Rafael HORTALA-VALLVE
Lecturer in Political Science and Public
Policy
Government Department
Contact
details
Government Department (Office CON.4.16)
Phone: +44 (0) 20 7955 71 76
Research
Interests
Formal Political Theory. Political Economy.
Social Choice. Public Economics. Collective
Decision-Making. Coalition Formation.
Voting and Elections. Experimental social sciences.
Teaching (11/12)
GV478
Political Science and Public Policy
GV514
Political Science and Political Economics Doctoral Workshop
GV4B3
MPA Capstone Project
Published papers
The Three A's of Government Formation: Appointment,
Allocation, and Assignment
American
Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, Issue 3, 2011 (joint with Torun Dewan,
LSE)
Generous Legislators? A Description of Vote Trading
Agreements
Quarterly
Journal of Political Science, Volume 6, Issue 2, 2011
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-zero Sum Colonel
Blotto Games
International
Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming (joint with Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Max
Planck Institute)
Journal of
Theoretical Politics, forthcoming
Voter Turnout and Electoral Competition in a
Multidimensional Policy Space
European
Journal of Political Economy, Volume 27, Issue 2, 2011 (joint with Berta
Esteve-Volart,
Voter Turnout in a Multidimensional Policy Space
Economics of
Governance,
Volume 12, Number 1, 2011 (joint with Berta Esteve-Volart,
A Simple Mechanism for Resolving Conflict
Games and
Economic Behaviour, Volume 70, Issue 2, 2010 (joint with Aniol
Llorente-Saguer, Max Planck Institute)
Inefficiencies on Linking Decisions
Social Choice and Welfare, Volume
34, Number 3, 2010
Economica,
Volume 77, Issue 308, 2010 (joint with Miguel Sanchez,
A Simple Model of Bank Disclosure and Subordinated Debt
Cuadernos de Economia, Vol 28, No. 77-78, 2005
Working
Papers
(joint with
Torun Dewan, LSE)
(joint with
Hannes Mueller, Institut Analisi Economica, CSIC; GSE Barcelona)
Avoiding Collusion Through Discretion
(joint with
Leonardo Felli, LSE) revise and resubmit Journal
of Economic Theory
The Role of Information in Different Bargaining
Protocols
(joint
with Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Max Planck Institute, and Rosemarie Nagel, Pompeu
Fabra), revise and resubmit Experimental
Economics