

Technology Gaps, Trade, and Income[†]

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This paper quantifies the contribution of technology gaps to international income inequality. I develop an endogenous growth model where cross-country differences in R&D efficiency and cross-industry differences in innovation and adoption opportunities together determine equilibrium technology gaps, trade patterns, and income inequality. Countries with higher R&D efficiency are richer and have comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries. I calibrate R&D efficiency by country and innovation dependence by industry using R&D, patent, and bilateral trade data. Counterfactual analysis implies technology gaps account for one-quarter to one-third of nominal wage variation within the OECD. (JEL D21, D24, D31, F14, O31, O33, O47)

Most innovation takes place in a small number of rich, industrialized economies.¹ And since technology diffusion is not instantaneous, more innovative firms and countries utilize better technologies. This paper studies the technology gaps that arise from innovation and diffusion (Parente and Prescott 1994; Buera and Oberfield 2020). What determines the size of international technology gaps? How do technology gaps differ across industries? And how important are technology gaps in explaining cross-country variation in wages and incomes?

The paper makes two main contributions. First, it develops a theory of equilibrium international technology gaps when productivity levels are determined by the innovation and adoption investments of heterogeneous firms. The theory assumes that firms behind the technology frontier benefit from an advantage of backwardness (Gerschenkron 1962) and that knowledge spillovers are stronger within than across countries (Keller 2002). I use the model to isolate the mechanisms through which country-level differences in the efficiency of innovation affect technology gaps, trade flows, and incomes. The model is both analytically tractable and sufficiently rich to be used for quantitative analysis.

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¹For example, the United States and Japan accounted for 48 percent of applications filed under the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Patent Cooperation Treaty in 2014, while producing 28 percent of world GDP (WIPO 2016; World Bank 2022).

The paper's second contribution is to calibrate the model and quantify how international variation in innovativeness affects trade and incomes. The calibration strategy exploits the model's prediction that cross-country differences in innovation efficiency generate Ricardian comparative advantage due to sectoral heterogeneity in the innovation and diffusion technologies. Consequently, trade data can be used to infer sufficient statistics that capture how innovation efficiency affects technology gaps in each industry. The quantification provides a novel way to evaluate international variation in living standards due to technology gaps. By contrast, previous development accounting research identifies productivity differences with the Solow residual after accounting for factor endowments (Caselli 2005), or estimates the effect of misallocation on the efficiency with which given technologies and factors are used (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Hsieh et al. 2019).

The components of the model are introduced in Section I. First, the *efficiency of research and development (R&D)* varies across countries due to differences in national innovation systems (Nelson 1993). Countries with better national innovation systems have an absolute advantage in R&D. Second, firms choose whether to upgrade their productivity through innovative R&D or through technology adoption (Benhabib, Perla, and Tonetti 2014; König, Lorenz, and Zilibotti 2016). Firms are heterogeneous in their R&D capabilities and, in equilibrium, there exists a capability threshold above which firms select into R&D. In countries with higher R&D efficiency the threshold is lower, which implies the share of firms that innovate is greater. Allowing for firm-level selection between R&D and adoption is a key distinction between the theory and existing quantitative models of trade and productivity.

Third, there are knowledge spillovers within and across countries. Knowledge is used as an input to both R&D and technology adoption and the knowledge level in each country is an average of the domestic productivity frontier and global knowledge capital. The weight given to the domestic frontier determines the *localization of knowledge spillovers*. There is also an *advantage of backwardness* that increases the efficiency of technology investment for less productive firms, regardless of whether they choose innovation or adoption (Gerschenkron 1962; Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen 2004). I allow both the localization of knowledge spillovers and the advantage of backwardness to be industry specific.²

The presence of international knowledge spillovers and an advantage of backwardness ensures that on a balanced growth path technology gaps (i.e., relative productivity levels) are stable, both between domestic firms and across countries. Section II characterizes balanced growth in a global economy with many countries and industries and studies equilibrium technology gaps. Countries with higher R&D efficiency are more productive and richer. Likewise, within country-industry pairs, firms that perform R&D are more productive than those that adopt and productivity is increasing in R&D capability among innovative firms.

However, the size of technology gaps is endogenous and differs by industry depending upon the dispersion and concentration forces. The dispersion force results from the localization of knowledge spillovers. The concentration force comes from

²Peri (2005) shows that the impact of international borders on knowledge flows varies by sector. Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) find that the effect of current productivity on future productivity growth, conditional on R&D investment, differs across industries.

global knowledge spillovers and the advantage of backwardness. Within countries, a greater advantage of backwardness strengthens the concentration force and reduces productivity variation. Across countries, not only is this effect present, but the localization of knowledge spillovers also plays a role. More localized spillovers magnify the advantage of firms in more productive countries and widen technology gaps.

In steady state, the strength of the dispersion and concentration forces in each industry can be summarized by a single sufficient statistic: the elasticity of a country's relative average productivity to its R&D efficiency. I call this elasticity the industry's *innovation dependence*. The theory implies that innovation dependence is decreasing in the advantage of backwardness and increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers. When innovation dependence is low, the gap between leaders and followers is small, whereas high innovation dependence increases the productivity advantage that accrues to innovators. Consequently, international technology gaps are greater in more innovation-dependent industries. It follows that countries with higher R&D efficiency have Ricardian comparative advantage in industries with lower advantage of backwardness and more localized knowledge spillovers.³

While cross-industry variation in innovation dependence determines the pattern of comparative advantage, the level of innovation dependence determines cross-country wage and income inequality. In a single sector economy with free trade, the elasticity of a country's relative wage to its R&D efficiency is proportional to innovation dependence. With trade costs and many sectors, the relationship is more complex, but the mechanism is the same: when industries are more innovation-dependent, countries with higher R&D efficiency have a greater technological advantage and this leads to larger differences in wages and income per capita. The model formalizes this intuition and unpacks the determinants of innovation dependence.

To quantify the importance of technology gaps, Section III calibrates a first-order approximation to the model using data on 25 OECD economies. Two key sets of parameters are required: R&D efficiency by country and innovation dependence by industry. Both are calibrated by matching model-implied moments to their empirical counterparts. Since the share of firms that choose R&D rather than adoption is increasing in R&D efficiency, the industry-level ratio of R&D expenditure to value-added is larger in countries with higher R&D efficiency. Using this moment, I calibrate R&D efficiency from cross-country, within-industry variation in innovation intensity. I obtain two independent measures of R&D efficiency using data on innovation inputs (R&D) and innovation outputs (patents), respectively.

Given R&D efficiency, I estimate innovation dependence for 22 goods industries using the gravity equation for bilateral trade implied by the model. The innovation dependence of each industry is estimated to match the observed correlation between R&D efficiency and trade flows. I estimate innovation dependence separately using the R&D efficiency measure calibrated from R&D data and the measure calibrated from patent data, but the two sets of estimates are similar with a correlation of 0.88. In both cases, innovation dependence is highest in the computers, machinery, and equipment; and chemicals industries, and lowest in mining. An out-of-sample

³This prediction provides an endogenous growth formalization of Krugman's (1985) argument that comparative advantage can be characterized in terms of technology gaps when countries are ranked by their technological level and industries by their technological intensity.

validation test confirms that countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in industries with larger estimated innovation dependence.

Using the calibrated model, I quantify the impact of R&D efficiency differences by comparing the calibrated equilibrium to a counterfactual economy where R&D efficiency is the same in all countries. The counterfactual analysis shows that technology gaps account for an important share of variation in both nominal wages and real income per capita across OECD countries.

Eliminating R&D efficiency differences increases nominal wages relative to the United States by around 20 percent for the average sample country. Since richer countries tend to be more innovative, equalizing R&D efficiency also reduces cross-country inequality in wages and incomes. The results imply that R&D efficiency differences account for one-quarter to one-third of nominal wage dispersion within the OECD. Under the assumption that innovation dependence is zero in the services sector, I also find that R&D efficiency accounts for around 15 percent of variation in real income per capita. Section IV shows that these conclusions are robust to generalizing how the R&D and adoption technologies differ across countries and industries, and to incorporating interindustry knowledge spillovers in the model.

As well as generating wage and income differences, technology gaps have large effects on comparative advantage. For example, in the calibration based on R&D data, eliminating R&D efficiency differences increases exports relative to the United States for the average country by 94 log points more for the Chemicals industry at the ninetieth percentile of the innovation dependence distribution than for the Agriculture industry at the tenth percentile.

By quantifying the impact of differences in innovativeness on living standards, this paper provides new evidence on the sources of international inequality and contributes to a small quantitative literature on technology gaps. Parente and Prescott (1994) calibrate a single sector model with exogenous growth and show that observed income disparities could be explained by plausible cross-country differences in the research technology, which they label barriers to technology adoption. Likewise, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) argue that variation in R&D investment may be sufficient to generate observed international productivity gaps. Using a directed technical change model, Gancia, Müller, and Zilibotti (2013) estimate the barriers to adoption needed to fit cross-country output differences and find that if all countries used frontier technologies then GDP per worker of the average OECD economy relative to the United States would increase from 0.68 to 0.91. Relative to these studies, the paper's contribution is to quantify the impact of technology gaps using innovation and trade data without targeting observed income differences in the calibration.

In related development accounting research, Alviarez, Cravino, and Ramondo (2021) use cross-country variation in the market shares of multinational firms to estimate that firm-embedded productivity differences account for one-third of cross-country income dispersion in their sample of mostly European countries. Although R&D efficiency is only one of the possible sources of firm-embedded productivity, the finding that it accounts for around 15 percent of income dispersion implies that innovativeness is an important determinant of firm-embedded productivity.

In common with this paper, Buera and Oberfield (2020) and Cai, Li, and Santacreu (2022) develop dynamic quantitative trade models incorporating knowledge diffusion. I differ from these papers in modeling technology upgrading by incumbent firms, rather than building upon the framework for studying trade and innovation pioneered by Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002). But a more important distinction is that, whereas their work asks how trade liberalization affects productivity, I study the extent to which technology gaps explain income differences. Eaton and Kortum (1999) also build a model of innovation and diffusion in five leading research countries, but their objective is to estimate the extent of international technology diffusion.

The theoretical framework in this paper builds upon research modeling the effect of international knowledge diffusion on productivity in single sector economies (Parente and Prescott 1994; Howitt 2000; Buera and Oberfield 2020; Lind and Ramondo 2022) and studying how endogenous innovation affects comparative advantage (Grossman and Helpman 1990; Somale 2021; Cai, Li, and Santacreu 2022). It is also related to product cycle theories of imitation and trade (Krugman 1979; Grossman and Helpman 1991), learning-by-doing models of how initial conditions shape long-run comparative advantage (Redding 1999), recent papers on innovation and/or imitation by incumbent firms (Atkeson and Burstein 2010; Perla and Tonetti 2014; Akcigit and Kerr 2018), and to work by Akcigit, Ates and Impullitti (2018) who study how technology gaps arise from endogenous firm-level innovation in a Schumpeterian economy with two asymmetric countries. Relative to these literatures, the theoretical contribution of this paper lies in developing a model with endogenous innovation and adoption that permits the quantitative analysis of technology gaps in the global economy. In particular, allowing for asymmetric countries and industries, trade costs, and firm-level selection between R&D and adoption enhances the mapping between model and data.

The methodology used to estimate innovation dependence from bilateral trade data is related to empirical studies that test for comparative advantage using the interaction of country and industry characteristics (Romalis 2004; Nunn 2007; Manova 2013), and particularly, to the approach developed by Costinot (2009) to reveal cross-country variation in institutional quality. Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012); Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2013); and Levchenko and Zhang (2016) show how structural gravity models can be used to infer productivity differences from trade flows. In their work Hanson, Lind, and Muendler (2013) and Levchenko and Zhang (2016) analyze how the pattern of comparative advantage changes over time, while remaining agnostic about mechanisms, whereas this paper provides a theory and quantification of cross-sectional variation in steady state technology gaps. An alternative approach to measuring international technology differences is to use data on the adoption of specific technologies (Caselli and Coleman 2001; Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito 2009; Comin and Mestieri 2018). Consistent with my model, such studies find that the rate at which new technologies are adopted differs greatly across countries and is strongly positively correlated with GDP per capita. The framework presented in this paper shows how technology gaps can be quantified using trade data even when direct measures of technology use are unavailable, as is the case for many technologies and sectors.

I. Technology Gap Model

This section develops a model of technology gaps and trade. There are S countries indexed by s and J industries indexed by j . I assume that output and factor markets are competitive, time t is continuous and all model parameters are time invariant. To simplify notation, I suppress the dependence of endogenous variables on time except when necessary to avoid confusion.

A. Production

Within each country, all firms in a given industry produce the same homogeneous output good. However, output is differentiated by country of origin following Armington (1969), implying that the output price p_{js} in industry j is country-specific.

Firms differ in their productivity θ , which is a time-varying, firm-level state variable. Labor is the only factor of production and a firm with productivity θ that employs l^P production workers produces output

$$(1) \quad y = \theta(l^P)^\beta, \text{ with } 0 < \beta < 1.$$

The assumption $\beta < 1$ implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in production.⁴

At each moment in time, firms in industry j and country s choose production employment to maximize the flow of production profits $\pi^P = p_{js}y - w_s l^P$ taking the output price p_{js} , the wage w_s and productivity θ as given. Solving the profit maximization problem yields

$$(2) \quad l_{js}^P(\theta) = \left(\frac{\beta p_{js} \theta}{w_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}, \quad \pi_{js}^P(\theta) = (1 - \beta) \left(\frac{\beta}{w_s} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} (p_{js} \theta)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}.$$

Employment, output, and profits are all increasing in the firm's productivity and the output price, but decreasing in the wage level.

B. Technology Investment

Each firm's productivity grows over time at a rate that depends upon its investment in technology upgrading. Firms can choose between two types of technology investment: R&D and adoption. R&D investment seeks to create new ideas and technologies through innovation, while adoption is aimed at learning about and implementing existing production techniques.

R&D technology.—Firms are heterogeneous in their R&D capability ψ . R&D capability is a time invariant firm characteristic that increases the efficiency of R&D

⁴Decreasing returns to scale ensure the firm's static profit maximization problem is concave. Concavity could also result from firms facing downward sloping demand curves. In an environment where each firm produces a differentiated variety with a constant elasticity of substitution between varieties and there is monopolistic competition between firms, the firm would face an equivalent optimization problem. However, this alternative would make the model analytically intractable in general equilibrium given the existence of many asymmetric countries and industries.

investment. A firm with capability ψ and productivity θ that employs l^R workers to undertake R&D (and does not invest in adoption) has productivity growth given by

$$(3) \quad \frac{\dot{\theta}}{\theta} = \psi B_s \left(\frac{\theta}{\chi_{js}^R} \right)^{-\gamma_j} (l^R)^\alpha - \delta,$$

where $B_s > 0$, $\gamma_j > 0$, $\delta > 0$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ are parameters, and χ_{js}^R denotes the R&D knowledge level in industry j and country s . The knowledge level χ_{js}^R is nonrival and does not vary across firms.

Conditional on current productivity and R&D employment, equation (3) shows that productivity growth is increasing in the firm's R&D capability. At the same time, conditional on capability and R&D employment, productivity growth is decreasing in the firm's current productivity with elasticity γ_j . This implies that there exists an advantage of backwardness, which benefits firms further from the technology frontier.⁵ I allow the strength of the advantage of backwardness γ_j to vary by industry to capture differences in the extent to which generating new ideas and techniques is harder for more productive firms.

The returns to R&D also depend upon country-level R&D efficiency B_s , which captures variation in the quality of a country's national innovation system. Countries with a higher R&D efficiency B_s have an absolute advantage in R&D. The parameter α determines the returns to scale in R&D, while δ is the rate at which a firm's technical knowledge depreciates causing its productivity to decline. The assumption $\delta > 0$ captures obsolescence of previously acquired techniques as well as loss of knowledge resulting from labor force turnover.⁶

Because knowledge is partially nonexcludable, R&D generates knowledge spillovers that allow firms to build upon the knowledge created by past innovations. The knowledge level χ_{js}^R captures these spillovers and the specification of the R&D technology implies that a higher knowledge level increases productivity growth all else equal.

Analysis of cross-border knowledge flows finds that domestic spillovers are stronger than international spillovers (Branstetter 2001; Keller 2002) and that the geographic localization of spillovers may vary by industry due to differences in the importance of tacit knowledge, cross-border communication, and whether production techniques must be adapted to local requirements (Evenson and Westphal 1995; Peri 2005). To model this geography of knowledge spillovers, I assume the knowledge level χ_{js}^R depends upon both the domestic productivity frontier and global knowledge capital accumulated through past R&D investments.

Formally, let Ω index firms and let Ω_{js} denote the set of firms operating in industry j in country s . Define $\theta_{js}^{\max}(\Omega) = \sup_{\tilde{\Omega} \in \Omega_{js}, \tilde{\Omega} \neq \Omega} \{ \theta(\tilde{\Omega}) \}$ as the supremum of the productivity of all firms in industry j in country s excluding firm Ω . The definition implies $\theta_{js}^{\max}(\Omega)$ is exogenous to firm Ω . In equilibrium, there will always be

⁵Using industry level data for OECD countries, Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) find that the effect of R&D on productivity growth is increasing in distance to the frontier. At the firm level, Bartelsman, Haskel, and Martin (2008) and Griffith, Redding, and Simpson (2009) both estimate that lower productivity relative to the domestic frontier raises productivity growth in the United Kingdom.

⁶Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) estimate the persistence of productivity and conclude that "old knowledge is hard to keep" (p. 1341).

a continuum of firms at the productivity frontier.⁷ Therefore, $\theta_{js}^{\max}(\Omega) = \theta_{js}^{\max}$ and does not vary with Ω . The R&D knowledge level χ_{js}^R of industry j in country s is then given by

$$(4) \quad \chi_{js}^R = (\theta_{js}^{\max})^{\frac{\kappa_j}{1+\kappa_j}} \chi_j^{\frac{1}{1+\kappa_j}},$$

where χ_j denotes global knowledge capital in industry j . This specification assumes all knowledge spillovers occur within industries.⁸

The knowledge level depends upon domestic spillovers through θ_{js}^{\max} and global spillovers through χ_j . The parameter $\kappa_j > 0$ determines the localization of knowledge spillovers, which varies by industry. A higher κ_j implies spillovers are more localized because the elasticity of the knowledge level to the domestic productivity frontier is increasing in κ_j , while the elasticity to global knowledge capital is decreasing. Since knowledge spillovers are localized, firms in countries with a greater frontier productivity benefit from access to a higher knowledge level.

Global knowledge capital χ_j is a state variable of the world economy that increases over time as R&D investment leads to the creation of new ideas and technologies. I assume growth in χ_j depends upon a weighted sum of R&D investment by all firms in all countries:

$$(5) \quad \dot{\chi}_j = \sum_{s=1}^S M_{js} \int_{\psi^{\min}}^{\psi^{\max}} \lambda_{js}(\psi) I_{js}^R(\psi) dG(\psi),$$

where M_{js} denotes the mass of firms that produce good j in country s , $\lambda_{js}(\psi) \geq 0$ determines the strength of R&D spillovers and $G(\psi)$ is the cumulative distribution function of R&D capabilities, which is assumed to be continuous with support $[\psi^{\min}, \psi^{\max}]$ and does not vary across countries. Note that this specification allows the strength of R&D spillovers to vary by country, industry and the firm's R&D capability. However, adoption investment does not affect global knowledge capital because it does not generate new ideas.

Adoption Technology.—Although innovation and imitation are closely related activities (Rosenberg 1990), adoption differs from R&D in two important ways. First, it does not require the rare combination of firm capability and institutional support that enables knowledge creation. Therefore, I assume neither firm-level R&D capability ψ nor country-level R&D efficiency B_s affect the efficiency of adoption investment B^A . It follows that firms with higher R&D capability and countries with higher R&D efficiency have a relative advantage at innovation compared to adoption. Second, while both R&D and adoption draw upon existing knowledge, prior inventions are more useful to adopters than innovators. Consequently, I assume that the adoption knowledge level is greater than the R&D knowledge level $\chi_{js}^A = \eta \chi_{js}^R$ with $\eta > 1$.⁹

⁷In steady state this observation follows from assuming that there exist a continuum of firms with each capability ψ . Outside steady state it also requires assuming an initial condition in which there are either zero or a continuum of firms with each (ψ, θ) pair.

⁸Section IVB generalizes the model to include interindustry knowledge spillovers.

⁹This specification is equivalent to assuming that R&D and adoption draw upon the same knowledge stock χ_{js}^R , but that knowledge is more useful in adoption than R&D (since $\eta > 1$).

Suppose the productivity growth of a firm that employs l^R R&D workers and l^A adoption workers is given by

$$(6) \quad \frac{\dot{\theta}}{\theta} = \theta^{-\gamma_j} \left\{ \left[\psi B_s(\chi_{js}^R)^{\gamma_j} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} l^R + \left[B^A(\chi_{js}^A)^{\gamma_j} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} l^A \right\}^\alpha - \delta.$$

This specification implies that the decreasing returns to scale in technology investment generated by $\alpha < 1$ apply to the firm's combined employment of R&D and adoption workers, meaning that no firm will invest in both R&D and adoption simultaneously. Firms invest in R&D if $\psi B_s(\chi_{js}^R)^{\gamma_j} > B^A(\chi_{js}^A)^{\gamma_j}$ and adoption otherwise. Moreover, for firms that choose adoption, productivity growth is given by

$$(7) \quad \frac{\dot{\theta}}{\theta} = B^A \left(\frac{\theta}{\chi_{js}^A} \right)^{-\gamma_j} (l^A)^\alpha - \delta,$$

showing that the adoption technology has the same functional form as the R&D technology in equation (3).

Optimal Technology Investment.—Each firm chooses paths for employment in R&D and adoption to maximize its value subject to productivity growth satisfying equation (6). Firms take the current and future values of χ_{js}^R and χ_{js}^A as given when making technology investments. Because technology investments affect productivity growth, but not the current value of θ , the technology investment problem is separable from the firm's static production decision.

Let $V_{js}(\psi, \theta)$ be the value of a firm with capability ψ and productivity θ . $V_{js}(\psi, \theta)$ equals the expected present discounted value of the firm's production profits minus its technology investment costs on the optimal investment path:

$$(8) \quad V_{js}(\psi, \theta) = \sup_{\{l^R, l^A\}} \left\{ \int_t^\infty \exp \left[- \int_t^{\tilde{t}} (\iota_s + \zeta) d\tilde{t} \right] \left[\pi_{js}^P(\theta) - w_s(l^R + l^A) \right] d\tilde{t} \right\},$$

where ι_s denotes the interest rate and $\pi_{js}^P(\theta)$ is given by (2). All endogenous variables in this expression, including the firm's value function, are time dependent.

C. Entry

Entrants must pay a fixed cost to establish a firm. To set-up a unit flow of new firms, a potential entrant must hire f^E workers where $f^E > 0$ is an entry cost parameter. Following the idea flows literature I assume that the capability ψ and initial productivity θ of each entrant are determined by a random draw from the joint distribution of ψ and θ among incumbent firms in the entrants' country and industry at the time the firm is created. Thus, the distribution of productivity θ at each capability level ψ is the same for entrants and incumbents. This specification implies the existence of spillovers from incumbents to entrants within a country-industry pair.¹⁰

¹⁰In Sampson (2016a) spillovers from incumbents to entrants lead to endogenous growth through a dynamic selection mechanism. In this paper the dynamic selection mechanism is absent because there is no fixed cost of production, meaning that firm exit is not endogenous. Instead, R&D investment by incumbent firms is the source of

There is free entry and the free entry condition requires that the cost of entry equals the expected value of entry, meaning

$$(9) \quad f^E w_s = \int_{(\psi, \theta)} V_{js}(\psi, \theta) d\tilde{H}_{js}(\psi, \theta),$$

where $\tilde{H}_{js}(\psi, \theta)$ denotes the cumulative distribution function of (ψ, θ) across firms.

Let L_{js}^E be aggregate employment in entry in industry j and country s . Then the total flow of entrants in industry j and country s is L_{js}^E/f^E . Since firms die at rate ζ this means the mass of firms M_{js} evolves according to

$$(10) \quad \dot{M}_{js} = -\zeta M_{js} + \frac{L_{js}^E}{f^E}.$$

D. Closing the Model

To complete the description of the model, we need to define consumer preferences, specify trade costs and impose market clearing conditions.

Each country has a representative consumer with identical preferences who consumes a single consumption good that is produced as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of industry outputs. The representative consumer has intertemporal preferences with discount rate $\rho > 0$ and unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and allocates a fraction μ_j of expenditure to industry j . Let c_s denote consumption per capita, z_s be the price of the consumption good and L_s be the population of country s . There is no population growth.

Within industries let $\sigma > 1$ be the Armington demand elasticity, which determines the substitutability of output produced in different countries. Suppose trade costs take the iceberg form, such that $\tau_{j\tilde{s}}$ units of industry j output must be shipped from country s to country \tilde{s} in order for one unit to arrive at the destination.

The system of demand and price index equations implied by these preferences can be found in online Appendix A.1. The Armington assumption is sufficient to generate constant elasticity demand, which implies equilibrium bilateral trade flows follow a gravity equation. In particular, demand in \tilde{s} for industry j output produced in country s is given by

$$x_{j\tilde{s}} = (\tau_{j\tilde{s}} P_{js})^{-\sigma} P_{\tilde{s}}^{\sigma-1} \mu_j z_{\tilde{s}} c_{\tilde{s}} L_{\tilde{s}},$$

where $P_{j\tilde{s}}$ denotes the price index for industry j in country \tilde{s} .

I assume there is no international lending, meaning asset markets clear at the national level. Labor markets clearing also occurs country-by-country, while output markets clear at the country-industry level. I let global consumption expenditure be the numeraire, implying $\sum_{s=1}^S z_s c_s L_s = 1$.

Finally, to ensure concavity in firms' intertemporal optimization problems, I assume that the returns to scale in production and R&D, the advantage of backwardness and the localization of knowledge spillovers satisfy the following restriction.

long-run growth. Garcia-Macia, Hsieh, and Klenow (2019) estimate that most growth in US manufacturing comes from incumbent firms, rather than creative destruction or the introduction of new varieties.

ASSUMPTION 1. For all industries j , the parameters of the global economy satisfy $\frac{1}{1-\beta} > \gamma_j > \frac{\alpha}{1-\beta} + \frac{\kappa_j \gamma_j}{1+\kappa_j}$.

This completes the specification of the model. Online Appendix A.1 provides the full set of equilibrium equations and defines an equilibrium of the global economy. The economy's state variables are the joint distributions $\tilde{H}_{js}(\psi, \theta)$ of firms' capabilities and productivity levels for all country-industry pairs, global knowledge capital χ_j in each industry and the mass of firms M_{js} in all countries and industries. An initial condition is required to pin down the initial values of these state variables. Note that, apart from any differences in initial conditions, the only exogenous sources of cross-country variation are differences in R&D efficiency B_s , population L_s and trade costs τ_{js} .

II. Balanced Growth Path

This section characterizes a balanced growth path equilibrium of the global economy, focusing primarily on how R&D efficiency affects comparative advantage and international income inequality. Full details of the solution together with proofs of the propositions can be found in online Appendix A.

Let $H_{js}(\theta)$ be the cumulative distribution function of productivity in industry j and country s . I define a balanced growth path as an equilibrium in which all aggregate country and industry variables have constant growth rates and the productivity distributions $H_{js}(\theta)$ shift outwards at constant rates. Online Appendix A.2 shows that, on any balanced growth path, the existence of cross-border knowledge spillovers implies $H_{js}(\theta)$ must shift outwards at the same rate g_j in all countries.¹¹ Moreover, rising productivity is the only source of growth and the growth rate of consumption per capita $q = \sum_j \mu_j g_j$ is the same everywhere. It follows that, on a balanced growth path, cross-country heterogeneity leads to differences in the levels, not growth rates, of endogenous variables.

A. Firm Productivity Dynamics

Productivity dynamics depend upon firms' technology investment choices. How do firms behave on a balanced growth path? To solve for optimal firm behavior, we start by determining whether firms invest in R&D or adoption. A higher capability ψ increases the returns to R&D investment, but not to adoption investment. Consequently, there exists a capability threshold ψ_{js}^* such that firms invest in R&D if and only if their capability exceeds ψ_{js}^* . From equation (6) and $\chi_{js}^A = \eta \chi_{js}^R$, we have

$$(11) \quad \psi_{js}^* = \eta \gamma_j \frac{B_s^A}{B_s^R},$$

¹¹ The assumption, embodied in equation (4), that the knowledge level χ_{js}^R is homogeneous of degree one in the pair $(\theta_{js}^{\max}, \chi_j)$ is a necessary condition for the existence of a balanced growth path. Since productivity growth depends upon current productivity relative to the R&D and adoption knowledge levels, this assumption ensures knowledge spillovers are sufficiently strong to sustain ongoing productivity growth and is analogous to Romer's (1990) assumption that knowledge production is linear in the existing knowledge stock.

which implies that the R&D threshold ψ_{js}^* is increasing in the advantage of backwardness γ_j , decreasing in R&D efficiency B_s and independent of the firm's current productivity. This means that, on the extensive margin, there is more R&D in industries where the advantage of backwardness is smaller and in countries that are better at R&D.¹²

Now consider the R&D investment problem faced by a firm with capability $\psi \geq \psi_{js}^*$. Let $\phi \equiv (\theta/\chi_{js}^R)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}$ be the firm's productivity relative to the R&D knowledge level. I show in online Appendix A.3 that changing variables from θ to ϕ allows the firm's problem to be written as an optimal control problem in which the payoff function depends upon time only through exponential discounting. Consequently, the firm's value is a stationary function of its relative productivity and the value function $V_{js}(\psi, \phi)$ satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation,

$$(\rho + \zeta)V_{js}(\psi, \phi) = \pi_{js}^P(\phi) + \frac{dV_{js}(\psi, \phi)}{dt},$$

where the profit flow $\pi_{js}^P(\phi)$ is given by substituting $\phi = (\theta/\chi_{js}^R)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}$ into equation (2). Online Appendix A.3 solves the firm's dynamic problem and shows that, on a balanced growth path, it has a unique, locally saddle-path stable steady state and that the firm's steady state relative productivity and R&D employment are given by

$$(12) \quad \phi_{js}^* = \left[\alpha \beta^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} (\psi B_s)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left(\frac{P_{js} \chi_{js}^R}{w_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \frac{(\delta + g_j)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}}}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)-\alpha}},$$

$$(13) \quad l_{js}^{R*} = \left[\alpha \beta^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} (\psi B_s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}} \left(\frac{P_{js} \chi_{js}^R}{w_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \frac{(\delta + g_j)^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)-1}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}}}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)} \right]^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)-\alpha}}.$$

The steady state and transition dynamics are shown in Figure 1. Along the stable arm, relative productivity and R&D employment increase over time for firms that start with ϕ below ϕ_{js}^* , while the opposite is true for firms with initial ϕ above ϕ_{js}^* . The existence of an advantage of backwardness is necessary for the stability of the steady state because it introduces a negative relationship between productivity levels and productivity growth, all else constant.

The steady state has several important properties. First, in steady state all surviving R&D firms in an industry have the same productivity growth rate g_j , meaning that the steady state satisfies Gibrat's law for surviving firms. Second, ϕ_{js}^* is increasing in ψ implying that, within each country-industry pair, more capable firms have higher steady state relative productivity levels. This explains why, even though R&D capability differs across firms, steady state growth rates do not. The advantage of backwardness raises the R&D efficiency of less productive firms and, in steady state, this exactly offsets the disadvantage from low ψ implying all firms grow at the same rate.

¹²I assume the parameter values are such that $\psi_{js}^* \in (\psi^{\min}, \psi^{\max})$, $\forall s$ implying both adoption and R&D take place in every country.




FIGURE 1. FIRM STEADY STATE AND TRANSITION DYNAMICS

Third, the steady state is consistent with two key stylized facts about R&D highlighted by Klette and Kortum (2004): (i) productivity and R&D investment are positively correlated across firms since ϕ_{js}^* and l_{js}^{R*} are both increasing in ψ ; and (ii) among firms with positive R&D investment, R&D intensity is independent of firm size. To see this observe that using (1), (2), and (13) implies the steady state ratio of R&D investment to sales satisfies

$$(14) \quad \frac{w_s l_{js}^{R*}}{p_{js} y_{js}(\phi_{js}^*)} = \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_j)}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)},$$

which is constant within each industry. R&D intensity is increasing in the returns to scale in R&D α , the knowledge depreciation rate δ and the industry growth rate g_j , and decreasing in the advantage of backwardness γ_j , the interest rate ρ and the firm exit rate ζ .

Fourth, inequality in productivity levels and size between R&D firms is endogenous and steady state inequality is strictly increasing in α and β and strictly decreasing in γ_j .¹³ An increase in α raises the returns to scale in R&D which disproportionately benefits higher capability firms that employ more R&D workers. Similarly, an increase in β raises the returns to scale in production giving higher capability, larger firms a greater incentive to raise productivity by increasing R&D investment. By contrast, a higher advantage of backwardness γ_j reduces steady state technology gaps between firms.¹⁴

¹³ See the proof of Proposition 1. All inequality results hold for any measure of inequality that respects scale independence and second order stochastic dominance. See Lemma 2 in Sampson (2016b) for a proof of how elasticity changes affect inequality.

¹⁴ In most heterogeneous firm models, such as Melitz (2003), the lower bound is the only endogenously determined parameter of the productivity distribution. This holds not only in static economies, but also in the growth

The adoption investment problem faced by firms with capability below the R&D threshold ψ_{js}^* is formally equivalent to the R&D investment problem of a firm with threshold capability ψ_{js}^* .¹⁵ It follows that the steady state relative productivity and adoption employment of firms with capability below ψ_{js}^* are given by (12) and (13), respectively, but with $\psi = \psi_{js}^*$. By allowing firms to draw upon existing knowledge, adoption permits firms with capability below the R&D threshold to attain the same steady state productivity level as a firm with R&D capability ψ_{js}^* . Consequently, adopters constitute a fringe of firms with mass $M_{js}G(\psi_{js}^*)$ that compete with innovators and all have the same steady state productivity.

The discussion above characterizes the productivity dynamics of incumbent firms. However, the evolution of the industry productivity distribution $H_{js}(\theta)$ also depends upon entry and exit. Recall that all firms exit exogenously at rate ζ and that entering firms draw their capability and productivity from the joint distribution of ψ and θ among incumbents. Consequently, net entry does not affect $H_{js}(\theta)$ because the productivity distributions of entering, exiting and incumbent firms are identical. Moreover, if all incumbent firms with capability ψ are in steady state, then each new firm that draws capability ψ enters at its steady state productivity level. Since all surviving firms grow at rate g_j in steady state, it follows that the industry productivity distribution shifts outwards at rate g_j provided all incumbent firms are in steady state.

By contrast, if any incumbent firms are not in steady state, then the shape of the productivity distribution $H_{js}(\theta)$ varies over time as firms transition towards steady state.¹⁶ This is not consistent with balanced growth. Therefore, entry, exit and firms' optimal R&D and adoption investment decisions generate balanced growth if and only if all incumbent firms are in steady state. Proposition 1 summarizes the model's predictions regarding firm-level productivity outcomes on a balanced growth path.

PROPOSITION 1. *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. On a balanced growth path equilibrium all firms in the same industry grow at the same rate and within any country-industry pair:*

- (i) *Firms that invest in R&D have higher productivity than firms that invest in adoption;*
- (ii) *Among firms that invest in R&D, productivity and R&D employment are strictly increasing in firm capability;*
- (iii) *Productivity inequality between firms is strictly decreasing in the industry's advantage of backwardness, but strictly increasing in the returns to scale in production and R&D and in the country's R&D efficiency.*

models of Sampson (2016a) and Perla, Tonetti, and Waugh (2021). An exception is Bonfiglioli, Crinò, and Gancia (2018) who allow firms to choose between receiving productivity draws from distributions with different shapes.

¹⁵To see this, substitute $\chi_{js}^A = \eta\chi_{js}^R$ and (11) into (7) to obtain:

$$\frac{\dot{\theta}}{\theta} = \psi_{js}^* B_s \left(\frac{\theta}{\chi_{js}^R} \right)^{-\gamma} (I^A)^\alpha - \delta.$$

This expression is equivalent to the R&D technology (3) except that the firm's R&D capability ψ has been replaced by the capability threshold ψ_{js}^* .

¹⁶Formally, a balanced growth path only requires a mass M_{js} of firms to be in steady state, which allows for individual firms with zero mass to deviate from steady state. I overlook this distinction since it does not matter for industry or aggregate outcomes.

B. General Equilibrium

Having characterized firm-level behavior, we can now solve for a balanced growth path equilibrium. For this purpose, let Ψ_{js} be defined by

$$(15) \quad \Psi_{js} \equiv \int_{\psi_{js}^*}^{\psi^{\max}} \psi^{\frac{1}{\gamma(1-\beta)-\alpha}} dG(\psi) + (\psi_{js}^*)^{\frac{1}{\gamma(1-\beta)-\alpha}} G(\psi_{js}^*).$$

Ψ_{js} is the average effective capability of firms in industry j and country s accounting for the fact that adoption is equivalent to R&D with capability ψ_{js}^* . Ψ_{js} is strictly increasing in the R&D threshold ψ_{js}^* and, therefore, strictly decreasing in country-level R&D efficiency B_s . It captures the benefits resulting from selection into adoption, which are larger in countries with lower R&D efficiency.

Using the individual’s budget constraint, the definitions of the R&D and adoption knowledge levels, the free entry condition, the goods, labor, and asset market clearing conditions and firms’ steady state productivity and employment levels, online Appendix A.5 shows that on a balanced growth path labor market clearing requires

$$(16) \quad L_s = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{\mu_j}{\rho + \zeta} \left[\zeta + \beta\rho + \frac{\alpha\rho(\delta + g_j)}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)} \right] Z_{js},$$

while asset market clearing implies that asset holdings per capita a_s are given by

$$(17) \quad a_s L_s = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{\mu_j}{\rho + \zeta} \left[1 - \beta - \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_j)}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)} \right] w_s Z_{js},$$

and the productivity growth rate in industry j satisfies

$$(18) \quad g_j = \sum_{s=1}^S \mu_j \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_j)}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)} \frac{Z_{js}}{\Psi_{js}} \int_{\psi_{js}^*}^{\psi^{\max}} \lambda_{js}(\psi) \psi^{\frac{1}{\gamma(1-\beta)-\alpha}} dG(\psi),$$

where

$$(19) \quad Z_{js} \equiv \frac{\sum_{\bar{s}=1}^S \tau_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}^{1-\sigma} (\rho a_{\bar{s}} + w_{\bar{s}}) L_{\bar{s}} w_{\bar{s}}^{-\sigma} \left(B_{\bar{s}} \Psi_{j\bar{s}}^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa_j} - \alpha} \right)^{\frac{(\sigma-1)(1+\kappa_j)}{\gamma_j}}}{\sum_{\bar{s}=1}^S \tau_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}^{1-\sigma} w_{\bar{s}}^{1-\sigma} \left(B_{\bar{s}} \Psi_{j\bar{s}}^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa_j} - \alpha} \right)^{\frac{(\sigma-1)(1+\kappa_j)}{\gamma_j}}}.$$

Equations (16)–(18), together with the definition of Z_{js} in (19), comprise a system of equations in the $2S + J$ unknown wage levels w_s , asset holdings a_s , and industry growth rates g_j . Any solution to this system of equations gives a balanced growth path. I prove in online Appendix A.6 that there exists a unique balanced growth path in the case where $J = 1$ and there are no trade costs. More generally, I assume existence and derive results that must hold on any balanced growth path.

The equilibrium conditions show that, conditional on industry growth rates, R&D efficiency affects wages, and asset holdings only through the Z_{js} terms. The term Z_{js} can be interpreted as a measure of industry size since $Z_{js}/Z_{j\bar{s}} = L_{js}/L_{j\bar{s}}$, where L_{js} denotes total employment in industry j in country s . Z_{js} depends upon R&D efficiency

B_s , both directly and indirectly through Ψ_{js} . In an economy without adoption this indirect effect is absent. Z_{js} also depends upon labor costs and upon market access, which is a function of trade costs and real demand in each destination.¹⁷

C. Technology Gaps and Comparative Advantage

On a balanced growth path relative productivity levels within each industry are stationary. However, the location of the productivity distribution in each country depends upon its R&D efficiency. Consequently, variation in R&D efficiency generates technology gaps. This section characterizes the technology gaps that support a balanced growth path equilibrium and analyzes how technology gaps affect comparative advantage.

Let $\bar{\theta}_{js}^* \equiv \left[E(\theta_{js}^*)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \right]^{1-\beta}$ denote the average steady state productivity of firms in country s and industry j . The technology gap between countries s and \bar{s} in industry j is given by

$$(20) \quad \frac{\bar{\theta}_{js}^*}{\bar{\theta}_{\bar{s}j}^*} = \left[\frac{B_s}{B_{\bar{s}}} \left(\frac{\Psi_{js}}{\Psi_{\bar{s}j}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa_j} - \alpha} \right]^{\frac{1+\kappa_j}{\gamma_j}},$$

which shows that B_s has a direct positive effect on productivity, as well as an indirect negative effect through Ψ_{js} .¹⁸ The direct effect results from R&D being more productive, all else equal, when B_s is higher. The indirect effect occurs because countries with higher B_s have a lower R&D threshold ψ_{js}^* , which reduces average effective capability Ψ_{js} . However, the direct effect is always stronger than the indirect effect, meaning that the net effect of B_s on average productivity is strictly positive.

Equation (20) also implies that R&D efficiency differences are the only source of international technology gaps in this model. Technology gaps do not depend upon trade costs because trade costs do not affect the price-wage ratio p_{js}/w_s , which determines relative technology investment rates and, consequently, relative productivity levels. This ratio is pinned down by the free entry condition independently of trade costs (see online Appendix A.5), meaning that any potential impact of trade cost variation on technology investment is offset by adjustments in net entry. The finding that technology gaps are independent of trade costs relies on the assumption that trade does not affect international knowledge spillovers. Linking knowledge spillovers to trade, as in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) or Buera and Oberfield (2020), would introduce an additional source of variation in technology gaps.

¹⁷Characterizing the equilibrium industry growth rates g_j given by equation (18) is not the focus of this paper and the counterfactual analysis in Section III does not require solving for g_j . However, to offer insight into the determinants of growth in this economy, Online Appendix A.6 shows that in a single sector version of the model growth is increasing in the R&D spillovers $\lambda_s(\cdot)$, the size of each country L_s and the R&D efficiency of each country B_s , but decreasing in the adoption knowledge premium η and adoption efficiency B^A . Growth is also higher in the open economy than autarky due to the existence of global knowledge spillovers, but does not depend upon the localization of knowledge spillovers κ or the level of trade costs $\tau_{\bar{s}s}$. Lower trade costs increase the effective size of export markets, but also expose domestic firms to increased import competition. In the single sector version of the model, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.9) and Eaton and Kortum (2001), these effects exactly offset, leaving R&D employment and growth unchanged.

¹⁸To see that the indirect effect is negative note that $\gamma_j(1 - \beta) > \alpha(1 + \kappa_j)$ by Assumption 1 and that Ψ_{js} is decreasing in B_s by (11).

The magnitude of international technology gaps is determined by the elasticity of productivity to R&D efficiency, which I call “innovation dependence” ID_{js} since it controls the extent to which countries benefit from being more innovative. Formally, define

$$(21) \quad ID_{js} \equiv \frac{\partial \log \left(B_s \Psi_{js}^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa_j} - \alpha} \right)^{\frac{1+\kappa_j}{\gamma_j}}}{\partial \log B_s} \\ = \frac{1 + \kappa_j}{\gamma_j} + \left[(1 - \beta) - \frac{\alpha(1 + \kappa_j)}{\gamma_j} \right] \frac{\partial \log \Psi_{js}}{\partial \log B_s}.$$

In general, innovation dependence may vary across industries due to differences in γ_j and κ_j and across countries due to differences in the elasticity of Ψ_{js} to B_s . However, in Section III I calibrate a first-order approximation of the model in which $\partial \log \Psi_{js} / \partial \log B_s$ is constant across countries, implying that innovation dependence only varies by industry.

Innovation dependence is decreasing in the advantage of backwardness γ_j and increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers κ_j .¹⁹ A higher advantage of backwardness raises the relative efficiency of technology investment at less productive firms and decreases the share of firms that undertake R&D. Both these effects reduce innovation dependence. By contrast, more localized knowledge spillovers increase innovation dependence by making technology investment more reliant on domestically generated knowledge.

Differences in innovation dependence across industries give rise to Ricardian comparative advantage. To see this, let $EX_{js\bar{s}} = \tau_{js\bar{s}} p_{js} x_{js\bar{s}}$ denote the value of exports from s to \bar{s} in industry j inclusive of trade costs. On a balanced growth path,

$$(22) \quad \log EX_{js\bar{s}} = v_{j\bar{s}}^1 + (\sigma - 1) (\log \bar{\theta}_{js}^* - \log w_s - \log \tau_{js\bar{s}}),$$

where $v_{j\bar{s}}^1$ is a destination-industry specific term defined in online Appendix A.7. Equation (22) implies exports are increasing in average productivity and decreasing in the wage level. An increase in average productivity raises exports by reducing the output price p_{js} , whereas higher wages increase labor costs and raise the output price. Equation (22) also implies that the pattern of comparative advantage is stable on a balanced growth path because productivity and wage growth do not vary by country.

By substituting for $\bar{\theta}_{js}^*$ in (22) we obtain

$$(23) \quad \log EX_{js\bar{s}} = v_{j\bar{s}}^2 + (\sigma - 1) \left[\frac{1 + \kappa_j}{\gamma_j} \log B_s + \frac{\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha(1 + \kappa_j)}{\gamma_j} \log \Psi_{js} \right. \\ \left. - \log w_s - \log \tau_{js\bar{s}} \right],$$

showing that R&D efficiency affects exports both directly and indirectly through Ψ_{js} and w_s . In addition, conditional on the wage, the elasticity of exports to R&D

¹⁹ See the proof of Proposition 2 for details.

efficiency equals $\sigma - 1$ times innovation dependence ID_{js} . This observation motivates the calibration strategy in Section III.

Using equation (23), we can characterize the pattern of comparative advantage on a balanced growth path. We have

$$\frac{\partial^2 \log EX_{js\bar{s}}}{\partial \gamma_j \partial \log B_s} = (\sigma - 1) \frac{\partial ID_{js}}{\partial \gamma_j} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 \log EX_{js\bar{s}}}{\partial \kappa_j \partial \log B_s} = (\sigma - 1) \frac{\partial ID_{js}}{\partial \kappa_j} > 0.$$

Thus, countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries where γ_j is lower and κ_j is higher. Proposition 2 summarizes these results.

PROPOSITION 2: *Suppose Assumption 1 holds. On a balanced growth path equilibrium:*

- (i) *Countries with higher R&D efficiency have greater average productivity in each industry;*
- (ii) *Countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries where the advantage of backwardness is smaller and the localization of knowledge spillovers is greater.*

It is worth noting that the proof of Proposition 2 does not rely on the labor, output or asset market clearing conditions. This implies that the pattern of comparative advantage on a balanced growth path is independent of how the market clearing conditions are specified.

Proposition 2 characterizes comparative advantage assuming γ_j and κ_j are the only parameters that vary across industries. But it is straightforward to check that Proposition 2 continues to hold if there is also industry-level heterogeneity in the Armington elasticity σ_j , the capability distribution $G_j(\psi)$, the returns to scale in production β_j , the returns to scale in R&D α_j , the knowledge depreciation rate δ_j , the adoption knowledge advantage η_j , the exit rate ζ_j , and the entry cost f_j^E .

In this case, countries with higher R&D efficiency also have a comparative advantage in industries with higher returns to scale in production β_j and R&D α_j and in industries with a lower adoption knowledge advantage η_j . Higher returns to scale in production and R&D, increase the average technology gap between innovators and adopters within countries as shown in Proposition 1, which gives a comparative advantage to countries where a higher proportion of firms invest in R&D. A higher η_j raises the R&D threshold by (11), which shrinks international technology gaps since the adoption technology is independent of R&D efficiency.

D. International Inequality

How do wages, income, and consumption differ across countries on a balanced growth path? The simplest case to consider is a single sector economy with free trade. In this case equations (16), (19), and (20) yield

$$\frac{w_s}{w_{\bar{s}}} \left(\frac{L_s}{L_{\bar{s}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}_s^*}{\theta_{\bar{s}}^*} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} = \left[\frac{B_s}{B_{\bar{s}}} \left(\frac{\Psi_s}{\Psi_{\bar{s}}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa} - \alpha} \right]^{\frac{1+\kappa}{\gamma} \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}},$$

which shows that the relative wage of country s is increasing in its relative average productivity, and consequently, in its R&D efficiency.²⁰ Moreover, differentiating this expression gives that the elasticity of the relative wage to R&D efficiency equals $(\sigma - 1)/\sigma$ times innovation dependence. From Proposition 2 innovation dependence is decreasing in the advantage of backwardness and increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers. Thus, wage inequality caused by differences in R&D efficiency is higher when the advantage of backwardness is smaller and when knowledge spillovers are more localized.

The intertemporal budget constraint implies consumption per capita depends upon assets per capita, wages, and the consumption price through

$$c_s = \frac{\rho a_s + w_s}{z_s},$$

implying that consumption per capita equals real income per capita. With a single industry, assets per capita a_s are proportional to w_s by (16) and (17). Because of free trade all countries also face the same consumption price z_s , meaning that consumption per capita c_s is proportional to w_s . It follows that international inequality in incomes and consumption is the same as inequality in wages and is increasing in the degree of innovation dependence. Proposition 3 summarizes these results.

PROPOSITION 3: *Suppose Assumption 1 holds, the economy has a single industry and there is free trade. On a balanced growth path equilibrium:*

- (i) *Each country’s wage, income per capita and consumption per capita relative to other countries is strictly increasing in its R&D efficiency;*
- (ii) *International inequality in wages, income per capita, and consumption per capita due to differences in R&D efficiency is greater when innovation dependence is higher. Consequently, inequality is strictly decreasing in the advantage of backwardness and strictly increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers.*

In the general case with trade costs and many industries, innovation dependence continues to be the key determinant of the mapping from R&D efficiency differences to international inequality. In particular, equations (16), (17), and (19) show that, conditional on industry growth rates, B_s enters the balanced growth path

equations for w_s, a_s, z_s , and therefore c_s , only through the term $B_s \Psi_{js}^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa_j} - \alpha}$.²¹ It follows that the elasticities of w_s, a_s, z_s , and c_s to B_s can all be expressed in terms of the innovation-dependence levels in the J industries.

A simple example arises when all industries are nontradable. In this case, equilibrium consumption per capita satisfies

$$\frac{c_s}{c_{\bar{s}}} = \prod_{j=1}^J \left[\frac{B_s}{B_{\bar{s}}} \left(\frac{\Psi_{js}}{\Psi_{j\bar{s}}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_j(1-\beta)}{1+\kappa_j} - \alpha} \right]^{\frac{\mu_j(1+\kappa_j)}{\gamma_j}},$$

²⁰The relative wage is also decreasing in relative population $L_s/L_{\bar{s}}$ due to the assumption of Armington demand.

²¹See online Appendix A.8 for the derivation of equilibrium consumption prices z_s .

which shows that relative consumption per capita in country s is increasing in R&D efficiency B_s , with an elasticity $\sum_{j=1}^J \mu_j ID_{js}$ that equals the expenditure share weighted average of industry innovation-dependence levels. Consequently, a higher innovation dependence in any industry raises the elasticity of relative consumption per capita to R&D efficiency.

With finite trade costs, exporters' market shares vary by importer meaning that the terms-of-trade effects of productivity differences are country-specific. Consequently, the relationship between R&D efficiency, wages, and incomes is more complex and depends upon the entire system of equations (16)–(19). However, by estimating innovation dependence and calibrating the model, it is possible to quantify the impact of variation in R&D efficiency on wage and income inequality in the general model. The remainder of the paper takes up this challenge.

III. Quantitative Analysis

This section calibrates the model and quantifies the effect of R&D efficiency differences on trade flows and international inequality.

A. Model Approximation

Before calibrating the model, I log-linearize the balanced growth path equilibrium conditions by taking a first order approximation to average effective capability Ψ_{js} around an equilibrium where the share of firms that perform R&D vanishes. The approximation makes the equilibrium conditions log-linear in R&D efficiency B_s , which facilitates the calibration.

Suppose the R&D capability distribution $G(\psi)$ is truncated Pareto with lower bound $\psi^{\min} = 1$ and shape parameter k , where $k > 1/[\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha]$ for all industries j .²² Using this functional form in (15) to compute average effective capability Ψ_{js} and letting $\psi^{\max} \rightarrow \infty$ yields²³

$$(24) \quad \Psi_{js} \approx (\psi_{js}^*)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)-\alpha}} \left\{ 1 + \frac{(\psi_{js}^*)^{-k}}{k[\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha] - 1} \right\}.$$

Taking a first order approximation to this expression for large ψ_{js}^* then gives

$$(25) \quad \Psi_{js} \approx (\psi_{js}^*)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)-\alpha}} = \left(\eta \gamma_j \frac{B^A}{B_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_j(1-\beta)-\alpha}},$$

where the second equality follows from the solution for the R&D threshold in equation (11). Since the approximation drops terms of order $(\psi_{js}^*)^{-k}$, it is valid provided $(\psi_{js}^*)^{-k}$ is small. With $\psi^{\max} \rightarrow \infty$, $(\psi_{js}^*)^{-k}$ equals the share of firms that undertake R&D. In UK data for 2008–09, 9.9 percent of goods firms report performing R&D, which is consistent with $(\psi_{js}^*)^{-k}$ being small. Section IIIF computes

²²The assumption $\psi^{\min} = 1$ is without loss of generality.

²³Online Appendix A.9 provides further details on the derivation of the approximation.

an upper bound on the approximation error in the counterfactual results and shows that it is not quantitatively important.

With this approximation to Ψ_{js} , the innovation dependence of each industry is constant across countries. Applying the approximation to $\partial \log \Psi_{js} / \partial \log B_s$ and using equation (21) yields

$$(26) \quad ID_{js} = ID_j = \frac{(1 - \beta)\kappa_j}{\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha}.$$

Note that ID_j is increasing in κ_j , α , and β , and decreasing in γ_j , meaning that the signs of the relationships between these parameters and innovation dependence, characterized in Section IIC, are unaffected by taking the approximation.

Now substituting the approximation to Ψ_{js} into the definition of Z_{js} in equation (19) yields

$$(27) \quad Z_{js} = \frac{\sum_{\bar{s}=1}^S \tau_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}^{1-\sigma} (\rho a_{\bar{s}} + w_{\bar{s}}) L_{\bar{s}} w_s^{-\sigma} B_s^{(\sigma-1)ID_j}}{\sum_{\bar{s}=1}^S \tau_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}^{1-\sigma} w_{\bar{s}}^{1-\sigma} B_{\bar{s}}^{(\sigma-1)ID_j}},$$

implying that the industry size measure Z_{js} depends upon R&D efficiency only through $B_s^{ID_j}$. Section IIID shows how R&D and bilateral trade data can be used to obtain model-consistent estimates of $B_s^{ID_j}$.

B. Calibration Strategy

The goal of the counterfactual analysis is to quantify how R&D efficiency affects trade, wages and incomes, not to analyze growth rates. Focusing on this objective simplifies the calibration by reducing the number of parameters needed to calibrate the model. To see this, first note that equation (14) implies the R&D intensity of innovative firms $FiRD_j$ is given by

$$FiRD_j = \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_j)}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)}.$$

Substituting this equation into the balanced growth path equilibrium conditions (16) and (17) then yields

$$(28) \quad L_s = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{\mu_j(\zeta + \beta\rho + \rho FiRD_j)}{\rho + \zeta} Z_{js}, \quad a_s L_s = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{\mu_j(1 - \beta - FiRD_j)}{\rho + \zeta} w_s Z_{js}.$$

Equation (28) together with the expression for Z_{js} in equation (27) can be used to solve for wages w_s and assets a_s without fully calibrating the model. Inspection of equations (27) and (28) shows that this approach requires calibrating trade costs $\tau_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}$, R&D efficiency B_s , innovation dependence ID_j , firm-level R&D intensity $FiRD_j$, the discount rate ρ , the Armington elasticity σ , industry expenditure shares μ_j , the returns to scale in production β , and the exit rate ζ . However, parameters such as the returns to scale in R&D α , the knowledge depreciation rate δ and the strength of R&D spillovers $\lambda_{js}(\psi)$ are not needed, which reduces the information required to calibrate the model. The cost of adopting this calibration strategy is that the quantitative analysis does not address the determinants of growth.

When solving the calibrated model, I assume the economy has $J - 1$ tradable industries and one nontradable services industry. The goods trade data that I use to calibrate ID_j does not provide information on the innovation dependence of nontradables. However, taking the limit of equation (27) as $\tau_{j\tilde{s}} \rightarrow \infty$ for all $\tilde{s} \neq s$ implies that if industry j is nontradable, then

$$Z_{js} = (\rho a_s + w_s) \frac{L_s}{w_s}.$$

It follows that equilibrium wages w_s and assets a_s do not depend upon innovation dependence in the nontradable sector. The intuition for this result is related to the Balassa-Samuelson effect: in an open economy, nominal wages are determined by productivity in tradable sectors.

The innovation dependence of nontradables does affect real variables through the price index. Consequently, the counterfactual analysis focuses on nominal wages as the main outcome of interest. However, I also calculate real incomes under the assumption that the innovation dependence of nontradables equals zero. This assumption will lead the model to underestimate variation in real incomes caused by differences in R&D efficiency if the innovation dependence of nontradables is positive.

C. Data

This section briefly describes the data sources used for the quantitative analysis. Full details can be found in online Appendix C.

The primary data constraint is the limited availability of internationally comparable data on R&D expenditure at the industry-level, which is needed to calibrate R&D efficiency. From the OECD's ANBERD database, I obtain R&D expenditure for 20 ISIC two-digit manufacturing industries (OECD 2018a). The OECD defines R&D as "work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge ... and to devise new applications of knowledge" (OECD 2015, p. 44). This definition corresponds to the model's conceptualization of R&D as investment that seeks to expand the knowledge stock through discovering new ideas or developing new production techniques. By contrast, the goal of adoption is to learn about existing knowledge and techniques, meaning adoption investment should not be counted in R&D data.

The coverage of ANBERD at the two-digit level has improved over time, but the annual data has many missing values. Consequently, I pool data for 2010–2014, and for each year, keep countries where R&D intensity is available for at least two-thirds of industries. This gives a baseline sample of 25 OECD countries with R&D intensity data. As an alternative innovation measure, I also use patent data from the OECD's Patents by Technology database (OECD 2020).

Value-added, output and trade by two-digit ISIC industry for 2010–2014 are taken from the OECD's STAN database (OECD 2018b,c). Gravity variables are from the CEPII gravity dataset (Head, Thierry, Mayer 2014). Additional country-level variables are obtained from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2017), the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IMF 2018), and the World Bank's World Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators,

Financial Structure database, and Doing Business dataset (Čihák et al. 2012; World Bank 2018a,b 2021).

The analysis also uses firm-level data on R&D investment in the United Kingdom. This data comes from two surveys undertaken by the Office for National Statistics: the Business Enterprise R&D Survey, and the Annual Business Survey (ONS 2017, 2021).

D. Calibration

The main parameters needed for the calibration are the R&D efficiency of each country B_s and the innovation dependence of each industry ID_j . This section calibrates these parameters using moments derived from the model's equilibrium conditions and then briefly describes how the remaining parameters are calibrated. The calibrated model has 25 countries and 23 industries (22 tradable goods industries and 1 nontradable services industry).

R&D Efficiency.—R&D efficiency differences can be inferred from cross-country variation in innovation intensity. Let industry R&D intensity RD_{js} be the ratio of industry R&D expenditure to industry value-added. At the firm-level, R&D intensity is the same for all firms that innovate by equation (14). However, because firms are heterogeneous and choose between R&D and adoption, industry R&D intensity depends upon the share of firms that select into R&D. Computing RD_{js} from (1), (2), (12), and (13), imposing the first order approximation for large ψ_{js}^* and using (11) to substitute for ψ_{js}^* gives

$$(29) \quad RD_{js} = \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_j)}{\rho + \zeta + \gamma_j(\delta + g_j)} \frac{k[\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha]}{k[\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha] - 1} \eta^{-k\gamma_j} \left(\frac{B_s}{B^A}\right)^k.$$

Equation (29) shows that R&D intensity is higher in countries with greater R&D efficiency. An increase in B_s results in a larger share of firms performing R&D, which raises RD_{js} .²⁴

Using equation (29) to take the ratio of RD_{js} for any pair of countries implies

$$(30) \quad \frac{RD_{js}}{RD_{j\tilde{s}}} = \left(\frac{B_s}{B_{\tilde{s}}}\right)^k,$$

showing that the relative R&D intensity of countries s , and \tilde{s} in industry j depends upon their relative R&D efficiency levels. I use equation (30) to calibrate R&D efficiency differences from within-industry, cross-country variation in observed R&D intensity. In particular, let $b_s \equiv k \log B_s$ denote log R&D efficiency in country s , and suppose R&D efficiency is normalized to one for the United States, i.e., $B_{US} = 1$. Using data on industry-level R&D intensity for each of the 25 sample countries, I

²⁴In the model cross-country variation in RD_{js} comes entirely from the extensive margin, but this restriction is not necessary to obtain the industry-level equilibrium conditions used in the calibration. For example, if firm output is the sum of output of a unit mass of nontradeable tasks and R&D capability has distribution $G(\psi)$ across tasks, then all international variation in RD_{js} comes from the intensive margin, but the balanced growth path is otherwise unchanged.

calibrate log R&D efficiency b_s^R as the median (across industries) of $\log(RD_{js}/RD_{j\bar{s}})$, where $\bar{s} = US$.

In the model, R&D expenditure corresponds directly to innovation investment. However, given the difficulties in measuring R&D and obtaining internationally comparable R&D data, I also calibrate R&D efficiency from data on innovation outputs (patents) instead of inputs (R&D). Online Appendix D.1 shows how patenting intensity, defined analogously to R&D intensity as the industry-level ratio of patents to value-added, can be used to calibrate R&D efficiency. Let b_s^P denote log R&D efficiency calibrated as the median (across industries) of log patenting intensity in country s relative to the United States.

Figure 2 plots b_s^P against b_s^R for the 25 sample countries. The two measures of log R&D efficiency have a correlation of 0.88, although b_s^P has higher variance than b_s^R . Both measures are strongly positively correlated with GDP per capita implying that, on average, countries with higher R&D efficiency are richer.²⁵ The correlation with log GDP per capita in 2012 is 0.73 for b_s^R and 0.78 for b_s^P . Most of the variation in R&D efficiency is between richer and poorer countries. However, there are notable differences in R&D efficiency even within wealthy countries, for example compare Canada and Italy to France and the United States in Figure 2.

Innovation dependence.—Countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries, as shown in Proposition 2. Consequently, the correlation between R&D efficiency and bilateral trade flows can be used to estimate each industry’s innovation dependence.²⁶

However, a challenge in calibrating innovation dependence, is that R&D efficiency may be correlated with other country characteristics that affect productivity and trade, such as institutional quality and factor endowments. To allow for this possibility, suppose that instead of equation (1), the production function is given by $y = A_{js}\theta(l^P)^\beta$, where A_{js} is the allocative efficiency of industry j in country s , which is exogenous and time invariant. Otherwise, the model is unchanged. If countries with better national innovation systems also have better economic institutions and policies more broadly, allocative efficiency A_{js} and R&D efficiency B_s will be positively correlated.

It is straightforward to solve the model incorporating A_{js} (see online Appendix B.1 for details). Although A_{js} enters the equilibrium conditions, all the theoretical results in Section II continue to hold because the effects of allocative efficiency and R&D efficiency on technology gaps and income differences are separable.²⁷ In particular, using the approximation to Ψ_{js} , the export equation (23) can be written as

$$(31) \quad \log EX_{j\bar{s}} = v_{j\bar{s}}^3 + (\sigma - 1)(ID_j \log B_s + \log A_{js} - \log w_s - \log \tau_{j\bar{s}}),$$

²⁵For consistency with the model, GDP per capita is measured as GDP per member of the working age population. See online Appendix C for details.

²⁶An alternative approach would be to estimate innovation dependence using productivity data. However, measuring international productivity differences requires comparable cross-country price data, which is less widely available than trade data.

²⁷Because of this separability, I use the version of the model without allocative efficiency differences except when estimating innovation dependence.




FIGURE 2. R&D EFFICIENCY

Note: R&D efficiency for 2010–2014 calculated using OECD’s ANBERD, patents by technology and STAN databases.

where

$$v_{j\tilde{s}}^3 = v_{j\tilde{s}}^2 + \frac{\sigma - 1}{\gamma_j} \frac{\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha(1 + \kappa_j)}{\gamma_j(1 - \beta) - \alpha} \log(\eta^{\gamma_j} B^A).$$

It follows that correlation between allocative efficiency and R&D efficiency could lead to omitted variable bias in estimating the effect of R&D efficiency on trade. In order to alleviate this concern, I use country characteristics known to affect productivity and comparative advantage as proxies for allocative efficiency.

To estimate the exports equation, I also parameterize bilateral trade costs. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), I model trade costs as a function of gravity variables. In addition, I include exporter-industry fixed effects to capture the possibility that export costs vary by countries as argued by Waugh (2010). Specifically, suppose $\tau_{jss} = 1$ meaning there are no internal trade costs and that international trade costs can be expressed as

$$(32) \quad \log \tau_{j\tilde{s}} = DIST_{j\tilde{s}}^i + BORD_{j\tilde{s}} + CLANG_{j\tilde{s}} + FTA_{j\tilde{s}} + \delta_{j\tilde{s}}^1,$$

where the impact of bilateral distance on trade costs $DIST_{j\tilde{s}}^i$ depends on which of $i = 1, \dots, 6$ intervals the distance between countries s , and \tilde{s} belongs to $[0, 375)$, $[375, 750)$, $[750, 1,500)$, $[1,500, 3,000)$, $[3,000, 6,000)$, or $\geq 6,000$ miles; $BORD_{j\tilde{s}}$ denotes the effect of sharing a border; $CLANG_{j\tilde{s}}$ gives the effect of sharing a common language; $FTA_{j\tilde{s}}$ is the impact of having a free trade agreement, and $\delta_{j\tilde{s}}^1$ is

an exporter-industry fixed effect. The impact of all gravity variables on trade costs is allowed to vary by industry.

Using this parameterization of trade costs and rearranging the exports equation (31) yields the specification that I estimate to obtain innovation dependence:

$$(33) \log\left(\frac{EX_{js\bar{s}}}{EX_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}}\right) - (\sigma - 1)\log\left(\frac{w_{\bar{s}}}{w_s}\right) = -(\sigma - 1)\frac{ID_j}{k}b_{\bar{s}} - (\sigma - 1)A_{j\bar{s}} \\ - (\sigma - 1)(DIST_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}^i + BORD_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}} \\ + CLANG_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}} + FTA_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}} + \delta_{j\bar{s}}^2) + \epsilon_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}},$$

where $\delta_{j\bar{s}}^2 = \delta_{j\bar{s}}^1 - ID_j b_s/k - A_{j\bar{s}}$ and $\epsilon_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}$ captures unmodeled variation in trade costs, productivity and comparative advantage. The left side of this expression is observable given a value for $\sigma - 1$. From equation (22), we see that $\sigma - 1$ equals both the trade elasticity and the elasticity of exports to average productivity. Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) estimate this elasticity in an Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework. For the baseline calibration, I set $\sigma - 1$ equal to their preferred estimate of 6.53, while Section III F reports robustness checks for alternative values of the trade elasticity.

Equation (33) is estimated by including the interaction of industry dummies with $(1 - \sigma)b_s^R$ on the right side. The resulting coefficient estimates give the innovation dependence of each industry j , relative to the shape parameter of the R&D capability distribution ID_j/k . Note that the parameter k cancels out when ID_j/k is multiplied by calibrated log R&D efficiency $b_s = k \log B_s$. When solving the calibrated model, the product of these two terms is sufficient to quantify the impact of R&D efficiency on comparative advantage, wages, and income levels (recall equation 27). Consequently, there is no need to calibrate k .

Table 1 reports estimates of ID_j/k obtained from (33), using pooled trade data for 2010–2014. The sample includes exports of 117 countries to the 25 OECD importers for which R&D efficiency can be calibrated. It covers 22 ISIC goods industries at the two-digit level (the 20 manufacturing industries used to calculate R&D efficiency plus the agriculture and mining industries). See online Appendix C for data details.

Column 1 does not include controls for the importer's allocative efficiency $A_{j\bar{s}}$. Estimated innovation dependence is highest in machinery and equipment, computers, and pharmaceuticals, and lowest in mining and agriculture. However, these estimates are likely to be biased upwards by correlation between b_s^R and $A_{j\bar{s}}$.

As proxies for allocative efficiency, column 2 adds measures of the importer's institutional quality, business environment and financial development. Institutional quality is measured by the rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability variables from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Business environment is the country's distance to the frontier in the Doing Business dataset. Financial development is measured by the log of private credit as a share of GDP. As expected, including

TABLE 1—INNOVATION DEPENDENCE BY INDUSTRY

R&D efficiency measure:	R&D intensity			Patenting intensity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (0103)	0.454 (0.0561)	0.333 (0.0468)	0.169 (0.0898)	0.00742 (0.0621)
Mining and quarrying (0508)	0.371 (0.0860)	0.250 (0.0658)	−0.105 (0.133)	−0.140 (0.0780)
Food products, beverages and tobacco (1012)	0.480 (0.0463)	0.359 (0.0434)	0.210 (0.0782)	0.0608 (0.0579)
Textiles (13)	0.507 (0.0465)	0.417 (0.0505)	0.286 (0.0640)	0.117 (0.0516)
Wearing apparel (14)	0.473 (0.0566)	0.370 (0.0606)	0.334 (0.0547)	0.131 (0.0428)
Leather and related products (15)	0.479 (0.0590)	0.386 (0.0679)	0.340 (0.0835)	0.122 (0.0699)
Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture (16)	0.520 (0.0627)	0.397 (0.0394)	0.201 (0.0678)	0.0282 (0.0451)
Paper and paper products (17)	0.580 (0.0549)	0.451 (0.0388)	0.341 (0.0668)	0.127 (0.0535)
Printing and reproduction of recorded media (18)	0.579 (0.0572)	0.460 (0.0383)	0.274 (0.0611)	0.109 (0.0396)
Coke and refined petroleum products (19)	0.479 (0.0452)	0.359 (0.0424)	0.141 (0.0782)	0.0530 (0.0363)
Chemicals and chemical products (20)	0.587 (0.0513)	0.474 (0.0519)	0.379 (0.0948)	0.189 (0.0576)
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (21)	0.622 (0.0735)	0.496 (0.0610)	0.223 (0.141)	0.168 (0.0964)
Rubber and plastics products (22)	0.603 (0.0518)	0.478 (0.0362)	0.376 (0.0507)	0.183 (0.0373)
Other nonmetallic mineral products (23)	0.568 (0.0520)	0.447 (0.0384)	0.295 (0.0583)	0.118 (0.0384)
Basic metals (24)	0.577 (0.0458)	0.425 (0.0487)	0.265 (0.0745)	0.178 (0.0338)
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (25)	0.598 (0.0548)	0.475 (0.0360)	0.333 (0.0561)	0.138 (0.0387)
Computer, electronic and optical products (26)	0.653 (0.0580)	0.487 (0.0408)	0.599 (0.119)	0.295 (0.0542)
Electrical equipment (27)	0.606 (0.0871)	0.530 (0.0688)	0.370 (0.0958)	0.185 (0.0383)
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28)	0.712 (0.0780)	0.599 (0.0522)	0.380 (0.107)	0.213 (0.0618)
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (29)	0.552 (0.0480)	0.387 (0.0363)	0.274 (0.0839)	0.188 (0.0328)
Other transport equipment (30)	0.563 (0.0969)	0.380 (0.0633)	0.256 (0.128)	−0.00330 (0.0545)
Furniture, other manufacturing (3133)	0.547 (0.0659)	0.424 (0.0397)	0.254 (0.0651)	0.103 (0.0520)
Observations	171,152	171,152	171,152	171,152
R^2	0.524	0.652	0.697	0.694
Trade cost controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Productivity level controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Comparative advantage controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
F -test innovation dependence equal across industries	0.133	0.001	0.067	0.000
Average innovation dependence	0.551	0.427	0.282	0.117

Notes: Innovation dependence estimated relative to the shape parameter of the R&D capability distribution. Standard errors clustered by importer-industry in parentheses. R&D efficiency is measured from data on R&D intensity in columns 1–3 and patenting intensity in column 4. Trade cost controls are: exporter-industry fixed effects; interaction of industry dummy variables with six bilateral distance intervals, and whether the countries share a border, common language, or free trade agreement. Productivity level controls are the importer's rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, ease of doing business, and log private credit as a share of GDP. Comparative advantage controls are the interaction of industry dummy variables with the importer's rule of law, log private credit as a share of GDP, log physical capital per employee, and human capital. Sample includes 25 importers and 117 exporters and uses data for 2010–2014.

these controls reduces the magnitude of the innovation-dependence estimates, but the pattern of cross-industry variation is similar to column 1.

Column 3 also controls for sources of comparative advantage other than R&D efficiency by including the interaction of industry dummy variables with the importer's rule of law, log private credit to GDP ratio, log physical capital per employee, and human capital. This specification allows for comparative advantage due to institutional quality (Nunn 2007), financial development (Manova 2013), and Heckscher-Ohlin effects (Romalis 2004). Adding the comparative advantage controls further reduces the innovation-dependence estimates. Average innovation dependence in column 3 is 0.28, compared to 0.43 in column 2 and 0.55 in column 1. However, the pattern of variation in innovation dependence across industries is similar in all three columns.

Finally, column 4 estimates the same specification as column 3, but using the R&D efficiency measure based on patenting intensity b_s^P . The innovation-dependence estimates in column 4 are smaller than in column 3, reflecting the fact that b_s^P exhibits greater dispersion than b_s^K . But reassuringly the correlation between the estimates in column 3 and those in column 4 is 0.89. In each case, innovation dependence is largest in the computers, machinery and equipment, and chemicals industries and lowest in mining. All except two of the 22 innovation-dependence estimates in column 3 and all except six of those in column 4 are positive and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.

The baseline calibration uses R&D efficiency calibrated from R&D data together with the innovation-dependence estimates in column 3. But I also assess the robustness of the counterfactual results to using patent data to calibrate R&D efficiency, together with the innovation-dependence estimates in column 4. In both cases, I set innovation dependence to zero for any industry where the point estimate of innovation dependence is negative.

Other Parameters.—The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows using data from 2012 or the nearest available year (see online Appendix C for further details). Bilateral trade costs $\tau_{j\bar{s}}$ are calculated from equation (32), using the coefficient estimates obtained when estimating innovation dependence. I use the trade cost estimates from the specification estimated in column 3 of Table 1 for the baseline R&D data calibration, and those corresponding to column 4 for the patent data calibration. $FiRD_j$ is computed from UK firm-level data. Population L_s is calibrated to the working age population from the World Development Indicators. I assume $\sigma - 1 = 6.53$, consistent with the value of the trade elasticity used to estimate innovation dependence. Expenditure shares μ_j are calibrated to the average across OECD countries of each industry's share of domestic absorption. The exit rate ζ is set to 0.103, which is the average OECD death rate of employer enterprises in the business economy excluding holding companies (OECD 2018d). The share of profits in firm revenue before accounting for R&D investment is $1 - \beta$. I set $\beta = 0.85$, implying a profit share of 15 percent, as in Gabler and Poschke (2013), and close to Barkai's (2017, Figure 2) estimate of the aggregate US profit share in 2012. Finally, I let the discount rate $\rho = 0.04$, which implies a risk-free interest rate of 4 percent per annum. Numerically, solving the model using these parameters with different initial guesses for wages and assets, delivers a unique equilibrium.

E. Model Validation

Before undertaking counterfactual analysis, I perform three validation exercises to assess the model's empirical credibility under the assumption that sample countries are on a balanced growth path. First, I compare wages and incomes implied by the calibrated model to their observed values. Second, I examine cross-industry differences in firm-level R&D investment choices. Third, I conduct an out-of-sample test of the model's predictions for comparative advantage.

Wages and Incomes.—The left panel of Figure 3 plots calibrated against observed nominal wages for the calibration using R&D data. There is an upward-sloping, approximately log-linear relationship between the two variables with a correlation of 0.89. However, there is more variation in observed than calibrated wages. The standard deviation of log wages is 2.3 times higher for observed wages. The right panel shows that a similar log-linear relationship holds for calibrated and observed income per capita, except the standard deviation is now 4.7 times higher for observed than for calibrated log income per capita. The calibrated model explains less of the observed variation in income per capita than in wages because assuming that innovation dependence equals zero in nontradables reduces cross-country dispersion in consumption prices without affecting equilibrium wages.

Although wage and income data were not targeted by the calibration, Figure 3 shows that the pattern of cross-country wage and income differences is comparable in the model and the data, except that calibrated wages and incomes exhibit less dispersion. Similar results hold for the patent data calibration.

Firm-Level R&D Investment.—The second validation exercise analyzes cross-industry variation in the intensive and extensive margins of firm-level R&D investment. Let $ShRD_{js}$ denote the share of firms that perform R&D, and $FiRD_j$ be firm-level R&D intensity, conditional on performing R&D. All else equal, the model predicts that $ShRD_{js}$, $FiRD_j$, and innovation dependence ID_j are each decreasing in the advantage of backwardness γ_j .²⁸ Consistent with this prediction, $FiRD_j$ and $ShRD_{js}$, calculated from UK data, are positively correlated with the innovation-dependence estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1; the correlations range between 0.32 and 0.48.

The model also delivers a prediction for the functional form relationship between $FiRD_j$ and $ShRD_{js}$. Equations (11) and (14) together yield

$$(34) \quad \frac{1}{FiRD_j} = -\frac{1}{\alpha k \log \eta} \log ShRD_{js} - \frac{\log(B^A/B_s)}{\alpha \log \eta} + \frac{\rho + \zeta}{\alpha(\delta + g_j)}.$$

This equation implies that the inverse of $FiRD_j$ is linearly decreasing in $\log ShRD_{js}$. Figure 4 plots $1/FiRD_j$ against negative $\log ShRD_{jUK}$, using UK data. A linear relationship fits the data well for most industries, as shown by the solid line, which plots the line of best fit excluding two outliers (industries 0103 and 17).

²⁸For $\psi^{\max} \rightarrow \infty$, $ShRD_{js} = (\psi_{js}^*)^{-k} = \eta^{-k\gamma_j}(B_s/B^A)^k$, which is decreasing in γ_j since $\eta > 1$. $FiRD_j$ is decreasing in γ_j by equation (14).




FIGURE 3. CALIBRATED VERSUS OBSERVED WAGES AND REAL INCOMES

Notes: Model calibrated in 2012 using R&D data to measure R&D efficiency. Observed nominal wages in 2012 from Penn World Tables 9.0. Observed real GDP per capita, defined as GDP per member of the working age population, calculated from Penn World Tables 9.0 and the World Development Indicators. Variables normalized to zero for the United States.

Moreover, departures from linearity are negatively correlated with industry growth rates g_j , as predicted by equation (34).²⁹ These results show the model is consistent with the observed variation in $FiRD_j$ and $ShRD_{js}$ in the United Kingdom.

Out-of-Sample Comparative Advantage Test.—The final validation exercise uses the innovation-dependence estimates from Section IIID to perform an out-of-sample test of the proposition that countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries. The baseline estimation covered 25 countries for which R&D efficiency could be computed from OECD data. To conduct the out-of-sample test, I use Eurostat data to calculate R&D efficiency for an additional nine European countries (see online Appendix C for details). I then estimate the following variant of equation (33):

$$(35) \quad \log\left(\frac{EX_{js\bar{s}}}{EX_{j\bar{s}\bar{s}}}\right) - (\sigma - 1)\log\left(\frac{w_{\bar{s}}}{w_s}\right) = \xi CompAdv_{j\bar{s}} + Controls_{js\bar{s}} + \epsilon_{js\bar{s}},$$

²⁹ A robust regression of $1/FiRD_j$ on $-\log ShRD_{jUK}$ and g_j yields a positive coefficient on $-\log ShRD_{jUK}$ with p -value 0.00 and a negative coefficient on g_j with p -value 0.13 (see online Appendix C for details on how industry growth rates g_j are calculated). As the slope of the relationship between $1/FiRD_j$ and $-\log ShRD_{jUK}$ depends upon the product $\alpha k \log \eta$, it could be used to jointly calibrate the returns to scale in technology investment, dispersion in R&D capability across firms and the extent to which existing knowledge is more useful for adoption than innovation. However, the quantitative analysis does not require calibrating this bundle of parameters.




FIGURE 4. FIRM-LEVEL R&D INVESTMENT

Notes: Share of firms that invest in R&D and median R&D intensity of firms with positive R&D investment computed for UK industries from Office for National Statistics' Annual Business Survey and Business Expenditure on Research and Development dataset. Both variables calculated for 2008–09 using two-digit ISIC Revision 4 goods industries. Solid line shows predicted relationship from linear regression excluding industries 0103 and 17.

where \tilde{s} indexes the nine out-of-sample countries, s indexes their trading partners, the variable $CompAdv_{j\tilde{s}} = -(ID_j b_{\tilde{s}})/k$ equals the interaction of R&D efficiency, and innovation dependence and $Controls_{j\tilde{s}}$ denotes the same set of trade cost, productivity, and comparative advantage controls included in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.

Table 2 reports the results from estimating (35) using pooled trade data from 2010–2014 for 20 ISIC two-digit manufacturing industries and 117 partner countries. In column 1, $CompAdv_{j\tilde{s}}$ is calculated using b_s^R and the innovation-dependence estimates from column 3 of Table 1, while column 2 uses b_s^P and the corresponding innovation-dependence estimates. The model predicts the coefficient ξ of $CompAdv_{j\tilde{s}}$ should be positive and equal to the trade elasticity. The estimated value of ξ equals 5.3 in column 1 and 13.1 in column 2. Subject to the caveats that the estimation only uses R&D efficiency for nine countries, and that the estimated trade elasticity differs across specifications. These results show that the relationship between R&D efficiency and comparative advantage that exists in the baseline sample is also present out-of-sample. This supports the proposition that countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries.

F. Counterfactual Analysis

The goal of the counterfactual analysis is to quantify the extent to which R&D efficiency differences explain cross-country variation in comparative advantage, wages and incomes. For this purpose, I compare the calibrated equilibrium to a counterfactual economy where R&D efficiency is the same in all 25 sample countries, but

TABLE 2— OUT-OF-SAMPLE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE TEST

R&D efficiency measure:	R&D intensity (1)	Patenting intensity (2)
<i>CompAdv</i>	5.27 (0.48)	13.13 (1.27)
Observations	31,996	31,996
R^2	0.85	0.86
Trade cost controls	Yes	Yes
Productivity level controls	Yes	Yes
Comparative advantage controls	Yes	Yes

Notes: Dependent variable is bilateral imports relative to domestic trade adjusted for efficiency wage differences. *CompAdv* is interaction of country R&D efficiency with industry innovation dependence. Standard errors clustered by importer-industry in parentheses. Column 1 uses measures of R&D efficiency and innovation dependence from R&D intensity data. Column 2 uses measures of R&D efficiency and innovation dependence from patenting intensity data. Trade cost controls are exporter-industry fixed effects and the interaction of industry dummy variables with six bilateral distance intervals and whether the countries share a border, a common language, or a free trade agreement. Productivity level controls are the importer’s rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, ease of doing business, and log private credit as a share of GDP. Comparative advantage controls are the interaction of industry dummy variables with the importer’s rule of law, log private credit as a share of GDP, log physical capital per employee, and human capital. Sample includes 9 importers and 117 exporters and uses data for 2010–2014.

the other calibrated parameters are unchanged.³⁰ For any variable x , let x^o be the observed value of x in the data and x^c be the difference between the value of x in the counterfactual economy and in the calibrated model. The counterfactual change x^c quantifies the effect of eliminating R&D efficiency differences on x .

R&D efficiency differences are quantitatively important in determining comparative advantage. Let CA_{js}^c be the counterfactual change in the comparative advantage of country s relative to the United States defined by

$$CA_{js}^c = -(\sigma - 1)\log B_s \left(ID_j - \frac{1}{J - 1} \sum_j ID_j \right),$$

where the summation only includes tradable industries. This definition implies that the cross-industry average of each country’s CA_{js}^c equals zero. Moreover, since log exports satisfy equation (31), CA_{js}^c maps one-to-one into counterfactual changes in log exports (defined relative to the United States and to the average change across industries in country s).

Figure 5 plots the cross-country average of CA_{js}^c by industry for the calibration using R&D data (similar results are obtained with patent data). Industries are ordered with innovation dependence increasing from left to right. Because the United States has higher than sample average R&D efficiency, the counterfactual mechanically decreases average comparative advantage relative to the United States

³⁰The counterfactual analysis holds productivity growth g_j and, consequently, firm-level R&D intensity $FiRD_j$ constant. This is equivalent to assuming that any growth effects of changes in R&D efficiency are offset by variation in other parameters that impact growth, but do not effect the calibrated equilibrium conditional on $FiRD_j$, for example changes in the strength of R&D spillovers.




FIGURE 5. COUNTERFACTUAL CHANGE IN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Notes: Average counterfactual change in comparative advantage by industry from author's calculations. Sample includes 25 OECD countries. Comparative advantage defined relative to the United States. Counterfactual sets R&D efficiency equal across countries. Model calibrated in 2012 using R&D data to measure R&D efficiency. Industries are two-digit ISIC Revision 4 industries.

in low innovation-dependence industries and increases average comparative advantage relative to the United States in high innovation-dependence industries. These effects are evident in Figure 5.

More importantly, the figure shows that eliminating differences in R&D efficiency has large effects on comparative advantage and trade. At one extreme, average comparative advantage in computers, relative to the United States, increases by 143 log points, implying that average exports of computers (relative to the United States and compared to the average industry) rise by the same amount. Likewise, in the counterfactual with no R&D efficiency differences, average exports relative to the United States, increase by 94 log points more for chemicals at the ninetieth percentile of the innovation dependence distribution, than for agriculture at the tenth percentile.

Next, consider wages. The left panel of Figure 6 plots the counterfactual change in nominal log wages $\log w_s^c$ against observed log wages $\log w_s^o$ for the R&D calibration. Both variables are normalized to zero for the United States. Eliminating R&D efficiency differences raises relative wages in countries with lower R&D efficiency and the figure shows that this results in higher wage gains for countries with smaller observed wages. The counterfactual wage changes are economically significant. For example, compared to the calibrated equilibrium, wages relative to the United States increase by 56 percent for Turkey, 23 percent for Spain, and 15 percent for Canada. On average, eliminating R&D efficiency differences raises wages relative to the United States by 18 log points, or 22 percent (see Table 3, column 1). For comparison, the average observed wage gap relative to the United States is 52 log points.

What determines the magnitude of the counterfactual wage changes? Section IID shows, in a single sector economy with free trade, the elasticity of relative wages




FIGURE 6. COUNTERFACTUAL LOG WAGE AND REAL INCOME CHANGES

Notes: Counterfactual changes calculated by setting R&D efficiency equal across countries. Observed nominal wages in 2012 from Penn World Tables 9.0. Observed real GDP per capita, defined as GDP per member of the working age population, calculated from Penn World Tables 9.0 and the World Development Indicators. Variables normalized to zero for the United States. Model calibrated in 2012 using R&D data to measure R&D efficiency.

to R&D efficiency equals $(\sigma - 1)/\sigma$ times innovation dependence. The counterfactual results imply that this finding generalizes to an economy with many sectors. Let $Q_s \equiv -[(\sigma - 1)/\sigma]b_s \sum_j \mu_j ID_j$, where the summation computes the expenditure share weighted average innovation dependence across tradable industries. Q_s accounts for essentially all of the variation in counterfactual wage changes. The correlation between $\log w_s^c$ and Q_s is 0.99 and the R^2 from regressing $\log w_s^c$ on Q_s equals 0.98. It follows that the magnitude of wage gaps due to R&D efficiency differences is determined by the extent to which R&D efficiency varies across countries together with the average level of innovation dependence.

By eliminating wage differences due to variation in R&D efficiency, the counterfactual reduces wage dispersion. The standard deviation of model-implied log wages is 55 percent lower in the counterfactual economy than in the calibrated equilibrium. To quantify the contribution of R&D efficiency differences to international wage inequality, I follow the development accounting literature and compare wage gaps caused by variation in R&D efficiency with observed wage dispersion. Specifically, I compute the ratio of the standard deviation of the log wage change caused by eliminating R&D efficiency differences to the standard deviation of observed log wages:

$$\text{Wage dispersion ratio} = \frac{\text{std}(\log w_s^c)}{\text{std}(\log w_s^o)}$$

TABLE 3—COUNTERFACTUAL RESULTS

R&D efficiency measure:		R&D intensity (1)	Patenting intensity (2)	R&D intensity: Generalized model (3)
1. Nominal wage	Average change relative to US	0.18	0.14	0.18
	Dispersion ratio	0.32	0.27	0.31
2. Real income per capita	Average change relative to US	0.059	0.042	0.059
	Dispersion ratio	0.17	0.13	0.16

Notes: Row 1 reports the average log wage change relative to the United States between the counterfactual economy and the calibrated model, and the ratio of the standard deviation of the log wage change to the standard deviation of observed log wages. Row 2 gives the same statistics for real GDP per capita, defined as GDP per member of the working age population. Counterfactual sets R&D efficiency equal across countries. Observed wages and GDP per capita calculated from the Penn World Tables 9.0 and World Development Indicators for 2012. For column 1 the model is calibrated using R&D data. For column 2 the calibration uses patent data. Column 3 uses the generalized model in Section IVA calibrated with R&D data.

The wage dispersion ratio measures the share of observed wage differences that can be explained by variation in R&D efficiency. Column 1 of Table 3 reports that the wage dispersion ratio equals 0.32.³¹ Thus, R&D efficiency differences account for just under one-third of observed wage dispersion within the OECD. This result implies that technology gaps are quantitatively important in explaining wage gaps within the OECD, but also that other sources of cross-country heterogeneity, such as factor endowment differences and misallocation, account for the majority of wage differences.

Wages are the primary outcome of interest for the reasons discussed in Section IIIB. However, I also calculate the counterfactual changes in real income per capita when R&D efficiency is equalized across countries. The right panel of Figure 6 plots the counterfactual change $\log GDPPC_s^c$ against observed log income per capita $\log GDPPC_s^o$. And column 1 of Table 3 reports the average counterfactual change in income per capita relative to the United States and the income dispersion ratio, defined as the standard deviation of $\log GDPPC_s^c$, relative to the standard deviation of $\log GDPPC_s^o$.

The counterfactual increases real incomes relative to the United States in poorer countries, leading to a decline in real income dispersion. But as expected, given the assumption that the innovation dependence of services is zero, R&D efficiency accounts for a smaller share of variation in real incomes than in nominal wages. Average real income per capita relative to the United States increases by 5.9 log points, compared to an average observed income per capita gap of 40 log points. The income dispersion ratio equals 0.17, implying that technology gaps due to R&D efficiency differences explain around one-sixth of real income dispersion in the OECD.³²

³¹The standard deviation of log wages is used to measure dispersion because Figure 6 shows a linear relationship between $\log w_s^c$ and $\log w_s^o$. Suppose $\log w_s^c = -\xi^w \log w_s^o$. Then the wage dispersion ratio equals ξ^w . Indeed, regressions of $\log w_s^c$ on negative $\log w_s^o$ give coefficient estimates close to the wage dispersion ratios in Table 3. Using the Gini coefficient as an alternative wage dispersion measure and taking the ratio of the counterfactual to observed Gini coefficients gives a wage dispersion ratio of 0.42.

³²When the Gini coefficient is used to measure income dispersion, the income dispersion ratio equals 0.18.

When interpreting these results, it is worth noting that the share of wage and income variation accounted for by R&D efficiency differences may depend upon the sample of countries studied. In particular, R&D efficiency differences may be more important between countries at different stages of development than within groups of similar countries. In Figure 6, there are six countries that benefit noticeably more from the elimination of R&D efficiency differences than the rest of the OECD.³³ Dropping these countries when calculating the wage and income dispersion ratios yields a wage dispersion ratio of 0.25 and an income dispersion ratio of 0.10. Thus, R&D efficiency differences explain a slightly lower share of wage and income variation within higher income OECD countries than in the full sample, but remain quantitatively important.

It is also informative to compare the baseline results with an alternative counterfactual that eliminates goods trade by assuming all industries are nontradable, but does not change R&D efficiency levels. In this case nominal wages are not comparable across countries, but counterfactual real incomes are still of interest. Eliminating trade reduces average real income per capita relative to the United States by 2.7 log points, with more open economies experiencing larger relative income declines. The income dispersion ratio for this autarky counterfactual is 0.080. These results imply that goods trade plays a less important role than R&D efficiency differences in explaining income variation within the OECD.

Robustness.—The baseline results in column 1 of Table 3 are robust to a series of alternative calibrations. Column 2 of Table 3 reports the impact of eliminating R&D efficiency differences when data on patenting intensity is used to calibrate R&D efficiency. For the patent data calibration, the wage dispersion ratio is 0.27 and the income dispersion ratio is 0.13. Comparing column 2 to column 1 shows that the counterfactual changes are similar regardless of whether R&D or patent data is used to calibrate the model. Indeed, the correlation of $\log w_s^c$ for the two calibrations is 0.86, while the correlation of $\log GDPPC_s^c$ is 0.87. Given the challenges inherent in measuring innovation, this consistency alleviates potential concerns that the results are driven by measurement error in R&D or patent data.

Online Appendix D.2 describes a series of additional robustness checks that (i) modify how innovation dependence is estimated; (ii) reduce the elasticity of patenting to R&D expenditure in the patent data calibration; and (iii) vary the trade elasticity $\sigma - 1$ between 2.5 and 8.5 and allow for cross-industry heterogeneity in trade elasticities using estimates from Caliendo and Parro (2015).

These alternative calibrations do not make a substantial difference to the quantitative results (see online Appendix Table A1). For example, increasing the trade elasticity dampens counterfactual changes in wages and incomes. However, the difference is small because of two countervailing effects. On the one hand, an increase in σ reduces estimated innovation dependence by inflating the size of the independent variable $(\sigma - 1)b_s$ in the exports equation (33). On the other hand, increasing σ raises the elasticity of relative wages and incomes to R&D efficiency conditional on innovation

³³These six countries are Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey. They are the poorest sample countries (as measured by observed nominal wages) and also have the lowest calibrated R&D efficiency levels.

dependence, which depends upon $(\sigma - 1)/\sigma$ as shown in Section IID. Overall, the robustness checks reinforce the conclusion that R&D efficiency accounts for an economically significant fraction of wage and income variation within the OECD.

Finally, online Appendix D.3 studies how using a first order approximation to the model affects the counterfactual results. The online Appendix shows that the approximation reduces cross-country inequality due to R&D efficiency differences and computes an upper bound on the size of the approximation error in the baseline R&D calibration. Performing the counterfactual analysis without approximating the model increases the wage dispersion ratio from 0.32 in column 1 of Table 3 to at most 0.36, and the income dispersion ratio from 0.17 to at most 0.19. These comparisons imply that the approximation error is small.

IV. Generalizations

This section analyzes how relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions made in the baseline model affects the quantitative results. It starts by generalizing how national innovation systems affect the R&D and adoption technologies, and then introduces interindustry knowledge spillovers.

A. R&D and Adoption Technologies

In the baseline model, R&D efficiency is homogeneous across industries and the efficiency of technology adoption is the same for all firms and countries. Relaxing these assumptions allows for cross-industry heterogeneity in how national innovation systems determine R&D efficiency and for the possibility that more innovative firms and countries also have an advantage in adoption. Suppose industry-level R&D efficiency is given by $B_{js} = B_s^{\nu_{0j}}$, where $\nu_{0j} > 0$ is the elasticity of B_{js} to country-level R&D efficiency B_s . National innovation systems matter more in industries with higher ν_{0j} . In addition, assume that instead of equation (7), the adoption technology is given by

$$\frac{\dot{\theta}}{\theta} = \psi^{\nu_{1j}} B^A B_s^{\nu_{0j}\nu_{2j}} \left(\frac{\theta}{\chi_{js}^A} \right)^{-\gamma_j} (I^A)^\alpha - \delta,$$

where $\nu_{1j}, \nu_{2j} \in [0, 1)$. This specification allows the returns to adoption to be greater, all else equal, for firms with higher R&D capability ψ and countries with higher R&D efficiency B_s . However, since ν_{1j} and ν_{2j} are below one, the efficiency of R&D relative to adoption is increasing in ψ and B_s as in the baseline model.

Online Appendix B.1 solves the generalized model and shows that the structure of the balanced growth path equilibrium is unchanged. Moreover, Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold. It also shows that, conditional on B_s , the calibration strategy developed in Section III remains valid. In particular, B_s and ID_j are still sufficient statistics for quantifying international technology gaps. And although innovation dependence ID_j depends upon ν_{0j} and ν_{2j} in the generalized model, it can be calibrated from trade data as before.

However, the generalization does affect the calibration of R&D efficiency B_s . Cross-industry variation in ν_{0j} , ν_{1j} and ν_{2j} means that the ratio of industry-level R&D intensities in any county pair differs by industry. Consequently, a double differences

approach is required to calibrate R&D efficiency (see online Appendix D.4 for details). Log R&D efficiency calibrated from R&D data using this approach has a correlation of 0.99 with b_s^R and 0.88 with b_s^P .

The counterfactual results for the generalized model are reported in column 3 of Table 3. Eliminating R&D efficiency differences has similar effects on wages and real incomes as in the baseline R&D calibration. The wage dispersion ratio in column 3 is 0.31 and the income dispersion ratio is 0.16. These findings demonstrate that the baseline quantitative results are robust to introducing greater flexibility in how national innovation systems and firm capabilities affect the returns to technology investment.

Both the baseline model and this generalization assume that technology gaps depend upon a single dimension of cross-country heterogeneity B_s . An interesting avenue for future work would be to allow for country-specific adoption efficiency B_s^A and estimate the correlation between adoption efficiency and R&D efficiency. Implementing this idea would require using an additional observable moment to calibrate B_s^A .

B. Interindustry Spillovers

In the baseline model, knowledge spillovers occur exclusively within industries. To introduce interindustry spillovers, assume that, instead of equation (4), the knowledge level χ_{js}^R satisfies

$$(36) \quad \chi_{js}^R = \chi_j \left[\prod_{i=1}^J \left(\frac{\theta_{is}^{\max}}{\chi_{is}^R} \right)^{d_{ij}} \right]^{\kappa_j}, \text{ with } \sum_{i=1}^J d_{ij} = 1.$$

This expression implies that domestic spillovers are a weighted average across industries of the ratio of frontier productivity θ_{is}^{\max} to R&D knowledge χ_{is}^R . The parameter $d_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ determines the strength of domestic knowledge spillovers from industry i to industry j . Note that setting $d_{jj} = 1$ and $d_{ij} = 0$ for $i \neq j$ gives the baseline specification with only intraindustry spillovers.³⁴

Online Appendix B.2 solves this extension of the model and shows that the calibration and counterfactual analysis in Section III are unchanged, meaning that the quantitative results in Table 3 continue to hold even with interindustry spillovers. However, interindustry spillovers do affect the determinants of innovation dependence, which is now given by

$$(37) \quad ID_j = \kappa_j \sum_{i=1}^J \frac{d_{ij}(1 - \beta)}{\gamma_i(1 - \beta) - \alpha}.$$

The key difference from the baseline model (compare equation (37) with equation (26)) is that the innovation dependence of industry j now depends upon the advantage of backwardness in all other industries, with weights given by the spillover

³⁴ See Huang and Zenou (2020) for a related formulation of interindustry spillovers in a version of the Romer (1990) growth model.

parameters d_{ij} . Innovation dependence is high in industries that receive strong spillovers from industries with a low advantage of backwardness.³⁵

The conclusion that interindustry spillovers do not affect the baseline results holds for the specification of spillovers in equation (36). Future research should provide additional evidence on the nature of cross-border and cross-industry spillovers and facilitate a better understanding of how the localization of knowledge spillovers, the advantage of backwardness, and the strength of interindustry spillovers determine innovation-dependence levels.

V. Conclusions

Understanding the origins of cross-country differences in income per capita is one of the central concerns of economics. The extent to which the geography of innovation contributes to international inequality depends upon the rate at which technologies diffuse across national borders. When diffusion is fast, the technology gap between innovators and imitators is small, whereas slow diffusion increases the advantage that accrues to knowledge creators. Yet evidence on the quantitative importance of technology gaps is scarce.

By building a quantifiable model of innovation and adoption in open economies, this paper develops a new methodology to estimate the importance of international technology gaps in explaining cross-country income differences. Rather than treating productivity as a residual, the paper shows how the size of technology gaps can be inferred from data on innovation intensity and bilateral trade. More innovative countries have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries, and, when innovation dependence is higher, international wage and income gaps due to differences in R&D efficiency are larger.

Counterfactual analysis implies that eliminating R&D efficiency differences within the OECD would increase wages relative to the United States by around 20 percent for the average country. Moreover, R&D efficiency accounts for one-quarter to one-third of nominal wage dispersion and approximately 15 percent of real income per capita dispersion in the OECD. The empirical analysis also finds that there is substantial heterogeneity in innovation dependence across industries, implying that differences in R&D efficiency are an important source of Ricardian comparative advantage.

While the quantitative analysis in this paper focuses on cross-sectional technology gaps, the modeling framework has many potential applications. It could be used to decompose the sources of growth in open economies with endogenous innovation and adoption, to characterize transition dynamics following changes in R&D efficiency, or to estimate changes in technology gaps over time. For example, the analysis could be adapted to study whether recent advances in information and communication technologies have promoted global convergence by shrinking international technology gaps. Addressing such questions would provide further insight into how access to technologies shapes global economic outcomes.

³⁵ Online Appendix B.2 also discusses the case where interindustry spillovers impact the growth of global knowledge capital χ_j . Global interindustry spillovers affect equilibrium growth rates g_j , but leave innovation-dependence levels, equilibrium technology gaps, and the quantitative results unchanged.

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