this movement from nominal reserves to real investments applies not only to real safe bonds, but to any real spending, like for instance the purchase of durables. In a limit case where the economy has no real assets, it would show up as a desire to save less and consume more. A common saying is that inflation results from too much money chasing too few goods. From this perspective, it arises rather from economic agents wanting to substitute into real goods or assets from nominal assets.

4.2 Exogenous Interest Rates

4.2.1 Nominal Pegs

By itself, relying on arbitrage and setting interest rates does not determine inflation: It depends on how it is done. Say the central bank chooses to set the interest rate on reserves to follow some exogenous sequence, $i_t^v = x_t$. The literature has traditionally referred to this as an interest rate peg. The log-linearized Fisher equation, (16), at all dates then implies that

$$(25) \quad E(\pi_1(s)) = x_0 - r_0,$$

$$(26) \quad \pi_t(s) = x(s) - r(s) \text{ for } t \geq 2,$$

recalling that the exogenous outcomes are constant from period 1 onward, so $x_t = x(s)$ and $r_t = r(s)$.

In the second equation, by choosing the right-hand side, the minimal central bank is able to uniquely pin down inflation at all periods from date 2 forward.¹³ Given the target $\pi^*(s)$, it can choose $x(s)$ to make sure actual inflation is always equal to it.

However, in the first equation, by setting the right-hand side the central bank only pins down expected inflation. Inflation at date 1 itself is not determinate. The second condition for

¹²A small literature has studied inflation using the arbitrage approach but when incomplete markets lead to variations of equation (24), see Bénassy (2000) and Den Haan, Rendahl, and Riegler (2017).

¹³This is because there is no uncertainty after date 1, in real outcomes or sunspots. Otherwise, it would only pin down expected inflation.

determinacy is not satisfied, as an infinite number of inflation rates in different states of the world are consistent with this equation.¹⁴

Moreover, there is no condition pinning down the initial price level, p_0 . If people expect higher prices in the future, the price level at date 0 will simply jump up today. The first condition for determinacy is also not satisfied.¹⁵

4.2.2 Real Payment on Reserves

Suppose instead that the central bank promises to remunerate reserve holders with a payment in real goods, x_t .¹⁶ The resulting nominal payment on reserves is then $i_t^v = x_t + p_{t+1}$, which in dollars rises automatically with the price level. Governments around the world have issued indexed bonds for a long time, and so could central banks; this is what promising a real payment of goods amounts to.

Plugging the above into equation (16) and rearranging delivers

$$(27) \quad r_t = E_t(x_t + p_{t+1} - \pi_{t+1}) \Rightarrow p_t = r_t - x_t.$$

At date 0 then $p_0 = r_0 - x_0$, and at all future dates $p(s) = r(s) - x(s)$. Since $(x_0, x(s))$ is uniquely chosen by policy and $(r_0, r(s))$ is uniquely shaped by real forces, then the above equation delivers a determinate price level conditional on the real variables.

No central bank does this, but this peg highlights the arbitrage forces behind inflation control. The real return on any investment is exogenously fixed by the stochastic discount factor. If the central bank promises a real payment on reserves, then arbitrage determines how many goods reserves are worth today. The economic force behind the Fisher equation is that, since real bonds and reserves both deliver the same payment tomorrow, they must be worth the same today. But, since reserves are denominated in dollars, not goods, then this pins down the price level today.

Using its estimates of the future log real rate $\hat{r}(s)$, the central bank will keep inflation as close to its target as the accuracy of those estimates allows.

4.3 Interest Rate Feedback Rules

While picking interest rates on reserves, the central bank can choose a feedback rule to adjust the interest rate to inflation (or the price level):

$$(28) \quad i_t^v = x_t + \phi \pi_t,$$

where $\phi > 1$, so the response to inflation is more than one to one.

Combining the above with the log-linearized Fisher equation (16) gives a difference equation:

$$(29) \quad \phi \pi_t = E_t(\pi_{t+1}) + r_t - x_t.$$

¹⁴Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) provide a thorough discussion across different economic environments.

¹⁵This classic result is due to Sargent and Wallace (1975).

¹⁶This was studied by Hall and Reis (2016), building on earlier work by Hall (1997), which in turn formalized a proposal by Irving Fisher.

Iterating forward, even though $r(s), x(s)$ are constant, we cannot just rule out that inflation rises or falls over time. For now, we impose a terminal condition that inflation will not explode at a rate higher than ϕ : $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \phi^{-T} E(\pi_T) = 0$, which we will discuss later. Then, the difference equation has a unique solution that implies

$$(30) \quad \pi_0 = \frac{r_0 - x_0}{\phi} + \frac{E(r(s) - x(s))}{\phi(\phi - 1)},$$

$$(31) \quad \pi(s) = \frac{r(s) - x(s)}{\phi - 1}.$$

Our initial normalization that $P_{-1} = 1$ implies that $p_0 = \pi_0$. The price level is thus determinate at all dates, including date 0, conditional on the real outcomes.

By having the interest rate from period 1 onward respond to inflation as well as to the central bank's forecast of real interest rates and the inflation target,

$$(32) \quad x(s) = \hat{r}(s) - (\phi - 1)\pi^*(s),$$

the central bank can achieve its target in expectation. This makes transparently simple what the main tasks are for economists at central banks. Some will calculate the optimal target for inflation, $\pi^*(s)$, using models that interpret the mandate of the central bank. Others will evaluate the "state of the economy" in terms of the sufficient statistic $\hat{r}(s)$. Finally, as reasonable people disagree on both the state of the economy and the short-run goal for inflation, committees of policymakers will discuss different views when choosing the right interest rate $x(s)$.

4.3.1 *The Virtues of Transparency*

The price level that results in period 0 depends on policy x_0 according to:

$$(33) \quad p_0 = \frac{r_0 - x_0}{\phi} + \frac{E(r(s) - \hat{r}(s))}{\phi(\phi - 1)} + \frac{E(\pi^*(s))}{\phi}.$$

To keep this close to p_0^* , the central bank must take into account not just the state of the economy r_0 in the first term. It must also consider the public's expectations of the estimation mistakes that the central bank will make on the future state of the economy in the second term. Even if neither the central bank nor the public know what $r(s)$ is, and even if their estimates are poor, as long as these estimates coincide, policy will be effective.

The central bank's communication is then an important input into keeping inflation on target. Speeches and statements of what it thinks about the future states of the economy are crucial to keeping inflation on target. The communication will work as long as it can steer the public's views toward agreeing with the central bank's forecasts. This is sometimes referred to as Delphic forward guidance, as the central bank works like an oracle that convinces believers.

Starting in 1999, the Federal Reserve (hereafter, often referred to as the Fed) started releasing statements at the conclusion of every policy meeting, and since 2000 these have included a balance of risks. Orphanides (2019) summarizes some of this evolution in the context of anchoring inflation expectations when setting interest rates.

Across the world and since the early 1990s, central banks have adopted inflation targeting frameworks. More than announcements of official inflation targets, these have consisted primarily of transparency and communication efforts with the public about the central banks' objectives, plans, and actions (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997). Empirical work in this area has shown repeatedly that communication under inflation targeting works by moving financial markets, the economic force behind feedback rules (Blinder et al. 2008). Data for 112 countries from 1998 until 2019 shows an almost uniform increase in transparency in the sense of central banks releasing data, sharing their internal forecasts, explaining their framework and deliberations, and disclosing policy decisions and their rationale (Dincer, Eichengreen, and Geraats 2022). Designing a central bank today is as much defining goals and strategies as it is setting a framework for transparency and accountability (Reis 2013). In this line, the IMF has published a Central Bank Transparency Code setting international standards (IMF 2020).

4.4 *The Taylor Principle*

The assumption $\phi > 1$ played a crucial role in delivering the determinacy of inflation. An aggressive enough response of interest rates to inflation motivated the terminal condition to rule out fast exploding paths for inflation and ensured that the sum of future real interest rates and policies converged. This section discusses its role.

4.4.1 *Different Rules and the Aggressiveness of Policy*

There are broader classes of interest rate feedback rules, partly motivated by the actions and experience of central banks across countries and times.¹⁷

First, most estimates of policy rules also show that interest rates are inertial. Central banks typically break a desired change in interest rates into 0.25 percent or 0.5 percent steps over successive policy meetings. We can represent this by having current interest rates responding to their own past value.

Second, convinced by estimates that monetary policy only affects inflation with a lag, many central banks adjust interest rates in response to the public's forecasts of future inflation. These are measured using surveys or the prices of financial contracts. We can capture this by adding the public's expectation of future inflation to the interest rate rule.

Third, many central banks respond to trend measures of inflation that smooth out noisy real-time measures. Following Muth (1960), we can model these trends (sometimes called core inflation) as a weighted average of past inflation, which is the optimal estimate of actual inflation if it follows a random walk contaminated with white noise measurement error.

Fourth, studies of optimal monetary policy often suggest that the central bank should target the price level rather than inflation. These Wicksellian rules replace π_t with p_t in the policy rule.

The mathematics and economic logic of all these cases are similar to the ones in the analysis of the Taylor rule. Table 1 formalizes them and shows the determinacy conditions derived from the same steps as in the previous section. In all of them, the response of interest rates to inflation must be large enough, although the thresholds differ. In fact, for all but the last

¹⁷ McCallum (1981) introduced these rules and first showed that they lead to determinacy. Taylor (1999), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), and Woodford (2003) are classic analyses.

TABLE 1
DETERMINACY CONDITIONS

Rule	Condition
Benchmark: $x_t + \phi \pi_t$	$\phi > 1$
Inertial: $x_t + \phi \pi_t + \chi i_{t-1}^v$	$\phi + \chi > 1$
Forecast targeting: $x_t + \phi \pi_t + \chi E_t(\pi_{t+1})$	$\phi + \chi > 1$
Core inflation: $x_t + \phi(1 - \chi) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \chi^j \pi_{t-j}$	$\phi > 1$
Wicksellian: $x_t + \phi p_t$	$\phi > 0$

rule, the condition states that the cumulative response of the interest rate to a persistent unit increase in inflation exceeds one.

4.4.2 *Dealing with Unobservables*

In our general model of prices, the real interest rate, $r(s)$, and the optimal short-run target, $\pi^*(s)$, are the sufficient statistics to implement policy as shown in equation (32). In practice, neither can be observed in real time.¹⁸

The two stylized models of Section 2.2 provide a mapping from observables onto r_t . First, recall the neoclassical economy where $r_t = r_t^n = E_t(y_{t+1}^n) - y_t^n$. This has motivated implementations of the Taylor rule to have x_t respond to the natural rate of interest (also referred to as r-star) and to measure those using filters that include measures of real activity. It also matches well the experience of central banks responding to recessions by cutting interest rates.

Since we already allowed for $r(s)$ to be a general stochastic process, this does not change anything when it comes to the determinacy of inflation. The effectiveness of the policy rule will differ according to different measures of activity and their relative variance and correlation with the short-term inflation target.

Second, in the new Keynesian model, consider a Taylor rule that makes explicit that the interest rate feedback rule in equation (28) includes the output gap:

$$(34) \quad i_t^v = x_t + \phi \pi_t + \phi_y \tilde{y}_t.$$

Combining this equation with equations (14)–(15) yields a system of two equations in two unknowns:

$$(35) \quad \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{y}_t \\ \pi_t \end{pmatrix} = \Phi E_t \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{y}_{t+1} \\ \pi_{t+1} \end{pmatrix} + \Omega \begin{pmatrix} r_t^n - x_t \\ z_t \end{pmatrix},$$

$$\text{where } \Phi \equiv \Omega \begin{pmatrix} 1 - \beta\phi & 1 \\ \kappa + \beta(1 + \phi_y) & \kappa \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } \Omega \equiv \frac{1}{1 + \phi_y + \kappa\phi}.$$

¹⁸Adão, Correia, and Teles (2011) and Holden (2024) suggest using private-sector forecasts of inflation and returns of real indexed bonds, respectively, as measures of the real interest rate.

A system of linear difference equations has a unique nonexplosive solution if the number of eigenvalues of the matrix Ω that are inside the unit circle is equal to the number of non-pre-determined variables. In this case, both output and inflation can jump, so both eigenvalues must have modulus smaller than 1. Standard linear algebra shows that this is the case if the following condition holds:

$$(36) \quad \phi > 1 - \frac{\phi_y(1 - \beta)}{\kappa}.$$

This is a generalized version of the earlier Taylor principle condition (Woodford 2001). The coefficient on the output gap relaxes the responsiveness with respect to inflation because output covaries with inflation in the long run. By responding to output, the central bank is indirectly further responding to inflation.¹⁹ The same intuition carries through, together with the reliance on a terminal condition. Likewise, the effectiveness of the rule at keeping inflation on target will depend on the gap between the policy rule and the public's perceptions, as in equations (31)–(32), regarding the real interest rate, the inflation target, and also now changes in desired markups. There is an extensive literature that considers many variants of general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities to derive a variety of lower bounds on ϕ to ensure determinacy.²⁰

The prevalence of a real indeterminacy, in addition to the nominal one, brings a further economic force at play. Together with the arbitrage channel that is specific to this approach, there is an aggregate demand channel as well. Changes in the returns of financial assets affect households' desire to save, while nominal rigidities make output demand determined. Therefore, changes in the interest rate now also affect inflation through changes in consumption.²¹

4.4.3 Testing the Taylor Principle

Since different rules put different lower bounds on ϕ , can we not estimate ϕ and test this mechanism? If one goes by the speeches, reports, and statements of central banks, one would think that they all follow feedback rules and subscribe to the Taylor principle. But central banks say many other things as well, and it turns out that it is hard to empirically verify the condition for determinacy.

Going back to the solution for inflation in equations (30)–(31), imagine that the central bank manages to deliver $\pi_t = \pi_t^*$ at all dates. In that case, since $x_t = r_t - (\phi - 1)\pi_t^*$, then combining with the policy rule, the observed interest rate on reserves will be $i_t^v = r_t + \pi_t^*$. Since there is no feedback anymore, this rule is observationally equivalent to a peg. Even if

¹⁹ Meyer-Gohde and Tzaawa-Krenzler (2023) show that in models of the Phillips curve, like under sticky information, where fully anticipated long-run monetary policy has no effect on output, the condition reverts back to $\phi > 1$.

²⁰ A few examples are the inclusion of capital accumulation (Sveen and Weinke 2005), trend inflation (Ascari and Ropele 2009; Khan, Phaneuf, and Victor 2020), constraints to firm credit (Lewis and Roth 2018), multiple policy regimes (Barthélemy and Marx 2019), and dispersion of information (Lubik, Matthes, and Mertens 2023).

²¹ Allowing for incomplete markets in the presence of nominal rigidities, as we eventually discuss in Section 7, does not by itself change the intuition underlying feedback rules, even if it changes the condition (Acharya and Dogra 2020; Bilbiie 2025). However, Acharya and Benhabib (2024) show that in heterogeneous agent new Keynesian models, if precautionary savings rise in recessions, this is a source of real indeterminacy in real outcomes that requires interest rates to respond not just to inflation but also to the natural rate of interest.

the econometrician had data allowing her to separate the state of the economy, r_t , from desired inflation, π_t^* , she could not estimate ϕ (McLeay and Tenreyro 2020).

Imagine instead $r_t = \pi_{t+1}^* = 0$, so that there are no shocks to the economy or to the policy goal, but only to monetary policy (mistakes) that follow the stationary process $x_t = \rho x_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$, where ϵ_t is iid mean zero. Then, the solution in equation (30) reduces to $\pi_t = -x_t/(\phi - \rho)$ so inflation is also autoregressive of order 1. Solving for the interest rate on reserves: $i_t^v = x_t + \phi \pi_t = -(\phi - \rho)\pi_t + \phi \pi_t = \rho \pi_t$. Therefore, a regression of the policy rate on inflation would recover the parameter ρ . Since $\rho < 1$ this estimate would mislead the econometrician to think the Taylor principle is violated (Lubik and Schorfheide 2004; Cochrane 2011).

The general result is that since shocks to the feedback rule affect inflation, regressions of policy rates on inflation inevitably give biased estimates of the feedback coefficient. To estimate ϕ one needs to measure (or instrument) for changes in inflation that are uncorrelated with the monetary policy shocks. But, since an effective monetary policy will respond to all shocks to inflation, it will be hard to find such instruments.²²

4.4.4 *The 1990s and 2000s Experience*

Econometrically estimating the inflation coefficient in an interest-rate feedback rule is hard. However, even without directly testing the mechanism behind the Taylor principle, one can use data to confirm whether central banks have set policy in a way that is consistent with equation (28) (Taylor 1993). A version of equation (28) that includes the difference between the unemployment rate and a time-varying natural rate plus two lags of the federal funds rate has an R^2 of 0.97 on quarterly data during the tenure of Alan Greenspan (1987–2006), but much less during the time of his predecessor, Paul Volcker (Blinder and Reis 2005). Furthermore, policymakers' description of how they approached policy during the 1990s and 2000s conforms to using feedback interest rate rules (Koenig, Leeson, and Kahn 2013). The same applies to the European Central Bank (ECB) from its foundation until 2013 (Hartmann and Smets 2018).

During these close to twenty years, inflation was low and stable. Comparing every twenty-year period over eight centuries of UK inflation, Reis (2023b) finds that the period 1997–2016 had the best inflation outcomes. It had not been so before in all of the G-7 countries, and the most likely explanation was the new monetary regime (Cecchetti et al. 2007).

4.5 *Escape Clauses*

Why does moving from an interest rate peg to a feedback rule make such a difference? A large enough ϕ only delivered determinacy when we combined it with a terminal condition requiring that deviations of expected inflation from target, $E_t(\pi_{t+T} - \pi_{t+T}^*)$, grow no faster than $\ln(\phi)$.

This is because, if inflation were to be higher at date t by one log unit relative to the solution in equations (30)–(31), then the feedback rule would have the central bank raise the interest rate on reserves by ϕ . This would lead to an increase in expected inflation between t and $t + 1$ of ϕ , which in turn would lead the central bank to raise i_{t+1}^v by ϕ^2 , raising expected inflation between $t + 1$ and $t + 2$ by that amount. The process would continue so inflation would keep

²²Carvalho, Nechio, and Tristão (2021) argue that as long as the output gap is used to proxy for x_t , what is left that drives policy has a small enough variance that the bias will be small.

on rising exponentially. These possible alternative solutions for inflation were ruled out by the condition that inflation would not explode at a rate higher than ϕ .

But where did that condition come from in the first place? We discuss it now.

4.5.1 *The Elusive Terminal Condition*

The terminal condition is not an optimality condition the way that transversality conditions are. Those apply to the real value of savings, whereas the condition needed here is on a purely nominal variable, the price level. Additionally, optimal behavior imposes no money illusion in the optimality conditions for savers nor in the transversality condition.

Furthermore, there is no sense in which the economy blows up if this condition does not hold. In the neoclassical economy, the unit of account may be exploding, but agents with no money illusion would be indifferent as real outcomes continue to be finite. In the new Keynesian model, real outcomes would explode, but that rests on the absurd assumption that prices would remain sticky (and firms would meet all demand at their posted prices) as inflation shoots to infinity.

Some authors argue that explosive paths for inflation are implausible. Perhaps people would never believe them. More formally, if people's expectations of inflation deviations from target in the future are constrained to stay locally bounded, then $E_t(\pi_{t+T} - \pi_{t+T}^*)$ is finite and would satisfy the terminal condition for $\phi > 1$.²³

4.5.2 *Escape Clauses as Anchors*

Escape clauses are valid and realistic justifications for the terminal condition. The idea is that the central bank commits to the feedback rule *only* if inflation does not go on an explosive path. If inflation exceeds a preannounced threshold, the central bank switches to a different policy approach. Realistically, if inflation starts rising without bound, no central bank would stick to following blindly a Taylor rule that tells it to raise policy rates more and more, even as it sees inflation rising faster and faster.

If the approach dictated by the escape clause pins down the price level at the date of the switch, then it provides the terminal condition for the feedback rule. Formally, the central bank follows the feedback rule only while inflation relative to target is within some interval, $[\epsilon^L, \epsilon^H]$. If, at some date T , inflation π_T relative to target π^* falls outside this interval, then the central bank switches to a different policy right away at T and from then onward. Take as given that this other policy is able to determine uniquely $\pi_{T+1} = \pi(s)$. It could, for instance, set a real payment on reserves as we already saw, or involve any of the other approaches this paper discusses in subsequent sections.²⁴

Going back to the solution for inflation with a Taylor rule, by iterating the Fisher equation from $t \geq 1$ up until a finite date T , we reach

$$(37) \quad \pi_t = \left(\frac{1 - \phi^{t-T}}{\phi - 1} \right) (r(s) - x(s)) + \phi^{t-T-1} \pi(s).$$

²³Cochrane (2011) criticizes these arguments.

²⁴The classic analysis is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), and see also Taylor (1996), Christiano and Rostagno (2001), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a).

The right-hand side is uniquely pinned down, thanks to the switch in regime, so inflation on the left-hand side is uniquely pinned down as well.

If the interval where inflation can fluctuate without triggering a regime switch is wide, and if the feedback rule keeps inflation close to target, then the switch may almost never happen. In expectation, T is large, and the inflation delivered by this rule would still be approximately given by the formula in equation (33), even if the regime to which it might switch may deliver an inflation $\pi(s)$ not too close to the target $\pi^*(s)$.

4.5.3 *Escape Clauses as Off-Equilibrium Threats*

A different way of writing the regime switch ensures that it never happens. In this case, it works as an off-equilibrium threat.²⁵

Say that monetary policy is still committed to a feedback rule only while the difference of inflation from its target stays in a bounded interval. If inflation at date T were outside of it, there would still be a switch in policy that would uniquely pin down inflation, but now this switch would only happen next period, at $T + 1$. Moreover, the new regime would be able to pin down inflation to a low enough level, well inside the interval. In particular, suppose that $\pi_{T+1} < \pi^* + \epsilon^H - r_T$.²⁶

The Fisher equation (16) at date T together with the regime switch pins down $i_T^v = \pi_{T+1} + r_T < \pi^* + \epsilon^H$. At the same time, the Taylor rule at T implies that since π_T was larger than $\pi^* + \epsilon^H$, and given that the Taylor rule coefficient is larger than one, $i_T^v > \pi^* + \epsilon^H$. This is a contradiction.

The only way to avoid the contradiction is for inflation to never leave the bounded interval and the switch to never happen. If the width of the interval is large enough such that the size of the exogenous shocks would never send the economy outside the interval, then the explosions that lead to indeterminacy with a Taylor rule are ruled out. As the feedback rule implies that inflation explodes at rate ϕ , then one of the bounds will be reached for sure in finite time for any inflation path that does not satisfy the elusive terminal condition. Thus, the condition holds.

Just like in the previous case, the central bank is making the promise that it will not stick to the Taylor rule if inflation enters one of the explosive paths that violate the terminal condition. This promise requires a commitment that is particularly strong, since the escape clause that is being promised is inconsistent with equilibrium. Somehow, it is assumed that rational agents would never expect it to be used, even as the central bank insists that it would.

4.5.4 *Monetary Pillars for the Regime Switch*

With a feedback rule, the size of reserves is irrelevant for inflation as long as it is large enough to keep their demand satiated. Yet, if the escape clause is triggered, the central bank can shrink V_t to the point where a convenience yield for reserves emerges. Just like we will discuss for banknotes in Section 6, the Fisher equation now includes the quantity of reserves. Fixing that quantity to some exogenous path uniquely pins down inflation. We will carefully

²⁵Much of this work builds on Bassetto (2005), and includes Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe's (2010) sophisticated equilibriums, Christiano and Takahashi's (2018) strategy equilibriums, and Loisel's (2021) implementability criteria.

²⁶This may require nominal rigidities to make the policy consistent by having deviations from it be costly.

explain the intuition for how this leads to determinacy in Section 6, but for now note that this could be equally done by setting a quantity for banknotes.

In this case, the central bank is said to rely on a monetary pillar. This is understood as a commitment to switch to a monetary approach to pin down inflation if the interest rate approach leads to an exploding path for inflation.

The pillar also serves as an alert to central banks that have successfully used feedback rules to control inflation for decades and think this is enough. Even though T may be large, it is finite. Even in the case of off-equilibrium threats, they must be credible. Having a monetary anchor as an escape clause behind the interest rate rule plays this role. Many central banks have such monetary anchors, often in the form of gold reserves or holdings of foreign currency, even if they are rarely used.

4.5.5 *The 1970s Experience and the Monetary Pillar*

Inflation was high during the 1970s across most advanced economies. One explanation for why this happened is that central banks did not satisfy the Taylor principle in setting interest rates (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000; Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2011). A complementary explanation is that policymakers at the time settled for a higher inflation target, π^* (Meltzer 2009), misestimated the state of the economy, r_t , or misunderstood what drove it (Orphanides 2003; Romer and Romer 2002), and neglected the measurement and management of private-sector expectations (Reis 2021). Each of these, and all combined, could have contributed to high inflation as a result of either indeterminacy or the lack of a terminal condition anchoring expectations. The conquest of US inflation by Paul Volcker after 1979 came with a brief switch to monetarism (explained in a later section), precisely what an escape clause would dictate.

An exception to the dismal inflation performance during the 1970s was West Germany. The Bundesbank both set interest rates following a feedback rule that satisfied the Taylor principle and had targets for monetary growth that made explicit the potential switch to a monetary strategy if inflation ever got too far from target (Clarida and Gertler 1997). This experience had an important impact on the design of the ECB twenty years later as following a two-pillar strategy. As described in Rostagno et al. (2021), from the 1998 initial strategy to the 2003 review, the ECB emphasized the flexibility of potentially switching to monetarism as a pillar that would stabilize expectations.

5. *Unconventional Interest Rate Policies*

Starting in 1999, the Bank of Japan found itself unable to use feedback interest rate rules to control inflation. The Federal Reserve, the ECB, and other major central banks faced similar struggles following the great financial crisis. The main reason was that feedback rules prescribed setting a very low policy rate, well below zero.

Central banks throughout the 2010s continued to rely on the forces of arbitrage, and to use interest rates as the policy tool. However, they now did it using different strategies, which were labeled unconventional in spite of their persistent use (Bernanke 2020). As much or even more than before, they relied on expectations of private agents, often well into the future.

This section discusses these alternative interest rate policies. We show that they can determine inflation, while at the same time arguing that, in general, they are inferior to feedback rules for the interest paid on reserves, justifying their unconventional label.




Figure 1. Phase Diagrams for Inflation

5.1 Bounds on Interest Rates

Banknotes have a net nominal return, ξ , that is below but close to 0, since they pay no interest but have storage costs and risk of theft. As banks would want to substitute all of their reserves for banknotes if interest rates went below ξ , banknotes impose an effective lower bound (ELB) on the payment of interest on reserves. The policy rule is now $i_t^v = \max\{\phi \pi_t + x_t, \xi\}$ (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2001b).

To study the impact of this bound, we focus on what happens from period 1 onward so there is no uncertainty. The left panel of Figure 1 plots the dynamics of the system that results from combining the new policy rule with the log-linear Fisher equation (16). As was the case earlier, if inflation is to the right of the target, π^* , then it grows without bound, violating the terminal condition, and triggering the escape clause. This is not an equilibrium.

What is new, however, is that once inflation is equal to $\xi - r(s)$, it stays there forever. This is a global steady-state equilibrium of the difference equation: a deflation trap. If π_1 is below the target, inflation will fall. Instead of exploding, it will now converge to the deflation trap. This is true for any initial π_1 , so inflation is again indeterminate: Any initial value between $\xi - r(s)$ and $\pi^*(s)$ is consistent with an equilibrium.²⁷

The same problem arises in the other direction. Sometimes, under pressure from the Treasury to keep the interest rate on government bonds low, central banks do not raise interest rates above a certain level (Reis 2009). This upper bound can be captured as a policy rule, $i_t^v = \min\{\phi \pi_t + x_t, \xi\}$, where with abuse of notation we use ξ to denote the upper bound. The right panel of Figure 1 shows this case. There is also a second global equilibrium steady

²⁷ Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Johannsen (2018) show that an e-stability restriction on the set of equilibriums delivers uniqueness. In the other direction, when expectations are backward looking, there may be no steady state and the economy spirals into ever higher deflation.

state, but it is now above the inflation target. Thus, there is indeterminacy of inflation, which may be well above the desired target.

Setting indeterminacy aside, the existence of two steady states implies that, in the presence of shocks to the state of the economy, to the inflation target, or to policy mistakes, there will be two stochastic solutions fluctuating around these steady states. Then, if there is a sunspot that triggers a change between them, equilibrium inflation may sometimes be close to target and other times be very far from it and close to the deflation trap instead (Mertens and Ravn 2014; Aruoba, Cuba-Borda, and Schorfheide 2018).

In general equilibrium, if prices are flexible, nothing changes. The interaction of nominal rigidities with the effective lower bound does make a difference, which has been explored in a large strand of the literature (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003). While this paper is not the place to survey the literature, we focus on how sticky prices affect the dynamics of inflation.

Once again, there is a permanent-deflation equilibrium. It is also the case that different initial prices, p_0 , come with different paths for inflation converging in finite time to that deflationary steady state (Werning 2011; Cochrane 2017). However, now small changes in how the nominal rigidities are modeled, including whether prices are sticky as in Calvo (1983) or as in Rotemberg (1982), or in how the sunspots that coordinate the equilibriums are introduced, or even in what numerical methods are used to solve the model in a log-linear approximation or globally, seem to matter significantly for the properties of the equilibrium.²⁸

5.2 Unconventional Times

In principle, one can eliminate the deflation or high-inflation equilibrium with an escape clause. However, with an inflation target of 2 percent, deflation is never too far, and escapes would be too frequent, making the feedback rule not useful.

To pursue its feedback rule, the central bank would like to remove the bounds. Eliminating the upper bound is usually done by having *operational* independence to set interest rates as it sees fit, without any interference from the Treasury. The Treasury–Fed accord of 1952 is the classic example.

Eliminating the lower bound is harder, but there are measures to lower the log return on banknotes, ξ , perhaps all the way to minus infinity. Some suggestions in the literature on how to lower ξ are to eliminate banknotes, charge a tax on them, or default on the commitment to exchange currency and reserves one-for-one (Goodfriend 2016; Rogoff 2017; Agarwal and Kimball 2019).

If, after trying these, the central bank finds itself unable to escape the bound, it can still use interest rates and the power of arbitrage to steer inflation. For the remainder of this section, we model these unconventional times in the following simple way: At date 0, we assume the interest rate is at its bound, ξ , which we set to zero. The Fisher equation (16) becomes

$$(38) \quad r_0 = -E_0(\pi_1).$$

In the long run, from date 1 onward, we assume the limit does not bind and the central bank can go back to using feedback rules to hit its inflation target, $\pi^*(s)$.

²⁸See Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), Boneva, Braun, and Waki (2016), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Johannsen (2018), among others.

5.3 Forward Guidance

From equation (38), the price level at date 0 is $p_0 = r_0 + E(p_1(s))$. If the central bank chooses to hit its inflation target, then $p_1(s) = p_1^*(s)$. Since $r_0 + E(p_1^*(s)) \neq p_0^*$, then p_0 may be very far from p_0^* . Having lost its tool, the central bank cannot deliver inflation on target.

Forward guidance is an unconventional interest-rate tool to try to remedy this situation. Say the central bank announces that it will keep $i_t^v = 0$ for several periods, until date T . As a result, in period 1, the price level now is $p_1(s) = Tr(s) + p_{T+1}^*(s)$. The central bank has delayed achieving its target until after period T , when finally it will get to $p_{T+1} = p_{T+1}^*(s)$. In exchange, by manipulating $E(p_1(s))$, it can bring p_0 closer to its target p_0^* .

This strategy involves a trade-off: To get inflation closer to target in the short run, the central bank has to sacrifice inflation being away from target in a potentially long medium run. If it finds itself unconstrained in period 0, so in conventional times, the central bank would never want to do this. In unconventional times, however, the central bank cannot use i_0^v . Since it was hitting its target exactly in the medium run before, the envelope theorem implies that it will always want to engage in some forward guidance whenever it hits the lower bound.

In sum, the central bank chooses to keep the interest rate on reserves pegged in the future, even though it is not constrained by the state of the economy to do so. This unconventional announcement of a path for the policy rate is sometimes called Odyssean forward guidance, to distinguish it from the conventional communication of the state of the economy, or Delphic forward guidance.²⁹

In the new Keynesian model, forward guidance comes with side effects. To save on needless terms, assume that all shocks are zero: $r_t^r = 0$ and $\tilde{y}_t = y_t$. This implies that inflation at $T + 1$ is on target and output is zero. Then, in period T , equations (14) and (15) imply that $y_T = \pi^*$ and that $\pi_T = \beta\pi^* + \kappa y_T$, respectively. By keeping the interest rate at zero, the central bank causes a boom that in turn pushes inflation higher. The previous period, output is even higher since $y_{T-1} = y_T + \pi_T$, and likewise inflation will be $\pi_{T-1} = \beta\pi_T + \kappa y_{T-1}$. Continuing until 0, then p_0^* can be brought closer to target by choosing T adequately, just as before. The combination of the peg with the Calvo Phillips curve makes forward guidance in the distant future a powerful tool to control inflation in the present.

What is new, along this path, is that output is above its natural level. Forward guidance causes a boom from period 1 onward, and if T is sufficiently large it may cause a boom in period 0 as well.

This result has been called the forward guidance puzzle since, it is easily contradicted by empirical estimates of the effects of forward guidance.³⁰ At the same time, the literature has found that limits to rationality, incomplete insurance markets that change the IS relation in equation (14), or different models of price rigidity like sticky information that change the Phillips curve in equation (15) can weaken the puzzle or make it go away.³¹

²⁹Disentangling Delphic from Odyssean forward guidance is empirically challenging even with high-frequency data (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2005; Campbell et al. 2017; Andrade and Ferroni 2021).

³⁰The puzzle was identified in Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2023) and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015). For empirical estimates, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), Cieslak and Schrimpf (2019), and Lunsford (2020).

³¹Angeletos and Lian (2018), Gabaix (2020), and García-Schmidt and Woodford (2019) study deviations from perfect-foresight rationality in this context; Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2023) and McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016) explore incomplete insurance against income risks by households; and Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015), Kiley (2016), and Eggertson and Garga (2019) explore sticky information.

5.4 Quantitative Easing

After the great financial crisis, the Federal Reserve and the ECB followed the example of the Bank of Japan and used reserves to buy risky assets in order to control inflation. These policies became known as quantitative easing, and in Japan included buying equities.

To understand how these policies work in our general model, consider another financial asset, $j = o$, with a risky one-period return, $i_{t+1}(o)$, and a convenience yield, q_t^o . The optimality condition for savers in equations (8) and (12), applies to this risky asset. Combining it with the optimality condition that applies to reserves gives the no-arbitrage condition:

$$(39) \quad E(i_{t+1}(o)) - i_t^v = (1/\eta^o)(b_0(o) - p_0 - y_0) - u_0(o).$$

The spread between the expected return on the risky assets and reserves is the convenience yield this asset provides relative to reserves.

When the central bank buys risky assets with reserves, it increases v_t and reduces $b_t(o)$. The central bank can therefore use these purchases, together with the interest on reserves, to target the risky rate, $E(i_{t+1}(o))$. Writing a feedback rule from inflation to this targeted risky rate would lead, by the same no-arbitrage logic, to determining inflation.

This equation also shows the limitations of quantitative and credit easing. The key coefficient, which is the elasticity of the utility from the risky asset to its quantity η^o , is hard to estimate. For long-term government bonds, it seems to be small (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2013; Fabo et al. 2021). In the spirit of the Taylor principle, this implies very large bond purchase programs when inflation is below target, in order to bring it back on target.

Moreover, the price of risky assets can be quite volatile, for reasons that seem divorced from expectations or risk. These are often called liquidity shocks, and are captured by the $u_0(o)$ term. With large shocks to $u_0(o)$, the central bank would have to adjust its asset purchases to counteract its effect, creating a new source of deviations of inflation from target. The literature has struggled to find a sizable and persistent impact of liquidity shocks on inflation (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2013; Fabo et al. 2021), perhaps because, as financial markets adjust to central bank actions, the $u_0(o)$ shocks are correlated with monetary policy, x_0 .

In effect, through quantitative easing, the central bank is targeting long-term interest rates. Historically, the source of doing so has been the Treasury rather than the central bank. Especially in the aftermath of wars, when long-term government debt is high, fiscal policy imposes low long-term interest rates. This has side effects on the balance sheet, which we will discuss in Section 7.

5.5 Going Long

Both forward guidance and quantitative easing focus monetary policy on long-term interest rates. The Bank of Japan went the furthest in this regard by announcing a desired target for the 10-year interest rate, standing ready to buy and sell government bonds of this maturity to hit the target. This policy was called yield curve control.

In theory, if the central bank issued bonds of a fixed maturity that were later paid off with reserves, it could choose how to remunerate these bonds just as it does with reserves. Concretely, say the central bank issues a two-period bill at date 0 that is a pure financial asset,

so it has no convenience yield. If the central bank pays an interest rate of $I_0(2)$ on it, then the optimality conditions for savers in equation (3) that applies to this asset is

$$(40) \quad E \left[\frac{\mathbf{M}(s)^2 (1 + I_0(2))}{\Pi_1(s) \Pi_2(s)} \right] = 1.$$

By choosing a feedback rule for $I_0(2)$ in much the same way as it did for one-period reserves, the central bank can control the price level. The condition for determinacy still requires ϕ to be larger than some threshold, but the threshold now depends on how strongly long rates respond to changes in short rates. The deviations of inflation from target with this policy involve similar terms but with different weights (McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams 2005; Reis 2019b).

There is an ingenious alternative where the central bank chooses a short-term interest rate and a sequence of long-term interest rates at different horizons (say by issuing reserves of different maturities). For each of these, there is an optimality condition like equation (40). If there are as many of these as there are states of the world at date 1 then, potentially, inflation can be pinned down.

To see this in action, assume that there are only two states of the world revealed at date 1, s^H and s^L , with probabilities f and $1 - f$, respectively. From date 1 onward, the central bank chooses two separate nominal interest rates, $I(s^H)$ and $I(s^L)$, and these pin down inflation from date $t = 2$ onward at two separate levels. If the central bank only chose the short-term interest rate, I_0 , then this would only pin down expected inflation at date 1, but not its separate values per state: $\Pi_1(s^H)$ and $\Pi_1(s^L)$.

If the central bank also chooses at date 0 a 2-period rate, $I_0(2)$, then we now have two versions of the optimality condition for savers in equation (3):

$$(41) \quad (1 + I_0) \left(\frac{f\mathbf{M}(s_H)}{\Pi_1(s_H)} + \frac{(1-f)\mathbf{M}(s_L)}{\Pi_1(s_L)} \right) = 1,$$

$$(1 + I_0(2)) \left(\frac{f\mathbf{M}(s_H)}{\Pi_1(s_H)(1 + I(s_H))} + \frac{(1-f)\mathbf{M}(s_L)}{\Pi_1(s_L)(1 + I(s_L))} \right) = 1.$$

As long as $I(s^H) \neq I(s^L)$, then these two equations have a unique solution in the two unknowns, $\Pi_1(s^H)$ and $\Pi_1(s^L)$ (Adão, Correia, and Teles 2014; Magill and Quinzii 2014).

Intuitively, if the level of the short-term rate pins down expected inflation, now the long-term rate pins down how it covaries with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. This is sometimes called the inflation risk premium. By pinning it down, the central bank achieves the determinacy of inflation across states of the world.

This approach has clear limitations. First, it does not pin down the initial price level P_0 . Only the stochastic degree of indeterminacy disappears. Second, counting the number of possible states of the world and responding with just as many maturities for reserves is a hopeless task. Third, while the effectiveness of a conventional feedback interest rate rule at keeping inflation near its target depends on the real interest rate—the expected value of the stochastic discount factor—going long requires evaluating the stochastic discount factor in every state. Fourth, slight mis-calibrations of the short and long interest rates would induce savers to take very

large positions in one versus the other, causing wide fluctuations in the composition of the liabilities of the central bank.

5.6 *The Cost of Credit*

Going back to equation (38), the central bank could try to affect r_0 directly in order to steer p_0 . An unconventional tool used in the 2010s was credit policies, whereby the Bank of England (through the Funding for Lending Scheme) and the European Central Bank (through the targeted long-term refinancing operations) lent funds to banks at favorable rates under the condition that these funds would then be used to provide loans to firms. The goal was to lower the cost of bank credit.

Since bank credit is an input in production, if its cost falls, so will the marginal costs of production, $C_i(i)$. With flexible prices, this real cost of credit would still be determined with other real variables independently of inflation.

There is a literature that shows that, in the presence of financial frictions and nominal rigidities, the wedge between loan rates and the nominal interest rate affects directly the real cost of credit (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992; Barth and Ramey 2001; De Fiore and Tristani 2013). This opens the door to another transmission channel of monetary policy over inflation. Whereas these papers explore how central banks can use the nominal rate to move real costs of credit, marginal costs of production, and ultimately optimal firm prices through the Phillips curve, in principle the central bank can target the wedge directly using credit policies.

Beyond firm credit, similar mechanisms could operate through household credit, especially on mortgages that have features set in sticky nominal terms, affecting demand for goods as opposed to supply (Greenwald 2018). A third channel through which lending rates can affect credit is if they affect the net worth of borrowers and tighten borrowing constraints (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).

While there is strong evidence for a credit channel of monetary policy (Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró 2015; Gertler and Karadi 2015), using credit supply or credit rates as the main strategy to control inflation is rarely used today. When tried in the United Kingdom in the 1950s in the context of the Radcliffe report, it failed (Capie 2010). Central banks have an influence on lending conditions but are very far from controlling them. There are large financial shocks in lending markets that would translate into large fluctuations in inflation.

5.7 *Nonrational Expectations*

The final term in equation (38) that the central bank could affect is the expectations operator directly. With rational expectations, this is not possible, but moving away from it creates room for policy to steer “animal spirits.” More generally, all of the unconventional policies require affecting expectations in financial markets. Even in conventional times, the feedback rule requires that people do not start expecting that inflation in an arbitrary far-away future will grow (or fall) at an explosive rate, so it relies heavily on rational expectations into the infinite future. This section discusses the relaxation of rational expectations.

The literature on nonrational expectations is too rich to cover here and has already been reviewed by Woodford (2013). Instead, we just describe three approaches that have been used to study the control of inflation.

The first approach consists of learning models that assume that expectations are formed by agents that behave like statisticians, using past data to form their beliefs. A learning rule gives a mapping from past outcomes to current expectations. In turn, recall equation (29), from combining the Fisher equation with the interest rate rule, which mapped expectations into outcomes (this is sometimes called a temporary equilibrium). Combining the two gives the learning equilibrium.

The most popular such model is least-squares learning, where agents use least-squares regressions on past outcomes to form their beliefs (Eusepi and Preston 2018). Taking the limit, as the sample for these regressions goes to infinity, delivers what is known as the learnable equilibrium. The literature focuses on the e-stability principle, that establishes that learning converges to the nonexplosive rational expectations equilibrium if certain stability conditions hold. In our simple model with constant r and x after period 1, one can show that $\phi > 1$ makes this learnable and e-stable (Evans and Honkapohja 2001; Bullard and Mitra 2002; McCallum 2003).

Another popular class of nonrational expectations models are models of education. Their central idea is that agents go through a mental process whereby they iterate on what expectations to have and what their implications are for equilibrium inflation until the two converge. This convergence need not happen at the fixed point of rational expectations, nor does it have to happen over time, like with learning, but rather occurs in agents' minds. For instance, with reflective expectations, at each stage of inference, agents update their expectations to close the gap to the expectations that are model consistent. In that case, it turns out that in the limit, as the rounds of reflection go to infinity, only the nonexplosive rational expectations equilibrium is selected.³²

Third, there are models of discounting the future through limited foresight (Gabaix 2020) or the past through imperfect memory (Angeletos and Lian 2023). Both imply that, either looking forward or backward, current inflation depends less on far-away expectations. Because of that, both can deliver determinacy of inflation without escape clauses and with conditions on ϕ that are less strict than the Taylor principle. Sometimes, limits to rationality or information are enough to select one of the multiple equilibria that arise even with an interest rate peg.

More generally, once one entertains nonrational expectations, then measuring expectations becomes important as an independent source of data and shocks. As much, or more, than measures of the output gap or natural rates of interest, these data on inflation expectations become part of the state of the economy, x_t , that a policy rule should include to keep inflation near its target (Reis 2023a).

6. *Steering Inflation Using the Supply of Money*

Monetarism has had many proponents in the past, but has only seldom been adopted by advanced-economy central banks; the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank between 1975 and 1999 are the two main examples. Sometimes, treasuries have imposed on the central bank a perverse version of controlling the currency stock to generate fiscal revenues, with dismal consequences for inflation (Sargent 1982). This section discusses the active use of H_t to control

³²See García-Schmidt and Woodford (2019), building on the calculation equilibrium of Evans and Ramey (1992) for the reflective case and Farhi and Werning (2019) for k-level thinking.

inflation (while interest on reserves and income shortfalls are passive) and the economic force through which it controls inflation.

6.1 The Economic Force That Drives Inflation

The optimality condition for saving in banknotes comes from combining equation (3) with equation (17) to get the nonlinearized version of equation (18):

$$(42) \quad E_t \left[M_{t+1} \left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right) + \left(\frac{H_t}{P_t Y_t} \right)^{-1/\eta^h} U_t \right] = 1.$$

This is sometimes called a money demand equation: It links the banknotes that people want to hold, captured by the convenience yield in the second term on the left-hand side, to the opportunity cost of holding those banknotes, captured by the interest rate foregone on pure nominal bonds in the first term on the left-hand side.

Recall that reserves paid an interest rate that the central bank could choose, and they gave no additional convenience because central banks abundantly supply them. Because banknotes pay no interest but give a convenience yield, they bring a different economic force to drive the price level.

It works as follows: All else equal, a higher P_t today lowers the real balance of banknotes in the hands of the private sector. This higher scarcity raises their convenience yield via the second term in the equation. At the same time, a higher P_t raises the first term in the equation; it lowers expected inflation between the present and the next period, so it lowers the shadow nominal interest rate. With both terms higher, only if P_t falls will their expected sum be one again. Again, this logic keeps P_{t+1} fixed, but we will elaborate below on the policy rules over time that leverage this force to ensure determinacy.

This mechanism can be explained using a demand–supply story. When the price level is higher, the supply of banknotes in real terms is lower (the second term). At the same time, because expected inflation is lower, the opportunity cost of holding banknotes is smaller, so the demand for them is higher (the first term). With lower supply and higher demand for banknotes, the price level must fall. This re-equilibrates the market by both increasing the supply and lowering demand through a higher nominal interest rate.

This Marshallian-sounding supply and demand story is appealing, but it can also be misleading. After all, we saw that nothing about demand and supply pins down the price level in Section 2. The previous paragraph uses a sleight of hand: the price level is *not* only the opportunity cost of holding banknotes. Changes in the price level bring the market to equilibrium by both affecting the opportunity cost *and* by directly changing the quantity of real banknotes held.

6.2 Money Growth Rules

In the benchmark case in Section 3, central banks passively satisfied the demand for banknotes, neutralizing the influence of the economic force described above on inflation. If instead central banks actively target the supply of money, both banknotes as well as other means of payment that have a convenience yield, this force can be used to control inflation.

A monetarist policy rule has the central bank growing the supply of currency according to $h_t = \pi^*(s)t + x_t$. A special case is the classic “k-rule” where the desired inflation target is

constant and x_t offsets any trends in U_t . This rule depends on exogenous variables, so it is not a feedback rule.

6.2.1 *Determinacy*

Replacing the policy rule into equation (18) and iterating forward gives a unique solution for inflation. In the long run, for $t \geq 2$, the central bank exactly achieves the target for inflation. Beforehand, inflation is on target if x_0 and $x(s)$ are picked adequately.

As before, this result depends on a coefficient condition and on a terminal condition. The coefficient condition is now that $\eta^h > 0$. In other words, it is simply that the demand curve of banknotes slopes down.³³ This is not a condition on the policy followed by the central bank, nor is it a requirement for feedback as before. Rather, it is a statement of the sign of the economic force that we just described.

As for the terminal condition, it is that $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{M}(s)^T (h_T - p_T) = 0$. This is a version of the no-Ponzi scheme condition for banknotes, as in equation (23). It is a consequence of households' optimal behavior, not a feature of the policy regime. There is no need for an escape clause. In fact, monetarism is a possible escape clause, in the sense discussed in Section 4.5. Instead of shrinking the supply of reserves, the central bank can switch to targeting the supply of banknotes and it will achieve determinacy.

6.2.2 *Experience with Money Rules*

In the short run, and keeping to our assumption that all exogenous variables are constant for $t \geq 1$ for simplicity, the monetarist rule leads to

$$(43) \quad p_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \eta^h} (x_0 + \eta^h r_0 - \eta^h u_0^h - y_0) + \frac{\eta^h}{1 + \eta^h} E(x(s)) \\ + \eta^h r(s) - \eta^h u^h(s) - y(s) + \eta^h E(\pi^*(s)).$$

Whether the central bank achieves the desired price level depends on how it chooses x_0 and $x(s)$. Higher supply of banknotes, in the present or the future, unambiguously raises inflation.

Just like with interest rate rules, the central bank has to keep track of the state of the economy and adjust policy in response. That involves estimating both the real interest rate and the level of consumption.

Even harder, the central bank also needs estimates of $u^h(s)$. This shock to the demand for central bank currency arises from the difference between the banknotes the central bank prints and the money that people find useful. Because there are close substitutes to currency produced by the private market, including foreign currency, $u^h(s)$ can be large. For instance, $u^h(s)$ arises from changes in the availability of ATMs, in the social norms of what shopkeepers

³³Different micro-foundations for money imply different forms of the money demand function and, as such, potentially slightly different conditions for price level determinacy. Still, the basic result and economic intuition remains; see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003).

will accept as payment, or in the prevalence of crime that drives the demand for the anonymity of banknotes. The volatility of money demand, confirmed by study after study, severely undermines the ability to deliver inflation near the target (Poole 1970).

The lack of success of monetarism in the short run is also not necessarily compensated by success in the long run. The result that the central bank exactly hits the target in the long run relies on our assumption that, from period 1 onward, consumption growth, real interest rates, and the demand shocks would all be constant. Otherwise, fluctuations in any of these would lead to deviations of inflation from target, just like they did in the short run. When it comes to the shocks to the demand for banknotes, there is constant financial innovation on means of payment with long-run consequences that will prevent the central bank from hitting the inflation target.

6.2.3 General Equilibrium Breakdowns of the Classical Dichotomy

With nominal rigidities, the changes in money and inflation come with changes in real interest rates and output. Again, nominal rigidities bring into play an aggregate demand channel. Higher money holdings are associated with higher consumption and aggregate demand, which leads to an increase in production and prices by firms. Sticky prices translate the short-term volatility of inflation that is due to financial shocks into volatility of output.

Monetarism points to alternatives to sticky prices in breaking down the classical dichotomy. If banknotes are used in transactions, their outstanding stock will facilitate trade. For instance, real money balances may enter the utility function (non-separably from consumption) and so affect the discount factor $\mathbf{M}(s)$. There are several well-justified models of these interactions (Lucas and Stokey 1987; Lagos and Wright 2005). The supply of banknotes may also affect marginal costs and so the production of goods, for instance by affecting the creation of bank deposits and bank lending (Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2016). These additional monetarist channels come with shocks that could raise inflation volatility further.

6.2.4 The Evidence

In the early 1980s, the United States and the United Kingdom both briefly adopted money growth rules. Nominal interest rates were very volatile, as were expected annual inflation rates. An empirical regularity emerged—Goodhart's law—stating that once the central bank started using a policy rule for one measure of h_t , the corresponding u_t^h shocks would turn out to be even larger than anticipated before. Monetarism is still a useful strategy in scenarios where the central bank lacks credibility in the escape clause of its interest rate rule so that volatile short-term inflation is tolerable in return for stable long-run inflation.

6.3 Seignorage

Recall that the seignorage earned from printing banknotes is $K_t = (H_t - H_{t-1})/P_t$. Seignorage and inflation are tightly linked. A sudden increase in the supply of banknotes, all else equal, raises seignorage. However, as we just saw in the previous subsection (equation (43)), it also raises the price level, which lowers seignorage. Moreover, an increase in expected inflation comes with higher nominal interest rates, which lowers the demand for currency (equation (18)) and lowers seignorage.

If the net worth of the central bank is constant, and it only holds short safe bonds as assets, then its dividends to the fiscal authorities are equal to this seignorage minus expenses: $D_t = K_t - E_t$. The central bank may be committed to delivering an exogenous dividend, just like a government fiscal agency that has a target for tax revenues, or a state-owned company providing a public service with a target for profits. Historically, this was common around war times, when central banks were asked to provide fiscal resources for the sovereign.

6.3.1 *Limits to Seignorage*

Given the definition of seignorage in Section 6.3, its steady state level, \bar{K} , is given by

$$(44) \quad \bar{K} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\Pi}}\right) \left(\frac{\bar{H}}{\bar{P}}\right).$$

The first term on the right-hand side rises with inflation, as households must hold more banknotes to keep the same real value under higher prices. The second term falls with inflation, since the demand for banknote holdings is lower when inflation is high. Overall, higher steady-state inflation may raise or lower seignorage; it depends on how elastic the demand function for banknotes is.

History suggests that seignorage at first increases with inflation and then falls. Estimating the peak of this Laffer curve is an understudied topic. In practice, once central banks are turned into fiscal agents, they are asked to deliver more resources than the upper bound on feasible steady-state seignorage allows. For a while, they can do it only insofar as they deliver runaway inflation above households' expectations, but eventually expectations catch up and the fiscal request becomes inconsistent with an equilibrium for inflation. Moreover, the peak of the Laffer curve likely moves around and is sufficiently flat, so that small changes in seignorage close to its maximum steady-state level come with large changes in inflation.

6.3.2 *Seignorage Policy Rules*

A seignorage policy rule will print banknotes to ensure that seignorage equals an exogenous amount: $k_t = x_t$. Log-linearizing the definition of seignorage and replacing for banknotes using the demand equation (18) gives a difference equation for inflation. Its version for $t \geq 1$ is

$$(45) \quad \begin{aligned} \pi_t + \eta^h E_{t-1}(\pi_t) &= \eta^h \bar{\Pi} E_t(\pi_{t+1}) + (\bar{\Pi} - 1)x(s) \\ &\quad - (\bar{\Pi} - 1)(y(s) - \eta^h r(s) + \eta^h u^h(s)). \end{aligned}$$

The determinacy of the price level is again ensured by the monetarist forces. Iterating this equation forward, it is enough that $\eta^h \bar{\Pi} > 1$, which again depends on the features of the economy.

With a seignorage policy rule, both the interest rate and the stock of banknotes follow endogenously from the Fisher equation and the demand for banknotes, respectively. If the central bank is mandated to hand in a dividend, then the exogenous $x(s)$ that follows may deliver an inflation that is far from the target.

If, instead, the central bank was free from government pressure, then in principle it could adjust its target for seignorage to control inflation. While we are unaware of any independent central bank pursuing such an explicit seignorage policy rule, fiscal authorities do trade off their desires for dividends on the one hand and for inflation on target on the other hand. The actual $x(s)$ may then trade off the seignorage policy rule that delivers the desired dividends with the one that is most effective at delivering inflation on target.

As the equation above shows, using seignorage as a strategy to control inflation is likely to perform poorly. Monetarist policies struggle to keep up with the volatility of the shocks to the demand for banknotes $u^h(s)$. Moreover, calibrating the response to these via $x(s)$ depends on pinning down the steady-state level of real banknotes held, which is likewise hard, given the extent of innovation in payment systems.

6.3.3 Experience with Seignorage

Seignorage policy rules are common during war times. A close cousin of them is for fiscal authorities to impose on the central bank a target for buying government bonds by issuing money. This is a hybrid of a money growth rule and a seignorage rule, closer to the latter in its focus on fiscal revenues (Sargent and Wallace 1984). In Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, the extent to which these fiscal pressures fluctuated from year to year can explain some of the movements in actual inflation rates (Kehoe and Nicolini 2021). Further back in history, many hyperinflations were associated with seignorage policy rules (Cagan 1956) and their ends with fiscal reforms that lowered the government's demand for fiscal revenue from the central bank (Sargent 1982).

6.4 Different Monies: Banknotes, Reserves, and More

Both reserves and banknotes are sometimes referred to as high-powered money. Yet, they provided different approaches to control inflation. Substantially, the two differences between these two monies were whether they paid interest (currency no, reserves yes since 2009) and whether they gave a convenience yield (currency yes, reserves no). This section relaxes these differences and, in doing so, further expands on the link between using the interest rate on reserves or the supply of money to control inflation.

Finally, most people make most transactions using neither currency nor reserves, but with a third type of money; deposits at private banks. We discuss its link to inflation.

6.4.1 Reproducing Monetarism with an Interest Rate Rule

We can rewrite the equilibrium in the market for banknotes in equation (18) as

$$(46) \quad i_t = \frac{p_t + y_t - h_t}{\eta^h} + u_t^h.$$

This is mathematically equivalent to a Wicksellian interest rate feedback rule, as the interest rate responds to the price level. Since $1/\eta^h > 0$, it satisfies the determinacy condition. But while in Section 4 this was a policy rule, here it emerges as an equilibrium condition.

The link to interest rates under a monetarist approach arises because the nominal interest rate i_t adjusts endogenously in response to arbitrage. Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1983) blur this distinction by specifying a feedback rule for currency that depends on the nominal interest rate: $h_t = x_t + \phi i_t$. In this case, the central bank can limit the volatility of the nominal interest rate. In fact, it can even peg it to follow a predetermined path while inflation remains determinate.

6.4.2 *Noninterest Paying Reserves*

Before 2008, reserves paid no interest in the United States. Yet, even though nominal interest rates were well above zero, banks still voluntarily chose to hold (small) amounts of reserve balances at the central bank, above regulatory requirements. These allowed the banks to settle unexpected transactions with other banks at the end of each day, especially when people ran to the banks to withdraw their deposits. In other words, before 2008, US reserves paid a convenience yield, which was driven to zero by the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet.

The central bank then engaged in open market operations whereby it would change the supply of reserves to hit a target for the nominal interest rate. Just as with banknotes, in equation (46), the central bank would target i_t by varying reserves and their convenience yield. The level of i_t would then follow a feedback rule, just as in Section 4.

Given that level of the interest rate and the level of inflation, the central bank would passively accommodate the demand for banknotes following equation (18). The final piece of the puzzle was to stand ready to exchange reserves for banknotes one-to-one at all times, as people preferred one or the other. Effectively, the central bank would only control the sum of banknotes and reserves (the monetary base).

The control of inflation was a hybrid of the monetarist and the arbitrage approaches. On the one hand, it was a monetarist principle applied to the narrow market for reserves that allowed it to control the interest rate. But, on the other hand this interest rate then followed a feedback rule that, through the force of arbitrage, allowed it to control inflation.

Since the great financial crisis, the market for reserves has been satiated, eliminating the monetarist force. Interest has been paid on these reserves, with this policy rate used to directly shift the safe interest rate (Ihrig, Meade, and Weinbach 2015).

6.4.3 *Scarce Interest-Paying Reserves*

In principle, central banks could pursue a novel approach where they keep reserves scarce and thus have a convenience benefit, but pay interest on the reserves. This may be particularly relevant in a future where households can have digital deposits at the central bank just like banks do today. The benefits from using currency for payments will extend to reserves, and the demand for them may be at a much higher level than in the past.

The optimality condition for savers in equation (8) applied to reserves when they pay a convenience yield as given by (12), combined with the same optimality condition for pure nominal bonds gives, in log-linear terms,

$$(47) \quad v_t - p_t - y_t = -\eta^v(i_t^v - i_t).$$

This leaves out u_t^v , for simplicity. Whereas before, with satiated reserves, the interest rate on reserves was equal to the interest rate on bonds, now the gap between them $i_t - i_t^v$ gives the opportunity cost of holding reserves that households trade off against their convenience benefit.

The central bank can now choose both v_t and i_t^v (Diba and Loisel 2021). In particular, consider the case where it follows a Wicksellian rule, whereby the interest on reserves responds to p_t with a coefficient ϕ . In that case, the price level is determinate as long as $\phi > -1/\eta^v$. This includes the case where $\phi = 0$, that is, there is a pure interest rate peg. The logic is that of the monetarist approach.

6.4.4 Bank Deposits as Money

Most households use their bank deposits to engage in transactions. The version of the optimality condition for savers in equation (3) that would hold for the demand for bank deposits h_t^d relates them to their opportunity cost, the gap $i_t - i_t^d$, where the interest rate paid on deposits is i_t^d .

The central bank does not control either h_t^d or i_t^d . Both are determined by the equilibrium in the banking sector. However, banks also deposit reserves at the central bank and can invest in financial assets (Piazzesi, Rogers, and Schneider 2022). Optimality in their portfolio choice leads to a log-linearized relation of the form $i_t - i_t^d = \ell(i_t - i_t^v)$. In Section 4, implicitly there were competitive frictionless banks absorbed into the private sector, so that in equilibrium $\ell = 1$, leading to $i_t^d = i_t^v$. With market power of banks or financial frictions, $\ell < 1$. Combining equations (8) and (12) for bank deposits with the above relationship yields

$$(48) \quad h_t^d - p_t - y_t = -\eta^d \ell (i_t - i_t^v).$$

If the production of deposits by banks was exogenous with respect to the price level, then by choosing the interest on reserves, the central bank could again control inflation. Even though the policy tool is the interest rate, the economic logic is the monetarist one, as the key equation is the demand curve above.

If, instead, the quantity of reserves affects the amount of deposits, then we are back at the previous case of scarce-interest paying reserves, where the central bank has two tools, v_t and i_t^v , with which to improve the effectiveness of inflation control.

Either way, while central banks' digital currencies, more realistic banking sectors, or scarce reserves all affect the dynamics of inflation, the economic logic and the policy approach by which the central bank can control it are unchanged.

6.5 Pegs

For many emerging and developing economies, the most common approach today to pin down inflation is to peg their currency to another country's currency. This was also the case for most of the advanced world during the Bretton Woods regime, where the peg was to the US dollar between 1944 and 1971 (Bordo 2019). The dollar in turn was convertible to gold, following an even older tradition that started in the 1870s of pegging the currency to gold. This is a type of monetarist approach that does not involve banknotes or rules for their supply. Instead, the central bank is following a rule of exchanging domestic reserves for either a commodity or a foreign money.

6.5.1 *Commodity Pegs*

Combining the equality of the marginal rate of substitution of good i with good 0, $\rho_i(i)$, to their relative prices, $p_t(i) - p_t(0)$, and the definition of the price index, p_t , in equations (5)–(6) gives

$$(49) \quad p_t = \sum_{i=0}^I \omega_i p_t(i) = p_t(0) + \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i \rho_i(i).$$

Recall that the parameters ω_i are nonnegative and sum to one, reflecting the weights of each good in the price index, and that $\rho_i(0) = 0$.

The central bank can announce that it will denominate reserves in the units of good 0. Since it can issue reserves in unlimited amounts, the central bank can enforce this denomination by buying good 0 with the reserves and holding it to keep their relative price at one forever.

This uniquely determines inflation. From equation (49), having defined that $p_t(0) = 1$, the price level p_t is unique. No expectations of the future or terminal conditions are involved because the central bank is relying on pegging the value of reserves relative to a commodity.

With this strict peg, changes in relative prices would lead the price level to deviate from target. The central bank could adjust the peg to estimates of relative-price movements using a rule $p_t(0) = p_t^* - \sum_{i=1}^I \omega_i \hat{\rho}_t(i)$.

Changes in the supply of good 0, or in the public's taste for it, become sources of deviations of inflation from target. Moreover, if good 0 is a complement with others in consumption, then the impact on relative prices across all goods, $\rho_i(i)$, can be large. The ideal commodity to peg the price level to has to be storable, have a stable supply, and not be complementary or substitutable with many other goods.

Gold or other precious metals meet these criteria, and this is why they have often been used with this approach. Still, relative-price movements are large enough that commodity pegs have tended to generate large deviations of inflation from its target (Bordo 1999).

6.5.2 *Exchange Rate Pegs*

Today, it is more common to peg to a foreign currency. This is especially the case in small open economies, which import goods from other countries, often denominated in a dominant foreign currency. A currency board consists of using the same strategy as in a commodity peg, but where reserves are now exchanged for a foreign currency (or a basket of currencies).

The economic logic of how they work is the same. Take the first j goods to be domestic, but the remaining $I - j$ goods are foreign. Their price in domestic units is then equal to a foreign price $p_t(j)$ plus the log exchange rate between the domestic and the foreign units of account: e_t . Letting α denote the measure of home bias in consumption, equation (5) for the domestic price level is then equal to

$$(50) \quad p_t = \alpha \sum_{i=0}^j \omega_i p_t(i) + (1 - \alpha) \sum_{j=j+1}^I \omega_j (p_t(j) + e_t) = \alpha \sum_{i=0}^j \omega_i p_t(i) + (1 - \alpha)(p_t^f + e_t),$$

where $p_t^f = \sum_{j=j+1}^I \omega_j p_t(j)$ is the price index of the imported goods in foreign currency and weights ω_i and ω_j are positive and each sum up to one.

The optimality condition between any two domestic and foreign goods in equation (6) is $\rho_t(i, j) = p_t(i) - p_t(j) - e_t$, where $\rho_t(i, j)$ is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of domestic good i and foreign good j . It then follows that $\sum_{j=j+1}^I \omega_j \rho_t(i, j) = p_t(i) - p_t^f - e_t$. Replacing for $p_t(i)$ in equation (50) delivers

$$(51) \quad p_t = e_t + p_t^f + \alpha \sum_{i=0}^j \sum_{j=j+1}^I \omega_i \omega_j \rho_t(i, j).$$

The second and third term on the right-hand side are exogenous with respect to the price level. An exchange-rate target peg is a choice of e_t . Thus, it uniquely pins down the price level.

6.5.3 Experience with Pegs

The peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar is perhaps the most famous case of a successful currency peg. In place since October of 1983, the standard deviation of the monthly log nominal exchange rate between the two currencies has been 0.004 over these almost 40 years. And yet, inflation in Hong Kong dollars has been significantly more volatile than inflation in US dollars, peaking at 11 percent in 1991 and bottoming at -4 percent in 1999. In part, this happens because choosing e_t to be constant over time implies that changes in $\rho_t(i, j)$, and consequently in the real exchange rate, lead to wide fluctuations in p_t (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995; Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff 2019).

Currency boards are not more common because of two practical difficulties. First, central banks often have conflicting goals for the desired price level, π_t^* , and for the exchange rate, e_t . When pursuing one of them has unpleasant consequences for the other one, the currency board is abandoned.³⁴ Second, currency boards require that the central bank keeps all the foreign currency it buys with its reserves, so it is ready to buy and sell it as needed. In reality, there is pressure on central banks to distribute some of these assets as dividends or to exchange the foreign currency for domestic government bonds. They then run out of the foreign currency when they need to sell it and the peg fails.

Without foreign assets to back the reserves, countries that try to maintain exchange rate pegs rely either on choosing the interest rate on reserves to mimic movements on foreign interest rates or in adjusting the supply of money to control its scarcity relative to foreign currency, or a mix of both. This translates into particular interest rate rules or money growth rules that we have already covered. One way to interpret these pegs is that the value of the exchange rate is seen as a useful indicator of the state of the economy or of the shocks to demand for currency that the central bank aims to track to have a more efficient policy rule. The adoption and abandonment of these pegs follows the usefulness of this indicator as wedges arise between the domestic economy and its foreign counterpart.

7. Steering Inflation Using Income Shortfalls

The final tool of the central bank is the net income shortfall, S_t , which resulted from choices for the composition of its assets, $A_t(j)$, its spending, E_t , and its dividend policy D_t . This section

³⁴See Frankel (2010) for the difficulty of controlling inflation when the central banks cannot commit to a monetary policy strategy.

studies this tool, while now keeping the interest on reserves and the supply of banknotes passive. This is the most controversial approach to controlling inflation because its economic force is disputed in theory and has been hard to test. It often goes under the name of the fiscal theory of the price level. It is important to understand it even if only for central banks to know how to avoid it.

7.1 *The Economic Force That Drives Inflation*

The key equation is the no-Ponzi scheme condition for the central bank. By forward iterating the law of motion of net worth in equation (20) combined with equation (3) for reserves, imposing the no-Ponzi condition in equation (23), and using the definition of net worth, we get

$$(52) \quad \frac{V_0}{P_0} = A_0 - \frac{\mathbf{M}(s)}{1 - \mathbf{M}(s)} S(s).$$

This provides one equation in one unknown, the price level.³⁵ The economic force at play is the following: A higher shortfall of the central bank leaves fewer real resources available to back its debt, reducing its real value. As reserves are default-free, they have a fixed value in nominal terms. Given their role as unit of account, the only way for their real value to fall is for the price level to rise.

The price level adjusts because banks choose to hold more or fewer reserves in response to them becoming a Ponzi scheme. When the central bank follows a path for shortfalls that makes it insolvent, then banks run on the central bank's liabilities. This causes these liabilities—reserves—to lose their real value until they are back in line with the central bank's assets and net shortfall, so the central bank is solvent. It is the control of the real resources earned by the central bank that gives it control over inflation.³⁶

7.2 *Shortfall Policy Rules*

Imagine that the central bank adjusts its balance sheet tools to follow a feedback rule for its shortfall:

$$(53) \quad (1 - \beta)s_{t+1} = \phi w_t + x_{t+1}.$$

If the net worth falls, the central bank may pay fewer dividends or cut spending to lower its shortfall, in which case $\phi > 0$. The exogenous policy shock x_{t+1} is now an action by the central bank that increases its shortfall.

7.2.1 *Determinacy*

Combining equation (53) with the law of motion for net worth in equation (21) to replace shortfalls gives a difference equation for net worth. In turn, the no-Ponzi scheme condition

³⁵The original analysis is found in Woodford (1994) and Sims (1994), and our approach is closer to that in Benigno (2020) or Cochrane (2005).

³⁶For criticism of this mechanism, see Niepelt (2004) and Buiter (2017).

for the central bank's liabilities in equation (23), which is $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T w_T = 0$ in its log-linear form, provides a terminal condition. Together, they give a solution for net worth as long as $\phi < 1 - \beta$, which is: $w_t = (x(s) - r(s)) / (1 - \beta - \phi)$.

Recalling that net worth is just the difference between assets and reserves delivers the solution for the price level in the long run:

$$(54) \quad p(s) = \frac{x(s) - r(s)}{1 - \beta - \phi} \left(\frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{V}/\bar{P}} \right) + v(s) - \left(\frac{\bar{A}}{\bar{V}/\bar{P}} \right) a(s).$$

The determinacy condition $\phi < 1 - \beta$ calls for the central bank to not lower its shortfall by too much when its net worth falls. In fact, a reckless central bank that spends more as its net worth falls ($\phi < 0$) would be ideal. Its irresponsible behavior forces banks to run on the central bank, exchange their reserves for real goods and assets, and so raise the price level to its new level. Following Leeper (1991), the literature has called feedback rules that satisfy this condition *non-Ricardian policies*.

It seems paradoxical that inflation control results from the central bank actively pursuing insolvency to trigger runs by banks. Any private agent that tries to do this would find that its liabilities become worthless, so it can get no real resources in exchange for the new debt it issues. What makes the central bank special is that its liabilities are the unit of account. It can honor these liabilities in nominal terms by just issuing more reserves, but also in real terms as long as the price level adjusts. Therefore, when it follows a rule that would lead to a Ponzi scheme for an unchanged price level, the required fall in the real value of reserves requires the price level to rise.

Inflation results from the condition that the central bank must stay solvent. It is a capital gain to the central bank that comes at the expense of a capital loss of the private sector holding the nominal reserves.³⁷

7.2.2 The Role of Dividends

As far as we know, no central bank has ever voluntarily pursued this strategy. Its ability to deliver inflation on target is dubious. A non-Ricardian reckless behavior would get a central banker fired before she got to implement it. Even if not, committing to a precise pattern for future shortfalls would be as hard for the central bank as it is for any government agency. Instead, the solvency approach is useful because it sheds light on how the central bank should manage its surpluses, s_t , to stay away from a reckless shortfall policy.

The shortfalls in equation (22) are the sum of four parts. The first is seignorage from banknotes. A policy rule for seignorage would affect inflation via the supply of currency, so it could not be used to control it via solvency at the same time. The second component is the expenses of the central banks. These are typically too small to be relevant. The third component is the returns from holding assets net of the interest paid on reserves. By choosing the composition of these assets, and so the risk in their returns, the central bank could, hypothetically,

³⁷If reserves earn a convenience yield that is tied to their safety, then the shortfall policy rules of the central bank can affect inflation now through a monetarist channel, like the one in the previous section; see Bassetto and Cui (2018) and Brunnermeier, Merkel, and Sannikov (2020).

guide its net shortfall and so control inflation. However, since financial returns are volatile, most fluctuations in net shortfall are outside the central bank's control.

This leaves the fourth component of shortfalls as their main driver: the dividends to the Treasury, d_t . Ensuring that the central bank is solvent at all times, or that $\phi > 1 - \beta$, is referred to as the central bank having full fiscal support (Hall and Reis 2015; Del Negro and Sims 2015; Benigno 2020). In practice, this is achieved by central banks having in their statutes that they must pay out their whole net income as dividends to the Treasury. In principle, this would imply that w_t is constant, the assumption we made in previous sections. In practice, because net income is calculated differently across central banks, the net worth fluctuates, but the condition we derived shows that what is important is that ϕ is sufficiently large so that the central bank is not running a Ponzi scheme.

7.2.3 *Experience*

If the central bank has a narrow balance sheet, in the sense of holding almost only short-term bonds, then the term on asset gains is close to zero. Because seignorage from banknotes greatly exceeds expenses, the dividend rule that guarantees solvency has traditionally always implied positive dividends. These would sometimes be larger or smaller, but they have raised little attention.

After the great financial crisis, as central banks in advanced economies held large amounts of long-term government bonds together with risky bonds, this was no longer the case. Most central banks in the world experienced negative dividends as a result of holding foreign assets whose value fluctuates with the foreign exchange rate (Reis 2019a). Between 2021 and 2024 this led to large losses. Different central banks had alternative approaches to ensure fiscal support, ranging from fiscal transfers from the Treasury (Bank of England), lower future dividends in exchange for zero dividends when net income was negative (the Federal Reserve), and paying lower dividends when net income was high through provisions that raised net worth then, so that net worth could fall back to its steady state when net income turned negative (European central banks).

7.2.4 *Monetizing the Deficit*

At some times in history the Treasury imposed a dividend process. The central bank was no longer independent to set a rule for its shortfall, whether it was one that ensures fiscal backing or not.

Section 6.3 derived the consequences for inflation if the central bank uses seignorage to satisfy the Treasury's request. The printing of banknotes pins down the price level through monetarist forces, often at high and volatile levels.

The solvency approach shows an alternative. The central bank could refuse to print the banknotes. Insofar as the dividends are exogenous, the resulting shortfalls would be exogenous as well. In that case, $\phi = 0$ and the price level would be pinned down by solvency forces. In effect, the central bank would be issuing reserves to borrow from the private sector and send the resources to the Treasury. Every time it does so, the reserves are worth less because of the inflation it generates.

Whether through seignorage or insolvency, this state of affairs could be referred to as *monetizing the fiscal deficit*. It is the monetary base, the sum of currency and reserves, that is adjusting to provide the necessary funding for the Treasury.

7.3 *The Solvency of Other Agents and Inflation*

Even if the solvency of the central bank is ensured, the solvency of other agents can affect the level of inflation.

7.3.1 *Fiscal Dominance*

The bulk of the literature on the fiscal theory of the price level focuses on the intertemporal budget constraint of the government linking the value of public debt to the present value of its primary shortfalls, the deficits (Leeper and Leith 2016). It makes three strong assumptions.

The first is that the government does not default on its liabilities, so that government bonds are perfect substitutes for reserves. Yet, unlike reserves, government bonds are not the unit of account, and sovereign defaults are frequent (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).

Second, it assumes that the central bank dividends are passive and can take any value. In that case, the intertemporal budget constraints of the central bank and the Treasury are no longer two separate constraints, but rather a single consolidated one that states that the sum of reserves and government liabilities (netting out the government bonds held by the central bank) equals the present value of shortfalls of both the government and the central bank (netting out the central bank's dividends). This assumption effectively denies central bank independence over its balance sheet.

The third assumption is that the Treasury solely chooses this shortfall, and any actions of the central bank on its expenses, seignorage, or composition of its assets, are exactly offset by the Treasury.

Combining these three assumptions, the same logic that allowed the central bank to control inflation is now applied to the Treasury. That is, the solvency of the Treasury becomes tied to the price level. This predicts that exogenous shocks to primary shortfalls are linked to movements in inflation. Sims (2011), Bianchi and Melosi (2018), and Cochrane (2022a) argue this was the case in the 1970s in the United States.

7.3.2 *General Equilibrium and Nominal Rigidities*

Nominal rigidities do not alter the underlying logic of the solvency approach (Woodford 1996; Sims 2013; Cochrane 2023). In terms of the basic new Keynesian model, the equilibrium condition that is combined with the IS and Phillips curve in equations (14)–(15) together with the net worth of the central bank in (21) give three equations with three unknowns—the output gap, inflation, and net worth—as a function of nominal interest rates and shortfalls. Instead of a feedback interest rate rule, as in Section 4, or a money growth rule, like in Section 6, now there are two parts of the policy rule: an exogenous process for the nominal interest rate set by the central bank and a rule for the central bank's shortfalls, as in equation (53). The first part fixes expected inflation, while the second part determines its response to shocks.

As before, nominal rigidities add complementary channels working through output and, especially, real interest rates. Now, after a loss, the jump in inflation to reestablish the solvency of the central bank will lower the real interest rate given a nominal interest rate peg. This stimulates more consumption, which further raises inflation via aggregate demand. In turn, the transfer of wealth from the private sector toward the central bank happens

not just via inflation but also because of lower real interest rates over time. Therefore, the dynamics of inflation change relative to when the classical dichotomy holds, becoming more drawn out.

These dynamics feed back into the size of the inflation response because the real value of the central bank's net worth depends on the maturity of its assets. The value of long-dated assets depends on both unexpected inflation and on the path of real interest rates. Quantitative easing strategies that set the maturity of the central bank's assets become a determinant of the persistence of inflation deviations from target (Cochrane 2001).

7.3.3 Alternatives to Break the Classical Dichotomy

The focus on solvency brings to light different mechanisms that can break the classical dichotomy even with flexible prices. The transfer of wealth to the central bank comes at the expense of banks holding these reserves (Reis 2016). If the net worth of banks constrains their willingness to extend private credit, then this provides a credit channel that complements the ones we already discussed in Section 5.

More generally, in an economy where different agents hold different mixes of nominal and real assets, the inflation that is driven by the central bank's solvency requirement will induce redistribution of wealth. With incomplete markets, these will matter for aggregate demand and so for the dynamics of inflation (Auclert 2019; Hagedorn 2016).

Incomplete markets raise another channel for breaking the classical dichotomy through the solvency channel. The total stock of reserves outstanding is a relevant variable for inflation because it determines by how much inflation must change to keep the real value of these reserves in line with solvency. Under the fiscal dominance version, the size of the government debt matters as well. In incomplete markets models, the net supply of assets available to agents affects their equilibrium choices. The reason is that, unable to diversify individual risks, agents engage in precautionary savings through these assets, so their relative availability determines the cost and limits of doing so. When inflation results from the central bank's choices regarding its shortfall, this both *ex post* redistributes wealth across different agents and *ex ante* affects the expected returns on different savings vehicles. Both affect the desire to consume and produce, and so the real outcomes in the economy (Angeletos, Lian, and Wolf 2024; Kaplan, Nikolakoudis, and Violante 2023).

In the other direction, breaking the classical dichotomy changes the source of shocks to inflation. Fluctuations in output and inflation directly affect the demand for currency and the seignorage revenue of the government. Variations in the path of real interest rates over time influence the capital gains and losses in the central bank's portfolio. And, the impact of monetary policy on real outcomes has an effect on tax collections and government spending, and so on the primary shortfalls of the fiscal authority. Through fiscal dominance, these would trigger changes in the demand for dividends from the central bank (Reis 2019a).

8. Conclusion

Each of the previous sections emphasized one policy tool that leans on one particular economic force to bring inflation close to target. They all coexisted in the same dynamic general equilibrium model, not as contradictory theories, but as different policy options. The central bank can choose a strategy that relies on arbitrage forces, money market forces, or insolvency

forces, and within each it can choose one rule to implement it, whether it is an interest rate rule, a money growth rule, a net shortfall rule, or one of their many variants.

Importantly, if more than one strategy is active, most likely they will be in conflict with each other; mathematically the economic system for prices becomes overdetermined. We discussed what determined the expected effectiveness for each policy strategy at delivering inflation near its target and used it to offer some interpretations of the history of monetary policy and inflation in postwar advanced economies. Our hope is that the academic debate shifts from arguments on which assumptions are perceived as being more convincing to attempts to measure the success of each strategy.

During Bretton Woods, most countries followed a monetarist strategy by pegging to the US dollar. During the 1970s, the United States or the United Kingdom loosely followed an interest rate strategy, but with a low feedback coefficient from inflation to interest rates, and without a clear pillar as an escape clause, while Germany or Switzerland followed a monetarist rule. In countries through Latin America in the 1980s, fiscal authorities imposed a combination of monetarist seignorage rules or net shortfall rules that flirted with insolvency, leading to high and volatile inflation.

The conquest of stable inflation between 1990 and 2010 came from a coherent strategy across the different elements. Central banks used feedback interest rate rules with strong responses to inflation, adopted inflation targeting regimes to manage expectations, and had escape clauses reliant on monetary anchors. Central bank independence imposed rules on the dividends paid to treasuries that kept the central bank solvent at all times. These ruled out seignorage or insolvency from driving inflation.

Between 2010 and 2020, this framework was refined through forward guidance, quantitative easing, going long, and communication strategies to overcome the effective lower bound, even if these tools relied heavily on rationality of expectations and were generally less effective.

Between 2021 and 2024, inflation rose well above 2 percent. Why this happened is understandably still the subject of debate. Perhaps this was the optimal rate of inflation. Or, perhaps central banks kept to this same framework but they made mistakes in judging the state of the economy, in anchoring expectations, and in using unconventional interest rate tools that are less effective (Reis 2023b; Eggertsson and Kohn 2023). Or, perhaps instead the expansion of the balance sheet of central banks through quantitative easing and the large increase in public debt during the pandemic have made central bank independence untenable, and it is concerns about solvency that are driving inflation (Bianchi and Melosi 2022; Cochrane 2022b). The future will show.

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